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Introduction
This book is not about a comparison, but rather a clash of two colonial
empires – first politically, then militarily and finally legally. The book an-
alyzes the Great War in Angola that saw a victory of German over Por-
tuguese troops. Encouraged by this defeat of his enemy, an African King,
Mandume, fought against Portugal and South Africa to save his indepen-
dence. In 1920, Portugal’s government started legal proceedings against
Germany and laid claims for damages inflicted upon Portuguese nationals
and the state during these wars. Both, the Luso-German arbitration case in
international law and the (politically charged) memorial practices with re-
gard to King Mandume have had ramifications up to the present day.
Colonial history is mostly analyzed within the framework of the colo-
nial state, be it British, French, Portuguese, German or Italian. However,
neither the history of international law nor the history of war can be told
within such a framework. Most of the interactions that are analyzed herein
span borders in one way or another. The analysis of the Great War in An-
gola (and to a lesser extent in German Southwest Africa [GSWA]1) and its
legal aftermath also makes it necessary to shift back and forth between the
colonies and Europe. By linking Angolan, Namibian, Portuguese and Ger-
man history with the history of international law, this book demonstrates
how colonial, African, military and legal histories can be intertwined in
one narration that no longer needs to ask for a “national” qualification.2
Advocates of transnational or comparative (post-) colonial history have re-
peatedly stated that “[i]mperialisms existed in relation to one another.”3 It
is therefore one of the goals of this book to identify in the Luso-German
legal dispute the historical themes underlying the argumentation brought
forward by the representatives of either party, as they underline how both
Portuguese and German colonialisms referred to one another and were un-
derstood as competing practices and “ideologies”. Calls for a “transbound-
ary perspective” in African history are numerous and so are the lamenta-
1 ‘GSWA’ is used for pre-1918 events, ‘SWA’ for pre-1968 events, and ‘Namibia’ thereafter.
2 Cf. Sheehan 1981: 4; 22.
3 Cooper 2002: 66; cf. Lindner 2011; Gissibl 2011: 162 on the ‘vital part played by the empires
of others. They provided role models’; Stuchtey 2010: 238; Matsuzaki 2009: 107f.
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tions about “historians still tend[ing] to treat [boundaries] as if they divide
separate historical spaces.” They do not. And the history of the region that,
in 1914, became the scene of fighting between German, Portuguese and
African troops and the subsequent arbitration procedure attests to the via-
bility of a multifaceted “transboundary dimension” of southern African
colonial history.4
State of the Art and Objects of Investigation
Over the last two decades, the “imperial turn” in historiography has
caused researchers to analyze the role of colonies in national (meaning
metropolitan) life thereby bringing colonialism back into a national histor-
ical narrative and bridging the argumentative dichotomy of “metropolis”
and “colony”. As a result, in the (post-) colonial and “new imperial” histo-
ries that have recently thrived, historians more often speak of “entangled
histories” that better attest to the complexities of colonial encounters.5
Research on the “close interpenetration of European and non-European
societies, especially during the colonial era” is a long established field
among historians of Portugal, after all, “Portugal [was] not a small coun-
try” given the colonies and the “500 years” of Portuguese presence in ex-
tra-European territories. State propaganda under the Estado Novo depicted
the empire as forming the nation and tried to build a myth around Portu-
gal’s colonial “vocation”.6 The 1974-Revolution did not result in an im-
mediate attempt by historians to deconstruct these “series of exploited and
abused myths, traditions, and rhetoric constructions aimed at praising Por-
tuguese overseas expansion.” Rather, Portuguese academic historiography
turned away from the colonies towards “European” topics, leaving much
space for popularized (military) colonial histories. However, while for a
long period, critical discussions of Portugal’s imperial past was left mostly
to non-Portuguese historians, the last years have seen an upsurge in Por-
tuguese studies on the colonial experience and the related myths. Indeed,
these “metaphysics of colonialism”, the myth of Portugal’s pacific colo-
nization, the Portuguese “civilizing mission”, the non-racialism and the
“presumed widespread creoleness” all played a role during the arbitration
4 Dedering 2006: 275; 294.
5 Duve 2014: 5f. points out that this is – to some extent – also true for legal historians.
6 On the map Portugal não é um país pequeno cf. Cairo 2006; on historiography Mattoso 2010.
Introduction
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procedure.7 Thus, for historical reasons the history of the colonies is an in-
tegral part of Portuguese historiography.
In Germany, this was not the case. It has been asserted recently that
“few West German historians took German imperialism seriously”. Until
the 1990s, the output on academic research on the German colonies re-
mained small.8 A marked change set in around the year 2000; the surge in
the number of accounts of Germany’s colonial period has often been de-
scribed since.9 The short period of the colonial empire’s duration, its
rather late formation in 1884/98 and the early demise during the First
World War might be reasons for the heretofore-reluctant treatment of the
colonies by German historians. The dominance of “domestic issues” on
the research agenda might be another. However, despite the belatedness
and the German colonial empire’s short duration, there was, as historians
now emphasize, nothing “particular or special” about it; it was an “integral
part of Europe’s colonial history.”10 Research has therefore underscored
the fact that the “society of the German Kaiserreich, too, was more strong-
ly influenced by colonial transfers than had long been supposed.”11 As a
result, the entanglements between “metropolis” and colonies, and the
repercussions of empire “have been a core concern of German colonial
studies over the past decade.”12
A book about the Luso-German conflict and its political, military, and
legal facets must thus take into consideration several research strands from
different national settings in order to make these entanglements dis-
cernible. Firstly, there are questions of “high politics” before the war: The
Anglo-German agreements of 1898 and 1913 on a future purchase of Por-
tuguese colonies have been analyzed, first, within the context of a possible
Anglo-German rapprochement, and second, as an example of the rather
7 Corrado 2008: xvii; Lourenço/Keese 2011: 239; cf. Figueiredo 1976; Marques 2006; Torgal
2009: 493; Arenas 2003: 14; Dianoux 1989: 22.
8 Güttel 2012: 232; cf. on German historiography: 6-9.
9 Lindner 2008; Arich-Gerz 2013: 111 ‘academic research has actually been following the lead
of novelists here, as it is these authors who have been shaping the literary rediscovery of
German colonial history since the mid-1990s.’ ‘[R]oughly fifty historical novels’ prove ‘con-
temporary German literature’s intense engagement with German colonialism’ (Göttsche
2013: 15).
10 Conrad 2003: 198 ‘Das deutsche Kolonialreich erweist sich … als keineswegs partikular
oder besonders, wie es in zahlreichen Untersuchungen immer noch suggeriert wird, sondern
als integraler Bestandteil der europäischen Kolonialgeschichte.‘
11 Habermas 2014: 47.
12 Gissibl 2011: 160; cf. Conrad 2012: 8 on ‘Konjukturen des kolonialen Interesses‘.
Introduction
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aggressive German policy of (colonial) expansion. The implications these
agreements had on policies “on the ground”, however, were barely taken
into account.
For decades, the history and cultural study of Europe’s Great War fo-
cused on the Western Front. Trench warfare, “total war”, forced labor,
prisoners of war, and many more aspects of the experiences of combatants
and civilians were mostly studied in the British, French, Belgian, and Ger-
man contexts. However, in recent years, scholars seem to have (re-) dis-
covered the other fronts of the First World War. The Eastern Front from
the Baltic Sea to the Caucasus is the most prominent example of the en-
deavor to more adequately capture the global dimensions of this war.13 A
global view on the war includes extra-European battlefronts on the high
seas and in the colonies. It was even claimed that the “Great War itself can
hardly be understood without recourse to colonial history”.14
The analysis of the First World War in Africa is mostly the history of
the “guerilla genius” Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa, who escaped the
British for four years,15 whereas the war was of considerably shorter dura-
tion in the other German colonies: two years in Cameroon, ten months in
GSWA, and one month in Togo. Irrespective of the centenary and any
question regarding the war’s continuing relevance for current affairs, the
“volume of writing about Africa and 1914–18 remains comparatively
modest”.16 Historians tend to characterize the war in GSWA as “a relative
sideshow” as compared to the campaign in East Africa.17 However, the
“South West Africa campaign still requires the same … investigation that
the East Africa campaign is now receiving”. Furthermore, it is all too of-
ten disregarded that this war was more than a conflict between European
colonial powers; it was inextricably linked to the attempt of an African
King to resist the onslaughts of colonialism. The few accounts of the “An-
gola campaign” were overwhelmingly written by eyewitnesses (most of
them Portuguese), who barely had access to any archival documents from
1914. Up to the present, secondary literature mentioning the campaign has
depended on these memoirs or other books and has quoted them uncriti-
13 Cf. Moyar 2007: 233; Bachinger/Dornik 2013 (Balkans; Black Sea); Mark 2013 (Turkestan).
14 Segesser 2010: 7; Klotz 2005: 136; cf. Janz 2013: 9-13; 133-140; Pawliczek 2014: 686; 704.
15 Michel 2004: 923; but cf. Nasson 2014a: 160f; Schulte-Varendorf 2011 on WWI in
Cameroon.
16 Nasson 2014: 674 Bibl. essay; cf. Jeanneney 2013; Reynolds 2013 on memorial cultures.
17 Nasson 2014: 437; cf. Teixeira 2003: 24 Angola, a ‘secondary and periphery theater of war’.
Introduction
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cally. In line with this, a recent account of the campaign was written from
a purely German perspective. In its celebration of the German victory in
Angola, it remains within the bounds of traditional colonial hagiography
and leaves out any African agency.18
The theme of war has been described as an “obsession in African histo-
ry”.19 “Few aspects of African history have generated as much interest …
as the study of resistance to colonial rule”.20 After all, in GSWA as well as
in Angola “African resistance remained the crucial factor in the sad histo-
ry of these years”.21 While the wars of resistance in the years 1904–07 in
Hereroland and Namaland (located in the center and south of GSWA)
have received considerable attention by researchers, the campaigns in the
south of Angola and the north of GSWA (1914–17) are mostly mentioned
only in passing. René Pélissier, le nouveau Cadornega de Angola22 is, as
he put it, “the only historian to have published works on the military histo-
ry of the Northern Ovambos”.23 Since the 1960s, Pélissier has again and
again pointed out that Portugal’s colonial campaigns barely receive atten-
tion by historians. The dominance of Anglophone literature and research
on the African continent must however not lead to a situation where de-
cisive events such as the battle of Mongua (1915) sink into oblivion due to
the inaccessibility of the sources’ languages.24 Pélissier’s “ruthless analy-
sis” of Portuguese warfare in Angola is based on a quantité astronomique
de documents25 and H.J. de Dianoux assumed that Pélissier labored in his
field of research (the conquest of Angola) so profoundly that following
him there would be barely anything left to research except etudes parcel-
laires. Indeed, Pélissier’s multi-volume analysis was also indispensable
for this book on the First World War in Angola. However, it turned out
that the inclusion of sources of African (oral history) and German (state
and missionary) origin further broadened the analysis of the events from
1914 to 1915. Moreover, much in line with modern “war studies” that take
18 Samson 2013: 231; Historicus 2012; cf. on colonial wars Kuss 2010: 19-31; Nuhn 2006.
19 Bois 2006: 13 ‘une obsession’; cf. Adam 2002: 168f.; Wesseling 1992.
20 Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 31; cf. Cooper 2000: 298f.; Michel 2003.
21 Bley 1996: v referring to GSWA 1884–1914; cf. Walter 2006; 2011 on ‘Imperial wars’.
22 Mesquitela 1980: 514 ‘(un Cadornega plus précis car il n’omet pas les dates) et que ces deux
volumes pourraient parfaitement intituler Nova história geral das guerras angolanas.’
23 Pélissier 2000: 578.
24 Pélissier 2004: 269; 271 conceived of a ‘quasi total ignorance’ among Anglophone authors
resulting in a guerre enterrée.
25 Corrado 2008: 4; Mesquitela 1980: 512; cf. Dianoux 1989: 10.
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the discipline beyond the confines of operational military history, aspects
of social, economic, and cultural history of warfare and societies at war
have been included here.26
Therefore, the literature on the theater of war, Angola and GSWA, shall
be taken into account as well. In 1914, the colonial imprint on both
colonies was substantial in some areas. Angola has been described as “the
most Portuguese of all the ‘overseas provinces’”27, and likewise GSWA,
as the “most Europeanized of all the territories acquired by the Ger-
mans”.28 GSWA was considerably smaller than Angola. Research has
shown that in both cases, only a fraction of the actual colonial territory as
defined by international treaties was under the control of the colonial au-
thorities. Angola and GSWA were still very much colonies in the making,
meaning that the so-called “pacification campaigns” to subdue Africans
were still raging. Contemporary pretensions of formal sovereignty and the
appearance of cartographical cohesion as presented in the latest maps of
colonial Africa should not conceal the fact that both colonial powers were
not yet in a position to exert their rule at will always and everywhere in
their respective colonies. In 1912, Angola’s population was forty times the
size of GSWA’s population (~4,000,00029 versus ~100,00030), while the
number of European settlers stood similarly at 12,000 to 15,000. Both
colonies were intended by their respective governments to develop into
settler colonies – and both administrations had to deal with separatist ten-
dencies. The decades between 1870 and 1920 have been characterized as
“still present[ing] wide-open spaces” in Angolan history. While this peri-
od is, no doubt, an “important … phase of Angolan history” it seems exag-
gerated to describe it as historiographicly “neglected”.31 Rather, it is no
easy task to collect most of what has been written about that period. The
26 Dianoux 1989: 14f. ‘tous auront envers lui une dette’; cf. Kühne/Z. 2000; Ziemann 2013.
27 Mesquitela 1980: 512; Chabal 2007: 4; Corrado 2008: 22; cf. Borchardt 1912 bibliography.
28 Kienetz 1977: 553 referring to processes of ‘acculturation’ starting in the pre-colonial period.
29 Rooney 1912: 284; on the demographic development since 1846 cf. Mora 1940: 579.
30 Bley 1996: 6 characterizes population estimates before the war as ‘extremely unreliable’.
31 Corrado 2008: xiii f.; 78; Pélissier 1996: 663 spoke of ‘the rare historians of Angola who are
still active’. The situation has changed in the meantime as can be seen from the discussions
on the H-Luso-Africa list; even though the accessibility of Angolan archives remains a chal-
lenge. Heintze 2008: 197 ‘the times when Angola (and other Lusophone African countries)
was only a footnote in African historiography are probably soon gone for good.’
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same holds true for the German period in the history of Namibia, “one of
Africa’s least understood and studied countries”.32
The history of Ovambo and adjacent peoples and ‘border’ regions
where Portuguese and German troops fought in 1914 has been researched
more thoroughly on the Namibian side of the border than on the Angolan
side. Lorena Rizzo has stated “that to date there is almost no published
scholarly work on south-western Angola”. Also, there seems to be a lan-
guage division (with a few exceptions) that characterizes historiography:
when analyzing the history of Ovambo, Anglophone or Germanophone
authors have barely taken Portuguese literature and sources into account.33
However, what has become evident from the latest research is the weak-
ness of colonial administrators in Ovambo. “The possibilities of how to
organize colonial societies could shift sharply in particular conjunctures”
and the colonial administration had to come to terms with its lack of au-
thority. As this book will also contemplate on the “malleable underbelly of
colonial rule” with its African soldiers and clerks, the fact that “the colo-
nial state functioned quite differently day to day than [higher ranking colo-
nial] officials often knew or wished to acknowledge” will prove quite evi-
dent.34 The outright dominance of African rulers, the colonialists’ depen-
dency on them or on their African clerks to hear, see, and understand the
societies they intended to rule is a marked feature on both sides of the
(imaginary) colonial borderline. In considering the many aspects of this
complex history, comparisons between both systems of colonial rule are
inevitably necessary.35 As this book spells out military conquest and re-
treat in Ovamboland, it will also enable the reader to “see the dirty work
of Empire at close quarters”.36
Out of the political and military engagements in Angola between Portu-
gal and Germany did an arbitration case grow in public international law
that, once decided in 1928/30 in Lausanne, has influenced the doctrine of
international law to the present day. The colonial setting from which this
dispute originated again underscores the above-mentioned entanglement
32 Wallace 2012: 13.
33 Rizzo 2012: 7 ‘meaning in English or German’; cf. Clarence-Smith 1979; Heintze 2008: 183.
34 Cooper 2002: 66; Osborn 2003: 31; 50; Cf. Cooper 2002: 64 ‘the study of colonial states…
produces curiously wooden results’ if the states’ interaction with their subjects is left out of
the picture (referring to Young 1994; Mamdani 1996).
35 Shipway 2008: 32, taking into account the risk of overstating ‘contrast[s] …, substantial dif-
ferences are sometimes indiscernable in the local impact of the two styles of colonial rule.’
36 George Orwell: Shooting an Elephant (1936).
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between “metropolis” and “colony”. A consideration of the case in its his-
torical context thus helps to bridge the argumentative dichotomy of the
two.
Given that (prior to the year 2000) “little has happened in international
legal history in the past half-century”, it was no wonder that also “[v]ery
little has been written on imperialism and international law”.37 For the last
fifteen-odd years, however, “interest in the history of international law has
greatly increased”. The discipline of public international law has wit-
nessed a veritable “historical turn”. The recent flood of publications has
broadened our understanding of this history by examining not only the de-
velopment of legal doctrines but also their political, biographical and intel-
lectual context. The histories of treaties, concepts, conferences and inter-
national organizations, jurisprudence, and courts of international law have
been analyzed. However, the “vast majority of recent scholarship still
tends to concentrate…on doctrine and not on legal practice”.38 George
Galindo’s critique that such an approach (based on the “genre of intellec-
tual history”) “gives only a partial picture of the history of international
law” seems justified, and thus “a history of state practice in international
law must ... be written” that includes “legal doctrine as a ‘form of concep-
tual practice’.”39
This book, when dealing with the Luso-German arbitration, concen-
trates on legal practice, and on international law in the making. This in-
volves an engagement with questions regarding German reparation pay-
ments according to the Treaty of Versailles (1919). Years ago, Sally
Marks pointed to the necessity to focus research on German reparations
and the implementation of the Treaty of Versailles on “the more relevant
question of German … determination not to pay.” However, the enormous
number of international arbitration cases in the interwar-period has found
surprisingly little attention being paid to the subject among (legal) histori-
ans, and the entire Luso-German arbitration is an example of this stubborn
“determination not to pay”, which was based, ultimately, in the German
conviction to reverse the Treaty of Versailles.40
37 Koskenniemi 2004: 61f.; 2001: 99 FN 6; cf. Ziegler 1994; Grewe 1988.
38 Lesaffer 2004: 1; Koskenniemi 2014: 119; Galindo 2005; cf. Nuzzo/Vec 2013; Fassbender/
Peters 2012: 19f.; Lesaffer 2007; Bowden 2005; Anghie 2003; Kennedy 1997; Preiser 1995.
39 Galindo 2012: 95 criticizing a ‘doctrine/theory versus practice dichotomy’.
40 Marks 1978: 255; cf. Keene 2012: 476.
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The case history of the Luso-German arbitration (1920–33), with its
three awards (1928; 1930, 1933) has barely been mentioned in legal or
historical literature to date. The arbitration was recently described as a
“Portuguese nit-picking, after the fact”.41 This is certainly one way of be-
littling the legal history of the interwar-period and its ramifications for
current affairs. Others were exceedingly at ease with the ‘facts’ underlying
the case.42 However, the examination of specific public international law
cases can foster a rich analysis of different legal histories, political and
cultural contexts, and particular legal agendas of both parties. Given the
grounded intricacies of the case in the Treaty of Versailles, this book pro-
vides a case study in the relationship between diplomacy and international
law: The party that did not succeed militarily or diplomatically sought a
legal remedy to secure a victory for “right over might”. Without such an
analysis, we know very little about the arguments and the ways evidence
was presented to the arbitrators, which in turn formed the basis for their
awards. This is all the more astounding considering the 1928 award, which
made (legal) history. Under the keyword “(military) reprisal” most current
textbooks of public international law refer to the “Naulilaa case”, as the
arbitration is known today, as it refers to one of the Portuguese fortresses
destroyed by German troops in late 1914. Not only a great number of au-
thors, but judicial decisions as well, refer to the 1928 award requirement
citing the fact that, for reprisals to be legitimate under international law,
they must be “in proportion to the alleged previous wrong”. Considering
its relevance for the laws of war, but also for other fields, Naulilaa has be-
come a landmark case, the key terms of which most students of public in-
ternational law are supposed to learn.43
Hitherto, a number of monographs have been published on other “land-
mark cases” in international law. These have shown that “small-scale anal-
yses are able to complement whole theories. They can show the uncount-
able specificities of types such as imperialism … they can take theories
41 Lohse in: Historicus 2012: 17 ‘Portugiesisches Nachgeplänkel’; his summary of the case is
in part faulty; cf. Santos 1978: 240f.
42 Colombos 1963: 380f. ‘Ermordung von Dr. Schultze-Jena … im Hafen von Naulila‘.
43 ‘Naulilaa’ is a misspelling of Fort Naulila. Misspelled in the 1928-award, the name
‘Naulilaa’ was accepted henceforth in all international law treatises and awards. Military his-
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more easily to the domain of contingency”.44 A focus on the Luso-German
arbitration procedure poses its own challenges when it links questions of
international law with those of colonialism. While many researchers have
treated colonialism and imperialism as “marginal” for public international
law, others have demonstrated an “increasing interest” in international law
and colonialism, including a marked “awareness of critical and post-colo-
nial approaches” that highlighted the significance of the colonial en-
counter for the discipline of international law. Such a “historico-legal” ap-
proach, as Lynn Berat has aptly taken to Namibia’s Walvis Bay dispute,
demands “a nuanced understanding of the relevant historical events that
most lawyers do not have and an appreciation of the evolution of applica-
ble concepts of law that most historians and an appalling number of
lawyers do not possess”.45
Sources
This book is based on primary sources originating mostly from the Por-
tuguese and German colonial administrations and the foreign offices in
Lisbon and Berlin. The reports, letters, telegrams, and diaries detail the
events in 1914 from an eyewitness perspective of those involved. Addi-
tionally, the accounts compiled during the arbitration procedure in the
1920s have been analyzed to help shed light on the war in Angola and its
antecedents. Even though the German and Portuguese narratives about the
same occurrences might tell conflicting stories, they are particularly wel-
come since the military archives from GSWA were most likely destroyed
in 1915; many of the files kept in Fort Naulila about what had happened
there in October were burnt during the German attack in December 1914.
While the book is (in part) about a European war in Africa, it is not ex-
clusively concerned with the history of Europeans in two African colonies.
Instead of clinging to a perspective of an imperial primacy, attention is
also devoted to African aspects of the war. The problems related to the
one-sidedness and ethnocentrism of the “colonial archive”, its language
and terminology have been described many times over, and this critique
hardly needs to be repeated here: Almost everything that is known about
44 Galindo 2012: 99; Combs 1970 (Jay Treaty); Stevens 1989 (Caroline); Cook 1975 (Alaba-
ma); Bannelier et. al. 2012 (Corfu); Berat 1990 (Walvis Bay).
45 Kosken. 2004: 65; Berat 1990: ix; cf. Galindo 2012: 86; Mutua 2000: 31; Anghie 1999: 74.
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Africans acting during the war was “translated” through missionary or
military reports, each of which had their own motives and standpoints. Al-
most no African self-testimonials exist. It is thus extremely fortunate that
contemporaries of the war participated in oral history projects in the
1980s. Even though the interviewers rarely posed specific questions about
the warfare in 1914/15, the printed interviews nevertheless offer additional
insights.46
In order to further broaden perspectives, non-governmental sources
have been consulted as well. French, German, and Finnish missionaries,
some working in the Luso-German border area since the 1890s, stood
more closely in contact with the African population (and their authorities)
than colonial officials. Their letters and reports therefore offer a different
view not only on the war, but also on Africans, Europeans, and their rela-
tions to each other. It is through their documents that a few direct com-
ments made by African leaders have survived in the archives. Evidently,
also the missionaries had their own motives and interests; their views on
Africans were not less impregnated by racist stereotypes than those of
government officials.
In addition to missionary documents, another category of records by
less involved witnesses has been included in the analysis, namely reports
from U.S., British and French consuls and their foreign offices. These doc-
uments offer, first, important additional information on the Luso-German
relations before the war. Second, during and after the war, the Americans,
the British, and the French became participant observers in Africa and Eu-
rope rather sooner than later, which was especially the case for the British
consul in Luanda. Considering the relevance of the Treaty of Versailles
and the subsequent conferences for the Luso-German arbitration, the Al-
lied documents with regard to reparations or legal conflicts with the Ger-
mans are indispensable for a fuller understanding of the European dimen-
sion of the arbitration.
The arbitration left German archives with thousands of pages of docu-
mentation. In the Portuguese archives, the documentation seems less com-
plete, especially for the first years of the arbitration. There is no traceable
archive left from the arbitrator in Lausanne. Given that the history of the
arbitration is obscured by missing archival evidence and threaded with bi-
46 Heywood/Lau/Ohly 1992; cf. Harding 2013: 146f.; Shiweda 2011: 12-15; Warnke 2009;
Arndt/Ofuatey-Alazard 2011; Arndt/Hornscheidt 2004; Henige 2005; Diawara 1997: 25-30;
Penvenne 1996: 422; cf. also the interview with Vansina 2001.
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ased accounts, this book cannot attempt to reconstruct in great detail the
formation of the legal memoranda in Lisbon and Berlin that laid out Por-
tuguese claims and German responses. We are left with the resulting four
memoranda that provide ample material to be examined. Apart from chal-
lenges posed by the bias of sources it is – for reasons of space available –
unavoidable to only allude to a number of phenomena relevant for the ana-
lysis rather than to fully explore the subject. No doubt, each of the book’s
three parts would have deserved an entire volume of its own.
Historians as Lawyers – Lawyers as Historians? Questions and Outline
The three parts of this book are not about answering the question of who is
“guilty” of the war in Angola (1914/15) in a legal or moral sense. Nor is
this book to be read as an attempt to retrospectively render a (second)
“judgment” about German and Portuguese conduct in Angola. A historian
ought to be neither a backward looking state attorney incriminating a par-
ticular party, nor is she or he a judge of second appeal. On the other hand,
criticizing the arbitration award or the preceding procedure has nothing to
do with an apology for the German or Portuguese warfare in Angola.47
Evidently, historians aim at finding a verifiable “truth”, similar to the arbi-
trators (as quasi-judges under international law). However, in contrast to a
judge, a historian does not decide anything; without being a know-it-all he
or she ought to narrate a story based on a broad foundation of literature
and sources. Their methods differ. Judges have to assess the matters of
“fact” in light of the legal norms to which they are bound; historians, on
the other hand, are more or less free to appraise and select their sources
according to their own criteria, according to their perspectives to look at
the past.48 Furthermore, the historian knows the result, the end of the story
he or she analyzes and narrates. The historian knows this end right from
the beginning of the work; he or she organizes and structures the materials
accordingly – and is free to choose the ending.49
These differences between the historian’s and the lawyer’s task (in
whatever occupation, be it judge, state’s attorney or defense counsel)
47 Nipperdey 1986: 175 ‘Die Aufgabe des Historikers ist nicht mit der trivialen Forderung nach
Kritik versus Apologie zu begreifen, nicht mit der Funktion des Staatsanwalts oder des
Verteidigers, ja nicht einmal mit der der Jury.‘; cf. Dietz 2014: 680f.; 693f.; Koselleck 1987.
48 Stolleis 2000: 178; 180f. recommends his readers to renounce the ‘fetish of historical truth’.
49 Cf. Nipperdey 1986: 221; Ginzburg 1999; Strebel 1976: 302; Oexle 2004 on sources.
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come into play not only when the “facts” of a given case in international
law are reconstructed and analyzed, but also in particular when the arbitra-
tion procedure in itself is to be included in the analysis. Thereby, the pro-
tagonists and the disputes during the case become objects of historio-
graphic scrutiny. Instead of retrospectively rendering a (second) “judg-
ment”, this book’s epistemological interest lies elsewhere: seeking to dis-
cover the history behind the charges made in relation to the Naulilaa case
and (where applicable) putting them into their legal-dogmatic context.50
In the Luso-German arbitration, the national representatives (the Por-
tuguese and German lawyers) themselves, in more than one instance, at-
tempted to be historians when they tried to expose the causes of the dis-
pute (or tried to refute the causes presented by their adversary). They had
clear aims when they accused the other party of wrong-doing by using
“events” in the past to further their argument and called this authoritative-
ly “history”. Part I of this book (“The First World War in Angola in its
Historical Context”), however, is not concerned with the confirmation or
refutation of these accusations made in the 1920s. Rather, it is necessary
to go further back in time and to lay out the Luso-German relations in
southern Africa. Based on primary sources and secondary literature, Part I
deals with the concrete political and economic development of Portugal
and Germany, Angola and GSWA in relation to each other since the
1880s, when both nations became colonial neighbors. In light of German
hopes to take over (part of) Angola, the question of Portugal’s alleged
“weakness” and Germany’s “strength” play an important role in the first
chapters. How did German foreign and colonial policy proceed in order to
reach the intended goal of enlarging “German Africa”? How did the Por-
tuguese administration react to these political “machinations”? While it
seems perceived wisdom that the means available to the administration in
GSWA were superior to those in Angola and thus posed a threat, a closer
look at the history of southern Angola makes evident that over one decade
the Portuguese administration invested far more heavily in the Luso-Ger-
man border region than their German counterparts. On the other hand, in
mid-1914, the situation was not characterized by open enmity, as the chap-
ter on the Luso-German Study Commission to explore the economic po-
tential of southern Angola will show.
50 On the ‘difficulties’ of ‘contextualism’ in the history of international law, see Koskenniemi
2014: 224; cf. Craven 2007: 15f.; van Laak 2000.
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The following chapters on the First World War in Angola offer an ana-
lysis of the events that led to the outbreak of open hostilities near the
northern border of GSWA – despite Portugal’s formal neutrality. The de-
tailed account of German attempts to procure foodstuffs from Angola, the
death of three German officers in the Portuguese fort Naulila, and the
build-up of the army in southern Angola might be justified by the rele-
vance the questions with regard to these occurrences had during the arbi-
tration: Who did what, when, and why? Most of the answers were given
only when the legal dispute was under way. However, whenever possible,
original sources from 1914 are added to complement (and verify) the ‘pic-
ture’ as the national representatives presented it several years later.
The account of the battle of Naulila is – without any pretensions to
completeness – embedded into the larger setting of the military history of
Angola and GSWA, including the conquest of GSWA by South African
troops since September 1914. After all, the battles that formed the basis of
the legal dispute are to be analyzed in their historical context that condi-
tion military skills. The question whether the German victory in December
1914 over a stronger enemy was “a piece of luck”, rather than a matter of
superior tactics was already posed by contemporaries. The sources avail-
able indeed attest to a number of (from the German perspective) fortunate
“coincidences” that make this unlikely victory more plausible.
Accounts of the World War in GSWA and Angola usually end with the
German retreat from Angola and the surrender to South Africa’s General
Botha in July 1915. However, for the Portuguese and the Africans of the
region the war had not yet ended. It is thus proof of the entangled histories
of the European conflict in Africa with the ongoing conquest of Angola by
the Portuguese that the soldiers meant to defend Angola against the Ger-
mans finally subdued one of Portugal’s African arch enemies. King Man-
dume ya Ndemufayo was defeated in one of the largest battles ever fought
in southern Africa. The chapter on Mandume’s reign puts his attempt at
reforms of his Kwanyama kingdom in relation to colonialism encroaching
the Luso-German border regions in Ovamboland. While the term “small
wars” or other expressions to describe colonial campaigns are at times still
used to set them apart from ‘ordinary’ wars, the battle of Mongua in Au-
gust 1915 leaves historians with the question, how “different”, how
“small” colonial campaigns should be to still remain within the precon-
ceived bounds of conflicts between African and colonial troops.51
Part I closes with chapters on the abolition of the Kwanyama kingdom
(also massively affected by a famine devastating the region since 1911) in
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1917 and the questions surrounding Portugal’s neutrality until Germany
declared war (following the seizure of German ships) in March 1916.
Part II on the “Arbitration Procedure and Awards” undertakes to ana-
lyze the Luso-German legal dispute most of all within the context of the
Treaty of Versailles and the question of Germany’s reparation payments
for damages caused during the war. Since Part II is also concerned with
what some have called the “sociology of international law”, its chapters
focus not only on questions of Portugal’s legal basis for claims against
Germany under international law, but also detail the personnel involved,
arbitrators and national representatives. The chapters on Portuguese claims
and German responses during the arbitration offer a systematic approach
to the legal questions under dispute. Which arguments did the claimants or
the defendants emphasize? What role did legal, doctrinal arguments play
in the arbitration, and how important were recourses to extra-legal reason-
ing like, for example, the “past”? To what extent did contemporary (politi-
cal) events play a role during and for the Luso-German arbitration?
The arbitrators’ awards of 1928, 1930, and 1933 are examined in indi-
vidual chapters; the first award, however, is to be considered the most sub-
stantive for the (colonial) questions dealt with herein. In particular the
award of 1933 and the question underlying the reasoning behind it – is
Germany able to pay? – underscore the connection of the Luso-German
arbitration with the great international political struggles of the era.
Parts I and II cover at least two political “periods” of Portuguese (the
First Republic, 1910–1926 and the military dictatorship, 1926–1933) and
German history (the Kaiserreich, 1871–1918 and the Weimar Republic,
1919–1933), often separated by historiography. The custom among histo-
rians of adhering to a more or less fixed frame of conventional chronolo-
gies has been repeatedly called into question. “A majority of historians
treat periodization as a necessary evil”, but it has become evident that in
particular with the rise of transnational history and the widening of re-
51 It might be surprising to find references to Clausewitz in a book about war in Africa. It has
been the assumption of generations of colonial officers and historians that war in the colonies
was fought differently than in Europe – from where Clausewitz drew his ‘historical exam-
ples’. However, this book describes, firstly, an engagement between European troops; and,
secondly, it appears that also the engagement of Portuguese and Kwanyama troops were not
that much different, ‘exotic’, or chaotic as the colonial notion of ‘native’ fighting might in-
cline one to think. Clausewitz’ insights in the art of war therefore also prove an aid in analyz-
ing the conduct of war in Angola. Cf. B. Brodie: The Continuing Relevance of On War, in:
Clausewitz 1976 [1832]: 45-58.
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search perspectives “periods” cannot be taken any longer as self-explana-
tory.52 In the case of the Luso-German arbitration, the question is relevant
to what extent the “revolutions” have affected the way this case in interna-
tional law was dealt with by the national administrations. The overall his-
torical framework of the arbitration was marked in both countries by un-
certainty in the course of action and constitutional ruptures. However, as
José Mattoso has put it wisely, “periodization does not depend only on
historians but also on their readers”.53 In the end, they have to decide
whether the frame based on political/constitutional events is necessary to
establish a narrative sequence and to analyze the events unfolding within
it.
Finally, Part III, “Legal and Historiographic Perspectives on the World
War in Angola”, determines to provide a broad, yet selective, overview of
the effects that followed from the war itself and the legal dispute. From
the perspective of international law it is to be asked how subsequent gen-
erations of lawyers made use of the arbitration awards. After all, why did
the 1928 award join the ranks of the chosen few “landmark cases” of inter-
national law? Did it bring anything new into international law? Did the
colonial context play a role in the history of the reception of the award?
The concluding chapters provide an outline on “’Naulila’ and King
Mandume in the memorial cultures of Portugal, Germany, Angola, and
Namibia”. The roles the war between Portuguese and German forces, on
the one hand, and between Portuguese and African forces, on the other,
has played in all four countries are distinctly different. Apart from the evi-
dent fact that in the age of nationalism a clear path towards glorification of
“heroes” is discernible from texts and memorials, participants and contem-
poraries in Europe and Africa soon had reasons to fear that the combats in
Africa would sink into oblivion. Today, those who once were barely given
a name have been elevated to the rank of “heroes” in the memorials of An-
gola and Namibia. In both countries, the “presence of the colonial past …
is a very marked feature of the post-colonial period”.54 King Mandume in
particular has become the object of official and societal veneration.
52 Osterhammel 2003a: 12; cf. Doering-Manteuffel 2014: 321f.; Le Goff 2014: 187-91.
53 Mattoso 2010: 5; on ‘Weimar’ Stibbe 2010 (1914-33); McElligott 2014 (1916-36).
54 Wallace 2012: 315 on Namibia.
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The First World War in Angola in its Historical
Context
Luso-German Colonial Relations before the First World War
Central Africa was supposed to be part of the Portuguese empire. This no-
tion among Lisbon’s officialdom went back to the fifteenth century, when
Portugal’s seafarers explored the west and the east coast of Africa.
Fortresses and stone crosses (padrões) along both coasts marked Portu-
gal’s claims that were still being upheld well into the nineteenth century.
When, in 1881, the Holy See tried to establish ecclesiastical circumscrip-
tions that reached into Angola without involving the government in Lis-
bon, the latter reminded the world of the extension of its claims along
Africa’s western coast (from 5° 12’ to 18° south latitude). Self-assuredly,
the Portuguese spoke of “our rights of patronage over central Africa, from
one coast to the other”.1
At the latest with the onset of the “scramble for Africa” this “right” was
no longer accepted by other European nations. Portugal saw the fringes of
its West-African possessions disputed on three sides. To the north, King
Leopold’s International Congo Association, founded in 1876 without
inviting the Portuguese, had stamped out its plan for ‘Central Africa’. This
“prelude for a European colonial project in Africa” seemed “a studied ef-
fort to exclude” Portugal.2 To the east dispute loomed with Great Britain
over the Zambezi region. And to the south, a “new and dangerous neigh-
bor”, the German Empire, entered the scene in 1884.3 In order to avoid
confrontations between European powers, the Berlin Conference of
1884/85 detailed principles to parcel out Africa into spheres of interest be-
tween European nations. In addition, bilateral accords were concluded
subsequently on the delimitation of these spheres.4
PART ONE.
1.
1 AGCSSp 3L1.1.1, M. de la Marine et des Colonies: Droits de Patronage du Portugal en
Afrique, 1883: 18; Schwindenhammer to C. Barnabo, 11/1864, in: Vieira 2012, No. 163: 621.
2 Bley 2005: 15 ‘Auftakt für ein gesamteuropäisches Kolonialprojekt‘; Nowell 1947: 8f.
3 Drechsler 1962: 57; cf. Koskenniemi 2001: 122 FN 106; Gaurier 2014: 966-9.
4 Bois 2006: 19, accords: France/GB 1890, 1899; France/Italy 1900; France/Ger. 1911.
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Slicing the “African Cake” – the Borders of Angola and GSWA
Devising International Law – the Congo-Conference 1884/5
Right from the beginning of Germany’s colonial engagement in Africa, its
policy was directed against Portuguese claims. On February 26, 1884 Por-
tugal and Great Britain concluded a treaty on their rights in the Congo re-
gion, including the right to collecting duties and to “police” the trade
along the Congo and other rivers. The limits of the region were defined by
the parties and Britain recognized the “sovereignty” of the King of Portu-
gal over a costal stretch between 5°12’ and 8° south latitude. However, the
British press and most of all the continental powers were united in their
opposition to this recognition of “the hitherto shadowy title of Portugal to
that part” of Africa. When the German ambassador in London learned of
this treaty, he warned of the negative repercussions it may have for mer-
chants belonging to neither nation. The German consul in Luanda –
lamenting Portuguese “custom systems, administration, tardiness and neg-
ligence” – spoke of serious damage to the trade in the region should the
treaty be ratified. Merchants from all over Germany sent petitions to
Berlin protesting against the treaty and pointing to notes of protest from
French and Dutch merchants doing business in the Congo region. In April
1884, the German minister in Lisbon declared that Germany would not
recognize the Anglo-Portuguese treaty for its citizens, since the treaty was
bilateral and no other powers had been invited to the negotiations. Already
in March the French government served a like notice. Portuguese insis-
tence on the treaty remained futile.5 Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1815–
1898) left no doubt that Germany would not recognize Portuguese “pre-
tentions” on the Congo region.6
Considering these tensions and the insufficient rules of international
law “towards the effective management of the colonial scramble” Bismar-
ck in October 1884 invited delegates of the European powers to Berlin to
“create a legal and political framework” for trade and effective possession
in the Congo region (and slow down British occupation of African territo-
ries). Next to the Turkish, the Portuguese delegation under Luciano
Cordeiro was considered the weakest of all participants. Contemporaries
repeatedly pointed out that Portugal’s “domination” in the claimed territo-
1.1
1.1.1
5 SBRT 6. Leg.Per. 1884/85, v. 7, Anl. No. 290 betr. Kongo-Frage: 1641f.; Reeves 1909: 109.
6 Cf. Weisung (W. v. Bismarck), 1.7.84, in Bismarck 2011: 249, No. 178; cf. Stern 1979: 405f.
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ries was, “in reality, more nominal than effective.”7 Some even began to
“openly denounce Portuguese colonial policies as inept”.8 The Berlin Con-
ference ended in bitter disappointment for Portugal. A mere 150 kilome-
ters of the southern bank of the Congo River and the Cabinda enclave,
north of the Congo River mouth, were conceded to Portugal. Most of the
Congo region – which was considered by the Portuguese as their sphere of
influence since Diogo Cão had anchored in the mouth of the river in 14829
– was ceded to King Leopold’s Congo Free State and France. Next to its
humanitarian rhetoric on the “amelioration” of the Africans and the sup-
pression of the slave trade (Article 6), the Congo Act of February 26, 1885
stipulated “essential conditions to be observed in order that new occupa-
tions on the coast of the African continent may be held to be effective”
(cpt. VI.). In Article 35, the signatories “recognize[d] the obligation to in-
sure the establishment of authority in the regions occupied by them on the
coasts of the African continent sufficient to protect existing rights, and, as
the case may be, freedom of trade and of transit under the conditions
agreed upon.” However, the results of the conference “made little practical
difference” as the applicability of these “general formulations … was limi-
ted to an almost meaningless minimum.” Having neither laid out a proce-
dure for acquiring valid title to territory, nor defined the meaning of “ef-
fective occupation”, the Berlin Conference created a “hypothetical geogra-
phy” as it did not deal with individual borderlines and did not apply to the
African interior. Rather, partition “preceded both the occupation of the ter-
ritories concerned and the precise determination of boundaries.” “Instead
of agreeing on a rule [on the conditions of colonial sovereignty], it was
[considered] better to leave conflicts to be settled by ad hoc agreements by
the powers”. Nevertheless, for the Portuguese, the doctrine of “effective
possession” meant that they could no longer claim territories (and exclude
other powers) in the name of “historical rights”, “discoveries”, symbolic
“annexations” and Papal grants. In the future, they could only deplore the
fact that the “great powers … applied [the doctrine] more rigidly to Portu-
gal than to themselves”.10
7 AGCSSp 3L1.12a8, Barileu? (Congr. du S. Esprit, Paris) to Propagatio Fide, 12.6.83.
8 Hamilton 1975: 3; cf. Anghie 1999: 57; Rodrigues 2009: 28; Reeves 1909: 111; Axelson
1967.
9 Cf. Bley 2005; Balandier 1992: 13; Wheeler 1968: 45; 53; 41 Portugal kept the Kingdom of
Congo, a ‘colonial puppet … of Angola’ since the early 19th century; Herlin 1979.
10 Koskenniemi 2001: 106; 123-6; 148; Nowell 1947: 12; cf. Courcel 1935; Stengers 1962: 476;
485f.; Art. ‘Berlim’, in: Serrão I 1971: 337; Schwarzenberger 1957: 310 doctrine had its ori-
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Also, the boundaries of Angola or GSWA were not defined in Berlin.
Within the next years European powers concluded bilateral treaties at-
tempting to define their different spheres of influence more exactly.
Changing authorities have since tried to detail with ever-growing precision
the course of these boundaries. However, as Sakeus Akweenda has shown,
“[e]ach section of the boundaries of Namibia [and Angola, respectively] is
fascinating and contains literally dozens of points of major legal inter-
est”,11 only a few of which will be analyzed in the following sections.
German Colonialism in Southern Africa and the Luso-German
Border
Angola’s southern border had never been demarcated by the Portuguese
administration.12 The notion that Angola stretches “indefinitely southward
from the mouth of the … Congo” brought Portugal into conflict with
British interests in the Cape Colony. On several occasions Great Britain
had “denied that by first sailing along the coast Portugal had a claim to the
territory.” The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of January 22, 1815 and a Con-
vention of 1817 stipulated 18° south latitude as the southern limit of Por-
tugal’s territory.13 Subsequently, Cape Frio, named by Diogo Cão in 1484,
was considered for most of the nineteenth century to be Angola’s south-
ernmost point. When in 1861 a captain Jones took possession of Ichaboe
Island near Angra Pequeña for Great Britain, the Portuguese protested,
pointing to their discoveries of the fifteenth century. Such claims, how-
ever, remained illusory and “weak”; even more so, since Portugal had not
concluded any treaties with African authorities in the area.14 The map at-
tached to the Congo Act in the German parliamentary documents of 1885
had a marker on the coast at 18° south latitude indicating the limit of Por-
tugal’s sphere.15
1.1.2
gins in the ‘primordial stage’ of int’l law when ‘effective control of a territory and power to
defend it was the title deed’; Hespanha 2010: 172; Korman 1996: 43f.; Wehler 1969.
11 Akweenda 1997: 2; cf. Carrington 1960: 436; Shipway 2008: 20; Anghie 1999: 60.
12 The Commission for Colonial Cartography, responsible for mapping the borders, had only
been established in Lisbon in 1883, cf. Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa. 2006: 121.
13 Nowell 1947: 1; Bixler 1934: 429 referring to Delagoa Bay; Akweenda 1997: 10; 212f.
14 Berat 1990: 16; 31; cf. Alexandre 1999: 62 ‘Carte de la Cȏte d’Angola’ (1846); Clarence-
Smith 1976: 215; Akweenda 1997: 18; Touval 1966: 288.
15 SBRT 6. Leg.Per. 1884/85, v. 7: 1671, Friederichsen, Karte von Central Africa.
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During most of the nineteenth century the areas between the Orange
and Kunene Rivers were of little relevance for European powers. Hunters,
traders, and missionaries were the first to enter the territories of Nama,
Damara, Herero, and Ovambo. German missionaries in the service of the
London Missionary Society had arrived in the territories north of the Or-
ange River around 1805 when Heinrich Schmelen (1776–1848) followed
his congregation. In 1814 they erected a station he called Bethanien on the
fringes of the Namib Desert.16 Later, German traders joined English and
Swedish itinerant traders who, based in Walvisbay, effected a lucrative
trade in cattle, guns, and ostrich feathers with Nama and Herero. The
Rhenish Missionary Society began to set up several mission stations in the
area that was, according to the rules of international law, terra nullius.
Economically, however, Namaland and Damaraland lost their “indepen-
dence” in the 1860s to the Cape Colony with the “intense participation by
Herero in the Cape trade network”. Politically, the period was character-
ized by the “relatively fragile position of Europeans”.17 Despite demands
by merchants and Cape officials, the British government refused to place
territories north of the Orange River under its “protection”. In 1878 the
British Cape Colony only extended its jurisdiction over Walvis Bay and
its hinterland and the islands off the coast of Damaraland (again, the Por-
tuguese protested). This enclave was used as a victualing point for the
Navy base on Saint Helena Island. It was considered the only suitable har-
bor between Tiger Bay and Angra Pequeña.18 The limits of the Portuguese
claims south of the Kunene River remained vague.
In 1883 the German merchant Adolf Lüderitz and his assistants signed
“treaties” with several African chiefs according to which the latter “sold”
their land to him. Much to the indignation of the governments in London
and in Cape Town, Lüderitz managed, in April 1884, to receive the “pro-
tection” of the German Empire for his “acquisitions north of Orange Riv-
er” (Angra Pequeña).19 In the following, consuls along Africa’s west coast
were surprised to find out that Consul Dr. Gustav Nachtigal was “making
treaties [with African leaders] on behalf of the German Government” and
that German gunboats called at ports in the region. Arriving from Angra
Pequeña, Nachtigal admitted to the American consul in Luanda, Robert S.
16 Cf. Kienetz 1977: 570; Dedering 1997; Trüper 2000.
17 Lau 1986: 29; Botha 2007: 11; Henrichsen 2013: 215; cf. Berat 1990: 25; Oerm. 1999: 47.
18 Berat 1990: 37; Kienetz 1977: 571; Akweenda 1997: 18; Wesseling 1999: 101-8.
19 AA to Consul Lippert, 24.4.84, in: Bismarck 2011: 131 no. 97; Lindner 2011: 67.
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Newton, that “it [Angra Pegueña] seems but a poor place to establish a
Colony and more resembles a desert than anything else.”20
Colonial enthusiasts in Germany had tirelessly worked for years to con-
vince the Imperial chancellor Bismarck of the “necessity” of colonial pos-
sessions. Colonies, it was said, would accommodate the masses of Ger-
man emigrants, keep them under German authority and would solve the
“social question”. For a long time Bismarck declined any overseas project.
His aphorism of 1870 is most famous: “A colonial policy for us would be
just like the silken sables of Polish noble families who have no shirts.” He
considered colonies as a means of “providing sinecures for officials”. And
when he finally agreed to grant German “protection” to overseas posses-
sions, he called his change of policy a “fraud” [Schwindel] that he needed
to win the elections in 1884.21 The domestic and foreign motives for “Bis-
marck’s sudden leap across principles and oceans troubled contemporaries
and has puzzled historians ever since.”22 Despite decades of research, as
one reviewer put it recently, “decrypting the primary reasons for the ac-
quisition of German colonies seems not yet over.” Bismarck considered
the German overseas possessions as a “means to an end” in order to please
the colonial enthusiasts in Germany for whose votes he was vying. At the
same time, he aimed at an entente with France by provoking the British
government under Gladstone. Given the ill health of Emperor Wilhelm I,
an Anglo-German crisis, which only he could solve, would have proven to
the German “liberal” circles around Crown Prince Frederick that Bismarck
was indispensable as Chancellor.23
Bismarck wanted to evade the question of German “sovereignty” in
Africa. He intended that the German possessions in Africa and the South
Sea should not have been “colonies” proper, but instead territories under
the German Emperor’s “protection” (Schutzgebiete) and administered pri-
vately by “British style” chartered companies. The Reich’s financial and
legal involvement was to be kept to a minimum; a “complicated colonial
administration with German civil servants … [and] garrisons with German
troops were to be avoided”.24 Bismarck’s arrangement soon proved inade-
20 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 3, USC to SoS, 9.9.; 13.12.84; Berat 1990: 44; Clark 2013: 195f.
21 Quot. in: Snyder 1950: 436; Herwig 1980: 95; ‘Schwindel‘ quoted in Stengers 1962: 487.
22 Stern 1979: 409; cf. Steinberg 2011: 418; Jureit 2012: 91 Debatte ‘letztlich ergebnislos‘.
23 Lappenküper 2011 on the state of the art; cf. Gissibl 2011: 166 on contempor. discourse;
overview in Conrad 2012: 22-29.
24 RK Bismarck to Emperor Wilhelm I., 19.5.84, in: Bismarck 2011: 166, Doc. no. 124.
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quate however, and so did hopes for Africans willingly accepting German
“protection”. He soon lost any interest in colonial affairs. An increase in
rebellions led to the deployment of more troops. The Imperial government
had to take over the administration of the Schutzgebiete and a colonial ad-
ministration was set up, overseen since 1890 by a new section of the For-
eign Office, the Colonial Department. However, it is important to bear in
mind that “military conquest was neither the intention of Berlin nor of
[GSWA]’s first Governor, Major Leutwein.”25
The extension of Lüderitz’ possession in southwestern Africa was at
first barely defined. Bismarck expected the German navy to hoist flags
along the coast from “north of the Orange River, except in Walvis Bay, to
the Portuguese border” that he located on 26° south latitude (just north of
Walvisbay). As mentioned, Portugal had territorial claims up to 18° south
latitude at or near Cape Frio, leaving the northern ‘shore’ of Lake Etosha
and all of Ovamboland and Kaokoland within the Portuguese sphere.26
However, the longer the bilateral negotiations between Lisbon and Berlin
lasted in 1885/86 the more the Germans pushed the Portuguese northward.
While shortly before the beginning of the Berlin Conference, the German
ambassador in London still spoke of “the tract of coastland between Cape
Frio and the Orange River” as being “placed under [German] protection”,
other German officials showed no concern for either Portuguese rights or
sensibilities. Irrespective of the custom to consider Cape Frio Angola’s
southernmost point, they demanded “peremptorily” the recognition of the
Kunene River as Angola’s southern border – arguing with the “objectivi-
ty” of the riverbed.27 In Lisbon, this demand raised “concerns about the
sovereignty of Angola’s southern border”.28 Portugal had attempted to
populate the areas near the Kunene River since the 1860s.29 Portuguese
authors left no doubt that the German claim had been made over areas
which Portugal had “discovered” and claimed centuries before, dating
back to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. The “indisputable old rights” over
Africa’s coast had been manifested in several stone crosses (padrões)
25 Bley 1996: xviii; cf. Canis 2004: 211; 222-5; Wagner 2002; Simo 2005: 101f.
26 RK Bismarck to Caprivi, in: Bismarck 2011: 152, Doc. no. 113; RK Bismarck to Emperor
Wilhelm I., 19.5.84, in: ibd.: 166, Doc. no. 124; cf. Map 13 (1885) in: Comissão 1997: 52.
27 Akweenda 1997: 17; Drechsler 1962: 57; cf. Schrader/Gal. 1896: 475; Regalado 2004: 14.
28 Southern 2007: 4; cf. Fernandes de Oliveira 1971: 32.
29 Medeiros 1977: 74, founding of Porto Alexandre in 1861; Baía dos Tigres in 1864.
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erected along the coast by Bartolomeu Dias, Diogo Cão and others. 30 The
future Governor General of Angola, José Norton de Matos (1867–1955),
then a student at Coïmbra, claimed that his enmity to Germany originated
from these affronts.31
Cape Frio seemed a location insufficiently clear on the map because it
did not square with 18° south latitude, nor could a perennial river be found
nearby to mark the border. The German minister in Lisbon, Richard von
Schmidthals (1830–1888), therefore, pointed to the mouth of the Kunene
River, more than 100 kilometers north of Cape Frio, as the starting point
of the border. Further inland, Portugal’s southernmost military post in An-
gola, Fort Humbe, at the bank of that river was then the second marker. At
Humbe the course of the border would depart from that of the river and
would follow the degree of latitude up to the Kavango River. The mouth
of the Kunene and Fort Humbe were the only two points about whose lo-
cation the parties seemed to have a “more or less realistic idea” according
to their maps. In 1886, very few Europeans had ever visited the area; the
maps they compiled were scarce and imprecise. Data on exact coordinates
could not be expected from them. Officials in Berlin and Lisbon were well
aware of their limited knowledge about the areas under negotiation.
Knowing nothing about river courses or mountain ranges they felt that
there was no alternative to drawing mathematical straight lines across ter-
ritories that were shown on maps as “white spots” (weiße Flecken).32
The Portuguese were reluctant to accept the Kunene River as the start-
ing point for a borderline. They made several counterproposals, one of
them being that instead of Humbe certain cataracts would define the point
from where the border departs from the course of the river. A compromise
was found once the Germans signaled their concession in terms of Portu-
gal’s plans to include Barotseland in its sphere of influence, linking Ango-
la and Mozambique as finally stipulated in Article III of the Luso-German
treaty of December 30, 1886.33 Article I defined the borderline between
Angola and GSWA as follows:
30 The padrão errected in 1485 by Diego Cão at Cape Cross (the remains of which were re-
moved in 1893 to Kiel) was replaced in 1894 by a replica adorned with the original Latin and
Portuguese inscriptions; at its bottom, a plate with the German coat of arms and a German
inscription was added. BAB R 1001/6917: 19, Port. Envoy (Pindella) to AA (Bieberstein),
12.10.94.
31 Casimiro 1922: VIII; Santos 1978: 119; Schneider 2003: 39f.; Baericke 1981: 14 on Norton.
32 Jureit 2012: 98f.; cf. Schinz 1891.
33 Drechsler 1962: 57; cf. Akweenda 1997: 213f.; Demhardt 1997: 195-205.
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From west to east, the Kunene River firstly forms the border, 310 kilometers
“from its mouth to the cataracts that are formed by that river to the south of
Humbe when crossing the range of the Serra [Hills] Canna. From this point
the line shall run along the parallel of latitude to the Cubango [or Okavango]
River [for 426 kilometers], and thence it shall continue along the course of the
same river [for 348 kilometers] as far as Andara, which place is to remain in
the German sphere of interest. From this place the boundary line will continue
in a straight line, in a due easterly direction to the rapids of Catima on the
Zambezi.”34
Whereas it had been the custom since the seventeenth century to attach a
map to international treaties concerning territories, there was none at-
tached to the Luso-German treaty of 1886. Attesting once more to its
rather provisional character, this text could barely be used for demarca-
tions on the ground. The future would show that the weak points of the
treaty were the definition of the starting points of the two straight lines.
Instead of using geometrical positioning (not available in 1886), the treaty
referred to two toponyms: 1. “cataracts [Wasserfälle/cataratas] which are
formed by that [Kunene] river to the south of Humbe when crossing the
range of the Serra Canna”; 2. “Andara”. The questions to be posed became
soon evident: Which of the cataracts south of Humbe and where are the
Canna Hills? Where (who or what) is Andara? As will be seen, answers
could not easily be found; the history of this border would become very
complex.35
Next to the ambiguity of the definitions used in the treaty, a second
characteristic of it is the resulting cut through numerous African domin-
ions. Considering that the negotiators were not familiar with the settlement
patterns of the Ovambo and other peoples, German assistant secretary of
state Count Berchem conceded that “it is not our intention that territories
which are ruled by one chief will in part be under Portuguese and in part
under German protection”. However, contrary to Berchem’s intention, this
is exactly what happened.36 When this bilateral treaty established the bor-
der, “there were only partial protection treaties [with Africans ‘agreeing’
to be part of the protectorate] in the area which had been marked out.”
While in some cases – when more information on the areas in question
was available – European officials tried to respect existing settlement pat-
terns or pre-colonial limits of “chieftaincies”, the Luso-German border
34 Art. 1, Treaty of 30.12.1886, in: Reichsanzeiger 21.7.87; cf. Dobler 2008: 16; Baud 1997.
35 Windler 2002: 126; Jureit 2012: 98f.; Wallace 2012: 8; cf. Akweenda 1997: 216.
36 Cit. in: Jureit 2012: 99; cf. Mutua 1995: 6; Wright 1999 on pre-colonial African ‘borders’.
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was agreed upon using only physical features and lines of latitude. The
new border thus cut the settlement areas of Ovamboland in two. By doing
so, Europeans “largely de-humanized the boundaries of Africa”. Altogeth-
er 177 such “partitioned culture areas” have been listed by researchers.37
Africans living in the newly established border zone had, as the geogra-
pher Georg Hartmann put it, “no idea” about the border. Contrary to what
had been stated the “frontier … [was not] well marked”. European visitors
to Ovamboland between the Kunene and Kavango Rivers would thus find
it difficult to know in which colony they were at a given location. When
the Rhenish missionary August Wulfhorst founded the mission station
N’giva in 1891/92 he did “not ask to whom the land belonged” according
to European treaties. He dealt with the African authorities (King Weyulu)
and asked their permission; the same was true when the stations Omupan-
da, Namakunde, and Omatemba were founded.38
However, colonial disputes over the course of the border were not
avoided. Illegal trade in guns, alcohol, ivory, and slaves caused numerous
complaints from either side about border intrusions. Most critical, how-
ever, were border incidents involving officials. The few German transgres-
sions, to be described later, have been characterized as “reconnaissance”
marches showing “a definite pattern” of “abuses”; but also German Gov-
ernors in Windhoek repeatedly contacted their counterpart in Luanda due
to border infringements by Portuguese troops. In both cases it seems un-
likely that bad faith based on expansionist motives had triggered the bor-
der infringements. They were rather caused by the difficulty to establish
an imaginary straight line “in the bush” whose starting point was un-
clear.39 In late 1911, in the Okavango region, a Portuguese officer ordered
the erection of a fort (Mucusso) south of the borderline Andara-Catima;
the Germans protested accordingly. Foreign Minister Augusto de Vascon-
celos (1867–1951), when asked about this incident in the Senate, declared
that the error of the Portuguese officer was due to the lack of clarity over
the borderline. Not completely correct with the geographic description of
the disputed area, he emphasized that the incident was solved “amicably”
37 Griffiths 1986: 205; 209; Bley 1996: 6 such treaties were ‘the basis on which claims were
made’; Anghie 1999: 59; cf. Touval 1966: 287; 1972: 4-11; Hertslet 1909 II: 703.
38 Hartmann 1902: 218; BAB R 1001/6640: 125, file: 51, Hochstrate, 26.4.26; NAN A.505: 1,
A. Wulfhorst. Chronik der Station Omupanda, 20.11.15; cf. Esser 1897.
39 Cann 2001: 149; NAN ZBU 10, A I d 3: 9, Telgr. GG to KGW, 25.7.11, ordering his troops
to respect the border; ‘je vous prie aussi de faire maintenir même respect de la frontière por-
tugaise.’
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between “good neighbors”. The fort was removed and re-erected north of
the border. A similar incident occurred in Ovamboland, when the Por-
tuguese erected Fort Henrique Couceiro south of the disputed ‘borderline’
and withdrew from it. The set-up of a border commission was subsequent-
ly proposed,40 similar to a Luso-Belgian “mixed commission” that traced
the border between Belgian Congo and Angola.41
Germans and Portuguese, however, had not been able to agree on a sim-
ilar commission, despite rumors to that effect since 1909. Colonial border
negotiations were often exceedingly lengthy, but the Luso-German border
proved of particular convolution. Already in 1894/95 negotiations about
the course of the border resumed but failed. Governor (Landeshauptmann)
Leutwein advised in 1895 that the question of settling the border with Por-
tugal should be put off “until we have a better footing in Ovamboland”.42
However, the Germans made no progress on the ground. In 1901, geogra-
pher Hartmann described the area between Angra Fria and the Kunene
River (Kaokoland) as “unexplored”. The Germans and Portuguese did not
reach a decision on how to identify the “cataracts” of the Kunene River
south of Humbe, at the point where the river breaks through Serra Canna.
There were at least three cataracts south of Humbe (Kambele, Chim-
bombe, and Kavale). To add to the misunderstanding, the Germans con-
fused the “cataracts” with “drifts” and they took the Hills of Calueque for
the Serra Canna. Therefore, German maps either depicted the most north-
ern (the small Kavale) Falls or Erickson Drift opposite of the Hills five
miles upstream of the Kavale (or Kazembue) Falls (or rapids) as the point
from where the border was to follow the parallel of latitude to the Kavan-
go River. The Portuguese claimed that the border starts further south
downstream, 30 miles below Erickson Drift where the Kunene River
breaks through the Serra Canna (which was not a hill) to form the enor-
mous Kambele (or Ruacana) falls.43
40 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 7.2.12, transl. Senate 18.1.12.
41 NARA RG 59, box 6812; 753m.55a152, US Legation Brussels to SoS, 18.10.13.
42 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/35, Portugal: 89, FML, 5.1.09; Lindner 2011: 101; Vigne 1998: 292.
43 Hartmann 1902: 215; Bollig 1998: 508; 2004: 265; cf. Rizzo 2012: part I; BAB R
1001/6634: 132, Report Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.1919), Ax 9 Memo All., 23.5.22. Hin-
trager admitted: ‘the greater probability points to the acceptance of the 70-80 meter deep
Kambele Falls and not to the unimportant northern falls’, BAB R 1001/1784: 160-2, KGW
to RKA, 22.3.10, quot. in: Jureit 2012: 105; Map ‘Kunene von der Chikende-Drift bis zum
Kambele-Wasserfall‘ Max Schmidt 1909, BAB R 1001 Kart 1784b;c; Militärkarte DSW
1914; cf. Sprigade/Moisel 1914a.
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In 1910, German colonial officials internally conceded that for “econo-
mic and political reasons” they no longer aimed at a definite settlement of
the Luso-German border. GSWA needed more migrant workers from the
entire Ovamboland; but most Ovambo lived on the Portuguese side – a
definite border may have entitled the Portuguese to prevent the population
to migrate to GSWA. Already in 1895 Leutwein found it “obvious that an
intersection of any Ovambo tribe by the boundary is unadvantageous and
has to be done away with.” Considering Portugal’s catastrophic finances,
some German officials speculated about “inheriting”, purchasing and an-
nexing at least Angola’s south. Until that time, the Germans deemed the
declaration of a “neutral zone” sufficient, “so as not to pre-empt realiza-
tion of their territorial ambitions to the north”.44 In 1910, a semi-official
map described the course of the border as “approximate”.45 However, in
1912 bilateral negotiations resumed. Portugal’s Foreign Minister Vascon-
celos suggested dividing the zone between the colonies. Both parties
agreed finally to declare the area within the two disputed parallel lines
(~15 kilometers wide, 420 long) to be a “neutral zone”. Given that the
Portuguese had just set up Fort Henrique Couceiro south of the disputed
line, they also agreed that no military facilities were to be erected in this
zone. Both sides were aware that the land, except for the areas near the
two rivers, was not worth much. By 1914 negotiations had not been com-
pleted.46
Competing Neighbors – Luso-British Border Disputes 1886–1905
Long gone was the glorious past of the Portuguese seafarers, when “Portu-
gal reigned as the undisputed economic mistress of West Africa’s coastal
1.1.3
44 Hintrager: ‘a common settlement of the border between Angola and GSWA is not needed for
the foreseeable future, neither for economic nor political reasons’ BAB R 1001/1785: 9f.,
KGW to RKA, 14.5.10, in: Jureit 2012: 105; Leutwein quot in: Vigne 1998: 292; 294; San-
tos 1978: 156; Hangula 1991: 133f.; 1993; Demhard 1997: 258-262; Wallace 2012: 95.
45 TNA CO 1047/187, Sprigade/Moisel: Karte DSWA, Berlin 1910. The 2nd ed. (1912) did not
mention the ‘approximate’ any more, it showed the abandoned Port. fort south of the border;
Namakunde was located on ‘German’ territory; cf. Sprigade/Moisel 1914: map No. 6.
46 BAB R 1001/6638: 58, Diário de Notíçias, 16.11.24; cf. Map 1:50,000 in: BAB R
1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 60, Rio Cunene desde Cazambue ao Forte Naulila, 1925; Akween-
da 1997: 204f.
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trade”.47 However, the Portuguese definition of Angola still included all
territories between the Atlantic and Mozambique (as shown to the Cortes
in 1886 on the “rose-colored map”). The Berlin Conference had not estab-
lished any provision to the contrary. For decades, the transcontinental con-
nection between Angola and Mozambique had been a political and econo-
mic goal of the governments in Lisbon.48 Already in 1811, Portuguese
traders had crossed the continent from Luanda to the mouth of the Zam-
bezi River. When the (slave) trader Silva Porto and the soldier João da Sil-
va traversed from Benguela to Mozambique, the claims were considered
to be official.49 The numerous trans-African journeys by Portuguese offi-
cials or pombeiros seemed to give credence to Portugal’s territorial
claims.50 Pater Charles Duparquet, one of the first Catholic missionaries
traveling across southern Africa,51 reported in 1880 to the Portuguese Mi-
nister of the Colonies in a manner as if the area between Kunene, Zambe-
si, and Lake Ngami were under Portuguese jurisdiction.52 In 1883 the
American Consul in Luanda, R. du Verge, on the other hand, assumed that
the “Cuanza river forms the south-eastern boundary of the Portuguese
province of Angola, although it is claimed by them to possess the whole
country from latt. south 5 to latt. south 19.”53 In 1886 Germany and
France “approved the Portuguese claim for a trans-African Empire”.54 The
Portuguese justifiably disputed the ‘explorations’ of David Livingstone of
Lake Nyassa, an area they had mapped in the eighteenth century.55 In
1887, the British, however, “protested vigorously” against the Luso-Ger-
man treaty of 1886, which reserved the territories between Angola and
Mozambique for future acquisition by Portugal. They argued with the
Berlin Act (1885) “that sovereignty could only be effective by effective
occupation of the territory.” Lord Salisbury did not take into consideration
the mere journeys of ‘explorers’ such as Silva Porto, Serpa Pinto or Brito
47 Vogt 1975: 623; cf. Arenas 2003: 3 on Portugal’s ‘short lived’ hegemony; Fisch 1984: 46.
48 Nowell 1982/3; Wheeler 1974: 581; cf. Corrado 2008: 11.
49 Cornevin 1971: 439; cf. Birmingham 1998: 353; Castro Henriques 2003: 90f.
50 AGCSSp 3L1.1.3, Durand: Voyage des Portugais d’un cȏte a l’autre, Meaux 1879.
51 AGCSSp 2L1.1.1, Durand: Voyage du P. Duparquet dans l’Afrique Australe, Bulletin de la
Societe de Geogr., 8-9/1879: 1-36; Estabelecimento de estações civilisadores, Lisbon 1881.
52 AGCSSp 3L1.1.3, Documents concernant les missions, App. IX: 14, Duparquet to Minister,
15.12.1880.
53 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 4: 190, USC to SoS, 10.1.83; cf. Corrado 2008: xv.
54 Cana 1915: 363; cf. Corrado 2008: 18 FN 20; Homem 1992: 283; Schrader/G. 1896: 462;
475, ‘l’intérieur, qu’on se habitua à regarder comme partie intégrante de l’empire’ portugais.
55 Cooley 1854: 267; cf. Cuninghame 1904: 168; Nowell 1947: 2f.; 5f.
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Capelo or ancient ruined forts. In 1887 he asked for “sufficient strength to
enable [the colonial power] to maintain order … and control the natives”
in Matabeleland and around Lake Nyassa if Britain were to recognize Por-
tuguese sovereignty in the area.56 For years already, Lisbon had been con-
cerned about Britain’s appetite for its possessions, in particular along the
Zambezi River and around “Lourenco Marques’ magnificent harbor”. In
1875 Delagoa Bay had been the subject of arbitration between Portugal
and Great Britain where the outcome was in Lisbon’s favor. The situation
was made more complex by Cecil Rhodes (1853–1902) who, through his
British South Africa Company, had his own ideas for a British empire
stretching from “Cape to Cairo”.57
In 1885 Portugal’s territorial claims had been reduced and now the
country seemed in danger of losing more of its “piece of the African
cake”.58 In Guinea, France claimed the Casamance and succeeded. For
central Africa, Britain argued that Portuguese colonies at the coast could
not be extended indefinitely into the African hinterland without effective
occupation. Colonial tensions with London (having erupted in 1846 with
regard to Angola’s northern border south of the mouth of the Congo Riv-
er59) culminated in the quarrel about the territories that became British
Rhodesia. When London, pushed by Rhodes and missionaries, declared its
“ultimatum” to Portugal in January 1890 demanding a complete withdraw-
al from the Shire and Mashonaland along the upper Zambezi (between
Angola and Mozambique), an “incredible wave of anglophobia” swept
across Portugal.60 Despite all nationalistic excitement the government in
Lisbon gave in to Salisbury’s pressure; it resigned afterwards. In compari-
son to Britain, Portugal was to remain an “imperial dwarf”. Having re-
vealed “Portugal’s position as secondary imperialist power”, the humilia-
tion of o ultimatum resulted in revolts that seemed to bring the Bragança
monarchy to an end. The “great crisis” was aggravated by an economic
downturn. In their relentless attacks on the monarchy republicans, by cele-
brating the “great forefathers” and their discoveries, used the opportunity
to present themselves as the true heirs of a golden past that only they
56 Akweenda 1997: 218f.; Nowell 1947: 13f; Cann 2001: 145.
57 Penvenne 1996: 444; GB-Pt (1875) RIAA XXVIII: 157; Samson 2006:162; Dás. 2008: 32.
58 Léopold II to Solvyns, 17.11.77, in Stengers 1962: 490 ‘ce magnifique gâteau africain’.
59 Wheeler 1968: 46; Bontinck 1969: 107; 109; 117; cf. Anstey 1962; Corrado 2008: 10; 25.
60 Labourdette 2000: 530; 534f.; Correira/Verhoef 2009: 50f.; Homem 1992: 281; Smith 1975.
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could reestablish.61 The “colonial mania” had reached the Portuguese
streets, whereas it had been hitherto the domain of the “armchair geogra-
phers” of the Lisbon Geographic Society. Similar to other nations “colo-
nial chauvinism” increased and Portugal “became dominated by colonial
questions”62; even though Angola was considered by outsiders to be “still
a colony of little importance”.63
After Britain and Portugal had signed conventions in 1890 and 1891
that declared the western limits of the Barotse kingdom their vaguely de-
fined border in the Zambezi region, the dispute continued. The press in
Lisbon anxiously reported on alleged British or German incursions into
Angola.64 The British equally complained about “raids … from Por-
tuguese territories”. In 1903, the dispute about Angola’s eastern border
was referred to King Emmanuel III of Italy for arbitration.65 The award of
1905 tried at length to define the (historical) extension of the Barotse
kingdom but in the end a border was established that ran for 390 miles
along astronomical lines. The King’s award left Britain with the longest
part of the Zambezi River. However, officials were critical of the “arbi-
trary meridians” and were concerned about the trouble that would likely
arise “when a native … dominion is divided between two [European]
spheres of influence.”66 Evidently, these new borders and ‘colonies’
should not prompt one to overlook “the profound unity of the region” in
historical and social terms.67
61 Jureit 2012: 82 ‘imperiale Zwerge’; Arenas 2003: 6; Wheeler 1978: 39; Ramos 2001: 40;
Birmingham 2011: 139f.; Teixeira 1990. The republican national anthem was written shortly
after: ‘Heróis do mar, nobre povo /Nação valente, imortal /Levantai hoje de novo /O esplen-
dor de Portugal! Entre as brumas da memória /Ó Pátria, sente-se a voz /Dos teus egrégios
avós /... Seja o eco de uma afronta /O sinal do ressurgir…’; ‘Heroes of the sea, noble people /
Brave and immortal nation /Raise once again today /The splendor of Portugal! /Among the
haze of memory /Oh Fatherland, one feels the voice /Of your distinguished forefathers /…
Let the echo of an offense /Be the sign for a comeback.…’
62 Smith 1991: 499; Birmi. 2011: 146; Stengers 1962: 486; 483; cf. Corrado 2008: 39; 118.
63 Schrader/Gallouédec 1896: 476; cf. Rodrigues 2009: 48f.; Livermore 1967: 30f.
64 PA Luanda 4 (Polit.) Consul to RK Bülow, 1.7.03; Canis 1999: 85; Touval 1966: 289.
65 TNA FO 179/390: 9f., Peel: Report on Portugal and her colonial possessions, 11.1.04.
66 RGS 1905: 201f; Reynolds 1972; 242; Fisch 1984: 423; Griffiths 1986: 207; Roque 2003:
118.
67 Vellut 1980: 104.
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“Medical Adviser” or “Heir”? – the Agreements of 1898 and 1913
Throughout the nineteenth century Portugal earned a reputation for its “fi-
nancial disorganization”. Following the financial and political crisis of
189068 the country experienced “virtual financial bankruptcy …, and con-
tinuous budget deficits”.69 In comparison with other western European na-
tions, Portugal’s GNP per capita fell back. This “backwardness” “was
perhaps as typical of the Africa she was purporting to civilize as of Euro-
pe.”70 Among others, Portugal was highly indebted with German cred-
itors. While Britain exerted an overall dominant economic role, in certain
branches German merchants, it was claimed, gained a “preponderant” pos-
ition in Portugal and its colonies.71 The country, with its protectionist poli-
cy, lacking meaningful economic growth, increasing state spending and an
ever rising public debt was financially overburdened with the administra-
tion and economic mise-en-valeur of its colonies spread across the globe
and twenty-three times the size of the metropolitan territory. In 1900, five
percent of the state budget had to be spent on the overseas administration;
together with defense expenses this rose to around 25 percent.72 Produc-
tion in the colonies, on the other hand, was often still based on slave labor
and foraging sectors.73
In Angola complaints by foreign observers were rampant about “offi-
cials having sadly neglected their duty” and a general Portuguese “want of
national enterprise”.74 In Mozambique, the French Consul warned of the
conséquences de la déplorable administration des colonies portugaises
that could cost one day the kingdom its best overseas possessions.75 Since
1890 rumors did not abate about the cession of Portuguese colonies to for-
eign powers “in exchange for financial support”.76 Following the British
ultimatum the Angolan journalist José de Fontes Pereira (1823–91) did
1.2
68 Esteves 2005: 311; 319f. on lack of remittances from Brazil since 1889; Wheeler 1978: 28.
69 Wheeler 1972: 175; on surpluses in the 1860s Clarence-S. 1979a: 172; Ramos 2001: 129.
70 Roberts 1986: 494; cf. Bonifácio: 1 in Mattoso 2010: ‘At the beginning of the 20th century,
the Portuguese GNP per capita only amounted to 40% of the GNP per capita of the richest
countries, whereas in 1850 the proportion had been 55%.’; Birmingham 2011: 141-4.
71 Penha Garcia 1918: 129; German exports were second only to GB; Esteves 2005: 319.
72 Esteves 2005: 331; Câmara 2005: 355; Roberts 1986: 495; but cf. Clarence-Smith 1985.
73 Clarence-Smith 1979a: 174; Pitcher 1991: 52; 48 on wild grown cotton; Roberts 1986: 523.
74 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS, No. 89, 2.5.1874.
75 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 23, French Consul Lourenço M. to MAE, 6.4.97.
76 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 4, USC to SoS, 13.2.92: 447 pointing to US ‘overtures’.
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“not wonder that foreigners … would try to take over Portuguese lands
which are still preserved in a state of nature … We have nothing to expect
from Portugal except … slavery … [W]e trust neither in the good faith nor
in the sincerity of the Portuguese Colonial Party, whose members are only
crocodiles … Out with them!!!”77
After his vitriolic attack, the author, having criticized the Portuguese
administration already for years, lost his employment in the civil service
and was prosecuted. However, the “Portuguese have often been the sever-
est critics of their own colonial misrule”. The account of former Overseas
Minister João de Andrade Corvo (1824–90) of the colonies and their “ret-
rograde and inefficient” administration (published between 1883 and
1887) left the impression that Portugal should abdicate its colonial her-
itage rather sooner than later. “Yet this is not at all what Andrade Corvo
intended”.78 Aware of the bitter reality and growing debts, his successor as
Overseas Minister, Ferreira de Almeida, came up with a different solution.
In 1895, he “twice introduced parliamentary motions in favour of selling
some of the colonies and using the proceeds to develop the remainder.”79
Considering these debates and the financial weakness of Portugal and
given the German aspirations for Weltpolitik, in 1898 Britain and Ger-
many commenced negotiations about the “hypothetical partition” of Por-
tuguese colonies. This was part of a more encompassing dialogue on a
“defensive alliance” between both powers. It was discussed whether to
buy Portugal’s colonies or to take them in debt payment. Rumors about
German aspirations for the Portuguese Empire were decades old.80 For
this reason Portuguese colonial administrators were not particularly Ger-
manophile.81
For the new German Foreign Secretary Bernhard von Bülow (1849–
1929) and Naval Secretary Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849–1930) the
negotiations with Britain opened a window of opportunity to prove the ef-
fectiveness of their self-assured foreign policy. They “firmly anticipated ‘a
new division of the globe’”. Germany was finally to find its “place in the
sun” and would inherit parts of the Portuguese empire. In London, the
77 O Arauto Africano (Luanda), 20.1.1890, transl. Wheeler 1969a: 16; Fernandes 2010: 92.
78 Boxer 1963: 128; 130; cf. Marques 2006: 199; Cardoso 2007: 5; Newitt 2007: 52.
79 Hammond 1969: 353; 1966; Corrado 2008: 37 on ‘selling’ debates 1860s/70s; 115-8; 172-6.
80 Rose 2011: 150f.; cf. Canis 1999: 291; Bixler 1934: 438 on rumors that Germany would
want to buy Delagoa Bay (1872).
81 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 8, Consul L. M. to MAE, 16.1.97; Lindner 2011: 72.
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British Vice-Foreign Secretary Arthur J. Balfour (1848–1930) and the
German Ambassador Paul von Hatzfeld (1831–1901) signed on August
30, 1898 two secret agreements “in connection with a possible loan to Por-
tugal” according to which Angola and Mozambique would be administra-
tively divided into spheres of interest between the two powers “in case of
default in the payment [by Portugal] of the interest [as in 1891] or sinking
fund of either loan”. Despite the underlying assumption that the disinte-
gration of the Portuguese empire was merely a matter of time, this was
never the case. Portugal came to terms with its foreign creditors in 1902.
Public finances stabilized for a while and the “treaty therefore remained
inoperative”.82
Furthermore, just as the government in Berlin remained unable to mobi-
lize the German economy to invest in the German colonies, German fi-
nanciers could not be induced to risk capital in the Portuguese colonies. In
this way, the absurd situation came into being that around 1895 British-
South African capital dominated GSWA83 and began also to invest in
southern Angola, intended to be a German sphere of interest. Finally, the
Disconto Gesellschaft showed interest in Angola. Led by Adolph von
Hansemann (1826–1903)84 the Disconto Gesellschaft was expected to
counter the British dominance and to give economic meaning to Emperor
William’s new Weltpolitik. Since the days of Georg Tams (1841 in Luan-
da) and “even more so since” the 1870s German “explorers” had been ac-
tive in Angola. Foreign Secretary Bülow ordered the thorough exploration
of the region he hoped to become German soon.85 The Kunene-Zambezi-
Expedition (1899–1900) was organized by the Kolonialwirtschaftliches
Komitee (Berlin) in cooperation with the Companhia de Moçâmedes
(Paris) and the South West Africa Company (London). This expedition
tried to explore a possible railway connection from the Atlantic to the cop-
per mines of Otavi in GSWA and possibly to the Transvaal.86 A long dis-
82 Kennedy 1984: 158; Gooch/Temp. 1927: 71f., No. 90 IV; No. 91; No. 93; Esteves 2005: 311;
Clarence-S. 1976: 218; Langhorne 1973: 364; Ramos 2001: 124; Winzen 2013: 197.
83 Paish 1911; Cana 1915: 357 SWA ‘mainly exploited by British capital’; cf. Drechsler 1996.
84 Stern 1979: 398 Hansemann was involved in colonial affairs since the Bismarck era and
brother-in-law of the first head of the Colonial Dpt., H. von Kusserow (1836–1900); on Bis-
marck’s laments about the timidity of German capitalists (ibd. 412; 434); Santos 1978: 140f.
85 Pélissier 1996: 660; Winzen 2013: 236; Strandmann 2009: 290-93; cf. Heintze 2007: 378.
86 It was led by Pieter van der Kellen, who led Père Lecomte (†1908) in 1886 to the Kavango
River and had family connections with the C. de Moçâmedes (AGCSSp 3L1.7b5, Schaller to
Grizard?, 28.10.86; 3L1.16a6); Heintze 2007: 121 on botanist Hugo Baum 1903.
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cussion commenced in Germany’s Foreign Office, in the German legation
in Lisbon and in business circles about the viability of the construction of
the railway, beginning either in Baia dos Tigres or Porto Alexandre. Point-
ing to the lack of local trade, the geographer Siegfried Passarge (1866–
1958) considered such railway premature. Hansemann, on the other hand,
argued in favour of the railway and emphasized that Tiger Bay was of no
relevance for Portuguese trade interests. He considered the Angolan ad-
ministration financially and technically incompetent to realize the railway
construction.87
The intrigues between Hansemann and Cecil Rhodes in 1899 about the
railway to Otavi ended in a diplomatic disaster. Alfred von Tattenbach
(1846–1910), the German minister in Lisbon, “a typical Prussian diplo-
mat” with a tendency to act like “a bull in a China shop” did not convince
the Portuguese government to grant exclusive concessions to the Germans
to run the harbor on Angolan territory and build and maintain the railway
lines. The railway line would never cross the border. Instead, the Por-
tuguese decided to finance the line themselves, but starting in Moçâmedes
and routed according to their own needs. The Otavi mine was, for “nation-
al reasons” linked southwards to the less than favorable German harbor of
Swakopmund. Incapable of realizing a policy of slow pénétration paci-
fique in southern Angola, Berlin had insisted on an exclusive German
sphere of influence, thereby offended the Portuguese and gained noth-
ing.88
Portugal’s government had been aware of the “uncomfortable” situation
due to the Anglo-German machinations. King Dom Carlos I. (1863–1908)
spoke openly with the French Minister in Lisbon about the necessity to
avoid the “execution of the Anglo-German accord of 1898”.89 He was de-
termined to hold what was agreed on during the Congo Conference in
1885. Since the “1880s the presence of colonial affairs in public debate
was wider.” Colonial enthusiasts presented colonial issues as questions of
national honor.90 Any slight to Portugal’s rank was considered inaccept-
able. The end of Spanish rule in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines at
the hands of the United States in 1898 made obvious the risks of losing an
ancient empire to rising powers without considerations for legal grounds.
87 PA Lissabon 268 (Tigerbai), DKZ No. 17, 24.4.00; Memo, 18.6.00; Strandmann 2009: 293.
88 Drechsler 1962: 58f.; 67; Tschapek 2000: 251-269; cf. Schwarze 1931; Ribeiro Lopes 1933.
89 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 194a, FML to MAE, 14.6.02; Hespanha 2010: 172.
90 Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa 2006: 113; cf. Stengers 1962: 484; Santos 1978: 132f.
1. Luso-German Colonial Relations before the First World War
49
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
The press in Lisbon carefully watched German movements in Angola.
Questioning the Companhia de Moçâmedes, Novidades did not hesitate to
warn of an “invasion” of foreigners buying out Portuguese sovereignty
with railway bonds; others deplored border infringements.91 The French
Ambassador in Berlin summarized the situation: “It is an open secret that
the Portuguese possessions are the object of German greed.”92 Also, in
subsequent years, the potential cession of all of Ovamboland to GSWA
was a recurring issue even among the missionaries.93
Lisbon was thus eager to revive the six-hundred-year-old Luso-British
alliance, the “bedrock of Portuguese diplomacy”. The Portuguese profited
from the growing imperial rivalry between the British and the Germans in
southern Africa.94 Given the “general impression in England that the de-
mands of Germany in Africa were exorbitant” and considering the ensuing
war with the South African Republic, London responded favorably to the
diplomacy of the “very subtle and clairvoyant Marquês de Soveral”
(1851–1922), Portugal’s Ambassador in London.[95] The alliance with
Portugal was confirmed by the secret Windsor Declaration (October 14,
1899), neutralizing the Anglo-German agreement (as intended by London)
and guaranteeing the integrity of Portugal and its empire, while Lisbon un-
dertook not to permit the “passage of arms” destined to the Afrikaaner Re-
publics and declared itself neutral in the conflict. Foreign Secretary
Bülow’s secret plan to occupy Tiger Bay in case the British would take
Delagoa Bay came to naught.96 In 1903 King Edward VII officially visited
Portugal and affirmed its politicians of the integrity of the Portuguese
colonies.97
The British, more diplomatically inclined than the Germans with their
“aggressive plans” and having more capital at their disposal, continued to
have a stronger foothold in southern Angola than the Germans. In 1902,
Robert Williams secured a concession from Lisbon for the construction of
91 PA Lissabon 268, DGL to AA, Novidades, 6.7.00; Diário de Notíçias; Popular, 26.10.01.
92 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 183p, French Ambassador Berlin to MAE, 9.11.01.
93 AGCSSp 3L1.11b3, Lecomte (Caconda) to TRP, 24.2.; 26.3.; 10.5.05.
94 Birmingham 2011: 24; 64; Labourdette 2000: 360-4; Strandmann 2009: 291; Butler 1989: 4:
‘The oldest treaty in force for the United Kingdom is a Treaty of Perpetual Alliance between
King Richard II of England and John I, King of Portugal, dated 9th May 13[73].’
95 Pélissier 2000: 575 ref. Costa, F.: Portugal e a Guerra Anglo-Boer, Lisbon 1998: 91f.
96 Gooch /Temperley 1927: 75, No. 93, Note; 77, No. 96; 93, No. 118; Winzen 2013: 233-8.
97 TNA FO 179/390, Report by A. Peel on Portug. Africa, 11.1.04; Penha Garcia 1918: 134.
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the Lobito railway to the Katanga mines.98 Manifestly, this ran counter the
German government’s plans for the economic development in Angola.
The Companhia de Moçâmedes, a Luso-French consortium sub-conceded
its mining and railway building rights to British companies “linked to Ce-
cil Rhodes”.99 After his trip to Angola in 1903, the British prospector
Boyd Cuninghame announced that Angola’s “natural advantages will soon
be more fully exploited by British enterprise”.100 Economic expectations
were high, if not illusory. The “Angola-Boer” Pieter van der Kellen (hav-
ing family connections with the Companhia de Moçâmedes) was quoted
by a French journal as having “found traces of gold in each handful of
gravel”. He spoke of a “new Witwatersrand” in the Cassinga region.101
The German Consul Dobritz even traveled to the Kunene area just to learn
that Cuninghame had crossed into Kaokoveld in GSWA.102 As several
other newspapers asked what had come out of the Anglo-German accord
of 1898,103 Der Tag warned about the railway track to the Katanga mines,
proposed by Cuninghame: “If we do not keep a close eye on things, our
GSWA will be surrounded by the British in the North as well, and thus on
all sides.“104
Due to the dominant position Britain exerted over southern Africa, also
Portugal’s relations with the British had repeatedly experienced frictions
in the past as could be seen from the “ultimatum” in 1890. Portugal had
“become a subsidiary colonial power to England” and had to “navigate be-
tween Scylla and Charybdis“;105 whereas the ancient alliance was of rele-
vance to Britain due to Portugal’s Atlantic possessions, the Azores, Cape
Verde and Madeira. They formed a triangle through which trade routes
passed that were “a major lifeline of Britain and her Empire.”106 It was an
“old [British] doctrine” that these islands “must never be allowed to fall
into potentially hostile hands”; a doctrine to which also the Americans ad-
hered.107 The Portuguese found it difficult to trust any power on the
98 Dáskalos 2008: 82; MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE Delcassé, 8.12.02.
99 Clarence-S. 1979a: 173 ‘it proved an almost total economic failure’; Alexandre 2005: 371.
100 Cuninghame 1904: 167 ‘with the concurrence of our old-time allies the Portuguese.’
101 AGCSSp 3L1.1.2, Gaulois, 8.6.1903 ‘Au Sud-Ouest Africain’.
102 PA Luanda 5 (Lobito-Eisenbahn) German Consul Luanda to RK Bülow, 19.11.04.
103 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 222a, French Ambassador Berlin to MAE, 7.4.04.
104 PA Luanda 4 (Luanda-Politisches) Der Tag: ‘Vorstoß der Engländer in Angola‘, 10.3.04.
105 Arenas 2003: 4; Drechsler 1962: 58; 68; cf. Alexandre 2005: 375; Willequet 1967.
106 Stone 1975: 743; cf. Collins 2013: 746; Livermore 1967: 309-313.
107 Vincent-S. 1974: 623; NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753b.00, Navy Dpt (FDR), 16.6.16.
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African continent. Everywhere “vultures hovered nearby, waiting for the
collapse of Portugal’s finances before swooping in on the country’s
colonies.”108 In as much as the French opposed any territorial gains for the
Germans, in as much they were inclined to raise the question de l’annex-
ion de la Guinée portugaise.109 And the Belgians were eager to enlarge
their access to the sea and to incorporate the enclave of Cabinda into their
Congo colony.110
Once they had subdued the Herero and Nama in GSWA in a long and
excruciating war (1904–1907), the Germans seemed again to be a threat to
Portugal’s sovereignty over Angola. Between 1907 and 1914 Portuguese
royal and republican governments were anxious to secure reaffirmations
of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance to receive protection against Germany,
Spain, and, increasingly, the Union of South Africa, eager to incorporate
the harbor of Lourenco Marques. In these years the concept of the indivisi-
bility of Portugal’s territory, in Europe or overseas, developed among the
elite. However, following the revolution of 1910 the validity of the al-
liance based on treaties between monarchs seemed in question and the par-
tition of the Portuguese empire seemed more imminent than ever. The
government in Lisbon thus sent the former minister Count Penha-Garcia
to Paris, Brussels, and Berlin to affirm the “will” (volonté) of the Por-
tuguese nation to hold fast to the colonies and to convince the foreign pub-
lic of the “progress” realized there over the last decades.111 The Luso-
Dutch skirmishes in 1911 over the border of East Timor left nobody in
doubt that the Portuguese were willing to defend what they considered
their “rights”.112
When he learnt about the Franco-German convention on Morocco and
the Congo region (1911), most of all the swap of territories, Foreign Mini-
ster Vasconcelos was alarmed. Congratulating the French on their “tri-
umph”, he was concerned about the German ambitions for further enlarge-
ment that would barely be limited to Belgian Congo. Vasconcelos feared
that article XVI of the convention, providing for the eventuality of territor-
ial modification, could be the prelude for a re-portioning of Africa which
108 Meneses 2010: 10.
109 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 30, MAE. Note sur les colonies portugaises, 30.12.12.
110 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, French Minister Brussels to MAE, 14.6.12.
111 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 31, MAE. Note sur les colonies portugaises, 30.12.12.
112 NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753.56, US Minister The Hague to SoS, 25.8.11; the dispute was
settled (25.6.1914) by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (C.E.Lardy).
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would be, as in 1885, to the detriment of Portugal. During a meeting with
the French Minister, Vasconcelos left the impression that the Anglo-Por-
tuguese alliance seemed to reassure him less than the German ambitions
disquieted him and his nation.113
British politicians, on the other hand, had no intention to put into
question the existing alliance and were satisfied with the status quo. The
final definition of the borders between British possessions and GSWA was
being arranged by several international arbitration procedures. The Walvis
Bay arbitration by the Spanish lawyer Joaquin F. Prida went in favor of
the British (1911). Following an agreement of 1890, new procedures about
the borders along the Orange and the Tchobe River had started in 1911.114
In 1911, after the Agadir crisis had brought Anglo-German relations to a
new low, the Colonial Secretary Lewis Harcourt (1863–1922) was, how-
ever, willing to help Germany to find “a place in the sun” and recom-
menced (in private) the discussions about Portugal’s colonies.115 Reasons
for this may be found not only in the desire to improve relations with
Berlin. Given the slave-like labor conditions on the plantations of São
Tomé Foreign Secretary Edward Grey (1862–1933) had often expressed
his “disgust at the ‘scandalous’ state of affairs in Portuguese Africa”. Fur-
ther, he had doubts about the applicability of “treaties of such ancient
date”. Also the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill (1874–
1965) was known for his “intense hostility to the republican regime in
Portugal”.116 The Germans “believed themselves to have been cheated by
England” since despite the agreement of 1898 they did not gain anything
in return for their neutrality during the South African war.117 They there-
fore wanted to renegotiate in Germany’s favor the agreement about the fu-
ture of Portugal’s colonies. At the same time, British and German politi-
cians showed “interest in reducing the intensity of their naval competi-
tion”. Grey, Europe’s “most influential foreign minister”, stated: “For a re-
al bargain about naval expenditure in which Germany gives up the attempt
to challenge our naval superiority we might give something substantial,
113 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/8, Portugal: 198, FML to MAE, 2.12.11.
114 TNA CO 879/114/5: 3, n.5, CO (H. Lambert) to FO, 21.5.14; cf. Carrington 1960: 438.
115 Langhorne 1973: 368; cf. Gooch/Temperley 1930: 651, No.480; 664, No.490; 684, No.506.
116 Vincent-Smith 1974: 620; 623; Grey to Goschen, 29.11.1911: ‘Metternich has already said
that the Germans would like a division of the Portuguese Colonies to take place as soon as
possible. So should I. These colonies are worse than derelict so long as Portugal has them;
they are sins of iniquity’, in Langhorne 1973: 369; cf. 1973b: 863f.; Miers 2003: 51.
117 Jagow to Lichnowsky: ‘we were duped by England’, in Langhorne 1973: 380;363; 1971.
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but the difficulty is that cession of [Portuguese] territory can hardly from
the German point of view be in pari materia with a naval arrangement.”118
This time, the officials in the German Foreign Office had learnt their
lesson that shortsighted policy focusing only on domestic prestige and an-
nexations would lead to no result. They now considered German economic
penetration of Angola and Mozambique through investment and the pur-
chase of Portuguese national loans as the corner stone of a policy that
should lead in the future to the takeover of (parts of) the Portuguese
colonies. A similar policy was pursued towards the Congo. After the Ger-
mans in 1911 through a German-French swap of colonial territories had
“secured a footing on the Congo River”, Germany was “more than ever
determined to connect her west and east coast possessions by means of a
piece of the Congo”. Since the colony was “on the verge of bankruptcy”
and since Belgians appeared rather resigned, a partition seemed not im-
probable, as the American Consul in Boma noticed. He recognized Britain
as Germany’s main competitor. The old plans for a “Cape to Cairo rail-
road” through all British Territory ran “directly counter to German ambi-
tions.” Considering the money Britain was investing in the Congo, he as-
sumed that she had “the better chance to carry out her plan”.119 In Ger-
many, on the other hand, Mittelafrika reaching from the Atlantic to the In-
dian Ocean was the envisioned goal. Especially the Pan-Germans
(Alldeutsche) and other ultranationalist groups with their “half-baked”
projects put pressure on the German government to follow a path to
worldwide territorial expansion.120
From the official German point of view, the Anglo-German negotia-
tions were not a (colonial) end in and of itself, as the French ambassador
in Berlin, Jules Cambon (1845–1935) assumed when he recognized a
“Prussion tradition” in “sharing the spoils of a weak state”.121 Chancellor
Theodor von Bethmann-Hollweg, Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf, Coun-
cilor Richard von Kühlmann and the Minister in Lisbon, Friedrich Rosen,
hoped to use the detour of negotiations about Africa with Lewis Harcourt
to find (at Portugal’s expense) common ground with Britain also in Euro-
pe. Solf was willing to see Germany as the junior partner of the British in
Africa and hoped to break through the isolation of Germany within Euro-
118 Maurer 1992: 284; Grey, 29.11.1911, in Langhorne 1973: 369; Clark 2013: 266.
119 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 13, US CG Boma to SoS, 28.2.12; 10.6.12.
120 Canis 2011: 523; Ritter 1970: 109; cf. Rosen 1932: 266f. ‘alldeutsche Krafthuber’ (Solf).
121 MAELC 192 CPC/CP/NS/19, Portugal: 9, French Embassy Berlin to MAE, 3.2.13.
PART ONE. The First World War in Angola in its Historical Context
54
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
pe. In October 1913, a new agreement was initialed that provided for a
German takeover of the larger part of southern Angola and northern
Mozambique not only in case Portugal would want to sell its colonies, but
also in case of misrule and revolts that could harm neighboring German or
British colonies. In this event the parties would seek a joint solution.122
These negotiations were openly discussed in the press across Europe. In
France concerns were raised about the German aspirations for “mythic”
Mittelafrika.123 The journal Géographie warned: “With England’s consent
and owing also to our weakness, [Germany] has cast her eye on the Bel-
gian Congo, Angola, and Spanish … Guinea”124 However, the Germans
“seriously underestimated the sensitivity and tenacity of the Portuguese
where their colonies were concerned”.125 In 1912, the Portuguese Foreign
Minister declared that Portugal would never cede territory to the Ger-
mans.126 O Mundo, the mouthpiece of the republic’s strong man Afonso
Costa, took comfort in “our old alliance with England”, whose Foreign
Secretary Grey had expressed England’s colonial “satisfaction”. This, it
was hoped, could in the future also be Germany’s guiding “principle” in-
stead of its constant “desire” for Angola.127 Indeed, Grey “played a double
game” and “misled” the Germans on his intentions. Being strongly influ-
enced by the “Germanophobe fraction” in the Foreign Office under Fran-
cis Bertie, Eyre Crowe, and Arthur Nicolson, Grey assured the Portuguese
Foreign Minister during the ongoing negotiations that neither Britain nor
Germany would want to unilaterally terminate Portugal’s colonial
sovereignty. He pressed Lisbon to develop its colonies in order to consoli-
date its sovereignty and to accept for that end British as well as German
investors.128
The new Portuguese republican ambassador in London, Teixeira
Gomes (1860–1941), questioned Britain’s “loyalty to an old ally”. His
122 Canis 2011: 531; cf. Otte 2013: 184; Silva 2006: 328; Schöllgen 1980; Hatton 1971.
123 Michel 2004: 918; cf. Stone 1975: 731; Afflerbach 2002; Forsbach 2003: 122.
124 ‘The backbone of her future network of railways is to be a great trans-Africa line from Dar-
es-Salaam to Lobito Bay’, transl. in: Journal of the Royal African Society 14/53 (1914): 41.
In case of a ‘necessity’ of liquidating the Portuguese Empire, France may have demanded
Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Principe, Cabinda, and part of Mozambique, cf.
MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 29-39, MAE. Note sur les colonies portug., 30.12.12;
192 CPCOM/19, Portugal: 18-21, Paul Cambon (London) to MAE, 12.2.13.
125 Vincent-Smith 1974: 627f.; cf. AGCSSp 3L1.1.2, French paper clippings, July 1912;
126 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 31, MAE. Note sur les colonies portug., 30.12.12.
127 NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753.00/1, O Mundo, 4.12.11, transl in: USML to SoS, 5.12.11.
128 Canis 2011: 531-6 AA ‘ließ sich blenden‘; cf. Clark 2013: 219f.; Livermore 1967: 323.
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German counterpart, Prince Lichnowsky (1860–1928), not concealing
“that Germany hoped for more than a mere development of Portuguese
colonies”, told Grey in disappointment “that the position I seemed to as-
sume was that of medical adviser to the Portuguese colonies, while what
Germany contemplated was that of being the heir.” However, irrespective
of the fact that the membership of the German Colonial Association
(DKG) “read like a ‘Who’s Who’ of prominent figures in the German
business world”,129 the great German credit institutions were, again, hard-
ly convinced of the economic prospects of this financial imperialism. The
Luso-German Treaty of Navigation and Commerce that came into effect
in June 1910130 did not assure them. Were Angola or Mozambique
promising investment objectives? The government in Berlin had to urge
investors to take risks. Only with the support of the Foreign Office Ger-
man banks bought in May 1914 the majority of stocks of the Nyassa Con-
solidated Ltd. (Mozambique). The purchase of Portuguese national loans
secured by the customs revenues of Angola was scheduled for July.
British officials, on the other hand, were hesitant to sign the proposed
agreement with Germany not only because they were aware of the sensi-
tivities of Portugal, France, and Belgium. Bearing in mind that the Ger-
mans had commenced to invest in (and stabilized) the Portuguese colonies
and being aware that Britain’s German counterparts did not value non-
European territory enough to make concessions with regard to Germany’s
ambitious naval policy, the desirability of an Anglo-German cooperation
that would expose the British as “desert[ing] their friends” seemed ques-
tionable. Thus, they demanded the publication of the new treaty together
with the Windsor Treaty of 1899; a move that was intended to put pressure
on the Portuguese to develop their colonies, but inacceptable to the Ger-
mans, as Portugal would have impeded German commercial expansion in
the areas allocated to Germany. Furthermore, the German public would
have learnt that Germany was “duped” in 1899. No formal agreement fol-
lowed the negotiations of 1913.131
One historian went so far to consider “the whole negotiation … a delib-
erate piece of theatre” that served but one purpose: to show the fact that
negotiations between the two were possible.132 In early 1914 diplomats at-
129 Grey 13.6.13, in: Langhorn 1974: 366/79; Blackbourn 1998: 333; Stern 1979: 412.
130 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 720, USML to SoS, 3.10.19 treaty was suspended in 1916.
131 Girão 2010: 42; Vincent-Smith 1974: 625; cf. Lindner 2011: 77; Santos 1978: 167f.
132 Stone 1975: 731; Langhorne 1973: 387; cf. Tschapek 2000: 354; Vincent-Smith 1974:624f.
PART ONE. The First World War in Angola in its Historical Context
56
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
tested “to a growing sense of détente” in Anglo-German relations even
without formal agreements on colonial territories or arms control.133 The
outbreak of the war prevented further steps in the direction of a German
Mittelafrika. This did not prevent German contemporaries from dreaming
of ‘German’ Angola as the “world’s most attractive colony”.134
The Portuguese in Southern Angola
Contact, Commerce, and Colonialism in Angola, ca. 1840–1900
The notion of Portuguese inaction and idleness as expressed in many (for-
eign) contemporary accounts gives an incomplete impression of Angola’s
administration. Governor General Calheiros e Meneses stated in 1861 “the
normal condition of the administration of the colony is to make war and to
prepare itself for war.” It was not one or two major battles to be fought in
order to “pacify” the colony. The Portuguese, similar to other colonial
powers “never … [took] more than a single bit at a time.” “[R]arely did a
year pass during the four centuries since 1575 when there was not a colo-
nial campaign somewhere in Angola”.135 From 1845 to 1926 alone
around 180 military campaigns ravaged the colony; altogether historian
René Pélissier counts 420 campaigns in the Portuguese empire during this
period. No other colonial power met with such harsh resistance in
Africa.136 Portugal’s constant war efforts prove to be the exception to the
rule that – due to the expenses – “only the major powers are capable of
engaging regularly in [colonial] wars.” However, short-term “victories”
did not necessarily result in colonization and pacification. As in any other
colony, “war and peace could not be clearly distinguished” from each oth-
er.137
Despite all their fighting, the presence of the Portuguese from the fif-
teenth to the nineteenth century remained mostly limited to the coastal
belt. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Angola was still far from
1.3
1.3.1
133 Otte 2013: 177; cf. Rose 2011: 567.
134 Reiner 1924: 334: ’What would Germany have made of this country if it would have been
in German hands for such a long time?; cf. Marquardsen 1920.
135 Quoted and translated in Wheeler 1969: 425; 428; Oliver/Mathews 1963: 454.
136 Cf. Pélissier 1977: 18; 20; 609; Dias 1981: 359; Dianoux 1989: 12; Wheeler 1967.
137 Ravlo/Gleditsch/Do. 2003: 528; Kuss 2010: 15f. on the characteristics of colonial wars.
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being occupied in its entirety by the Portuguese; it was conquered and col-
onized only in the subsequent decades. The Portuguese thus were prevent-
ed from “reaching an effective detribalization of the hinterland”. As it has
been described for the British advances into Xhosa territories in the first
half of the nineteenth century, the “process of interaction” between Euro-
peans and Africans remained central to the creation of imperial rule.138
“Colonial encounters” were never one-sided affairs but left both parties
with options, while both were seeking for advantages. The processes of
accommodation between Africans and Europeans were manifold and the
Portuguese were not capable of imposing their will upon their African
subjects unaltered. The “creation of Angola” entailed more than a simplis-
tic reiteration of the dichotomy of “pacification campaigns” and “wars of
resistance” can present. Rather than force, trade, diplomacy, and negotia-
tions had to be applied as the administration lacked the manpower for out-
right conquest and rule. The colonial states that were implemented with
great pains following the “partition of Africa” were “mere skeletons
fleshed out and vitalized by African political forces.”139
In Angola’s interior for centuries the relation between Portuguese and
Africans “was not so much a confrontation of cultures as an intimate, bal-
anced commercial collaboration.”140 Europeans did not necessarily act
from a position of strength; rather, historians do not shy away from terms
such as “African hegemony”. The question of African allies and their im-
portance for the colonial project comes into play here too. The Portuguese
colonial state, “despite its seeming antiquity, remained a series of patrimo-
nial satrapies improvisionally run by an amalgam of settlers, renegades,
and officials.” “[S]urvival and endurance” were the characteristics of the
“traditional [Portuguese colonial] policy” that has also been defined as
“Luso-African feudalism”.141 Indigenous structures of production and of
authority often remained unaltered in areas Portugal penetrated. The ad-
ministration upheld “a system of Portuguese commercial ‘consuls’ at-
tached to Ovimbundu courts”.142 For decades these isolated sertanejos re-
mained the only representatives of the Empire. In 1877 Governor General
Albuquerque compared “colonial settlements [to] islands, lost in a limit-
138 Corrado 2008: 3; Price 2008: 1; cf. Brunschwig 1974: 48.
139 Henriques 2004: 9 ‘a criação de Angola’; Iliffe 2007: 193; 203 similar to Ranger 1969: 297.
140 Miller, J.C.: Review, Madeira Santos, M.E.: Serventia e posse, in JAH 41 (2000): 503.
141 Corrado 2008: 20; Henri. 2004: 17; Young 1994: 152; Wheeler 1969: 426; Boxer 1963: 29.
142 Birmingham 1974: 194; Ferreira, 2011: 6; cf. Péclard 1999: 123; Medeiros 1977: 75.
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less indigenous sea.” Therefore, historians have remarked that we cannot
speak of a “veritable colonial situation” in those days.143 In nineteenth
century Angola, as elsewhere in Africa,”trade could not have been per-
ceived by locals as the precursor of a new regime.”144
Pre-colonial trade routes between Benguela, the slave port of southern
Angola since the seventeenth century,145 and Bailundo, Bié, or the Zambe-
si regions (Barotseland) continued to be used by Ovimbundu and others.
Beginning in the eighteenth century they had pioneered a commercial sys-
tem of their own with a caravan network of long-distance trade. The cara-
vans could consist of more than a thousand porters and conducted a con-
siderable trade in ivory, cautchouc, firearms, alcohol and slaves, often in-
volving Luso-African itinerant traders (funantes, pombeiros) or offi-
cials.146 In the kingdom of Kazembe transcontinental trade connections
had been formed since the eighteenth century that reached the east and the
west coast via Bié traders. Slaving raids and the introduction of guns
proved disastrous for the affected communities at the end of the nineteenth
century,147 but Portuguese officials did next to nothing to protect the trad-
ing caravans.148
The American Consul summarized the situation in 1885 in the “interi-
or” (Bailundo and Bié): “although considered vasals of the Portuguese
Govt., the Govt. has … not the power to compel [the chiefs] to do as they
would like”.149 Irrespective of the abolition of slavery in the Portuguese
Empire in 1875, the “substitution of the overseas slave trade by commerce
in raw materials and cash crops” was still ongoing around 1900.150 The
“governors simply forgot to implement the anti-slave laws”. And Brazilian
coffee growers did “their utmost to delay the abolition of slavery.”151 Rum
(aguardente) and guns were the main commodities used in the slave trade
and continued to be so well after the official ban on alcohol production in
143 Albuqu. transl. in Corrado 2008: 35; 28; 31; Mesquitela 1980: 512 refer. to Pélissier 1977.
144 Dobler 2014: 2 emphasizes that the ‘perspective linking trade and colonialism is certainly
valid, but it offers an analysis after the fact.’; cf. Cunha 1900; Heintze 2002; 1999.
145 Cf. Candido 2013; Curto 2005: 98-100; Alencastro 2007: 188; 202.
146 Bontinck 1974; Flint, 1970: 76; Reynolds 1972: 241; Alenc. 2007: 200; Corrado 2008: 29.
147 Wilson 1972: 579; 582; 586f.; cf. Ranger 1969: 305; Coquery-V./Moniot 2005: 159f.; 192f.
148 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 183g, FML to MAE, 24.9.01; cf. Vellut 1972.
149 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 3, USC to Board of Commis. for Foreign Missions, 12.1.85.
150 Dias 1981: 349; cf. Clarence-Smith 1976: 218; 1979a: 170; Rodrigues 2009: 29f.
151 Nowell 1947: 4; Tavares/Silveira 2006: 111f; dos Santos 2002: 61; cf. Marques 2006.
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Angola in 1910.152 High-ranking officials were often helpless against local
authorities and merchants involved in these illicit trades. The former were
thus more interested in covering-up any potentially discrediting informa-
tion about slavery or other illicit activities than acting against them.153
While “for much of the nineteenth century, the relationship of the Por-
tuguese with black potentates in the interior of Angola was conditioned
chiefly by the penury and consequent … weakness of the government”,154
politicians in Lisbon had attempted at implementing changes since the late
1870s. Foreign Minister Andrade Corvo initiated public works and invest-
ments in the colonies. Not least the tercentenary of the poet Luís de
Camões (1524–1580) in 1880 marked a rise in a more aggressive foreign
policy that included “utopian” colonial claims (culminating in the defeat-
ing ultimatum).155 The doctrine of “effective occupation” set by the Con-
go-Act (1885) required at least “a skeletal grid of regional administra-
tion.”156 In its entire empire, Portugal started to make “desperate attempts”
to satisfy this condition and to prove to the “civilized word” its colonial
“qualities”. Next to its “rights” to the colonies, based on century-old pres-
ence, the myth of Portugal’s “historical mission” and “unique colonial vo-
cation” was to be reinvigorated in order to raise national sentiment against
foreign encroachments.157
Moçâmedes, the Planalto, and Portuguese Settlement Policies
A more vigorous approach towards the expansion of colonial power into
the sertão, the hinterland of Angola, was thus felt by the African popula-
tion. “Contact” was to be replaced by “colonization”. In the south of the
colony it was not the implementation of colonial rule that was still in the
process. Instead, military conquest was not yet accomplished before the
First World War.158 From a colonial perspective, southern Angola seemed
1.3.2
152 Dias 1981: 375f.; cf. Alexandre 2005: 373; Dáskalos 2008: 74.
153 Cf. Roque 2003: 116; Corrado 2008: 82 FN 7; Birmingham 1998: 353; 351, in 1903 Heli
Chatelain observed in Caconda that officials ‘personally benefitted from it [the slave
trade].’
154 Dias 1976: 253.
155 Freeland 1996: 61; Birmingham 2011: 150; cf. Rodrigues 2009: 28f.; Dáskalos 2008: 36.
156 Young 1994: 100; cf. Alexandre 2005: 370f.; Herbst 2000, cpt.2-4.
157 Mendy 2003: 41; cf. Henriques 1995: 80; Costa 1903 on ‘achievements’.
158 Pélissier 1993: 2 ‘contact n’est pas le synonyme de colonisation’; Regalado 2004: 13.
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peripheral, but it gained in prominence in light of the ongoing Anglo-Ger-
man negotiations. The Portuguese not only tried in general to prove their
colonial effectiveness, but also attempted concretely to keep the Germans
at bay in a region they had tried to include into their realm already for
decades.
As it was the case with other colonial empires too, the Portuguese ex-
panded from naval bases or trading posts along the seashore. The remote
southern port town of Moçâmedes (trapped between the ocean and the
desert, a fort since 1840 and a place to bring unruly functionaries “out of
harm’s way”159) had been the point of entry for improvised attempts of
colonization with hundreds of persecuted settlers fleeing from Brazil’s
major cotton-growing region, Pernambuco.160 Their cotton produced in
Angola was of “the first quality”, but the quantities remained small.161 In
1845 a second fort was erected in Huíla, located on the planalto beyond
the desert and the escarpment. Here, “temperate climate” seemed to favor
European settlement; but for decades there was “neither capital nor men”
for colonial development. Before the Portuguese reached beyond the
desert, contacts with Africans had been “marginal”. Few “migrant laborers
from the Ovambo-Nkhumbi area” came to the coast. These contacts regu-
larly resulted in humiliating defeats for the Portuguese. During the 1840s,
two governors of the Benguela province were ambushed and captured by
Africans.162 Not until 1860 the Kunene River was reached near Humbe
where a fort was erected. It became a stronghold along a frontier that was
characterized by trade in guns, alcohol, slaves, and ivory. In 1909 Humbe
consisted “of a fort, a magistrate’s office, a store and a few huts”.163
159 Wheeler 1968: 50 on Prince Nicolas of Kongo’s transfer to ‘the new village’ in 1860.
160 Clarence-S. 1976: 214; Pitcher 1991: 45 ‘cotton regime ill-planned’; Marques 2006: 228.
161 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS: 89, 2.5.74; TNA FO 179/390: 4, A. Peel: Re-
port on Portugal and her colonial possessions in Africa, 11.1.04.
162 Clarence-S- 1976: 220; Marques 2006: 225; Pélissier 1977: 139-45; cf. Dias 1981: 366.
163 Pearson 1910: 510; cf. Reclus 1887: 393f.; MPLA 1975: 139; Corrado 2008: 22.
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“Forteresse de Humbi en 1885”, Pieter van der Kellen
Further south, the Portuguese came in contact with the Walvis Bay traders
who attempted at dominating the ivory trade. One of these traders de-
scribed the situation lyrically: “As dawn precedes sunrise, a kind of twi-
light-zone of European civilization was spreading over the interior, far in
advance of real colonial power.”164 As the Congo River had been the ob-
ject of Stanley’s journey, in 1878 the Portuguese under Major Serpa Pinto
(1846–1900) turned their attention to the regions southeastwards, to the
Okavango (Cubango) and Zambezi Rivers.165 Two fortresses were erected
in 1886, but talk of abandonment followed suit.166 With the Portuguese
beginning to conquer the southern fringes of Angola to prove their “effect-
ive rule”, a new chapter of the Luso-African relations in this area was
opened. By sending in soldiers where previously only traders and mission-
aries had entered, the Portuguese had unilaterally changed the rules of the
Ill. 1
164 Gerald McKiernan 1879, in Kienetz 1977: 553; cf. Rizzo 2012: 40; Wallace 2012: 86f.
165 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS, No. 89, 24.8.77; Oliveira Marques 1998: 409.
166 AGCSSp 3L1.1.1, O Reporter, 26.4.89; Serpa 1881; Rodrigues 2009; Fernandes 2010: 75.
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game.167 Resistance to European conquest became a major political char-
acteristic of the area.
The local population had not only to endure soldiers but also an inflow
of settlers. While for centuries, the area north of the Cuanza River had al-
most exclusively remained Angolas’s only settlement district, the late
nineteenth century saw the Portuguese attempting to open up the southern
plateau as “a white man’s country” and European settlement became part
of the rationale for imperial expansion.168 However, given the colony’s
skeletal stage of development, Portuguese immigration to Angola was li-
mited, whereas millions settled in Brazil. In 1910, Angola had merely
12,000 European inhabitants, most of them living in Luanda or other
coastal towns, amid them many degredados.169 Until 1930, Angola “re-
tained its image as a convict colony.”170 Among politicians in Lisbon the
advisability as well as the possibility of settling farmers in Angola re-
mained disputed. The search for the “ideal settler” continued in Angola
just as it did in GSWA, since it “was feared that the arrival of those who
could not sustain themselves would place strains on the colony’s limited
resources.”171 Many of those who settled in Angola were assessed with
disdain by foreign observers: Returning after thirty years, an American
missionary considered them unsuited “to build up a strong colonial popu-
lation. Their one effort seemed to be to bleed the native and to get as much
money out of the country in a short time as possible.”172 A French mis-
sionary was equally appalled: “The Portuguese do absolutely nothing for
the country except exploiting it.”173
Liberal politicians in Lisbon like Sá de Bandeira (1795–1876) initially
hoped settlers would produce wheat on the planalto for the metropolis to
avoid expensive foreign imports. Due to crop failure this dream “never re-
alized”. “[E]cological crisis had aided Nyaneka resistance” to Portuguese
expansion in the region. During this period Europeans were heavily de-
pendent upon the capacity of African peasants to feed them. In 1881, 420
167 Brunschwig 1974: 51 ‘l'Européen de 1880 n’était pas le même homme que celui de 1850.’
168 Cuninghame 1904: 154; cf. Birmingham 1965; Dáskalos 2008: 58-65 on settlements.
169 Labourdette 2000: 533; Curto 2002: 46 on the ‘white’ male population: ‘Luso-Brazilian
convicts and army deserters sent to serve their sentence in Angola, fortune-seekers, admin-
istrative personnel, and their locally born sons’; cf Nogueira 1880 on Africans.
170 Birm. 1982: 345; 2011: 171; Corrado 2008: 32; Kienetz 1977: 569 ‘deserters‘ in SWA.
171 Smith 1974: 655, Smith 1991: 502; cf. Pimenta 2008: 71; on GSWA Kundrus, 2003: 44.
172 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 18.10.19: 6 (Thomas Woodside).
173 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Goepp (Bailundo) to Pascal?, 9.12.02 (excerpts).
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Southern Angola, excerpt “Die Portugiesische Expedition quer
durch Südafrika, 1884&1885“,1887
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Afrikaaners were granted permission to settle in Humpata, near Huíla. Ar-
riving with their ox wagons from the South African Republic the thirst-
land trekkers played an important role in the establishment of Portuguese
rule on the planalto. The “white dogs, as [the Africans] call them”174,
“quell[ed] the native opposition” and managed to drive the Nyaneka off
“much of the best land by the mid-1880s”175 However, the Portuguese,
similar to the colonial officials of GSWA, began to worry about their
“sense of independence”. Rumors about “Boer conspiracies” to “proclaim
a small republic” found their way into the press, alleging joint efforts of
Afrikaaners and Kwanyama against Portuguese rule.176 One officer de-
manded to oblige the Afrikaaners to speak Portuguese and to do military
service in the Portuguese army.177 (An “exodus” of Afrikaaners com-
menced around 1910 and after 1928, most of the 2,500 “Angola-Boers”
were resettled in SWA178).
Following the Congo Conference and attempts by the central govern-
ment to set up a more effective colonial administration, this new policy
was felt even in Angola’s remoter parts. A few kilometers north of Huíla
and Humpata, Lubango (renamed Sá da Bandeira) was founded by emi-
grants from Madeira. The intention was to populate Angola with Por-
tuguese in order to “nationalize” the colony. In 1901 Sá da Bandeira be-
came the administrative center of the planalto (Huíla Province), where
around 3,000 Europeans, soldiers and settlers, lived. A British observer
considered the “absence of railways and … cheap transport” to be the
“great obstacles” to further development.179 In 1905 the construction of a
railway across the desert from Moçâmedes to Sá da Bandeira began. Much
to the disappointment of foreign investors, eager for concessions, the gov-
ernment decided to finance the railway itself.180 In June 1909 seventy
miles were constructed.181
174 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 3, USC to SoS, 18.11.81, 250 were women/children.
175 Clarence-S. 1979a: 171; Dias 1981: 366f; cf. Pélissier 1969, 76; Cuninghame 1904: 156.
176 TNA FO 367/18: 644, BML to FO, 12.5.06, exc. O Seculo 6.5.06 on J. Pienaar; Birming-
ham 1998: 352; Botha 2007: 12 ‘ambivalent attitude’ of Ger. officials towards Afrikaaners.
177 AHM/Div/2/2/37/55, Pimento to Chefe do Estado Mj, 24.9.15; Pélissier 1977: 502.
178 Pearson 1910: 507f.; NARA RG 59, MF 705, roll 28, 853m00/19 USC Luanda to SoS,
12.7.28; Stassen 2011: 124-33; Silvester/Wallace/Hayes 1998:11f.
179 TNA FO 179/390: 4, Peel: Report on Portugal and her colonial possessions, 11.1.04.
180 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 1.6.06, credit of 1,500 Contos granted.
181 Stone 1956: 323; Alexandre 2005: 372; Pearson 1910: 505, railway completed in 1923.
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All of this was not more than a “colonial nucleus”. Attempts to occupy
territories beyond the Kunene River were ill starred. Intentions of policy-
makers stood often in sharp contrast with the performance of their agents.
As in the future, “military colonization” remained a “persistent but often
frustrated plan” in Angola.182 The garrison of Humbe was decimated dur-
ing uprisings by the Nkhumbi, who had previously “forb[idden] the entry
of Portuguese traders into their lands.” Further Portuguese attempts to
push forward in southern Angola were met with harsh resistance in 1891
and 1897. The Portuguese gained nothing more than “a partial and very
insecure victory”. The “garrison in Humbe was practically impotent.” For
years officials did not exercise jurisdiction outside the walls of their
fortresses.183
Além-Cunene – Military and Missionary Perspectives, 1900–1914
The political aim of imperial consolidation by effective colonial rule in all
territories claimed by Portugal was incommensurate with any form of na-
tive sovereignty. Effective rule was tantamount to control over Africans.
This would enable the colonial state to demand African obedience, labor,
and tax payments. However, it turned out that before these aims could be
achieved, the territories to be ruled had to be conquered first.
Portuguese military campaigns beyond the Kunene River have compre-
hensively been analyzed by historian René Pélissier. Two characteristics
of these campaigns are particularly striking: the ferocity with which one
campaign after another was waged against the local population; and the
enormous human and financial resources the Portuguese monarchy and the
republic were willing to sacrifice for an area that would furnish no imme-
diate economic return. Since the 1860s, colonial forces had tried to gain
influence in the Kunene region, but only after 1907 their status – acquired
by conquest, not by treaties – seemed (to themselves) more or less se-
cured.184
Within the same period, a second force emanating from Europe at-
tempted to implant itself in the region: Missionaries. From 1870, arriving
from the south (Walvis Bay and the Cape Colony), Finnish Lutheran mis-
1.3.3
182 Wheeler 1969: 435 referring to plans of colonial reformers of the 1960s.
183 Clarence-Smith/Moorsom 1975: 371; 375; cf. Roque 2003: 122.
184 Cf. Pélissier 1969: 114f.; 2004: 213f.; Korman 1996: 41; 65; Vandervort 1998.
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sionaries began to evangelize in Ovamboland (Ondonga). In line with a
global trend, Roman Catholic missionaries (Spiritans) followed suit. The
Apostolic Prefecture Cimbebasia (reaching from the Atlantic Ocean to the
Orange and Zambesi Rivers) was established in 1879, headed by Charles
Duparquet (1830–1888), who had visited Kwanyama King Shipandeka the
same year.185 His missionaries from France and Portugal set up the Prefec-
ture of Cubango (Gallangue, 1879) and the mission district of Cunene
(Huíla, 1881). As one missionary journal put it, Spiritans followed the
Portuguese flag.186 When they attempted to outpace military occupation,
their success was limited. After all: “Missionaries were guests who invited
themselves” and they stayed longer than rules of hospitality would have
allowed; worse, they challenged traditions, authority, and social hierar-
chies. Conflicts were predictable. A mission station (St. Michel) founded
among Kwanyama by Father Duparquet in 1884, had to be abandoned in
early 1885 when political turmoil after the death of King Namhadi led to
the destruction of the station and the killing of two missionaries.187 This
was considered a tragedy also because “80,000 souls were abandoned to
Lutherans”.188 Even though “[r]elations between Catholics and Protestants
were not hostile” in Angola, the more or less open competition between
the Spiritans and the Lutherans remained a political factum well beyond
1915.189 In 1891 also German Lutherans (Rhenish Mission) began to set
up stations on both sides of the colonial border among the eight Ovambo
groups.190
The missionaries facilitated the contact with the colonial state greatly.
After years of work they gained trust and exercised considerable influence
over Ovambo societies. The missionaries’ descriptions of the struggles
taking place in the region are an important complement to the administra-
tive sources. At the same time, missionaries acted and reacted in their own
185 Peltola 2002: 46; AGCSSp 3L1.1.3, Doc. conc. les missions, App. IX: 14, Duparquet to
Min of Colonies, 15.12.80; App. XII: 23, Decreto Apostolico, 3.7.79; Duparquet 1953.
186 AGCSSp 3L1.1.2, Congregação Esp. Santo 1901; Boucher 1933: 160; Osterhammel 2011:
1262; cf. Gray 2012: 153f. on colonialism-mission relation; Prudhomme 2004: 67f.
187 Osterhammel 2011: 1266; AGCSSp 3L1.11a1, Keiling: Compte-Rendu, 29.6.10; cf. Hayes
1993: 96; Wallace 2012: 93; Oermann 1999: 220f.; Santos 1993; Koren 1982.
188 AGCSSp 3L1.7b5, Lecomte (Humbe) to Grizard, 1.4.85; Gibson in Estermann 1976: X.
189 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Propag. Fide, 9.9.14; 9.9.16; Birmingham 1998: 348.
190 Cf. Wulfhorst 1904; Ovambo territory was politically divided into eigth Kingdoms: Ondon-
ga (South), Uukwanyama (north), Uukwambi (center), Ongandjera, Ombalantu, Uukwalu-
udhi, Uukolongadhi/Eunda, Ondombondola (west); each forming distinct language groups.
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right, just as the Africans and their authorities whom they wanted to con-
vert to Christianity. The missionary correspondence also illustrates how
their work was interwoven with the violent establishment of the colonial
state penetrating the region from the west. But most of all the military and
missionary history of além-Cunene attests to the dominance of African ac-
tors.
When the Kwanyama expelled the Spiritans after the death of King
Namhadi in 1885, Portugal’s colonial administration was not in a position
to intervene. For the next thirty years, the Kwanyama, the most populous
of the Ovambo kingdoms would be considered among the most persistent
challengers of Portuguese domination. Already in 1893 – after Artur de
Paiva had attempted to occupy the area between the Kunene and Okavan-
go Rivers – it was known in Lisbon that the people of Ovamboland were
not only pastoralists but also well-armed. The Kwanyama were singled-
out as “bellicose people”, possessing a regular cavalry. The guns they
used, no doubt was allowed, originated from “foreign merchants” from
south of the Kunene River. German administrators, on the other hand,
“pressure[d]” the Portuguese “to intensify their supervision of the arms
trade”.191 This was achieved only to a limited extend. When in 1896 the
Portuguese asked King Weyulu for permission to erect a fort in Kwanya-
ma to tighten control and prevent “a German invasion,” he refused. Given
the raids of the Kwanyama against their neighbors, “lack of security” re-
mained most of all a threat to missionaries. The Spiritan station among
Kwanyama, (re-)established by Père Lecomte in 1900,192 had to be evacu-
ated in early 1904 after missionary D. Duarte was killed. The Spiritans
counted on a Portuguese expedition before the station could be reopened,
but to no avail. Lecomte warned Nande (the future King) that his raids
against neighbors must end or the government would turn against him.193
However, the Kwanyama incursions northwards into the Caconda district
did not abate. Over the following years, killed soldiers, sacked villages,
stolen cattle (and at times kidnapped missionaries) proved the impotence
of the Portuguese army.194 The latter barely found the time to recover
191 AGCSSp 3L1.1.1, SGL 1893: 36; Rizzo 2012: 41; cf. Reclus 1887: 416; Siiskonen 1990:
156f.
192 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Cardinal, 9.9.16; Piolet 1902 506; MPLA 1975: 146.
193 AGCSSp 3L1.16a6, Lecomte: A travers la Haute-Cimbébasie, Missions Cath. (1899): 583.
194 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Blanc (Caconda) to Faugere, 6.2.; 8.4.; 24.12.04.; 10.6.05; 29.5.06.
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from “the great colonial war” crushing the kingdom of Bailundo (1902–
03), which had ravaged the central district of Benguela.195
Despite the ongoing raids in Ovamboland, the Governor General “in-
sisted” on the founding of a new station, hoping for the ‘civilizing power’
of Christianity. It was established by Lecomte in July 1904 while a mili-
tary expedition to end Kwanyama raids was being prepared. Lecomte
found himself “perfectly received” by the Kwanyama and everything
seemed “calm”. The Kwanyama “counted on the missionaries to solve the
matter amiably” and prevent the Portuguese from unleashing their war
machine.196 Germany’s minister in Lisbon, Tattenbach, assumed that the
Alsacian missionaries were “used” by the Portuguese “against our penetra-
tion towards the Kunene River.” Given the raids, for the Portuguese ad-
ministration it seemed clear that the Kwanyama needed to be “paci-
fied”.197
The Kwanyama kingdom was located 100 kilometers to the east of the
Kunene River. A number of other “tribal areas” had to be traversed before
it could be reached. Finally, in September 1904, a Portuguese army of
over 1,000 men led by Captain João de Aguiar took off to occupy the re-
gion. The attempt was ill-fated. While trying to cross the Kunene River at
Pembe Drift south of Humbe, the Cuamato (Ombandja) attacked Aguiar.
The ensuing battle of September 25 resulted in the Cuamato’s “great vic-
tory”. More than 300 Portuguese were killed. This “catastrophe” created a
“state of overexcitement” and spared the Kwanyama a military confronta-
tion with Aguiar.198 It not only became the starting point for a Portuguese
“Ovambo complex” and a long campaign in southern Angola that con-
tributed to the further deterioration of Portugal’s public finances.199 The
“disaster of Pembe” also aligns with a “series of financial, colonial, and
195 Birmingham 1988: 100; PA Luanda 4 (Politisches) Otto Peters to Consul Luanda, 20.6.02.
196 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4; 11b3, Lecomte (Kwanyama) to TRP, 12.7.04; 20.8.04; 6.9.04; 24.10.04.
197 BAB R 1001/6912: 90, German Minister Lisbon to RK v. Bülow, 9.9.04.
198 AGCSSp 3L1.12a9, Superieur J.M. Antunes (Huíla) to Cardinal Prefet Gotti, 6.1.05.
‘Cuamato’ is a corrupted Portuguese version of ‘Kwamatwi’ (meaning ‘those who have
ears’, ‘those who have accurate information about the enemy movements’ or ‘those who are
alertful’). The reference to the people of Mbadja as ‘ova-Kwamatwi’ was made first by
Kwanyama during their cattle raids against them prior to the arrival of the Portuguese. I am
grateful to Phil ya Nangoloh for this explanation; cf. Lecomte 1902.
199 Pélissier 1969: 73f.; 2004: 210f.; Southern 2007: 4f.; Siis. 1994: 78; Medeiros, 1977: 69.
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political disasters” since the 1890s, culminating in the assassination of
King Carlos I. in 1908.200
Still in fairly recent literature it is claimed that the African victory at
Pembe Drift, a “second Adua”, was possible only because “Kwanyama”
(meaning Cuamato) had “received support [in “wip(ing) out a large Por-
tuguese force”] from Germans in South West Africa who hoped to seize
southern Angola from the Portuguese.”201 Whereas these “hopes” – as we
have seen – were a historic reality, no such “support” can be discerned
from the sources. On the contrary, there had been talks of joint efforts of
Portuguese and German troops against the African “robbers”.202 The Por-
tuguese hoped for German support that would result at the same time in
Berlin’s recognition of Portuguese sovereignty over southern Angola, thus
“paralyzing” the execution of the Anglo-German accord of 1898.203 While
Portugal had lost an important part of its colonial army at Pembe, a Ger-
man colonial army of 6,000 men was being built up against the Herero.
The Portuguese government had originally aimed at having an equally
strong force available in case of any eventuality. If Herero had escaped to
Angola and the German troops pursued them, the lacking Portuguese “ef-
fective occupation” should not be an excuse for any potential German oc-
cupation of southern Angola. Instead, Portugal wished once more to show
permanent presence in the entire area to prove its sovereignty.204
However, both plans came to nothing: the campaign against the “revolt-
ing” Cuamato and Kwanyama failed before the negotiations with the Ger-
mans on joint military operations could be concluded. The French minister
in Lisbon de Cernay compared the colonial military efforts of the Por-
tuguese and the Germans in the area directly. He concluded from the Ger-
man “victory” at Waterberg (August 1904) against the Ovaherero and the
Portuguese defeat at Pembe Drift that the “roles are [now] inverted”. The
Portuguese had pointed to the German colonial “inexperience” and their
own grande habitude des affaires colonials, but then saw themselves hu-
miliated by Africans. The defeat made it evident that they could not with-
stand any German attempt to occupy southern Angola; a fear – “irrational”
as it may have been – that reigned in the Ministries of War and Colonies
200 Vincent-S. 1974: 621; cf. Wheeler 1972: 173f.; 188; Regalado 2004: 15; Wallace 2012: 98.
201 Roberts 1986: 521; Pélissier 1977: 451f.; 2004: 207f. on Pembe Drift, ‘un second Adowa’
202 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Blanc (Caconda) to Faugère, 24.10.; 9.8.04; Lecomte to Pascal, 5.5.04.
203 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 222d, FML to MAE, 18.5; 11.6.04.
204 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 225b, FML to MAE, 6.9.04; cf. Pool 1979.
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in Lisbon in late 1904.205 Within the Portuguese administration the French
military attaché observed a general méfiance (distrust) vis-à-vis the Ger-
mans.206
Despite the setback in 1904, the Portuguese pushed eastwards. But only
in late 1906 did expeditions along the Kunene become more successful.
The British, well informed as ever, had even discussed the question with
the Portuguese government as to whether or not to send a military attaché
to accompany the Portuguese troops against the Kwanyama. However, the
Portuguese did not plan for one particular “punitive expedition”, but, as
the Foreign Minister explained, “[t]he plan of action will be a gradual oc-
cupation of the Cuanhama country”.207 Seeing an existential threat coming
closer, the Kwanyama under King Nande (reigned 1904–1911) tried to
come to terms with the Portuguese; the raids abated.208 Finally, in October
1907 Major José A. Alves Roçadas (1865–1926) succeeded in defeating
the Cuamato, “immortalizing himself” in the annals of official Portuguese
historiography.209 After this “magnificent revanche” Father Lecomte
hoped fervently that Roçadas would continue his expedition to the
Kwanyama (where Lecomte was waiting in the mission station for two
months); since “without European occupation” nothing “solid” could be
achieved in “this turbulent country”. He assumed that King Nande would
declare his submission to the Portuguese. But no submission took place;
“native treaties” no longer played a role. Much to the disappointment of
the missionary, the Portuguese army (being bound in a campaign in
Guinea-Bissau throughout 1908) did not reach out to the Kwanyama.
However, he hoped that once the Germans would advance from the south,
the Portuguese would be forced to occupy the region “beforehand”
(avant).210
The Germans, on the other hand, observing closely the situation near
their colonial border, came to a different conclusion. When the Portuguese
already spoke of the “urgent necessity to garrison the [southern most end
of the] Kavango” River,211 German officials had not even been to Ovam-
boland. There was no overall structure of colonial control. German offi-
205 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 225c, FML to MAE, 11.10.04; Pélissier 2004: 211.
206 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portug: 227a, Lt.Col. Cornulier to Min. de la Guerre, 20.11.04.
207 TNA FO 367/17: 224, War O. to FO, 16.2.06; 258, BML to FO, 19.9.06; cf. Costa 1906.
208 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Blanc (Caconda) to Faugere, 4.11.; 14.11.06 (excerpts).
209 GEPB 1936, vol 2, Art. ‘Angola’: 663; cf. Roçadas 1910; 1908a,b,c; Regalado 2004: 66f.
210 AGCSSp 3L1.11b4, Lecomte to TRP, 15.9.07; 17.10.07; 24.11.07; Koskenniemi 2001: 141.
211 AGCSSp 3L1.1.1, SGL Missões de Angola, 1893: 37 M. de Albuquerque was present.
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cials never exercised formal jurisdiction over Ovambo polities. The region
was considered unfit for white settlement, too distant from any German
harbor or railway head, and the Ovambo neither posed a threat to German
rule in Hereroland nor did they raid GSWA. Not until 1899 the district
chief of Outjo, Lieutenant Victor Franke (1866–1936) visited as the first
German officer the kingdom of Ondonga. He was received by King Kam-
bonde and discussed the illicit trade in weapons from Angola to
Hereroland, the securing of the border to Angola, and the sending of mi-
grant workers to work on German farms and railway sites. But Franke did
not obtain any “treaty of friendship” or the permission to set up a German
fort.
When in June 1901 German soldiers approached the Portuguese border
and crossed into Angola to visit the Lutheran mission station N’giva in the
Kwanayama area, this caused uproar in the colony and metropolis. Father
Lecomte, who was visiting a nearby Catholic station, faced the Germans
and asked them what they were looking for in Portuguese territory. The
German Captain Kliefoth (1862–1905) responded that part of Kwanyama
belonged to GSWA, but Lecomte emphasized that N’giva was north of the
border. Despite their intention to travel up to the Portuguese Fort Humbe,
Kliefoth withdrew southwards. Lecomte credited himself with having won
a victory over the Germans for Portugal and the Catholic mission – “much
to the satisfaction of the natives”.212 Following this German border viola-
tion, the Portuguese press made the affair internationally known, accusing
the Germans of having “dark intentions”. The French consul in Lisbon
saw the German attempt to penetrate into the Humbe area in connection
with the exploration of the railway track from Porto Alexandre. Also
France’s ambassador in Berlin diagnosed German attempts to extend their
sphère d’action northwards into an area that they hoped would one day
become German. Germany’s semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitung, however, denied any hidden agenda and refused to see any border
violation.213 In 1903 attacks on “German colonists” in the Okavango bor-
der area did not result in a major campaign. And also later on German pol-
212 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Lecomte (Huíla) to Rooney, 17.7.01; cf. Zollmann 2010a: 98;
Alexandrowicz 1973 on ‘treaties’ with Africans
213 Peltola 2002: 162; MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 183m, FML to MAE, 29.9.01;
183p, Emb. Berlin to MAE, 9.11.01; Stals 1972: 19f.; Siisk. 1990: 174; Rizzo 2012: 63.
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icy towards the region was characterized by hesitation. From 1899 to 1908
merely seven “peaceful expeditions” were sent to Ovamboland.214
The colonial state in the making often consisted of not more than a
loose network of forts. Following the victories of Major Roçadas in
1906/7 and his successor as Huíla district governor, Major João de Almei-
da, a string of forts was set up in the new military district east of the
Kunene River, commencing with Fort Roçadas (October 1906),215 the
“base for any future operation on the left bank”. The appalling conditions
in these make-shift strongholds can be sensed from the following report
about this fort that
“has a commanding position on a high chalk cliff overhanging the [Kunene]
river. Until recently it has been the frontier fort; as such it has witnessed
many hard-fought engagements between the Portuguese and the warlike
Ovambo tribes … The vicinity of the fort is extremely unhealthy – a condi-
tion largely due to the utter neglect of the most elementary sanitary precau-
tions. That no improvement in these matters had yet been effected was proven
by the presence of the decomposing body of an ox and other organic refuse
within a short distance of the walls of the fort. The mortality among white
troops stationed there has been so great that it will in future be occupied only
by native soldiers.”
Hardship was worse for the African population during the “campaigns”
even in those regions already ‘pacified’ as was witnessed by the botanist
Pearson, who visited Fort Roçadas in May 1909, when “operations” were
“in progress”. On his way from Humpata he noticed “few natives”
“… along the transport roads. Their absence from the vicinity of the road is
no doubt due, in some part, to the demand made upon them for food and other
commodities by an impoverished and disorderly soldiery on their way to the
front, and to the dislike for compulsory service as labourers or carriers, which
is still enforced very much as it was in 1854, when it was described in the
Golungo Alto District by Livingstone.”216
214 TNA FO 179/390, Report by Mr. A. Peel on Portug. Africa, 11.1.04; Shiremo 2011; BAB R
1001/2183: 69 (77), KGW to RKA, 21.11.08 ‘friedliche Expeditionen in das Ovamboland’.
215 Regalado 2004: 21 Ft. Roçadas, Ft. Aucongo, Ft. Damaquero, Ft. Dom Luís de Braganca,
Ft. Nalu[sh]eque [Eduardo Marques], Ft. Henrique Couceiro; cf. Singelmann 1911; Hennig
1920: 114.
216 Pearson 1910: 509; TNA FO 367/17: 252;268, BML, 3.9.; 12.12.06; Pélissier 1977: 473.
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“Forts im Ovambolande”, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911
Construction of a Portuguese fort, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911
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“Forts im Ovambolande”, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911
“Forts im Ovambolande”, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911
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Beginning in mid-1909 a 500 men-strong expedition led by João de
Almeida resulted in the military occupation of the northern bank of the
Okavango River. “Within a mere two months a series of [five] military
posts was being established in the territory of each of the five Kavango
tribes, each in the immediate vicinity of the respective Hompa’s [Chief]
residence”, the most important of which was Fort Cuangar near the vil-
lages of the Kwangali ruler Himarua. Almeida knew that the most
formidable enemy was still to surmount: the “independent” Kwanyama
kingdom. He thus not only augmented the forts in the south from 13 to
over 20, but he also encircled Oukwanyama territory from three sides. The
Portuguese invested heavily in materials and manpower. Still, it has been
estimated that by 1910 no more than a tenth of Angola as it is defined to-
day was under Portuguese control.217 Southern Angola’s border region
stood out, however. While the “myth of the ‘thin white line’” in colonial
Africa was cultivated by contemporaries arguing the “sparseness of an of-
ficial European presence across colonial territories” demonstrated “the
consent of colonial subjects”, after 1910 there were no “lone District Offi-
cers” in southern Angola.218
A territory of around 30.000 square miles was guarded by over 20 forts
being staffed with several hundred men. In 1911, this made it one of the
most densely developed networks of military facilities in colonial Africa
(irrespective of the question what earth walls could protect in the age of
modern artillery). Interestingly, the German traveler Carl Singelmann was
not only given access to these forts in 1911, but he was also permitted to
take pictures of the military installations and the extension works. In the
absence of a “natural frontier” between the Kunene and the Okavango
Rivers a double if not triple line of fortresses protected the Huila Plateau
in order to come closer to the vision of a bounded and unified colony. The
ancient dilemma of (colonial) rule – that it became weaker the more dis-
tant it was from the ruler – was to be brought to an ‘end’: colonial rule
should be omnipresent in the territory. Evidently, the immense expenses
incurred to this end were not exclusively explained by Portugal’s respect
for the unconquered Kwanyama. It was most of all a military form of what
historian Fritz Stern called “preemptive imperialism: expand in order to
217 Eckl 2004: 189; 2004a: 77; Clarence-S./M. 1975: 375; Almeida 1912; Sousa [~1935]: 8.
218 Shipway 2008: 26 ‘at the heart of the myth is the lone district officer’ in his remote station.
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forestall others.”219 Spiritan missionary Louis Keiling assumed that the
Portuguese would stay in the south “in order to stop the German advance –
otherwise we would lose the current Kwanyama mission”220
However, the Portuguese still overestimated their colonial neighbor.
The Germans remained cautious when it came to including Ovamboland
and its neighboring regions into GSWA. The experience of the Portuguese
troops at Pembe Drift in 1904 taught the Germans the lesson not to pro-
voke any of the Kings and to refrain from military conflict. Nevertheless,
rumors about German intentions abounded. In May 1904, after Ondonga
King Nehale Mpingana (1884–1908) had unsuccessfully attempted to raid
the German Fort Namutoni, it was falsely claimed “that the Germans have
occupied Ondonga”, south of Kwanyama.221 The threat of the “loss” of
Ovamboland by approaching Germans was yet again invoked by Catholic
missionaries, Portuguese officials and newspapers.222 However, the oppo-
site seemed to be the intention of the authorities in GSWA. Some re-
searchers go so far as to claim that Ovamboland “was left untouched by
German Imperialism”.223 German administrators attempted to distance af-
fairs in their colony from those in Ovamboland: Given the ongoing war in
the south of GSWA, in a decree of January 25, 1906 Governor Friedrich
von Lindequist (1862–1945) banned all trade in alcohol, weapons and oth-
er war materials with “Ovamboland” (as defined by the German adminis-
tration) and the entry into the region for any “non-resident” (meaning
European). The administration wanted to avoid conflicts between Africans
and Germans over trading goods or land possession, as it had happened in
Hereroland. In 1907, police protection had been confined to the central
and southern parts of GSWA within the reach of railway lines and main
roads. Within the “police zone”, where most Africans were dispossessed
and farmland was allotted to settlers after 1907, “whites were left ‘mas-
219 Stern 1979: 400; Baericke 1981: 23 Portuguese forts ‘did not have the least military value’;
cf. Freiburger Zeitung, No. 59, 29.2.1912: 1 (Abendausgabe) report on a talk in Freiburg
given by ‘Consul Carl Singelmann, Braunschweig‘ about German interests in the Por-
tuguese empire, where he presented his pictures. ‘Besonders interessant waren auch die
Vorführungen der Forts, die die Portugiesen in Angola gegen die wilden Stämme der
Ovambo errichtet haben.’; cf. Singelmann 1911; Singelmann in: DKZ 28 (1911): 709; Sin-
gelmann in Borchardt 1912: 5f.
220 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Keiling (Caconda) to TRP, 10.10.08. (excerpts); cf. Hennig 1920: 114.
221 Großer Generalstab 1908; Wallace 2012: 99-102; AGCSSp 3L1.11b3, Lecomte (Catoco-
Cubango) to TRP, 25.5.04; cf. BAB R 1001/6912: 89, DGL to v. Bülow, 9.9.04.
222 AGCSSp 3L1.11b4, Keiling (Caconda) to TRP, 10.11.08; cf. Diário de Notíçias 20.1.10.
223 Gewald 2003a: 300; however, migrant labor ‘touched’ Owamboland cf. McKittrick 2002.
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ters’”.224 The officers of the police stations along this internal borderline
(Okaukwejo, Namutoni, and Tsumeb) had to control the prohibition of ac-
cess to Ovamboland. In March 1914, the parliament in Berlin passed a res-
olution demanding to exclude future “white settlement in Ovam-
boland”.225 The “ambivalence of colonial policies”, marked by the “racist
fantasies of omnipotence” but also by the demands of “modern bureau-
cratic rule” including calls for restraint and criticism of colonialism, mani-
fests itself in the policies of creating a new spatial order by this geographic
division.226
Being well aware of the military planning in Angola, GSWA’s Deputy
Governor Oskar Hintrager warned against any military action in Ovam-
boland. In 1910, he knew the Portuguese were organizing an expedition
against the Kwanyama and was concerned that “Chief Nande, who is well
aware of his affiliation to two states, [will] use this state of affairs to his
advantage in that he moves his Werft to our area and from here sends his
own people against the Portuguese.“ This would have led to unpleasant
complications and could have forced Germany to take action, resulting in
possibly warlike action. “However, this must be avoided at all costs up on
the border.“227 In Portugal, in the meantime, political factions were argu-
ing about the “necessity” to militarily occupy Kwanyama territory. Diario
de Notiçias considered this a task “not to be delayed”, while others point-
ed to the exorbitant costs incurred hitherto in Angola. As Africans else-
where in contested colonial borderlands, Ovambo and Nkhumbi retained
the possibility of playing the colonial powers off against each other to se-
cure better terms. The Kwanyama were visited by rival groups of Por-
tuguese and German officials, who used “all kinds of blandishments to en-
tice labor into their economies.”228
While for Germans the conquest and taxation of Ovamboland were out
of the question, they attempted to win influence ‘diplomatically’ by using
missionary channels. The Portuguese victories over the Cuamato in 1907
and the Evale in 1912 made other kings more responsive to German of-
fers. Much to the chagrin of the Portuguese, in June 1908 Captain Franke
224 Miescher 2012: 44-51; Bley 1996: xix; cf. Dobler 2014: 19; Werner 1993: 140.
225 Der Südwestbote, 11. Jg. No. 36, 25.3.14: 1 (Telegramme).
226 Bley 1996 Introduction: 6; cf. Miescher 2012: 54f.
227 BAB R 1001/1785: 9f, KGW to RKA, 14.5.10, in: Jureit 2012: 107f.; cf. Rizzo 2012: 98.
228 Clarence-S./M. 1975: 379; Dedering 2006: 276 on the ability to ‘negotiate hegemony’;
BAB R 1001/2183: 270, DGL to Bethmann-H., 28.1.10 quot. Diário de Notíçias 20.1.10.
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traveled for the second time to Ondonga. He convinced, in cooperation
with Finnish and German missionaries, King Kambonde (~1865–1909,
reigned 1884–1909) and Uukuambi King Iipumbu ya Tshilongo, (~1873–
1959, 1907–1932) to “sign” “treaties of protection”. They had indeed re-
quested protection – from the Portuguese. (At the occasion, a picture was
taken of Franke that would later lead to much discussion.) In a proto-colo-
nial tradition Kambonde and Iipumbu understood Franke’s treaties to be
concluded among equals that would not imply renunciation of their
sovereignty in Ovamboland. Franke, however, interpreted the documents
as a declaration of submission to the German Emperor and thus to the Ger-
man colonial administration. When Franke moved on to Kwanyama terri-
tory, the Spiritan Father Génie informed a Portuguese officer, so he could
counter the German influence by meeting the soba (King Nande) and
Franke.229 In 1909 Captain Kurt Streitwolf (1871–1954), the future “na-
tive commissioner” of GSWA, entered Ovamboland to convince the chiefs
to send more workers south, but a German station was never erected in
Ovamboland. Merely, in 1909 surveyor Görgens was allowed to work in
Ondonga to clarify on which colonial territory the Ovambo kingdoms
were located. Attempts to create a Luso-German border commission failed
for reasons described above. Finally, given the number of Portuguese
forts, the Germans decided to have at least one police station on the bor-
der. A small post was erected in Kuring Kuru, east of Ovamboland at the
Okavango River opposite Fort Cuangar. However, “[c]ontrary to the Por-
tuguese forts, the establishment of [this] police station … in 1910 was a
mere symbolic gesture which entailed no practical political conse-
quences.” Much to the regret of traders, the German administration also
attempted in the Okavango region to ensure “that no ammunition and alco-
hol” would be delivered to Africans.230
The Portuguese were inclined to make 1914 the decisive year and to fi-
nally subdue the Kwanyama. The end of fighting in the area after the oc-
cupation of Cuamato (1907) and Evale (1912) was ceasefire at best. The
Portuguese profited from this greatly.
229 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Blanc (Caconda) to TRP, 8.8.08; cf. Baericke 1981: 22.
230 Eirola 1992: 237f.; Peltola 2002: 183f.; Keene 2012: 490; Eckl 2004: 209; 2004a: 202-212;
BAB R 1001/2193: 176 BA G’fontein to KGW, 23.10.12 on control of route to Okavango.
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Railway construction in southern Angola, photo: Carl Singelmann,
1911
Not only could the military resources be refilled; but most of all, the rail-
way tracks from Moçâmedes were extended beyond the desert and the es-
carpement. The new King of Kwanyama, Mandume, on the other hand,
did not have these means available. Not only did he see the geographical
barrier shrinking between him and Portugal’s harbor; in addition, since
1911 his people had had to endure drought and famine.
Famine, Labor, and Taxation in Southern Angola
For the people of southern Angola the military onslaughts of the Por-
tuguese were matched by ecological disaster. The rinderpest, having dev-
astated the herds of southern Africa since 1896, reached Ovamboland in
1897 and
“possibly destroy[ed] over ninety per cent of the herds in southern, central
and eastern parts of [Angola] by 1899. The effects of rinderpest were aggra-
Ill. 6
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vated in 1898 by locust invasions”, followed by a “major epidemic of small-
pox. It apparently began in Bié in 1901, and was spread to all parts of Angola
by Ovimbundu porters. … the 1900s and 1910s were marked by an almost
uninterrupted sequence of drought, flood and locust plague. The worst effects
were experienced in the south …”.231
By 1905 all Ovambo polities were considerably weakened by these disas-
ters. The Portuguese offensive 1905-07 to avenge the defeat of 1904 could
hardly be resisted. With their “chain of forts” close to the Kunene River
the colonial administration hoped to “put an end to raiding” activities of
the Ovambo and Nkhumbi who had repeatedly attacked the Ngangela and
Ovimbundu further north “to recoup their losses.” In 1908, famine broke
out. It led to the shipment of tons of grain by the German and Portuguese
governments to convince more Ovambo to work in their economies. Fol-
lowing the visit of Major Franke, the Germans were particular successful
in this. The tendency of young men to seek work elsewhere was increased
by the continuing drought. In 1909 missionaries reported yet another
famine among the Kwanyama up to Caconda.232 As the deadly cycle of
floods, droughts, and locusts continued, Germans sent more supplies.
Hunting was no longer an option, “large game [had] almost disap-
peared”.233 In “1911 people were again dying of hunger”. Levels of vio-
lence increased; families broke up, the resulting tragedies are still being
remembered in recent Namibian memoirs; “women were abandoning their
children”. In late 1914 the rains failed for the third year in succession.
People left their homesteads for good in search of food and work else-
where.234
231 Dias 1981: 374; cf. Echenberg 2001: 41; Mack 1970: 210f.
232 Clarence-Smith/Moorsom 1975: 375; AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Blanc (Caconda) to TRP, 10.3.09.
233 Pearson 1910: 509; cf. AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cuanhama) to TRP, 29.10.11;
22.11.11.
234 Gewald 2003: 217; Ndeikwila 2014: 1f. ‘My father was born in 1911 at Oshihenye village
near Outapi [Ombalantu district] during the year known in my village as the Year of the
Aangandjera Famine. … some Aambalantu and Aangandjera warriors went to raid cattle
from Ehinga [Naulila] village in Ombandja … and came back with a large herd of cattle. …
[However], the Aambalantu warriors conspired among themselves and savagely turned
against the unsuspecting Aangandjera warriors. Scores of Aangandjera were killed … [t]he
Aambalantu took the whole herd of cattle for themselves. .. As a result of that famine there
were only a few people of my father’s age who survived.’; cf. McKittrick 2002: 160f; Iliffe
2007: 215 on African rain patterns 1850–1920.
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Lack of a viable labor force was considered “a grave problem … for
Angola as a whole.”235 In areas where they had been introduced, the
forced labor system as well as the tax system of Angola was considered
not only by German visitors as extremely tough. British humanitarians
severely criticized Portuguese labor policies. In light of H. Nevinson’s
book “A Modern Slavery”, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey personally in-
serted into a letter to the Legation in Lisbon that “with regard to the meth-
ods of recruiting in Angola, the effect on public opinion would be very
prejudicial”. A few days before he had received information from Luanda
that the “condition may be described as worse than stated by H.W. Nevin-
son.”236 Some historians have called this critique a concerted “Anglo-Ger-
man campaign … to prepare public opinion for the imminent partition of
the Portuguese Empire.” However, American missionaries were equally
appalled by the heavy taxation and forced labor.237 Modern research has
summarized “the principles of the old days” on São Tomé Island as having
“consisted in working to death as many Africans as possible, whilst pay-
ing them the strict minimum, or nothing at all.”238 Whereas these “accusa-
tions tended to rally Portuguese political groups around ideas of national
honor”, even opposition members “denounced the government [in parlia-
ment] … for being too harsh in charging the ‘hut tax’ in Angola, which
had led to a recent wave of revolt“.239 The dizimo (tithe tax) had been
levied since the eighteenth century in the northern presidios of Angola; its
oppressive effects were well known. Forced labor for public works was
decreed in 1899 for the entire Empire as a substitute for slavery. The law
was based on the “deeply ingrained feeling that Africans were lazy and
would not work without compulsion”.240
While the “direct taxation of Africans was completely abolished be-
tween 1896 and 1907”241, the enormous costs of “effective” occupation,
military campaigns, and the building of railways had to be incurred.
Therefore, the hut tax (imposto da palhota) was introduced in remoter
parts of Angola in 1907. In colonial Africa taxes were seen as “a ‘sacra-
235 Whittlesey 1924: 119; cf. Cadbury 1910.
236 TNA FO 367/18: 292, Cadbury to Grey, 10.12.06; 296, FO to BML, 29.12.06; cf. Birmi.
2011: 147; Miers 2003: 49 on São Tomé; Bontinck 1969: 116; Duffy 1967; Higgs 2012.
237 Dáskalos 2008: 182; NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 18.10.19: 6.
238 Pélissier 2000: 581.
239 Wheeler 1978: 97; Meneses 1998: 88 (Tamagnini Barb., 6.6.17); cf. Dáskalos 2008: 69.
240 Smith 1991: 505; cf. Pitcher 1991: 56f.; Almeida-Topor 2010: 44; Corrado 2008: 10.
241 Clarence-Smith 1979a: 174 referring to GG Paiva Couceiro; cf. Dáskalos 2008: 34; 37; 46.
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ment of submission’” that served at the same time as “an ‘educational’
measure” to drive Africans into the cash economy.242 In Angola, thou-
sands were forced to seek work in the plantations, fisheries or infrastruc-
tural works.243 However, “it was not till the republican revolution of 1910
that these measures were enforced systematically.” And the republic’s
“greatest proconsul, Norton de Matos,” faced with a dramatic decline in
revenues after the collapse of rubber prices in 1913, continued to justify
neo-slavery as a means of modernizing the infrastructure even though he
aimed at a “completely free, market-driven labor regime”.244 In 1913, the
“encouraging” picture the “Keynesian avant la lettre” drew of Portugal’s
ongoing oeuvre civilisatrice was backed up by the tightening of the tax
system. Speaking against German plans for a repartition of Africa (to the
detriment of Portugal) that would only disturb his modernizing efforts,
Norton de Matos assessed the colony’s occupation to be “effective”. To a
French naval officer he predicted that the ongoing military campaigns
would from now on be replaced by mere “police operations”.245 Soon
facts would prove him wrong. “In colonial matters the republic was far
from liberal”. In São Salvador near the Congo River, the tax collection
caused an “uprising”. In December, Norton personally had to lead 300
men to quell the “revolt”.246 The British missionary Boskell was detained
for “giving assistance to the natives”.247 Eager for more (financial) auton-
omy for his colony, Norton de Matos “became increasingly dictatorial”.248
Contemporaries accused him of having acted ruthlessly.249 Furthermore,
the labor and tax systems invited for corruption and “minor officials were
often accused of abuses”.250
Under the catchword “development” Norton de Matos further tightened
the tax system in 1914: Africans were now pressed to pay their taxes in
cattle to diminish their herds. Considering the high esteem of cattle among
242 Iliffe 2007: 203; cf. Almeida-Topor 2010: 38f.
243 Clarence-Smith/Moorsom 1975: 377; cf. Roberts 1986: 498; Heywood 1987: 357f.
244 In the late 19th century rubber had substituted revenues incurred through slave trade. Wild
rubber accounted for 77% of Angola’s exports in 1910, Clarence-S. 1979a: 176; Heywood
1987: 357, 86% of exp. in 1903; Newitt 2007: 54; Alexandre 2005: 374; Dáskalos 2008: 67.
245 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 130, Lecoq to M. Marine, 2.9.13; Dáskalos 2008: 21; 55.
246 Birm. 2011: 157; MAELC CPC/NS/9, Portugal: 188, FML, 20.2.14; Norton 2001: 202.
247 NARA RG 59, MF 705, roll 28, 853m00 USC Boma to SoS, 11.3.14
248 Roberts 1986: 499; 521; cf. Newitt 2007: 53-5; Oliveira 1998: 561; Wheeler 1978a.
249 Clarence-Smith 1976: 221f; cf. 1979a: 168; Guimarães 1923: 21f.; Mendy 2003: 43.
250 Smith 1974: 659; cf. Capella 1977; Schaper 2012: 368 on the hut tax in Cameroon.
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many people of Angola, this policy likely caused uproar.251 Vying for a
balanced budget and additional labor force, he hoped to force Africans in-
to the colonial economy. With the end of the caravan trade, people of the
central districts were expected to make a living of either commercial agri-
culture (corn) or to seek work in the plantations. Those living in the south
were to be employed on plantations, at fisheries, or public works.252 How-
ever, the development of Angola’s colonial economy remained rudimenta-
ry. The social changes it caused were, on the other hand, tragic for many
of the people affected.
New Friends? – Luso-German Trade and the Study Commission
When King Dom Carlos I was assassinated in February 1908, the German
Parliament expressed its condolences to a “befriended nation”. The revo-
lution of October 5, 1910 led to the downfall of the Bragança-Coburgs, a
“caricature of a parliamentary monarchy à l’anglaise”.253 However, the
new republican regime, short of “any foundational consensus” and bring-
ing together an “explosive combination of factors: weak governments,
commitment to economic and social reform, planning misconceptions”,
was unable to alleviate Portugal’s political and social challenges (illiteracy
stood at ~80 per cent). Assumptions fed by positivism and/or partly social-
ist thought “that progress would feed itself” and related hopes for an “era
of peace, of prosperity and of justice” that would halt the “decline” of the
“first world power” were soon disappointed. Among the Portuguese elites
the old sense of “national failure” became widespread once more.254
In German political circles and the press the Portuguese republic made
no favorable impression. Republican leaders complained about the Ger-
man “chill” towards the republic and the complaisances pour les émigrés
portugais; even German support for royalist plots was assumed. The Ger-
man government was hesitant to receive a new Portuguese minister after
the revolution, as it had not yet recognized the republican government.
1.4
251 BAB R 1001/6640: 97, Dr. Vageler, excerpt: ‘Die Bahnfrage auf dem Planalto‘, 15.7.19;
Norton 2001: 184; Medeiros 1977: 74; Dias 1976: 263.
252 Péclard 1999: 123f.; Birmingham 1978: 536; Pössinger 1973: 31f.; Dias 1981: 370.
253 SBRT 12. L.P. 93.Sess., 3.2.08: 2835; Labourdette 2000: 529; Wheeler 1978: 44: Liver-
more 1967: 319.
254 Madur. 2010: 648; 657; Vincent-S. 1974: 621; Wheeler 1972: 173; 194; Arenas 2003: 4;12.
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This policy cost the government in Berlin the last sympathies of Prime
Minister Bernhardino Machado (1851–1944).255 Furthermore, it was
known in Lisbon that the Deputy, Pan-German, and former Governor of
German East Africa, General Eduard von Liebert, had called the Por-
tuguese the “savages of Europe” incapable of colonizing and bound to
cede their corrupted colonies to the Germans. Implicitly, he thereby allud-
ed to the Portuguese’s somewhat awkward standing, described by later
generations as being “simultaneously semi colonizers and semi colonized
(this can be said in relation to Brazil but also to England).”256
The Luso-German relations regarding the colonies were characterized
on the Portuguese side by mistrust of German territorial pretensions, and
on the German side by disdain for the Portuguese (colonial) administra-
tion, considered to be inefficient and corrupt.257 German colonial officials
carefully considered almost every policy change or legal reform in the
British or French colonies. They were willing to “learn” from the more ex-
perienced colonizers, but for them Portugal was not among those – stereo-
typing was rampant. German visitors to Angola complained that Angola
still “belongs to the dark continent thanks to the 300-year-Unkultur of the
Portuguese.” The first republican minister in Berlin, Sidónio País (1872–
1918) worked hard not only to counter the Anglo-German rapprochement
about Angola, but also to create a more favorable impression of the Por-
tuguese colonial enterprise. In early 1913, Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von
Jagow (1863–1935), when discussing the future of the Portuguese
colonies with Pais, flatly denied the existence of any agreement with Great
Britain.258
255 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 27.3.11; cf. Wheeler 1978: 64; 71.
256 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 7.2.12; Arenas 2003: xxi; 17; Portuguese
ministers emphazised that Liebert did not speak as an official. He ‘represented an officer
type hitherto unknown in traditional Prussian army circles – the general as popular orator
and political functionary, who was wooed by political groups because of his high social
prestige, and who impressed mass meetings with frowning remarks about civilian failure in
the foreign office even more than by hollow patriotic pathos. At bottom he knew nothing
about politics.’ Ritter 1970: 109; cf. Blackbourn 1998: 431; Martin-M. 2008: 8 on Spain.
257 Cf. Silva 2006: 310; allegations of corruption were ‘common enough’; Curto 2005: 113;
Rodrigues 2009: 37; Marques 2006: 198; Smith 1991: 510; 1974: 658f.; Dias 1976: 253;
258; Clarence-S. 1976: 216; 222; Osterhammel 2003: 70 ‘the Belgians had the best reputa-
tion in Africa, and the often inept and corrupt Portuguese administrators had the worst’.
258 Lindner 2011: 55 on the ‘Topos des Lernens’; NAN A.529 n.1: 3, O. Busch: Studienreise…
nach Angola [~12/14]; Samara 2004: 52f.; 152; Silva 2006: 318; Reiner 1924: 333.
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While the Monarchy’s approach to Portugal’s colonies was “strictly
mercantilist” and Brazil had for centuries remained “Angola’s traditional
economic partner, customer, banker, shipper, and food-supplier”, the re-
publican government “preached a closer relationship” between the colony
and Lisbon.259 Now it was up to the republicans to prove their more effi-
cient colonial policy. Considering that Angola “lurched from one crisis to
the next in a constant state near bankruptcy”260 and thus caused a drain on
the public finances, the metropolitan government was eager to find means
of investment to make the colony profitable. Prime Minister Afonso Cos-
ta, the “greatest of the republican leaders”, considered a balanced budget
to be the “cornerstone” on the republic’s “path [to] international re-
spectability”.261 His generation of politicians was characterized by “a new
spirit of realism”. They believed in “a more rational exploitation of the
colonies in the interest of Portugal”.262 In light of the Anglo-German ne-
gotiations Lisbon aimed at “emphasizing the genuine unanimity of Por-
tuguese feelings against the alienation under any guise whatever of any
colonial territory”.263
However, since the days of Sá de Bandeira’s attempts at reforming the
Empire, the implementation of new policies had been hampered by the
“poor State finances, the backwardness of the country’s economic infras-
tructure, and the constant political struggles”.264 In 1879, Historian
Joaquim de Oliveira Martins deplored: “The conquests [the colonies] are
now tainted by the infamous brand of slavery and are a symbol of idle-
ness, corruption and syphilis.”265 The American consul, Robert S. New-
ton, when reporting about Angola’s first railway construction site, spoke
with disdain of “[t]he useless and extravagant manner in which money has
been squandered”.266 Given the “persistence of the plundering mentality”
among Angola’s colonial elite and considering that “Portuguese capital
259 Pitcher 1991: 56; 62; cf. Alexandre 2005: 364; Birmingham 2011: 146; 1982: 343.
260 Birmingham 1974: 196: ‘profits…came less from colonial enterprise, than from commer-
cial links with the markets of the surrounding kingdoms of the Bakongo, the Imbangala, the
Lunda, the Chokwe, the Ovambo’; Corrado 2008: 27; cf. Dáskalos 2008: 131f.
261 Birmingham 2011: 153; Meneses 2010: 36, in 1913 Costa claimed a ‘budget surplus of
£117.000’.
262 Smith 1991: 499; Clarence-Smith 1979a: 167; 176; cf. Alexandre 2005: 366; 371f.
263 Vincent-Smith 1974: 624; cf. Corrado 2008: 120; Guevara 2006.
264 Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa 2006: 111; cf. Alexandre 2005: 366.
265 J. Oliveira Martins 1879, transl. in Corrado 2008: 116.
266 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 3, USC to SoS, 9.4.79; v. 4, USC to SoS,15.11.88 45 km of the
Luanda-Ambaca line were inaugurated on 31.10.88; Marques 2006: 220; Norton 2001: 176.
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was notoriously reluctant to involve itself in [colonial] grassroots
projects”,267 as already contemporaries remarked,268 foreign investment
was now considered by many an instrument to improve the situation. This
in turn would strengthen Portuguese sovereignty over its colonies. Portu-
gal’s colonial trade increased considerably during the decade prior to the
war. The base for the success was laid already in 1892 with a new protec-
tive tariff law privileging Portuguese exports to Africa and requiring all
African exports to third countries to be re-exported via Portugal. From
1904 to 1913 Portugal imported goods valued at around 600,000,000 dol-
lars from its colonies and exported merchandise valued at
around 300,000,000 dollars to the colonies. This “enormous difference …
created a balance of trade in favor of Portugal” that surpassed all profits of
previous decades.269
Despite disdain and mistrust between Germany and Portugal, commer-
cial and political cooperation was possible. German exports to Portugal
had more than doubled from 1898 to 1908, when a new treaty of com-
merce was signed. Germany was among the most important trading part-
ners of Portugal, accounting for more than 35 per cent of its total exports
(Germany’s exports to Portugal accounted for less than ½ per cent of its
exports).270 When the Anglo-German negotiations on the Portuguese Em-
pire recommenced, the Germans, with certain suddenness, also began to
court the Portuguese. In January 1912 the German gunboat Panther visited
Lisbon. It was the first foreign man-o-war to visit the republic and it was
warmly greeted by several ministers. Foreign Minister Vasconcelos spoke
of a Luso-German “flirt”. And when asked in the Senate about Portugal’s
relations with Germany in light of the “colonial question”, he responded
that they were “excellent”. A short while later, the gunboat Eber visited
Luanda.271 German officials were eager to secure railway and other con-
cessions in southern Angola and thus sought closer connections with the
Portuguese once they realized that this policy seemed the only way to en-
ter the Angolan market. In August 1912, the American minister in Lisbon
267 Corrado 2008: 4; Smith 1991: 502; cf. Marques 2006: 195; Alexandre 2005: 372f.; Smith
1974: 656; Roberts 1986: 495 Portugal’s colonial trade was only 7-10 per cent of her for-
eign trade (1905-26).
268 TNA FO 179/390: 10, Peel: Report on Portugal and her colonial possessions, 11.1.04.
269 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 179: 631, USCG to SoS, 25.4.21: 5566; Corrado 2008: 40;
Wheeler 1978: 29.
270 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/35, Portugal: 106; 80, French Embassy Berlin to MAE, 8.12.08.
271 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 7.2.12; Manz 2012: 199; 213.
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assumed that the present government had no more friends (among foreign
powers), with the “possible exception of Germany, which, under a show
of friendship, is improving every opportunity of fishing in the troubled
waters.”272
The results of the Luso-German “flirt” were soon to be felt in Africa.
Germany had been represented in Angola already since the 1880s by (lo-
cal) commercial agents. For years, the Portuguese businessman Eduardo
Prazeres catered for German sailors or business interests in Luanda. In
August 1907 the Vice-Governor of GSWA (1902–07), Hans Tecklenburg
took over the German consulate in Luanda. Tecklenburg did not stay long
and was relocated to Boma in Belgian Congo.273 Prazeres was reappoint-
ed. However, since not only the political but also Germany’s commercial
interests in Angola grew, the post in Luanda was again elevated into a
consulate in December 1913. For the first time it was headed by a career-
diplomat. This was later interpreted as proof of Germany’s less-than-sub-
tle pénetration pacifique to execute its annexation designs. Consul Dr.
Ernst Eisenlohr (1882–1958) arrived from the German embassy in Lon-
don. He reported to the legation in Lisbon under Friedrich Rosen (1856–
1935), and oversaw Vice Consul Heym in Benguela and Vice Consul
Georg Schöss in Moçâmedes, the agent of the Deutsche Ostafrika Linie.274
In January 1914, the Deutsche Ost-Afrika Linie inaugurated a direct
connection from Europe to Lobito and Moçâmedes, but also from the
ports in GSWA, Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund to Angola.275 In Lisbon,
Friedrich Rosen worked hard to convince Afonso Costa to admit German
investments in Angola. In a sort of “last-minute panic” the German gov-
ernment pressed German investors to get active in Angola to prove that
Germany was willing to take responsibility for its “sphere of influence”. It
is said this “diplomatic and financial offensive” was intended “to weaken
Portugal’s hand in Africa”; but in a long-term perspective the investments
made under the premises of an expansionist foreign policy favored Portu-
272 NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753.00/2, USML to SoS, 26.8.12.
273 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 5, German Consul Luanda to USCG Boma, 27.8.08. It can be as-
sumed that the post (in charge of Angola, Belgian, French Kongo) was not a promotion for
the hard-line administrator who oversaw the Governorate during the Herero-/Nama-War.
274 PA Luanda 1, betr. Einrichtung, AA to Eisenlohr, London, 10.11.13; AA to Consul Luanda,
13.12.13; Consul to AA, 23.12.13; 24.1.14; DGL to Consul, 3.7.14; Cann 2001: 147.
275 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 146, transl. Tägliche Rundschau, 12.11.13.
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gal and Great Britain more than Germany.276 Until mid-1914, however,
the German efforts to commercially penetrate Angola paid off:
“[A] German line of freight and passenger steamers made regular calls at Lu-
anda, Lobito and other ports, and, owing largely to its assistance, German ex-
port firms at Hamburg and Bremen had built up an important trade in Angola.
All the merchandise that would benefit by the 20 per cent reduction in cus-
toms duties if arriving in Portuguese vessels was transshipped, and other
goods such as machinery, were sent direct in the German steamers. Another
factor highly favorable to the German trade was the excellent system of local
representation in the principal towns of Angola. At Luanda, for instance, …
there were no less than five representatives of German export houses … Ex-
cessively liberal credits were allowed on all orders, but this system was
proven to be a failure in 1912 when the rubber crisis caused financial difficul-
ties throughout the Colony and some of the German firms, suffering severe
losses, were forced to exercise more caution in granting credit. The German
trade, however, still increased, and, during the year 1913, it is estimated that
more than one-half of the nationalized imports [imports originating in foreign
countries, then imported to metropolitan Portugal, duty paid thereon, and fi-
nally re-exported to Angola] were of German manufacture and probably at
least 50 per cent of the foreign trade imports arriving in foreign vessels.” Ger-
many was also “the greatest ultimate market for Angolan products.”277
Similar to Angola the Germans were involved in the commerce of
Mozambique, which they “penetrated slowly, sans éclat but surely”.278
The success of German business in the Portuguese dominions was also
said to be due to Portuguese language education offered by a number of
German business schools.279 The opening up of the Angolan market was
also supported by Germans in GSWA. In 1912 the businessman Heinrich
Ziegler of Lüderitzbucht, who had traveled widely in Angola and was con-
vinced of its potential for farmers and miners, set up the Angola Bund with
public support. The British Consul to GSWA, Muller, wrote to his Foreign
Secretary Grey that the “purpose” of the Angola Bund “is to awaken inter-
est in GSWA for the annexation of Portuguese Angola.”280 Also the
French noted with interest that Ziegler declared Angola to be a necessary
“territorial complement” to GSWA most of all because of the future har-
bor in Baía dos Tigres. The Bund thus promoted the purchase of “unoccu-
pied government land and making it available as farming areas to German,
276 MAELC 192 CPCOM/19, Portugal: 338, FML, 16.3.14; Canis 2011: 535; Cann 2001: 146.
277 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 610, USC Boma, Report on Trade of Angola, 9.9.15.
278 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 115, French Consul Lourenço Mar. to MAE, 16.5.13.
279 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 6.12.19; cf. Tschapek 2000: 355f.
280 Muller to FO, 11.12.12, in Vincent-S. 1974: 628; cf. Samson 2013: 41; Cann 2001: 149.
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Boer and Portuguese settlers on easy financial terms.”281 In the following
two years, the number of German immigrants to Angola increased indeed.
They partly arrived from GSWA, but most were destitute and looked for
work. The German consuls were not pleased by these new arrivals.282
At first, Portuguese comments about the foundation of the Bund were
rather sober: For the Jornal de Comercio Germany’s expansionist inten-
tions seemed evident and it was equally evident that Portugal had to stay
in charge of its colony. Thus, on Portuguese territory the railway connect-
ing the German copper mines of Otavi with the harbor of Porto Alexandre
had to be built and operated by the Portuguese.283 However, watching
Germany’s growing success in peacefully penetrating Angola many Por-
tuguese politicians soon expressed their concern. In mid-1914 Portuguese
foreign policy “gravitated around the colonial question”. The new Foreign
Minister, Alfredo Freire de Andrade, a former Governor of Mozambique
(1906–10) and previously Colonial Minister, was an ardent adherent to
Portugal’s alliance with Great Britain.284 He was alarmed that Portugal
“would wake up one day and find that to all intent and purposes Angola
had become a German possession.” Also the new Governor General of
Angola, Major José Norton de Matos was convinced that the “Germans
had aims in Angola which went well beyond economic penetration”. He
prohibited Portuguese from joining the Angola Bund. In early 1913, after
reading Friedrich von Bernhardi’s book Germany and the next War (1911)
he – so he remembered later – predicted in a letter to the Minister of
Colonies that in a future war Angola and Mozambique would be among
the first victims of German aggression. Firm in his anti-German senti-
ments, he urged for preparations.285 To counter the growing German pres-
ence, Norton de Matos asked for a French diplomat in Luanda (in 1913,
only Great Britain maintained a consul of career in Luanda, Mr. Herbert
Hall Hall) since France’s incumbent consular agent, Léon Appert, repre-
sented a German trading house.286 The French Minister in Lisbon respond-
281 MAELC 192 CPCOM/19, Portugal: 32-6 MAE to Senateur Gervais, 21.4.13; Southern
2007: 5.
282 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.I) VK Benguela to German Consulate Luanda, 2.9.14: ‘That which
came from GSWA to Lobito can neither contribute to giving prominence to German names
nor to serving our interests’; cf. Manz 2012: 199; Stassen 2011: 81.
283 MAELC 192 CPC/CP/NS/19, Portugal: 13, FML to MAE, 5.2.13.
284 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Portugal: 86, Daeschner to MAE, 29.5.14.
285 Vincent-Smith 1974: 628; Baericke 1981: 19; Dáskalos 208: 182; Norton 2001: 183f.; 207.
286 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 131, Lieutn. Lecoq to Minstre de la Marine, 2.9.13.
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ed it was “too late” to counter the German dominance, since Angola was
considered by the Germans as one of the “most precious elements of their
future colonial empire.”287 Given the German success, Norton de Matos
was also against opening Angola for (more) international trade. Instead,
“an ultra protective custom tariff favoring both the goods imported from
Portugal and the Portuguese merchant marine” was upheld; irrespective of
the fact that this was “a burden upon the merchants of Angola” since they
had to import almost all goods from foreign countries.288 The difficulties
were aggravated by the fact that “the steamship line [Empreza Nacional de
Navegação] and the state railways are notoriously mismanaged and have
presented an opportunity all too generally used of disposing of those hav-
ing political claims on the government.”289
On the other hand, there were politicians in Lisbon who acknowledged
that foreign, including German, capital could well be used as a means to
develop Angola without “denationalizing” the colony. Whereas the com-
petitive element of colonialism is indisputable, also a sense of “coopera-
tion” among colonial powers had developed in Europe that focused on the
exchange of expertise and transfer of knowledge. The task of “civilizing”
Africa began to be understood as a common European project as formulat-
ed by the Institut Colonial International founded in Brussels in 1894.290
Hitherto, the Anglo-German treaty of 1898 had deterred “the Por-
tuguese from seeking loans [abroad] or granting concessions”. As a result,
credit for commercial purposes had almost been non-existent in Angola.
While it was a common feat of African colonies that “public investment
during that period was small, and private capital influx even smaller”291,
the financial situation of Angola was at the brink of collapse. The press in
Angola did not hesitate to criticize the “military bureaucracy” of the new
republic that had caused an annual deficit of 4,000 Contos.292 Some politi-
cians “privately admitted that the best solution would be for Portugal to
sell her colonies.” The “currency was unstable”; inflation remained a con-
stant threat.293
287 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/42, Portugal, FML to MAE, 30.11.13.
288 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 610, USC Boma, Report on Trade of Angola, 9.9.15.
289 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 169: 877, USML to SoS, 17.10.19.
290 Lindner 2011: 86f.; 97; cf. Trotha 2004; on ‘civilization’ Bowden 2005; 2009; Pauka 2013.
291 Vincent-Smith 1974: 620; Young 1994: 136.
292 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/8, Portugal: 174, FML to MAE, 14.11.11.
293 Smith 1974: 657; cf. Roberts 1986: 494; Reiner 1924: 334.
1. Luso-German Colonial Relations before the First World War
91
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
While excluding any cession of territorial sovereignty, the government
confirmed its acceptance of foreign-financed railways in its colonies in
1912.294 In Angola the two railway lines from Luanda and Benguela were
to be extended up to the copper mines of Katanga in Belgian Congo. Fur-
thermore, the southern-most Moçâmedes railway was planned to be built
via Lubango up to the Kunene River. Financed with public funds, 176 ki-
lometers had been completed in late 1914.295 However, for strategic rea-
sons the old plan to reach GSWA and to connect it to the Otavi Railway
scheduled to be built through Ovamboland by German engineers was put
on hold. The German authorities, on the other hand, continued to push for
the construction of this line.296 Altogether, more than 2,000 km of railway
were planned. Prime Minister Machado, recognizing “no immediate dan-
ger” emanating from the Anglo-German negotiations, confirmed in March
1914 that his government was “ready to open up Angola” for foreign in-
vestors. In July 1914, a decree was published “authorizing the Portuguese
government to contract a loan of 8,000,000 escudos for developing” An-
gola by investing in infrastructure and agriculture.297 With a law on the fi-
nancial autonomy of the colonies, such amounts could be borrowed from
(foreign) lenders. The accompanying report to Parliament drew a grim pic-
ture of the colony’s financial situation, the works of Norton de Matos and
his policy to oppose opening the colony to more international trade.298 The
French Colonial Minister, Albert Lebrun (1871–1950), warned his col-
league in the Foreign Ministry, Gaston Doumergue (1863–1937), Portu-
gal’s new loan policy would help the Germans in their policy of peaceful
penetration, commencing with commercial exploitation and ending with
294 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 31, MAE. Note sur les Colonies Portug., 30.12.12.
295 Dáskalos 2008: 78-84; NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 165: 850, Communication, 29.5.18. In
1914 there were ‘540 kilometers of state railroads [Malanje; Moçâmedes] and 901 kilome-
ters of private railroads [Ambaca; Benguela] in Angola’; cf. Lemos 1929: 73; Tschapek
2000: 361-84.
296 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 148, transl. Post, 12.11.13; cf. Tschapek 2000: 396.
297 MAELC 192 CPC/CP/NS/19, Portugal: 308, FML to MAE, 7.3.14; NARA RG 84, Lisbon,
v. 151: 851, USML to SoS, 22.7.14. The government estimated the costs for the railway to
exceed 20,000 Contos (90 Million Marks). Altogether, a credit of 40,000 Contos (180 Mil-
lion Marks) was considered necessary to upgrade the habors, roads, railways and to im-
prove the administration (Südwestbote, Jg. 11, No. 75, 24.6.1914: 2, ref. to Kölnische
Zeitung); Dáskalos 2008: 133; 10 reis were equivalent to 1 centavo: 1,000 reis or 1 milreis
equal to 1 escudo. 1,000 escudo equal to 1 conto. Reis and milreis were eliminated when
the republic was proclaimed.
298 Vincent-Smith 1974: 628.
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annexation. In the interest of France, Lebrun deemed it wise for the “Paris
market” to play a role too.299
In order to attract German investors, the German government ordered
the thorough exploration of southern Angola. After heavy pressure from
the Foreign and Colonial Offices in Berlin “to create German interests in
Angola” the Warburg Bank convinced in early 1914 other reluctant Ger-
man banks, Krupp as well as investors from Portugal and Belgium to
found a company (Überseestudiensyndicat) with the aim to study the tech-
nical and economic potential of the southern railway that had been under
discussion by then for 15 years. As it was the case in Germany’s own
colonial empire that proved to be an almost complete economic failure
since the government paid more in subsidies to the colonial budgets than it
received from colonial revenues, also the penetration of Angola was nei-
ther caused by nor based on private financial interests; it was a purely
state-run policy. The Foreign Office remained heavily involved in the set-
ting up of the Überseestudiensyndicat and sent a representative to its first
meeting in February 1914. He urged to act quickly in Angola. It was
agreed that an expedition should be sent to investigate the future railway
track. Internally, it was admitted that the expedition was sent for “purely
political reasons”.300
The expedition was set up immediately. It was called Comissão luso-
allemão des estudos de Caminho de Ferro do Sul de Angola. Formally a
private enterprise301 without “official German character”, it could count
on the support of a few Portuguese politicians, especially the Minister of
Colonies, Alfredo Lisboa de Lima (1867–1935), and Sidonio Pais in
Berlin.302 The expedition was assigned to investigate the course of the rail
track and other investment opportunities like mining and farming, both de-
pending on the railway. Until that time Moçâmedes had “never really
prospered as a trading center. It was too close to Benguela, and communi-
cations with the interior were hampered by the twin obstacles of the desert
and the abrupt face of the escarpment.”303 Also in Angola304 hopes ran
high that “wild lands [could be] tamed into productive estates” by running
299 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/9, Portugal: 189, Fr. Minister of Colonies to MAE, 20.2.14.
300 Canis 2011: 534; Gissibl 2011: 159f; cf. Tschapek 2000: 384-411; Rosen 1932: 253-9.
301 On English-Portuguese joint commissions (commissỡes mixtas) cf. Wheeler 1974: 582.
302 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Remark Consulate Luanda, ~19.10.14; cf. Silva 2006: 340.
303 Clarence-Smith 1976: 215; cf. Santos 1978: 187-90.
304 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS, No. 89, 2.5.74 ‘what a wonderful reformation’.
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rail lines across Africa. Colonial imagination assumed that the “mere
whistle of the locomotive would beckon the traffic necessary for amortiza-
tion of the capital costs.” However, excruciating natural obstacles, diffi-
cult labor conscription and doubtful commercial prospects stood at odds
with these “visions”.305
The German part of the group was led by the engineer Dr. A. Schubert;
further German members were the engineer Thurner, the geologist and
agronomist Dr. Paul Vageler (1882–1963) and the three surveyors, Curt
Hempel, Claren and Rudolph Klemoscheg.306. The Portuguese party was
headed by the former Governor General of Angola, Colonel Manuel M.
Coelho (1857–1943) (the immediate predecessor of Norton de Matos)307
and Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos R.M. de Faria e Maia (c. 1870–1942), an
engineer who had already been involved in colonial settlement schemes
for years. It does not appear that the Portuguese had to be “intimidated by
Germany” to agree to the commission, as was later claimed. Before their
departure to Angola, the German members were warmly welcomed in
April 1914 in Lisbon by Prime Minister Machado and Minister Lisboa de
Lima. Both politicians expressed their hopes for a close cooperation be-
tween the neighboring colonies and underlined common colonial inter-
ests.308 Those more critical of the German undertakings considered the
colonial minister naive. In Lisbon speculations about German intentions
were “heightened” at the time. Diplomatic circles spoke of Germany’s “de
facto preponderance” in Angola.309. The German government knew about
these fears. When the commission was on its way to Luanda, Consul
Eisenlohr was ordered not to join their expedition. Confidentially, the For-
eign Office explained that the Studienyndicat had caused “concern” in
Portugal. Allegedly, Norton de Matos, who arrived in Lisbon too in April
1914, “was taken by complete surprise” when he learnt of the group. An
305 Young 1994: 134f; positive Iliffe 2007: 211 railways cut transport costs by 90–95 percent.
306 BAB R 1001/6634: 157, Vageler to KGW,~11/1914, Ax 11 Memo Allem., 23.5.22.
307 The American Minister reported about M. Coelho, after he became Prime Minister in 1921
following a military coup: Coelho is ‘little known. He … held the position of Governor
General of Angola where he is reported to have shown himself absolutely inefficient. He
was leader in the first revolutionary revolt against the Monarchy in 1891, was discharged
from the army and exiled for five years’. NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 175: 800, USML to
SoS, 22.10.21.
308 BAB R 1001/6634: 80f., Report of Schubert, Ax 1 tMemo All., 23.5.22; Cann 2001: 147.
309 Vincent-S. 1974: 629; Rosen 1932: 147 ‘Mistrust with respect to German ambitions in A.’
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“attentive reader of the international press”, he was perfectly aware of the
Anglo-German accord of 1913 about the division of Portugal’s Empire.310
In the following months the Germans “began hacking their way through
the Angolan bush … while innocently assisted by compliant Portuguese
district commissioners following Lisboa de Lima’s instruction.”311 The
Portuguese colonists in Angola considered the expedition with suspicion
and the two Portuguese officers deplored that they were deemed by their
compatriots to be “traitors”.312 Rumors spread in Angola about the Ger-
mans closing in on the colony also technically. In May 1914, it was
claimed that the railhead of the German Ovamboland railway (being still
in its planning phase and never going beyond Outjo) had reached
Kwanyama territory were “the Germans” maintained nine Protestant mis-
sion stations.313
On the other hand, not only the German government had plans for the
future. Also the Portuguese had high hopes for Angola. As the German
Colonial Office’s expert on agriculture, Vageler was asked by the Por-
tuguese to investigate the possibility of populating the planalto with up to
100,000 colonists.314 Since the 1850s it had been considered attractive
“because of its plentiful supplies of ivory and because its temperate cli-
mate was well-suited for white settlement.”315 In 1902 the geographer
Georg Hartmann assumed the fact “unquestionable” that the area of
Humbe and Ovamboland would – one day – be of “great economic value.”
However, after months of travel across the area the head of the Study
Commission Schubert expressed his conviction that the establishment of
the commission was based on wrong assumptions of the value of southern
Angola. He was “very disappointed about the country” and could see no
potential for settlements.316 When later geographers spoke of the area to
the east of the Chela Range as “the finest corn-producing area in Angola”,
they all agreed that further south, near the Kunene River the territory,
310 PA Luanda 1, AA to Consul, 25.2.; Telgr. AA, 1.5.14; Norton 2001: 203; Cann 2001: 147;
Dáskalos 2008: 183.
311 Southern 2007: 6, referring to Leal 1966: 308.
312 BAB R 1001/6634: 83, Report of A.Schubert, Annex 1 to Memo Allem., 23.5.22; BAB R
1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 12, testimony of General Norton de Matos, 5.5.26.
313 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling to TRP, 19.5.14 ‘Allons vois ce que fera la républic.’
314 BAB R 1001/6640: 73 extra-file: 3f., protocol stenographique Dr. Vageler, 12.10.25.
315 Clarence-Smith 1976: 215; Mora 1940: 585 before WWI ~12,000 Europeans lived in An-
gola; cf. Oliveira Marques 1998: 558.
316 Hartmann 1902: 229; PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schubert, 3.9.14; Medeiros 1977: 69.
1. Luso-German Colonial Relations before the First World War
95
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
“rolling and barren, would seem to be of little use, agriculturally or pas-
torally.”317 Soon, this would be a theater of war.
The First World War in Angola and GSWA
The Outbreak of the War and its Impact on GSWA and Angola
The military defensibility of the German colonies was not only debated
early on; it was doubted by many decision makers. For this reason, Chief
of Staff Count Waldersee hoped in 1889 that Germany would soon rid it-
self of the overseas possession just acquired. Most famous is the question
Chancellor Leo von Caprivi put to Governor Eduard von Liebert, who had
recently returned from GEA: “But how will you defend East Africa
against England?” The course of the First World War would prove
Caprivi’s skepticism right. After all, already in 1891 it was decided by
Emperor William II. “that GSWA could be sacrificed to maintain GEA” in
case of war.318
On August 2 and 3, 1914 Germany’s Colonial Secretary, Wilhelm Solf
sent wireless messages to the colonies: “Calm the settlers. There is no dan-
ger of war in the colonies.” The anglophile Solf soon recognized that this
was an illusion. After the war, he was heavily criticized for his “naivete”.
In private, however, Solf allegedly considered the war already lost for
Germany by August 4.319 Ironically, some German politicians and French
pacifists alike assumed that (southern) Africa would remain neutral terri-
tory due to provisions of the Berlin Act of 1885 that, in fact, mentioned
merely that colonial “territories … may be” considered neutral. However,
such “precautions proved useless”320 since the Allies decided to attack
German colonies for several reasons: the occupation would close their
ports to the German navy and allow better control of the oceans; the Ger-
man wireless stations could be disrupted; Germany’s breach of Belgian
neutrality made the claim of Africa’s neutrality according to the Berlin
Act less convincing and had repercussions on Belgian Congo; also, the ex-
2.
2.1
317 Wells 1940: 558f.; Miller 1982: 17 ‘zone of sandy soils and unstable climate’.
318 Quoted in Ritter 1970: 110; Samson 2013: 30; cf. Herwig 1980: 97f.; Michels 2006: 165.
319 Vietsch 1961: 135; 137; Brunschwig 1957: 178f.; Hintrager 1955: 190; Wolff 1984: 69 (# 5:
10.8.14); Klöckner in: Kolonialkriegerb. 1924: 58; Doß 1977: 191; Förster 2012: 190.
320 Cooper 1991: 371 referring to Fr. Passy; Förster 2012: 191.
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clusion of Germany from Africa and colonial expansion developed into an
Allied war aim; the occupied German colonies would be useful as a bar-
gaining tool during peace negotiations; finally, South Africa was “keen” to
incorporate GSWA into the Union.321 As a first step, Britain used its mar-
itime supremacy to prevent ships from reaching German colonial harbors.
The Royal Navy sealed off the entrances to the North Sea. The German
colonies were left to economic starvation. The blockade proved the Ger-
man assumption right that the “colonies must be defended in the North
Sea”, allegedly “England’s weak point”.322 This defense failed, however.
GSWA’s agriculture was incapable of producing sufficient food to sus-
tain 14,000 Europeans. In the mostly arid or semi-arid country cereals or
fruit and vegetables were grown in insufficient quantities.323 Storage ca-
pacities were limited. And barely any provisions were made to feed the
Europeans for an extended period of time without constant supply from
Germany and neighboring British South Africa.
GSWA’s Governor Theodor Seitz (1863–1949) – not as much an an-
glophile as Solf – assumed that his colony would be involved in the war
rather sooner than later. On August 2 he asked the police to compile lists
of Russians and Britons. Those trying to agitate Africans against German
rule were to be apprehended immediately. When on August 5 Britain’s en-
try into the war became known in GSWA,324 rumors spread that also Por-
tugal had declared war on Germany. Haunted by the possibility of an at-
tack from all sides, Seitz asked via wireless message the Colonial Office
in Berlin about the relations with Portugal. On August 8, he received the
answer that there was no war with Portugal. This was correct, yet it told
him only half of the truth.
When Great Britain entered the war on August 4, 1914 after the Ger-
man invasion of Belgium and France, the Portuguese parliament decided
in a stormy session by a close margin not to join the war on Britain’s side.
Anti-German sentiments seemed widespread.325 For fear of Spain entering
321 Michel 2004: 920; cf. Samson 2006: 29; 2013: 40; Bührer 2011: 359.
322 Tirpitz to Büchsel, 29.7.99, in: Kennedy 1984: 6; cf. Herwig 1980: 148f.; Seitz 1920: 1.
323 This was a difference to GEA where farmers were able to produce foodstuff, DOAZ, Jg.17,
no.28, 3.4.15 ‘DOA und der Weltkrieg‘: ‘Covering the food requirements for both Euro-
pean and the indigenous populations is permenantly assured, for everything that one needs
for daily life is being delivered from the [colony] and in more than adequate amounts.’ This
was overstated, famine hit GEA. On the Allied blockade Stevenson 2004: 199f.
324 NAN BOM 34, GA 5, KGW to BA Omaruru, 2.8. 14; Hennig 1920: 3.
325 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Portugal: 121, FML Daeschner to MAE Delcassé, 8.12.14.
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the war on the German side if its Iberian rival joined the Allies and con-
cerned with Portugal’s “demands for more [colonial] territory” after the
war, Britain “applied diplomatic pressure upon Bernardino Machado’s
government not to become belligerent”. However, Portugal was asked to
not explicitly declare its neutrality. In 1912 the Admiralty War Staff in
London had defined what Britain should expect from Portugal in time of
war: Portugal should be “a neutral sufficiently strong to make her neutrali-
ty respected, whose ports were free to the British mercantile marine but
denied to the warships of the enemy.” It was doubted whether the Por-
tuguese could open their own front in Africa and sustain it against the Ger-
mans.326
On August 5, Britain’s minister to Portugal, Lancelot Carnegie (1861–
1933), reaffirmed the Luso-British alliance and a few weeks later, Portu-
gal was given the assurance of British defense support in case of a German
attack on Portuguese possessions.327 Portugal’s government “declared [on
August 7] that she was quite prepared as the ally of Great Britain to give
every assistance”.328 Portugal kept its ports open to allied war ships; ar-
tillery pieces were sent to Britain and France. On August 12 a Luso-
British treaty of Commerce was concluded. The next day Britain requested
authorization for the passage of British troops across Mozambique to
Southern Rhodesia. There, the Portuguese were asked for “assistance” by
the British against troops from GEA. On August 18 Foreign Minister
Freire de Andrade spoke of Portugal’s neutralidade condicional. In
September, Portugal’s minister in London, Teixeira Gomes, informed
Eyre Crowe about the authorization of British troops to traverse Mozam-
bique. In early October, following the German atrocities in Belgium and
France, a committee headed by the republic’s first President, Teófilo Bra-
ga (1843–1924), and composed of “the academies of science, the schools
of higher learning, the scientific, literary and artistic communities, the Ma-
sons, the Press, the Anti-German League, the agricultural, industrial, com-
mercial and labour associations and other groups dedicated to Portugal’s
success and advancement”, presented the French and Belgian ministers in
Lisbon
“with their most vehement, indignant and solemn protest at the heinous
crimes that have been committed in Belgium and in France, particularly at the
326 Stone 1975: 730; 732; cf. Samson 2006: 40; Hespanha 2010: 172; Livermore 1967: 324.
327 Diário do Governo, Decreto n.729, n.133, 4.8.14: 636; 27.8.14; Castro Brandão 2002: 278.
328 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 820, USML to SoS, 24.11.14; Silva 2006: 347.
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destruction of the library of the Catholic University of Louvain and of the
cathedral at Rheims, crimes that will forever defile the Prussians before the
incorruptible court of history.”
Given these anti-German resentments among the elites, on November 23
Congress authorized President Manuel José de Arriaga (1840–1917) to in-
tervene militarily in the war on Britain’s side if deemed necessary.329 All
these steps did not remain unnoticed by Germany’s Minister Rosen. In
October, he filed a formal protest against Lisbon’s hostile attitude. Never-
theless, in November yet another Luso-British Convention declared opera-
tive the Treaties of Alliance.330
Considering the German pretensions on Portugal’s colonies, the gov-
ernment was anxious to protect these territories. It decided on August 12
to reinforce the colonial troops with men from Portugal. A decree was is-
sued to send forces to Angola and Mozambique and a special appropria-
tion (crédito extraordinário) of 1,000,000 escudos ($950,000) for war ma-
terial was granted to the Ministry of War under General Pereira de Eça.331
Two weeks later, a first border skirmish between German and Portuguese
border posts occurred in Maziua, Mozambique. On August 24 a German
official shot a Portuguese guard in the wrong assumption that there was
war between both countries. The German government later apologized for
this incident.
In GSWA the mobilization of the Schutztruppe was ordered on August
8, and simultaneously Governor Seitz prohibited the export of weapons,
livestock, and foodstuffs from GSWA.332 The decisive question for him
was from where food could be imported. Its harbors sealed by the British
Navy and GSWA being surrounded by three British colonies, only neutral
Portuguese Angola seemed to offer any possibility. From the German
steamer Adelaide (having “escaped” to Luanda) Consul Eisenlohr (being
informed about the German mobilization) immediately sent an encrypted
telegram to Swakopmund asking Seitz whether he should procure food-
329 Girão 2010: 44f.; Silva 2006: 348; Penha Garcia 1918: 130f.; O protesto de Portugal con-
tra os vandalismos alemães, entregue aos senhores ministros da Bélgica e da França em 4
de Outubro de 1914, Lisboa 1914, transl. www.cphrc.org/index.php/documents/firstrepub-
lic/463-1914-10-04- german-vandals [14.10.2014]; cf. Wheeler 1978: 106.
330 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, SGL to MNE, 16.10.14; cf. Samson 2013: 59; Castro Br. 2002: 279.
331 Girão 2010: 44; NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 134: 800, USC General to SoS, 18.8.14.
332 Morlang 1998: 43; Stals 1968: 186; Eckenbrecher 1940: 170. Seitz scheduled in June 1914
a military exercise for September, Südwestbote, Jg. 11, no. 75, 24.6.1914: 2.
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stuff and coal for GSWA in Angola.333 Seitz requested Eisenlohr the next
day “to buy as much foodstuff as possible” and to send it over land if
ships would not accept load to GSWA. He hoped that Eisenlohr would
come to an agreement with the Governor General Norton in Luanda.334
Eisenlohr tried to convince the agent of a Portuguese steamer to stop in
Swakopmund. However, the Portuguese telegram asking for permission in
Lisbon to do so was not allowed to pass the British telegraph station in La-
gos, Nigeria.335 Also telegrams from Luanda to Germany could not be sent
any longer. Soon, also Eisenlohr and Seitz could no longer communicate
directly; since Adelaide‘s wireless apparatus was rendered inoperative by
order of the Governor-General.336
Governor Theodor SeitzIll. 7 Governor General José
Norton de Matos
Ill. 8
Nevertheless, more and more troubling rumors about Angola reached the
Governor in Windhoek. In late August, Dr. Hans Schultze-Jena (1874–
1914), the head of the Outjo district bordering Angola, sent a telegram
about suspected British troop movements or at least growing British influ-
333 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telgr Consulate Luanda to KGW, 8.8.14. Telgr. DGL to
German Consulate Luanda, 1./8.8.14; cf. Suchier 1918: 26.
334 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telgr KGW to German Consulate Luanda, 9.8.14.
335 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Tel. Consul to KGW, 14.8.14; cf. Wenzlhuemer 2012: 107.
336 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Note Cpt B. Tadsen to German Consulate Luanda, 9.8.14.
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ence in Angola. Most wearisome were allegations that “the Portuguese are
attempting to get the Ovambo at our throats”, as Seitz expressed it. He did
not hesitate to counter these “attempts” by an immediate order to “send a
messenger to [Kwanyama King] Mandume [to tell him] that the governor
will forward weapons and powder. German troops will come to support
him against the Portuguese.” While Schultze-Jena himself conveyed the
surprising message to the King that he “will be given 100 guns plus am-
munition”, Missionary Welsch was asked to come from Oukwanyama to
Windhoek to report about his latest impressions from the area.337 In early
September, the governor asked Welsch to forward and translate a letter to
Mandume in which Seitz, after letting the King know about Germany’s
“great victories” in Europe, repeated the offer of “100 guns for your war-
riors and wine for you”. Assuming Portuguese attempts to “alienate” the
Kwanyama, he assured Mandume: “if you stay faithful to the Germans
you need not fear the Portuguese. If they attack you, I will send German
troops to expel them.”338 However, soon the Germans would find them-
selves under attack and it was to be seen whether they would ever be in a
position to defend King Mandume against the Portuguese.
Beyond German Reach – Smuggling Food across Angola
Food had become scarce in many African colonies since steamship lines
had withdrawn their services following the outbreak of the war. Already in
August, the Governor General of Belgian Congo asked for additional sup-
ply of provisions for his colony.339 Reports about “shortage of food sup-
plies” reached Europe also from Monrovia and Dakar.340 GSWA imported
more food than it produced. The British, well aware of the statistics, as-
sumed that the colony would surrender after five months due to lack of
food. Governor Seitz understood that ships would no longer reach GSWA
even from Angola and Consul Eisenlohr suggested putting the procure-
ment in private hands in order to avoid raising suspicion. Seitz therefore
requested the merchant Otto Busch from Keetmanshoop to organize the
2.2
337 BAB R 1001/6645: 4-7, Tlgr BA Outjo to KGW, 22.8.; remark Seitz 24.8.; telgr 28.8.; 123,
Welsch (Omupanda) to KGW, 8.10.14.
338 BAB R 1001/6645: 8-10, KGW to Mandume; KGW to Welsch; KGW to BA Outjo, 6.9.14.
339 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18, 840, USC Boma to SoS, 30.8.14; cf. Suchier 1918: 77f.
340 TNA FO 371/1884:250, Brit. Consul Dakar, 15.8.;254, Br. Consul Monrovia, 14.8.14.
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transport. He had just returned from a trip to Luanda to investigate the
possibility of labor recruitment for the diamond fields of GSWA. Busch
was a jack-of-all-trades who had already in 1905, during the Nama War,
assisted the German consulate in Cape Town to reconnoiter the Anglo-
German border along the Oranje River for smugglers of weapons and
food.341
Luanda, DKG BildarchivIll. 9
341 Seitz 1920: 15f.; Morlang 1998: 43; PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consul Cape Town to
German military stations, 5.9.05; NAN A.529 n.8, Busch: Berichte Grenzschmuggel, 1905.
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Ernst Heinrich Eisenlohr
In mid-August 1914, Busch traveled to Luanda. This was still possible by
ship, and Busch would act within the next months as Germany’s ‘(secret)
agent’ in Angola. More self-confident than talented for this undertaking,
Consul Eisenlohr ordered him to go from Luanda to southern Angola and
procure and carry “in an inconspicuous manner” as much foodstuff as pos-
sible to GSWA. Busch was promised a commission of 7.5% of all costs.
The German vice consuls in Benguela and Moçâmedes had to support the
undertaking. Eisenlohr transferred to them $12,000 and $6,000 respective-
ly. In case the amount would not suffice, Busch should take on credits on
account of the consulate.342
However, in 1914 the Germans in Angola were unable to install a
“complex system of bribery and clandestine interference” similar to the
Germans in the Cape Colony under Consul von Humboldt during the Na-
ma War (1905/6).343 In a long letter to Governor Seitz (reaching the ad-
dressee five weeks later) Eisenlohr detailed the difficulties of transporting
foodstuffs to GSWA: 1) food was scarce in Angola and Portugal. The Por-
tuguese central government had ordered the Governor General to deliver
food to the Cape Verde Islands and to Portugal. Eisenlohr considered it
likely that the Governor General therefore would soon prohibit the export
of food to foreign states. Therefore, the purchase and transport of food to
Ill. 10
342 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to VC Moçâmedes/Benguela, 14.8.14;
NAN A.529 n.2: 3, O. Busch: Erlebnisse... in Angola, Anfang August–24.12.14.
343 Dedering 2006: 283 on German policies to smuggle weapons and equipment to GSWA.
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GSWA should be executed swiftly before the authorities learned about it;
2) money was scarce in Angola and it was barely possible for the consul to
draw large sums at the public bank without raising suspicion (Busch as-
sumed one million marks would be needed); 3) there was no established
connection between Angola and GSWA. Portuguese ships did not call at
ports in GSWA. Telegrams that did not pass the censor at the British tele-
graph station were not transmitted. Eisenlohr thus assumed that sending
Busch to southern Angola under the pretext of erecting a pig farm near
Catumbela at the plantation of the trader Antonio da Costa would be the
best way to commence the “smuggling”, as he called the transport. It was
intended to convince da Costa to use his own credit for the inconspicuous
procuring of foodstuff. Eisenlohr believed the transport would be best or-
ganized by using “fisher boats or smuggler boats from Moçâmedes” and to
land the food in GSWA near the border. At the same time he planned a
transport by ox wagons to Outjo, but warned of the difficulties due to the
“Kwanyama rebellion”. Eisenlohr intended to send under pretext 25,000 to
50,000 Marks to Moçâmedes to enable Busch to pay a first rate “especial-
ly to the smugglers”. He urged Governor Seitz to send money also from
GSWA to Angola.344 A similar request was sent to the German consul in
Cape Town.345
The European war washed ashore unexpected assistance for an under-
taking that was not yet formally illegal, but which certainly stretched to
the edge the role a diplomatic representative could take up. The engineer
Georg Kéry of Budapest arrived in Luanda from São Tomé and met Eisen-
lohr since no Austrian consulate was available. As Kéry spoke Portuguese,
he was recruited by Consul Eisenlohr to support Busch’s mission and was
sent to southern Angola.346 At the same time, Eisenlohr was eager to enlist
the services of the Luso-Portuguese Study Commission still surveying
southern Angola. He re-called Dr. Vageler to Lubango.347 Code words
were exchanged between Eisenlohr and Kéry, who was to inform Busch
and Vageler on their meaning.348 Assessing the situation in the south,
Kéry suggested a small-scale transfer of foodstuffs on land, calling at the
“German farmers [Strauwald, Schneider and Schwarzer having their farms
344 BAB R 1001/6645, 21, Consul Eisenlohr to KGW, 14.8.14 (arrived 21.9.).
345 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to Consulate Cape Town, 17.8.14.
346 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda to Georg Kery, 18.8.14.
347 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telegr Consulate Luanda to Schoess, Lubango, 18.8.14.
348 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda remark on code words, ~8/14.
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in southern Angola], the German missionaries, [Consul] Schöss and the
Study Commission”. To send the supply by boat was deemed unfeasible
by Kéry and Busch since they had no means available to ship 60 to 100
tons. Without contact to the government in GSWA, they did not know
where to land; should it be in Swakopmund, Cape Frio, or Cape Cross?
Furthermore, Angolan fishermen in Moçâmedes and Porto Alexandre
were allegedly ordered to report any foreign ship and it was feared that the
British navy was nearby.349
In the meantime, Busch met the head of the Study Commission Schu-
bert in Moçâmedes and initiated him into the secret mission to procure and
transport food to GSWA. Schubert, who had been to Windhoek and under-
stood the necessity of the food supply, was willing to support him. He ex-
plained that due to lack of water only the land transport from Capelongo
downstream the Kunene River up to the border at Erickson Drift would be
feasible. Schubert was positive about the success of the undertaking since
the Study Commission could “initiate” the procurement and transport “un-
der the guise of its semi-official Portuguese mission”. Schubert was also
convinced of the support by German and Afrikaaner farmers in the region.
Farmer Strauwald would know the way across Ovamboland to GSWA.
Busch told Schubert that he had already commenced the purchase of food
with the brokerage of a Portuguese farmer in Catumbela. It was agreed
that Strauwald should take a letter to the Rhenish mission station at On-
donga notifying Governor Seitz that transports were underway to Erickson
Drift. From Ondonga messengers should bring it to the German police sta-
tion at Okaukwejo, which was to forward it to the district office in Outjo.
Busch wrote to missionary Tönjes at Ondonga that deliveries from Huam-
bo (terminus of the Benguela railway) via Capelongo (Schwarzer’s farm)
to Erickson Drift were being prepared. Since three Study Commission ox
wagons would arrive there “within a few days”, Busch requested Tönjes to
go to Erickson Drift with all his transport capacities and to bring the “ur-
gently needed foodstuff” to Outjo. He advised him to distribute “extra-
gifts” to any “assisting Ovambos”.350 Busch also addressed a letter to the
head of the Outjo district, Dr. Schultze-Jena, requesting him to forward
the letter from the consulate in Luanda about the transport to Governor
349 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Georg Kéry to German Consulate Luanda, 24.08.14.
350 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Otto Busch to Missionary Tönjes, Ondonga, 22.8.14.
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Seitz. The supply could be taken over at the border – “probably Erickson
Drift”.351
Over the following weeks numerous letters were exchanged between
Germans in southern Angola and the German consul in Luanda detailing
enigmatically the routes, waterholes, and transport capacities in the region,
“so people do not suffer from hunger”.352 It was repeatedly stated that
Germans serving the food supply of GSWA would thereby fulfill their
military duty. Those Germans living in Angola, however, who wanted to
avoid the return to Germany and their military duty were threatened by the
consul with being court-marshaled after the war. Only those should stay in
Angola who were either under no military duty or who could help to bring
food across the border.353 Minister Rosen informed the consul, however,
that it was almost impossible for the returnees to reach Germany from
Portugal. Therefore, they were to be discouraged to travel via Lisbon.354
Consul Eisenlohr could count on the German members of the Study
Commission, which had to maintain its official character at all times while
the Portuguese Colonel Coelho had to be “held at bay”. It was agreed that
Schubert should lead the first three ox wagons to Erickson Drift, “if possi-
ble accompanied by Mr. Coelho” under the pretext he would start survey
works at the drift. Vageler should guide Kéry and the farmers Schneider
and Schwarzer along the river with their food transport. Once the connec-
tion to GSWA has been established the Study Commission would retreat
and leave the execution to Schwarzer, Schneider, and Kéry, who was to
remain stationed at Erickson Drift.355
However, despite careful planning, difficulties soon became apparent.
The unusual traffic in Angola’s south was to the detriment of the smug-
gling activities of the Germans. They were concerned about the anti-Ger-
man sentiments among the Portuguese population. The Afrikaaner
Zacharias Roberts was asked to assist in convincing at least “the natives
[south of Humbe] to support us if possible (promise rich rewards to the
chiefs)”. Furthermore, Schubert learnt that 1,000 troops would soon arrive
from Lisbon to subdue the Kwanyama under Mandume. Rumors abound-
351 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Otto Busch to Bezirksamt Outjo, [o.D.] ~ August 1914;
NAN A.529 n.2: 6, O. Busch: Erlebnisse... in Angola, Anfang August–24.12.14.
352 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schubert (Luanda) to Vageler, 2.9.14.
353 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.I) German Consulate Luanda to VK Benguela, 9.9.14.
354 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.I) DGL to German Consulate Luanda, 25.9.14.
355 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) note of Schubert, 30.8.14; Confirmation Schubert, 2.9.14;
BAB R 1001/6645, 26-30, Telgr Busch (Outjo) to KGW, 14.9.14
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ed that theses men were also sent to protect the border against any German
attack.356
Eisenlohr still hoped not to raise suspicion with the Portuguese authori-
ties. But they happened upon a chance to assume what the Germans were
planning when the German vice consulate Benguela ordered 500 sacks of
corn from the merchant and former German honorary consul Eduardo
Prazeres. Eisenlohr was outraged about the “foolish und perfidious” tele-
gram informing him about the order. It was contrary to his instructions to
Busch not to procure any foodstuff in the region of Luanda.357 A few days
later Busch sent the encrypted message from Benguela that “transports de-
parted on land, many wagons”. Eisenlohr was again irate, since a German
trader would usually not send a telegram from Benguela to the consul in
Luanda, considering that a vice consulate was located in the town.358 Se-
crecy was not Busch’s thing. Complaints about his overconfidence and his
boasting during the purchase of goods in Moçâmedes were still recalled
years later.359 The British Vice-Consul Beak in Lobito soon got hold of
the German attempts to purchase foodstuffs for GSWA and assumed the
financial support of Consul Eisenlohr. He “called the attention of the local
authorities to this fact, with the result that the buyers … were held up.”360
Further problems arose, delaying the “smuggling”. Traditionally, the
authorities kept a close eye on the movement of any European. Traveling
within Angola had required a passport since 1761.361 Worse, at the end of
August Vice Consul Schöss informed Busch that farmer Strauwald, the
most important messenger across Ovamboland, did not arrive in Lubango
to pick up the letters and his load. Schöss now deemed him untrustworthy.
He therefore sent the “pro-German” Afrikaaner Piet du Plessis with the
letters to Governor Seitz and missionary Tönjes in Ondonga. Du Plessis
had lived in GSWA and knew the area on both sides of the Kunene. He
would leave Lubango the next day. Schöss mentioned that the Portuguese
administration followed all his steps closely. He had already sent two ox
wagons with flour to Fort Dongoena, addressed to the Study Commission.
He hoped to procure enough foodstuffs to equip 16 additional ox wagons
356 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schubert, Luanda to Thurner, 2.9.14.
357 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telegr. VK Benguela to Consulate Luanda, 1.9.14.
358 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Telgr. Busch, Benguela to Consulate Luanda, 9.9.14.
359 BAB R 1001/6634: 136f., Report of Baericke (16.11.19), Annex 9 Memo Allm., 23.5.22.
360 TNA FO 371/1884: 424, Brit. VC Lobito to Army Headquarters Cape Town, 10.10.14.
361 Curto/Gervais 2001: 6 FN 14.
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with corn and flour; altogether around “150 tons”. The Portuguese allowed
food exports only via custom stations, and Schöss warned Busch of the
controls and the penalties for defraudation of the customs. It was still to be
seen how the Portuguese officials would react to the food transports when
they learned about their purpose. Would it be possible to ask the Governor
General to permit the transports? Consul Eisenlohr deemed it too early for
such a step.362 Under pretext, he withdrew another 200,000 Goldmark in
Luanda and had the money sent via courier to Benguela for the purchase
of new foodstuff.363 However, the imminent campaign against the
Kwanyama provided the Portuguese authorities with ample arguments to
exclude German action in the war zone. In September, a state of emergen-
cy was declared for the Huíla district. Only the support of Colonel Coelho
enabled Schubert to continue his journey from Porto Alexandre to Huíla
and Lubango.364
362 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) VK Schöss, Lubango to Busch, Benguela, 30.8.14.
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Since Governor Seitz did not receive the information about the ongoing
procurement in Angola, he asked the representative of the Woermann-Line
in Swakopmund, Brauer, to go with his ship to Moçâmedes and transport
food to GSWA.365 In a letter to the Vice Consul Schöss, forwarded by
Brauer, Governor Seitz requested him to provide the mariner with “as
much sugar and gasoline as could be possibly loaded onto his ship.” The
remainder should be transported to the border along the Kunene River.
Seitz also asked Schöss for news regarding the Portuguese position in the
war and “whether strict neutrality or a pro-English attitude” was shown by
the Governor General in Luanda.366 Following Brauer’s arrival in
Moçâmedes on September 9, it was “unthinkable” to provide him with the
goods. An employee of Schöss’ company could only explain the situation
in a letter: Pointing to the new state of emergency in the Huíla district, he
responded to Seitz that it was now even more difficult to transport goods
to GSWA. Any traffic from the coast to the interior was prohibited. He
had already sent several ox wagons to the Kunene border, but it seemed
doubtful whether these loads would reach Erickson Drift, the intended
point of transfer. He furthermore mentioned that on September 2 400 “na-
tive troops” had arrived from Mozambique and were sent inland to the
Huíla District. Additional 1,200 troops from Lisbon were expected to ar-
rive in Moçâmedes on September 20. The population believed these men
were sent at the request of Britain.367 Indeed, it was no secret that Lisbon
sent “fifteen hundred additional troops for garrison service” in Angola.
The American minister believed this “an additional precautionary measure
against occupation by any of the European powers”.368
Brauer’s appearance had caused excitement among the population.
When Schubert arrived in Moçâmedes on September 10, 1914 he saw
Brauer’s boat and noticed anti-German sentiments. Immediately after the
war had broken out, contradictory rumors began to circulate in southern
Angola.369 Brauer was considered a German spy. His vehicle was careful-
ly checked before he was ordered by the district governor to leave.370 He
363 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) note Eisenlohr, 10.9.14.
364 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schubert to Eisenlohr, 10.9.14; 11.9.14; Santos 1978: 198f.
365 BAB R 1001/6645, 14, KGW to Woermann-Linie, 21.8.14.
366 BAB R 1001/6645, 12, 15; PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) KGW to V-Cnsl Schöss, 29.8.14.
367 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) VK Moçâmedes to KGW, 11.9.14.
368 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 820, USML to SoS, 8.9.14.
369 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz (Huíla) to Faugère, 11.8.14.
370 BAB R 1001/6634: 83f., Report of A. Schubert, Annex 1 to Memo Allem., 23.5.22.
2. The First World War in Angola and GSWA
109
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
could not take in any provisions, but at least, Brauer could take with him
the latest journals reporting that the Prime Minister had declared Portugal
to be benevolently neutral in favor of the allies. He also forwarded letters
from the consulate and from Consul Alfred Haug (1873–1929), Johannes-
burg, who, upon his return to Europe, had passed Moçâmedes and left a
note about the likely South African attack routes and war objectives (wire-
less station Windhoek). Finally, he confirmed the rumors about the troop
movements in Moçâmedes. Thus, Brauer’s journey to Moçâmedes was in-
deed a reconnaissance tour. After his return, he reported that Angola was
completely under British influence and deemed it unrealistic to procure
provisions for GSWA there.371
The day Brauer arrived in Moçâmedes, Eisenlohr wrote to Governor
Seitz that, upon his return from Lisbon on September 2, Governor General
Norton de Matos had emphasized to him that the friendly relations be-
tween Portugal and Germany should remain as they were. Until the Gov-
ernor’s declaration, Eisenlohr was never sure whether or not Portugal was
neutral. Eisenlohr also mentioned the transport of troops, which were
“probably” not just meant to subdue the Kwanyama, but also to protect the
border against German incursions or to disarm German troops in case they
retreated from GSWA due to the British invasion. Eisenlohr feared that
the British could cause the Portuguese to attack GSWA from the north in
order to split the German troops. He urged Seitz to have the situation at
the border closely monitored and to ensure that there were no German ac-
tions at the border that could be interpreted by the Portuguese as an in-
tended attack on Angola.372
Within the next days it became apparent that Angola’s authorities knew
everything and were “not well disposed towards Seitz’ plan” to transport
foodstuff from Angola to GSWA. On September 12 Norton de Matos,
who allegedly harbored an idée fix about the coming German invasion of
Angola,373 published a decree according to which the export of foodstuff
from Angola was only possible with the permission of the district gover-
nor and only if these products were dispensable in Angola. This decree
was in line with similar provisions in the metropolis. Already on August 3,
1914 the government had forbidden “the exportation to foreign countries
371 BAB R 1001/6645, 46f, Report Brauer, 25.9.14; 37, Haug to KGW, 2.9.14; BAB R
1001/6634: 136, Rpt Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.19), Ax 9 MA, 23.5.22; Seitz 1920: 32.
372 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consul Luanda to KGW, 10.9.14; Norton 2001: 208.
373 Stals 1968: 186 ‘nie goedgesind … nie‘; Baericke 1981: 20 ‘Invasionsidee‘.
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from continental Portugal … of foodstuff (except wine), livestock and
combustibles”.374 This was a reaction to food scarcity in Portugal due to
the failure of crops in 1913. The government authorized “the purchase of
thousands of tons of wheat to supply the deficiency”.375 Also modern re-
search confirms that Angola produced barely enough food to sustain its
population. “[M]alnutrition continued to be the most widespread and seri-
ous problem [in Angola] by the twentieth century”.376
Norton de Matos’ decree changed the situation. It was not possible to
transport the supplies clandestinely across the border if the authorities had
expressed the desire to keep the food in Angola. Eisenlohr therefore went
directly to Norton de Matos. He openly told him about efforts in southern
Angola to transport food to GSWA and that he did not want his compatri-
ots to infringe Portuguese law. The governor gentlemanlike evaded the is-
sue by claiming he signed the decree due to attempts from Belgian Congo
to purchase all food available in Angola. He understood, on the other
hand, that Angola’s richness consisted in food and that the poor merchants
of southern Angola depended on the new business opportunity with
GSWA. He therefore had nothing against the export to GSWA – as long
as the Governor of the Huíla district agreed. Eisenlohr, in turn, pointed to
the difficulty of informing the Germans about the decree and hoped the
authorities would be lenient in case of contravention.377
As a next step, Eisenlohr planned to go to Benguela and Moçâmedes to
inform his compatriots about the new situation. Before that, he again met
Norton de Matos who now told him that on the same date as he regulated
the food export (September 12) he had formally declared the state of
emergency in the Huíla district. Nobody was allowed to enter the district
except Portuguese officials. The only exceptions he allowed were for the
Study Commission and Eisenlohr to inform the Germans. Norton de
Matos now explicitly refused the export of food to GSWA. Eisenlohr was
thus left with two (illegal) options for transports to GSWA: either via ship
or across the “completely waterless” southern part of the Huíla district.
Both possibilities were dangerous. Conceding that the chances of success
374 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 134: 690, USC General to SoS, 31.8.14 (Annual Report).
375 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 133: 600, USC General to SoS, 20.5.14 (Annual Report).
376 Dias 1981: 375f. ‘[T]he question of improving domestic food supplies continued to be
largely ignored by the government [still] in the 1920s.’
377 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to DGL, 14.9.14. Eisenlohr also men-
tioned that a British citizen purchased in Luanda food for the Congo. The Governor General
gave him the same answer as he gave to Eisenlohr; cf. Baericke 1981: 35.
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were limited, Eisenlohr claimed he would attempt “without regard to hard-
ship and danger” to send transports on both routes.378 However, he failed
to take into consideration the Governor General’s legalistic ingenuity to
prevent the Germans from taking any useful step towards the completion
of their mission. In Lisbon, Britain’s Minister Carnegie received a more
candid explanation for the proclamation of the state of emergency in
southern Angola: “to refuse the entry into that part of the colony of Ger-
mans, who, under the guise of missionaries, might endeavor to foment dis-
turbances among natives. Both German civilians and missionaries had al-
ready been making trouble.”379
Just before the steamer left for Moçâmedes on September 19, the Gov-
ernor General sent Eisenlohr a message that his permit to enter the Huíla
district was withdrawn since soon also the Moçâmedes district would be
under a state of emergency. Eisenlohr insisted on going to the south in or-
der to mitigate potential conflicts with district officials due to the ongoing
attempts to deliver food to GSWA despite the ban (which was not known
to all involved Germans). He wrote to Minister Rosen in Lisbon to request
the government to lift the ban – but such step would have taken months.380
Despite the setbacks, in those days the Germans in Angola seemed to
have been in high spirits. German Consul Dr. Asmis, who had to leave the
Belgian Congo for Angola wrote to the American Consul McBride about
his pleasure to read four-week old German newspapers in Luanda detail-
ing German successes in France. “The excitement in Germany is great …
our mood [in Luanda] is excellent.”381 However, it was not granted to
Consul Eisenlohr to repeat these “successes” diplomatically in Angola.
The Portuguese authorities continued to hold him back. When he arrived
in the harbor of Moçâmedes he was not allowed to land and had to return
to Benguela. Similar situations arose in the hinterland. Vice Consul
Schöss was provoked repeatedly in Lubango. All his attempts to send
foodstuffs across the border proved futile. Busch, already on his way to
Erickson Drift, was arrested south of Huambo. The Portuguese officials
and the population considered the deliveries to be German war prepara-
tions. The density of fortresses in southern Angola proved now an advan-
378 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to DGL, 18.9.14; Estado de sitio, no dis-
trito da Huíla, Boletim Official de Angola no.37, 12.9.14, no.985: 806f.; cf. Ramos 1970.
379 TNA FO 371/1884: 354, Brit. Minister Lisbon to FO, 23.9.14.
380 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to DGL, 19.9.14.
381 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18,703, Asmis to McBride, 27.9.14 ‘we are in the best of spirits’.
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tage to be used against German activities. Sub-Lieutenant Manuel A.
Sereno (1877–1914?), Commander of Fort Otoquero, near the German
border, received the order from the new District Governor Alves Roçadas
to intercept the ox wagons sent from Lubango, Humbe, and Chibia head-
ing towards GSWA. Subsequently Sereno and his men confiscated eleven
wagons near the Kunene River382 and discovered three German storages.
Also Africans reported about the great number of soldiers in the area south
of Humbe setting up military edifices along both banks of the Kunene
River. All fords were blocked and anyone attempting to cross the river
was apprehended.383 In this particular case, the Portuguese colonial state
showed that it was capable to organize institutional cohesion: The orders
given at the center were truthfully carried out on the periphery. Also ox
wagons for the Study Commission were withheld. Portuguese mistrust that
382 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 68, Relatório pedido pelo Capitão-Mor de Cuamato, 22.10.14.
“Huilla – Chibia”Ill. 12
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there was no difference between the provisions sent to the Study Commis-
sion and those sent by Schöss proved well founded.384
When Consul Eisenlohr involuntarily landed in Benguela he met Busch
who had procured food and sent it to the border. Busch told the consul
how Kéry was stopped with 13 ox wagons and ordered by officials to re-
turn to Huambo. Here the group was interrogated. The official was con-
cerned that the Germans would deliver guns to the Kwanyama. Since no
weapons were found, he released the group. Kéry and Schwarzer returned
to their load, which was guarded, on the road to Caconda where they had
arrived on October 1. Kéry wanted to reach Luceque, where two traders
were expecting him with another 19 ox wagons. The administrator in Ca-
conda however ordered all the goods to be secured in Caconda. Kery’s
group thus had to return to Benguela at the end of October.385
In Benguela the district governor told Eisenlohr that in the meantime
the Governor General had prohibited all export of food except to Portugal
or the Portuguese colonies. Eisenlohr therefore wrote to Rosen in Lisbon
that under these circumstances the endeavor had to be “provisionally
abandoned”. Busch was told to discontinue the transports of food and to
sell all perishable goods. Eisenlohr hoped to clarify the situation with Nor-
ton de Matos who had come to Moçâmedes to welcome the troops from
Portugal. He hoped to convince him to “alleviate” the prohibition of ex-
ports. The Jornal de Benguela commented that Portugal would no longer
stay neutral and that the arriving troops had to “conquer Damaraland” and
to “castigate alongside” the Kwanyama. It was now widely known in
southern Angola that an “expedition of 5,000 soldiers” would subdue the
Kwanyama.386 Eisenlohr was concerned since the troops sent to Mozam-
bique had stopped over in Luanda on a British steamer under British
Flagg. This could lead to confusion in case a German war ship encoun-
tered these transports.387
383 BAB R 1001/6645: 63, Rautanen to BA Outjo, 29.9.14 [quot. Josua ja Namuhuja]; R
1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 31, statement Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21; Santos 1978: 200.
384 BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file:13f., testimony Ambass. Norton de Matos, 5.5.26.
385 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Report of Georg Kéry to Consulate Luanda, 16.11.14.
386 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Gallangue) to TRP, 2.10.14.
387 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to DGL, 2.10.14; Portaria no. 1:028, in:
Boletim Oficial de Angola no. 39, 26.9.1914: 866.
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“Angola” Ox wagon
“Bei Junda?”, Angola, Ox wagon
Ill. 13
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Before he arrived in the south, the Governor General had declared the
state of emergency also for the districts of Moçâmedes and Luanda. Vice-
Consul Schöss tried in vain to convince Norton de Matos to permit food
transports and the transfer of mail to GSWA. The former was not allowed
due to the “lack of customs stations” along the southern border. The latter
was not permitted due to the state of emergency. Eisenlohr was annoyed
by this constant “reference to the wording of whatever laws”. He admitted
defeat and considered the “undertaking to have failed.”388
On September 14, Seitz received a telegram from Outjo, notifying him
about a letter forwarded by a man from Angola, du Plessis, indicating that
ox wagons loaded with food, including those of the study commission,
were under way from Angola. It was suggested to proceed from the border
at Erickson Drift to Okaukweyo, preferably also with the ox wagons of
German mission stations where the goods should be stored temporarily.
Similar to the news received from Brauer, the governor was informed that
1,600 soldiers from Portugal were under way to Moçamedes. Also trader
Busch had arrived in Outjo and reported that the provisions delivered by
Kéry and Schwarzer would arrive at Erickson Drift, but would not cross
the border.
The organization of the food transports to GSWA was immensely ham-
pered by the absence of Governor Seitz, who was then in the south of
GSWA, and Schultze-Jena, Outjo’s district officer, who had still not re-
turned from his journey to King Mandume. After more than a week had
passed, Seitz ordered Schultze-Jena to immediately leave for Erickson
Drift after his arrival from Ovamboland. He was directed to pay and take
over the food transports from Kéry or Thurner and direct them to Okauk-
weyo.389 Contrary to Eisenlohr’s intention, the “undertaking” he had initi-
ated continued – the smuggling drama would soon turn into a tragedy.
388 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Consulate Luanda to Otto Busch, Benguela, 12.10.14; Por-
taria no. 1:050; 1:051, in: Boletim Oficial de Angola no. 39, 26.9.1914: 869.
389 BAB R 1001/6645: 16 Telgr BA Outjo to KGW; 26 Busch to KGW, 14.9.; 32, KGW to BA
Outjo, 23.9.14; R 1001/6634: 158, Report Seitz (10.5.1921), Ax 13 Memo Allm., 23.5.22.
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Misunderstandings – the Naulila Incident, October 1914
After requesting Eisenlohr, sending Busch and then Brauer, Schultze-Je-
na’s trek was Governor Seitz’ fourth attempt to create a supply line from
Angola. Schultze-Jena had indeed informed King Mandume about Seitz’
intention to deliver 100 guns and ammunition and asked about possible
Portuguese advances. He also visited two mission stations (Olukonda
[Sept. 7] and Omupanda [Sept. 19]). There, he told missionary Wulfhorst
that the delivery of guns to Mandume was conditioned upon the case that
the Portuguese joined the British and advanced across Ovamboland. 390
One week after Seitz’ order, Schultze-Jena set out from Outjo with a
small expedition to go to Erickson Drift, also with the intention to contact
Portuguese officials in order to discuss the possibility of delivering mail
and supplies via Angola to GSWA. His troop consisted of the two lieu-
tenants Alexander Lösch (1885–1914), survey corps, and Curt Roeder
(1887–1914), a farmer near Outjo (Chauas-Okawa) and reserve officer,
Constable Joseph Schaaps, Police Sergeant Braunsdorf, the soldiers Kim-
mel and Pahlke, four African “police servants”, and five Africans to han-
dle three ox wagons. A Danish farmer, Carl Jensen, accompanied them as
“interpreter”. The “old Africa-hand” had worked in the gold mines of
Cassinga and knew southern Angola from his wagoner service during the
expedition of Alves Roçadas in 1907. Contrary to what has been written
about him, he was not “an able linguist fluent in Portuguese, German and
the Ovambo language”. He spoke fairly German, but his knowledge of Os-
hiwambo and Portuguese was limited.391
The men left Outjo on October 3, 1914 for the 300-kilometer trek north;
this very day Schultze-Jena received a letter from missionary Rautanen
about Portuguese soldiers occupying all Kunene fords. According to
Jensen, except for Schultze-Jena, nobody knew of the object of the mis-
sion. Rumors spread that British troops had landed in southern Angola,
preparing to invade GSWA from the north.392 It was thus an additional ob-
jective of the mission to clarify Portugal’s neutrality.393
2.3
390 NAN A.505: 34, A. Wulfhorst. Chronik Station Omupanda, 20.11.15; BAB R 1001/6645:
11, Telgr. BA Outjo to KGW, 28.9.14; cf. Peltola 1958: 177; 2002: 191.
391 Southern 2007: 8; 10, ref. to Baericke 1981: 45; Santos 1978: 202; Kurz 1995: 20.
392 BAB R 1001/6645: 63, Rautanen to BA Outjo, 29.9.14; Bethe to KGW, 11.10.14.
393 BAB R 1001/6634: 98, Report of C. Jensen, Ax 4 to Memo Allem.; 131, Jensen to DGL,
30.4.15, Ax 8 Memo Allem, 23.5.22.
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After a few days, the group entered Ovamboland, the most densely pop-
ulated area of GSWA. Around 100,000 inhabitants had been – as one of
the first South African officials to travel there in 1915 put it – “left [by the
Germans] entirely to their own devices.” During the next weeks, the 16
men had to follow the traditions of the area. According to missionary Au-
gust Hochstrate (1861–1936) “[i]t was the custom that when European
visitors came to the country they would visit the native chief”.394 Ovambo
kings exerted a “thorough control of the whole trading process, and a sys-
tem of compulsory ‘gifts’ meant that in effect the surplus generated in
trade tended to accumulate in royal hands.” The kings had their messen-
gers and “officials [to] watch over every move made” by the Europeans.
Since German officials had requested the support of German and Finnish
missionaries (as Russian citizens, they were formally enemy subjects) in
the transport of foodstuffs from Angola (for lack of transport capacity, the
latter had refused) and since at least one missionary had informed Ondon-
ga King Martin of this request, the purpose of the German visit was well
known in Ovamboland. Rumors reached the German group that Por-
tuguese soldiers had set up traps for them. Then, a mysterious German,
who had defected from the Schutztruppe, appeared. The man, Haunschild,
warned the group of the Portuguese and offered help. Schultze-Jena asked
him to find out about the whereabouts of Portuguese troops.
Schultze-Jena, although a high-ranking official, was not exempted from
the gift system and the “pervasive royal control”.395 He first met Uuk-
wambi King Iipumbo and Finnish missionaries. Iipumbo, in control of the
route to the Kunene, was – according to Jensen, who translated – unfriend-
ly to Germans. Due to their rich gifts he spoke highly of the Portuguese.
Schultze-Jena presented him with a rifle and sold him a horse in exchange
for Iipumbo’s permission to cross his area. He told the King to stay calm
in spite of the war between Europeans.396
The group intended to go to Erickson Drift. Referring to his map of the
Kunene region Lösch, the surveyor, stated that the ford’s southern bank
would still be on German territory.397 There, they arrived on October 16,
394 Pritchard 1916: 3; BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 35, testimony Hochstrate, 26.4.26.
395 Clarence-Sm./Moorsom 1975: 370f.; cf. Peltola 2002: 191; NAN A.505: 34, A. Wulfhorst,
Chronik der Station Omupanda, 20.11.15.
396 BAB R 1001/6634: 137f., Report Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.19), Ax 9 Memo Allem.; Hart-
mann 1998: 270; Stals 1968: 187; Peltola 1958: 177; Schaaps 1930: 382; Henning 1925:
110; Baericke 1981: 48.
397 BAB R 1001/6645: 67, BA Outjo to KGW, 3.10.14; 1001/6634: 99, report Jensen, 2.8.21.
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1914 in the early morning and erected their camp some 500 meters south
of the river. The place was located 14 kilometers south of the Portuguese
Fort Naulila (also called Ehinga, Esinka, Ouinga or Kinga). At Erickson
Drift the river changes its course to the west; at the time it was around 130
meters wide and shallow; arms of the river (mulola) crossed the vicinity.
In the past the riverbed had changed. The margins were covered with belts
of high reeds, swamps, “creeks and pools infested with crocodiles”. On its
northern (‘Portuguese’) bank the two hills of Calueque (or Kampili) domi-
“Viehtränke am Kunene”
KUNENE RIVER NEAR ERICKSON'S DRIFT 
THE UPPER KAVALE RAPIDS 
This content downloaded from 193.174.6.78 on Mon, 07 Dec 2015 12:45:23 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Hans Schultze-JenaIll. 16 Erickson Drift, 1921Ill. 17
Ill. 15
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nated the landscape.398 It was known that the right of possession over Er-
ickson Drift was disputed. The Germans considered it the northern edge of
the “neutral zone” between the two disputed parallel lines agreed on with
the Portuguese in 1912. Lösch was intrigued by the hills of Calueque, a
“small cluster of kopjes [and] a striking landmark for miles around”.
At Erickson Drift Schultze-Jena did not find the ox wagons with food
from Angola. The group had arrived three days late. Since late September,
Vageler had tried to arrange the handover of food deliveries organized by
Vice Consul Schöss. He had waited in vain at the Zwartbooi and Erickson
Drifts to meet German officials and to inform them about the delays and
difficulties with the deliveries from Angola. Not expecting anymore that
Germans would arrive, Vageler decided to return to Humbe on October
13, 1914. He also learned that several ox wagons were confiscated by Por-
tuguese officials. However, on his way to Humbe Vageler met another
German who informed him about an alleged Portuguese telegram he had
heard of that a certain Dr. Schultze was expected, probably at Erickson
Drift. Vageler decided to meet this man. He expected him to be a German
official, whom he considered in danger in case he entered Portuguese ter-
ritory. Vageler wanted to cross into GSWA to warn him. However, his ap-
proach of the border near Fort Naulila in the evening of October 14 did
not go unnoticed in the “densely populated area”. He was arrested and
brought to Fort Naulila, where he was interrogated by Commander
Sergeant Gentil. He claimed that he had lost his way,399 but he raised sus-
picion since he carried large sums of money. The next day Vageler was
transported to Fort Cuamato. From there he sent a telegram to Schöss be-
fore being taken to Humbe.400
398 Kanthack 1921: 322; 327, cf. photograph of Erickson Drift; cf. Pearson 1910: 509.
399 BAB R 1001/6634: 151, Vageler to KGW (~11/1914), Ax 11, 23.5.22; Baericke 1981: 32.
400 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 31, statement A.Varão, 11.11.21; Hennig 1920: 109.
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Being unable to take over any foodstuffs or see anyone upon the oppo-
site riverbank, Schultze-Jena decided to send Roeder and Jensen with a
letter (in “slightly Luso-cized” German) to the Portuguese Fort Dongoena
to inform its commander about his arrival. The “Iberian administrative
system [in the colonies] was characterized by a dense network of petty
white officials” and for foreigners it was not easy to understand each one’s
responsibility.401 His mission to try to establish a supply line from Angola
did not allow Schultze-Jena to hide from the Portuguese. However, he did
not contact the nearest Portuguese post, Fort Naulila (that had replaced the
vacated Fort Henrique Couceiro in the neutral zone), because it was not
yet mentioned on his maps. It was Haunschild – he had been in contact
with the Portuguese on October 15 – who reported the following day, Oc-
tober 17, the arrival of the Germans to Sergeant Gentil in Fort Naulila.
Gentil sent a patrol to verify the information. Shortly before two Por-
tuguese soldiers entered the German camp, Haunschild rejoined the Ger-
mans. He then disappeared, however, before he could be questioned about
the suspicion that he might have spied for the Portuguese. The two sol-
diers asked the Germans what they were looking for. Schultze-Jena an-
swered that they were coming from Outjo and were pausing. He requested
them to forward a (second) letter to the administrator in Humbe informing
him about his arrival and asking for a meeting.402 After the return of his
men, Gentil sent a messenger to his district officer (Capitão mor), Captain
Antonio F. Varão, in Fort Cuamato notifying him about the arrival of the
Germans and their letter.403
In the meantime, Roeder and Jensen, after having waved white flags as
signs of their peaceful intentions, asked at Fort Dongoena, around 30 kilo-
meters north of Erickson Drift, whether there was war between the two
countries. The question was most pressing since at the same time in Lis-
401 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 55, report C. Palermo, 5.11.14 ‘em almão levemente aportuguezado’;
Machado 1956: 15; Clarence-Smith 1985: 321.
402 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 63, Relatório pedido pelo Capitão-Mor de Cuamato, 22.10.14: ‘12.
[17.]10.1914 – Monsieur! Excusez le papier et cette lettre, mais je ne parle pas bien le
français. Je suis venu de Outjo et j’ai envoyé deux de mes compagnons à Dongoena pour
notifier au commandant de mon arrivé, parce que j’ai crois que Dongoena serai la station la
plus prochaine. Je vous propos une entrevue. Veuillez destiner la place et le temps. With
kind regards, Dr. Schultze-Jena, Administrateur de Outjo.’; Santos 1978: 204; Stals 1968:
187 (German letter); the latest German map (Sprigade/Moisel 1914: No. 6), however, men-
tioned ‘Ouinga’; on the difficulties of making maps in GSWA Demhardt 2000: 206f.
403 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 32; 35 testim. A. Varão, 11.11.21; Baericke 1981: 49.
PART ONE. The First World War in Angola in its Historical Context
122
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
bon negotiations about sending troops to the western front were ongoing,
and “it was generally felt that within weeks, if not days, Portugal would
become a belligerent.” However, it turned out that the Portuguese army
was completely unprepared for this task.404 Fort Dongoena’s Commander,
Sergeant Batouchas, may not have been aware of these discussions about
an intervention, but he knew that Portugal was (for the time being) neutral.
This he stated to the Germans and he also explained that the Portuguese
troops who had landed in Moçâmedes were to be employed against the
Kwanyama. Roeder and Jensen handed over their letter to be forwarded to
the administrator in Humbe, Armando de Campos Palermo. Batouchas
provided them with a laisser-passer and they procured an old copy of the
Lisbon daily O Seculo, accidentally detailing the reasons for the dispatch
to Angola of an expeditionary force. In the afternoon they left Dongoena
and arrived at the German camp the next morning. Roeder and Jensen in-
formed their group that there was no war with Portugal. They learned
about the two Portuguese soldiers who had visited the camp and the letter
given to them for their superior. Jensen assumed that King Iipumbo had
already informed the Portuguese about the German mission, so they could
plan ahead.405
In the early morning of October 18, immediately upon receiving the
message from Fort Naulila, the Capitão mor in Fort Cuamato, Varão, sent
a telegram to Sub-Lieutenant (alferes) Manuel Sereno in Fort Otoquero,
who had confiscated the ox wagons Schultze-Jena was looking for. Varão
ordered Sereno to go “with all forces available” to Naulila. In line with the
decree on the state of emergency, Sereno, “at 37 years of age, a very ma-
ture junior subaltern”,406 was tasked with intercepting and disarming the
Germans, who had allegedly entered Portuguese territory. Varão was
aware of the difficulty understanding the Germans and directed Sereno to
use “native interpreters”.407 Varão left it to the initiative of the alferes “to
act in accordance with the circumstances” and “with patriotism”. He also
informed the Governor of the Huíla district, Roçadas, and asked for or-
ders.408
404 Meneses 2010: 42.
405 BAB R 1001/6634: 120, Report Jensen, Ax 6 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; Machado 1956: 10f.
406 Southern, 2007: 8; cf. Fraga 2010: 127; Santos 1978: 206f.; Machado 1956: 22f.
407 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3:4, Varão, auto de averiguações, 30.10.14 ‘com toda força disponivel’.
408 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 32f., testim. Antonio Varão, 11.11.21; L’Ange 1991: 172.
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Sereno rode with his men 30 kilometers from Otoquero to Fort Naulila
where he was told by Sergeant Gentil that the Germans camped south of
Erickson Drift (also called “Caloéque” or “Kalusheke”). Sereno reached
Schultze-Jena’s camp on October 18, 1914, around 4 p.m., with 15 dra-
goons and 20 African soldiers. At that moment, the Germans “were
naked” (im Adamskostüm), since they were taking a bath. Sereno asked the
Germans what they were looking for on Portuguese territory. Schultze-Je-
na responded that he had announced his presence in Fort Dongoena and
was waiting for the administrator of Humbe to come to Erickson Drift for
negotiations. (He had also sent word to missionary Wulfhorst in Omupan-
da about his arrival at the Kunene and asked for more information about
all events in Ovamboland; Wulfhorst responded.) He then referred to Ger-
man maps (Sprigrade & Moisel) indicating that his camp south of the
southern bank of Erickson Drift was on German territory. Sereno disputed
this. Lieutenant Lösch is said to have responded: “It is well known that Er-
ickson Drift forms the border and the two small [Kampili] hills beyond the
Kunene assure me that we are at Erickson Drift. The hills are part of the
cataracts.”409 In fact, Erickson Drift was six miles upstream of the Kavale
cataracts. However, Lösch was not completely misguided by his map. The
Kunene River formed a northwards stream bend between Erickson Drift
and the Kavale rapids, the northern “starting point” for the parallel limit-
ing the “neutral zone”. According to the German map, at Erickson Drift
this parallel “re-touched” the river before it turned again northwards, thus
leaving Erickson Drift’s southern bank in the “neutral” (or German) zone
and not on indisputably Portuguese territory. The situation was most con-
fusing and the British engineer F.E. Kanthack remarked in 1921: “[N]ear-
ly all information concerning this section of the river, both official and
otherwise was … misleading.”410
Schultze-Jena also told Sereno that he was searching for the deserter
Haunschild, whom he had seen in Ovamboland; indirectly referring to the
ancient legal doctrine of “hot pursuit” that may have justified the crossing
into foreign territory (had there been a treaty).411 Schultze-Jena openly
stated that he wanted to talk to the administrator of Humbe to receive per-
409 BAB R 1001/6634: 99, Report Jensen (2.8.21), Ax 4 Memo A., 23.5.22; R 1001/ 6640: 38,
hearing Gonçalves, 13.10.25; NAN A.505: 34, Chronik, 20.11.15; Baericke 1981: 51.
410 Kanthack 1921: 322;336; Machado 1956: 58 ‘não existia uma carta regular da região’; cf.
Demhardt 2000: 208; Nasson 2014a: 170 on the ‘loose character of colonial borders’
411 Cf. Poulantzas 2002 [1969]: 4-11 dating back to Byzantine law.
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mission to continue his journey to Lubango. Sereno told him that the area
was in the jurisdiction of the Capitão mor in Fort Cuamato who was in
charge of such permits, and not the administrator Campos Palermo.412 As
Sereno later wrote, he invited Schultze-Jena to meet the Capitão mor, to
be “provided with the requested permit or to decide what should happen
with the Germans.” A. Schubert of the Study Commission, who was told
the story by Jensen, raised doubts whether Jensen did understand the pro-
viso allegedly made by Sereno. Sereno did not speak French or German,
Jensen’s Portuguese was insufficient and he had to re-translate what he
understood into another foreign language, German.
Language challenges of European travelers in a colonial context have
been repeatedly analyzed by historians. Traditionally, those problems of
miscomprehensions and misinterpretations occurred between European
visitors and African hosts. However, similar difficulties could arise be-
tween Europeans especially when Portuguese nationals were involved
since other Europeans usually had not learnt Portuguese “back home”, but
French or English. However, the “European lingua franca [of west-central
Africa] was Portuguese”, and Schultze-Jena was not the first German visi-
tor to have underestimated the challenge of finding his way across Angola
without understanding Portuguese. Traditionally, such travelers – those
visiting an African court – were eager to find able intermediaries who
would act as “master of ceremonies” and advise their “employers … in
matters of protocol”. Schultze-Jena, who had merely planned to visit An-
golan officials to ask them for a permit, miscalculated the need to careful-
ly select his interpreter who should also have been a “trans-cultural ‘trans-
lator’”. But Jensen was not an ambaquista, he was a miserable interpreter
whose Portuguese, as Sergeant Batouchas reported, was “hard to under-
stand.”413
412 Naulila was one of eight forts in the Capitania mor Cuamato under Captain A. F. Varão:
Forts Roçadas, Otoquero, Nalusheque, Naulila, Aucongo, Inhoca, Damaquero, and Cuama-
to – head quarters of the Capitania mor and of the 17th Native Company. The latter consist-
ed of 120 African soldiers being commanded by two officers and twelve non-commissioned
officers. They were distributed among the forts. In addition, Varão commanded 25 dra-
goons and a battery of artillery in Damaquero. However, twelve artillerists had only one
cannon and no ammunition (BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 29, statement Antonio F.
Varão, 11.11.21). Capitão mor: ‘an official choosen by the Portuguese government to rep-
resent the interests of Portugal to the local rulers, to protect the local Portuguese communi-
ty from oppression and to ensure they remained at least partly under government control.’
Heywood/Thornton 1988: 223.
413 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 54, report C. Palermo, 5.11.14; Heintze 2011: 20; cf. Stolz et.al. 2011.
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After he believed to have understood what was said, Schultze-Jena ac-
cepted Sereno’s invitation to meet the Capitão mor of Fort Cuamato.
However, according to Jensen’s translation of Sereno, the Capitão mor
was currently in Naulila, while Sereno, according to Portuguese sources,
had explained that Captain Varão was currently at Cuamato, where the
Germans were supposed to meet him. Since it was almost sundown,
Schultze-Jena invited Sereno and his men to stay as his guests overnight in
the German camp. Jensen had to translate the conversations. The atmo-
sphere during dinner was relaxed; although Sereno did not believe
Schultze-Jena’s explanation that he was on the trail of a deserter. He was
convinced that the Germans wanted to pick up the load of the ox wagons
he had already confiscated. The Germans on their part were not convinced
that the troops recently arrived from Lisbon (as shown in the newspaper
brought from Fort Dongoena) were only supposed to subdue the “rebel-
lious” Kwanyama and occupy their territory since in October the rainy
season was imminent. Both sides put guards near the camp all night
long.414
The next morning, October 19, Lieutenant Lösch was hesitant to follow
the Portuguese invitation. He wanted to stay in the camp. According to
Vageler, who quoted Constable Schaaps, Lösch said: “Nobody will leave
the fort alive”. It was not clear what gave him reason for his mistrust. But
Vageler reported that he later learned that Schultze-Jena had received
warning letters from missionaries in Ovamboland. Sereno noticed Lösch’s
reluctance and explicitly requested him to join them in Naulila, allowing
him to carry his gun and inviting him and the other Germans to bring their
bedding gear, thus implying that their sojourn would be longer. The Ger-
mans, however, convinced that they would only ride to Fort Naulila and
return the same day, took only their arms. Around 8 a.m. Sereno,
Schultze-Jena, Lösch and Roeder together with Jensen and the African
“police servants Hugo, Andreas, and August” departed for Fort Naulila, 14
kilometers north.415
Shortly before they reached the fort, the horses were watered at the riv-
er. In the meantime, Sereno sent one of his men, Sergeant Gonçalves, to
414 PA R 52529: 53-61: Memo port., 1921; BAB R 1001/6635: 51, Memo Allm, 23.5.22; R
1001/6639: 43, Diário de Notíçias,~15.2.15; Machado 1956: 65; Southern, 2007: 9.
415 BAB R 1001/6634: 150f., Dr. Vageler to KGW (~November 1914), Annex 11 to Memo
Allemand; p. 120., Report of C. Jensen, Annex 6 to Memo Allemand, 23.5.22
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Naulila to announce their arrival and to order breakfast.416 Gonçalves re-
turned 15 minutes later. Jensen understood from him that the Capitão mor
Varão had returned to Fort Cuamato, but had left a letter. Schultze-Jena,
listening to Jensen’s translation was surprised, but did not want to reject
Sereno’s offer to have breakfast in Naulila. When they arrived
around 9:30 a.m., the Portuguese officer ordered to unsaddle the horses
and to serve breakfast. Gonçalves and one corporal stayed with the horse-
gear, the other soldiers went for fodder. Sereno was at pains to explain to
the Germans that Captain Varão was at Cuamato. He read the order writ-
ten by the Capitão mor and also showed it to Jensen so he could explain to
Schultze-Jena that they all had the order to proceed to Cuamato. Jensen as-
sumed that this letter had just been written by Varão informing the Ger-
mans that he had to leave and that they were now in Portuguese custody,
but free to follow him (Varão) to Cuamato under the supervision of
Sereno. Jensen was not sure to have correctly understood the letter and
told Schultze-Jena about this order by the Capitão mor. Schultze-Jena, not
informed about the decree of the Govenor General from September 12
about the state of emergency that gave plenty of prerogatives to the mili-
tary, protested. He reminded Sereno of his invitation and argued that he
trusted a Portuguese officer to honor his own words. The latter tried to
play down the tension and invited the Germans to have breakfast before
they all would continue their journey to Fort Cuamato. Schultze-Jena re-
fused and ordered his men to bit the horses. No one understood the other.
Jensen, now completely overstrained in his language capacity, noticed that
the Portuguese soldiers had been given order by Sereno to take position
with their guns. When he alerted Schultze-Jena to this conduct, the latter
ordered his men to mount their horses. He protested against being tricked
and the impertinence that he should ride to Fort Cuamato, since he was
only following the invitation to the fort in the belief that he could meet the
Capitão mor here in Fort Naulila. Schultze-Jena insisted on returning to
his camp to wait there for the response of the administrator in Humbe,
Campos Palermo, or the Capitão mor Varão. Sereno, “known for his
brusque manner and direct approach”417 responded that he had express or-
416 For food the fort depended to a large degree on Africans living in settlements nearby; pho-
tographs published in Ilustração Portugueza (no. 470, 22.2.1915; no. 471, 1.3.1915) show
Indigenas de Naulila. Women were ‘charged’ with preparing corn (milho) for the troops.
The fort had also several animals, among them a domesticated ostrich and two camels.
417 Southern 2007: 9; Norton 2001: 209; Machado 1956: 35; Baericke 1981: 55.
2. The First World War in Angola and GSWA
127
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ders not to permit the Germans to return to Erickson Drift, but to keep
them here or bring them to Fort Cuamato. He seized the bridle of
Schultze-Jena’s horse to stop him from riding. According to Sereno,
Schultze-Jena was at that point about to take his gun. Sergeant Gonçalves
warned the unarmed Sereno. Feeling threatened (ameaça), he gave the or-
der to fire. Schultze-Jena was shot dead by the surrounding soldiers. Roed-
er and Lösch wanted to escape through the gate but were shot by the
guards too, without having fired a single shot.418 Lösch died within min-
utes, while Curt Roeder was still alive. Jensen managed to escape, but was
hit by a bullet and caught near the river, whereupon he was taken to the
prison cell of Naulila. Jensen accused the Portuguese soldiers of having
looted the body of Schultze-Jena and robbed Roeder, heavily wounded, of
their valuables. The “police servant Hugo” escaping with the Germans
was shot dead and allegedly thrown into the Kunene River “for the
crocodiles”. “Police servants August and Andreas” were rounded up, beat-
en and put into prison. August managed to escape the following night to
Eunda on German territory. Andreas, too, later escaped from Portuguese
custody.419
The administrator in Humbe, Campos Palermo, had in the meantime re-
ceived a telegram from Fort Dongoena and soon afterwards received the
letter from Schultze-Jena.420 He was confused and glad to be able to show
it to his prisoner Vageler, who had just been transferred from Fort Naulila,
for translation.421 That night, Campos Palermo sent telegrams to the Dis-
trict Governor in Lubango, informing him about the arrival of the Ger-
mans at Erickson Drift and asking for permission to meet them. When the
permission was received from Governor Roçadas, Campos Palermo sent a
telegram to Fort Cuamato that he would meet the group from Outjo.422
Vageler could offer his services for the negotiations and Campos Paler-
mo released the German. On October 18, they and the trader and inter-
preter Pieter Jacob van der Kellen and two other men (one soldier guard-
418 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 66, Relatório pedido pelo Capitão-Mor, 22.10.14; cf. Santos 1978:211.
419 BAB R 1001/6634: 101f., Report of Jensen, Ax 4 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; p. 154, Vageler
to KGW (~11/19), Ax 11 Mémoire All., 23.5.22; R 1001/6639: 43, Diário de Notíçias,
~15.2.15 (German transl., 20.2.25); R 1001/6640: 39, testimony Gonçalves, 13.10.25;
Suchier 1918: 30; a different version: Southern 2007: 9f. ref. to Cidade 1928: 497.
420 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 61, Telgr. (copy) Batouchas to Administrator Humbe, 17.10.1914;
AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5a Rep, Cx.996, auto de averiguações ‘Naulila’ (1914).
421 BAB R 1001/6634: 148, Vageler to RMW (10.11.1921), Ax 10, 23.5.22; Stals 1968: 187.
422 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 33, statement A.Varão, 11.11.21; Hennig 1920: 110.
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ing Vageler) rode to Erickson Drift as stated in Schultze-Jena’s letter, 70
kilometers south of Humbe. The group arrived on October 19, around 9
a.m. at the German camp, when Schultze-Jena and his men were about to
enter Fort Naulila. Vageler, convinced that there was war between Ger-
many and Portugal, persuaded soldier Georg Kimmel to ride after the sev-
en men who had left an hour ago, to warn the Germans not to enter the fort
and to inform them about the arrival of the administrator from Humbe.
However, Kimmel reached the fort when the Portuguese had caught al-
ready the escaped, but wounded, Jensen. Kimmel was caught too and
brought in together with Jensen. Alferes Sereno ordered Kimmel to write a
letter to the remaining Germans to also come to Naulila. He did not know
about the telegrams from Roçadas in Lubango permitting negotiations
with the Germans. Nor did he believe Kimmel’s assertion that the admin-
istrator of Humbe was currently in the German camp. Rather, Sereno told
Kimmel not to mention in his letter that two Germans were dead. Kimmel
and Jensen, however, wrote in German: “Schultze-Jena, Lösch shot dead”
which Sereno could not read. Around noon Vageler sent, behind Campos
Palermo’s back, sergeant Braunsdorf and “Bushman Jan” to cautiously
monitor the situation in the fort. Around 5 p.m. they both returned to the
German camp with the message from Kimmel and Jensen, received from
an African accompanying Kimmel to Naulila.423
Upon reading the message, Vageler was once more convinced that there
must be war between Germany and Portugal. He wanted to inform the
Governor in Windhoek as soon as possible. With the help of the German
constable and the police sergeant Campos Palermo and his men were
rounded up, but later released when the Germans departed south towards
Eunda. During the night following the incident, Sereno sent patrols out to
reconnoiter the area. In the meantime, he had learnt via telegraph from
Fort Cuamato that the administrator of Humbe had indeed been waiting at
Erickson Drift. Gonçalves later confirmed that he had been again at the
place of the German camp to search for the remaining Germans. As the
escaped “police servant August” witnessed on his way south, a Portuguese
patrol of 20 men reached almost the main location of the “’free tribe’, thus
at least 15 km into German territory”, blocking the path on which they
may have expected the remainder of the German expedition on their way
423 BAB R 1001/6634: 152, Vageler to KGW~11/1914, Ax 11, 23.5.22; Schaaps 1930: 384.
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back from Erickson Drift.424 Since the Germans had taken another route
“across the bush” to Eunda, they reached the place unhindered the next
morning. Here they joined two men who were waiting in vain with addi-
tional ox wagons for Schultze-Jena. Before the group left for Outjo, they
were also joined by “police servant August”. From the German group, he
was the only witness of the incident in Naulila not in Portuguese custody.
He told Vageler that Sereno ordered to his men to take up their guns when
Schultze-Jena gave instructions to prepare the horses to escape from
Naulila. August also claimed that Sereno personally shot at the Ger-
mans.425 When the German party arrived in Outjo on October 24, Vageler
sent a six-pages telegram to Governor Seitz that “by order of the comman-
der [of Fort Naulila] Dr. Schultze, Lösch, Röder and police servants An-
dreas and Hugo were shot from behind, without a clue”.426
With the desertion of Dr. Vageler to GSWA, Governor General Norton
de Matos and others saw their suspicion confirmed that the Study Com-
mission was in fact nothing more than a tool of German expansionism.
Despite requesting the engineers to continue the survey works, he had or-
dered their close observation in early October.427 Finally, Colonel Coelho
and District Governor Roçadas agreed to dissolve the Commission. The
German members had to return to Moçâmedes and were supposed to em-
bark on the next steamer to Europe.428 Engineer Thurner was arrested in
Lubango together with the other German members of the Commission, the
surveyors Klemoscheg and Hempel, and with Vice Consul Schöss and his
family. The arrest was not only “for their protection”, but also because
they were considered “German spies”. The group was transported to
Moçâmedes and put on a ship to Luanda.429 Also Dr. Alfred Schachzabel,
ethnologist and “erudite traveler representative” of German aspirations,430
424 BAB R 1001/6634: 148f., Vageler to RMW 10.11.1921, Ax 10 Memo Allem.; p. 154,
Vageler to KGW~11/1914, Ax 11 Memo Allem.; R 1001/6640: 39, testimony Gonçalves,
13.10.25; Schaaps 1930: 384; The ‘free tribe’ was probably the ‘native tribe in Okolonskasi
[Uukolongadhi, near Eunda, Olusuati], a Free State (Negrostate) without chief’ where
Schultze-Jena passed on 15.10.14, R 1001/6634: 98f., Report Jensen, Ax 4 Memo Allem.,
23.5.22.
425 BAB R 1001/6634: 153, Vageler to KGW, Ax 11 Memo All., 23.5.22; Schaaps 1930: 385.
426 BAB R 1001/6645: 82, Telgr Vageler to KGW, 24.10.14; R 1001/6634: 88, Report Schu-
bert, Ax 1 Memo All.; p. 158, Report Seitz 10.5.1921, Ax 13 Memo All., 23.5.22.
427 BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 11, testimony Ambassador Norton de Matos, 5.5.26.
428 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Chefe do Gabinete to Ger. Consul Luanda, 26.10.; 9.11.14.
429 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schöss to German Consulate Luanda, 28.11.14.
430 Pélissier 1996: 661; cf. Heintze 1995.
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was arrested in Benguela and sent to Luanda, as he was in contact with
persons who had established food storage facilities in several places.431 As
Germans, Busch and Schachzabel experienced numerous difficulties in
Benguela: “People see new phantoms [Gespenster] everyday. In Bihe, Ca-
conda … in Moçâmedes they see Zeppeline and Aeroplane”. There were
rumors in Benguela that Busch had “instigated” the “mulatos” to poison
all Portuguese.432
In Naulila, Lieutenant Roeder died of his wounds the night following
the incident. In the morning, Sereno told Jensen to accompany him to the
German camp to lure the remaining Germans into the fort. However, when
they arrived at Erickson Drift, Vageler’s group had already left for Eunda.
According to Jensen, Sereno then felt that he had committed an error. He
started an “inquiry”. His soldiers had to confirm that Schultze-Jena had
pointed his rifle at him. Jensen was ordered to confirm Sereno’s self-de-
fense. He finally understood that Capitão mor Varão had not been in
Naulila that morning. Varão’s letter, Jensen claimed, was hastily written
by one of Sereno’s men before the Germans arrived.433
On October 21, Roçadas informed Governor General Norton de Matos
about the incident, who in turn notified the government in Lisbon.
Roçadas ordered the Capitão mor to undertake a thorough investigation.
Sereno, Gentil, and other witnesses were heard; the German “war materi-
als” were neatly listed. As Varão remembered, the prisoners Kimmel and
Jensen had to be “pressed” hard to answer their interrogators. It was later
claimed that the resulting report and all testimonies were destroyed during
the battle in December.434 However, copies of the 52-page report have sur-
vived in the Arquivo Histórico Militar in Lisbon. Sketches were drawn of
the German camp, the way along the Kunene River and the scene of
shooting. It can be assumed from the numerous side-remarks that this re-
431 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Chefe do Gabinete to German Consul Luanda, 28.11.14.
432 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Otto Busch to German Consulate Luanda, 26.10.14. It was
known in Luanda that in Elisabethville, Belgian Kongo, German merchant Scheffler was
shot by a policeman because he happened to be the first German the sergeant met after he
had learnt about the sacking of Lieuwen in Belgium by German troops. NARA RG 84, Bo-
ma, v. 18, 703, German Consulate Luanda to USC in Boma, 5.10.14.
433 BAB R 1001/6634: 103, Report of C.Jensen, Annex 4 to Memo Allem., 23.5.22.
434 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 35f., testimony Commander Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21.
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port and the accompanying documents were the starting point for the
preparation of the Portuguese legal memoranda after the war.435
For diplomatic usage, Portugal’s government developed its own version
of the occurrences at Naulila: A German force crossed into Angola “in
search for provisions. They were stopped by Portuguese troops and a short
engagement took place after which they recrossed the frontier.” The
British Foreign Office was informed about Eisenlohr’s endeavor to pro-
cure provisions for GSWA and the Governor General’s prohibition to do
so. The government in Berlin depended completely upon the Portuguese
version.436
Revenge? – Devastating the Kavango Forts, Oct.–Nov. 1914
When Governor Seitz learned from Vageler about the incident at Fort
Naulila early in the morning of October 24, the same telegram also in-
formed him that 1,800 Portuguese soldiers were currently marching to-
wards the German border, that fortresses were set up along the border, that
Germans in Angola, including consul Schöss, were “in dire straights” and
that all food transports had been confiscated. Convinced that a state of war
now existed between Portugal and Germany, Vageler urged the governor –
“in the interest of the defense of the colony” – to take the matter serious.
The facts of the Naulila incident seemed confusing. However, considering
all what he had learned about Angola over the last two months, one thing
seemed undisputable for Governor Seitz: the state of war with Portugal.437
Would the Portuguese attack GSWA from the north? Was an Allied en-
circlement of GSWA to be feared? A few hours after he learnt of the inci-
dent, Seitz sent a telegram to the Commander of the Schutztruppe, Lt.-
Colonel Joachim von Heydebreck (1861–1914), in Kalkfontein (in the far
south of GSWA, today Karasburg) to inform him accordingly. The only
German post at the border with Angola, the police station Kuring-Kuru
2.4
435 AHM/Div/2/2/23/3, auto de averiguações, 30.10.-9.11.14; Sereno, Material de guerra,
31.10.14; AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5a Rep, Cx.996, auto de averiguações ‘Naulila’.
436 TNA FO 371/1884: 424, Telegram BML to FO, 23.10.14; RKA 1915: 17 (15.11.14).
437 BAB R 1001/6645: 83, Telgr Vageler to KGW, 24.10.14; R 1001/6634: 145, Rpt Baericke
16.11.19, Ax 9 Memo All, 23.5.22; R 1001/6634: 88-91, Report Schubert, Ax 1 Memo
All.; p. 158-160, Report Seitz 10.5.1921, Ax 13 Memo All., 23.5.22; Samson 2013: 78.
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(opposite the Portuguese Fort Cuangar on the Okavango River) seemed to
be in danger.438
At the same time Seitz ordered to send “open!” radio-telegrams (three
times during three nights) to “all board stations and coastal stations” “in
all directions” to let friend and foe know that the “lieutenant of Fort Ishin-
ga [Naulila] had invited Schultze-Jena, Lösch, and Röder to Ishinga and
had killed them there.” He expected – so he argued after the war – that
Angola’s Governor General would thereby also be informed about what
had happened and would respond with an explanation. Norton de Matos
did not respond. German cables had been cut and British cables were no
longer open for Germans. Attempts by Eickhoff, the engineer in charge of
the wireless station at Windhoek, to reach the wireless station in Nauen
near Berlin in order to receive an answer from the Colonial Office as to
whether or not Portugal was at war with Germany, failed. The “five terrif-
ic steel lattice pillars, nearly four hundred feet high, tied by cables with
bolts as big as a man”439 remained silent. Since the destruction of the sta-
tion of Kamina in Togo on August 27, 1914 upon the approach of French
troops, only “under favourable conditions” had “direct communication
with Berlin” been possible. Until then, Seitz had been in “daily connec-
tion” with Berlin.440 In Paris, the radio station on the Eifel Tower had de-
tected in early October that Berlin could still send messages to Windhoek
via an unknown post in Cameroon or East Africa, but since mid-October
messages from Berlin could no longer be received in Windhoek.441 The
Windhoek station was built to cover a radius of 4,000 kilometers to reach
Kamina. Millions had been spent and now Germany’s global wireless net-
work proved futile. The British were still concerned about it; especially as
there were “rumors of wireless stations being erected on the south coast of
Brazil by German sympathizers”.442
438 BAB R 1001/6645: 89, Telgr KGW to Cdr, 24.10.14; Oelhafen 1923: 51; Cann 2001: 151;
Baericke 1981: 60; Seitz 1920: 33; Suchier 1918: 25; 63.
439 Ritchie 1915: 54; BAB R 1001/6645: 88, radio KGW to all stations, 24.10.14.
440 Park 1916: 116; 130 claims that until ‘end of March wireless messages were being received
at Windhuk direct from Berlin’, which is an exaggeration; BAB R 1001/6645, 12 KGW to
Vice-Consul Schöss, 29.08.14; R 1001/6634: 161, Eickhoff to RMW 15.11.21, Ax 14
Memo All., 23.5.22; cf. Crabtree 1915: 390; Roscher 1925; Marguerat 2006: 109-113;
Klein-Arendt 1995; Mantei 2004.
441 TNA FO 371/1884: 366, French Embassy to FO, 9.10.14; NAN A.566 v. 2: 6, Schmitt to
parents, 5.2.15.
442 Friedewald 2001: 56; Baum 1919: 597; cf. Thurn 1912; Doß 1977: 46f.; Suchier 1918: 77.
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Commander Heydebreck was less than pleased with Seitz’ intention to
inform the world about the Naulila incident. He was, however, equally
concerned about Kuring-Kuru and advised to either “substantially rein-
force or withdraw” the station. Still on October 24, in the afternoon, Seitz
justified his radio telegrams by pointing out that the “murder… proved the
start of Portuguese hostilities”, thus German ships must be warned of Por-
tuguese war ships. However, Heydebreck – apparently aware that radio-
telegrams could for technical reasons only be sent after midnight – insisted
that a general notification was “questionable”. Seitz then ordered via tele-
gram his engineers at the wireless stations in Windhoek and Aus to abstain
from sending the messages about Naulila “for the time being”. Whether or
not the telegram from Windhoek reached Aus (in the far south of GSWA)
before midnight or not would later become an important question. After
the war, the Germans claimed that they had indeed sent the wireless mes-
sages so that also stations in Angola would have received them.443
Still on October 24, Seitz and the Police Commander, Lt. Colonel Hein-
rich Bethe, decided to order their forces at the police station Kuring Kuru
to attack Fort Cuangar. A telegram was sent to Grootfontein, the nearest
district office, ordering to “burn down” Cuangar and to “give no quarter”.
The press in GSWA was immediately informed about the Naulila-inci-
dent; the call for revenge became widespread. More than 200 kilometers
north of Grootfontein, the head of Kuring Kuru, Constable Oswald Oster-
mann, received Bethe’s order on October 29 – a time lag known to Seitz
and Bethe. The next day, Rittmeister (cavalry captain) Lehmann, military
commander of Grootfontein, arrived with seven men.444
It must be noted that historians have argued the Germans had the “strat-
egy” to compel Portugal to “abandon its position of neutrality through a
contrived border dispute and associated incident. This action would serve
as a pretext to provoke a break with Portugal”, i.e. to wage war against it
and annex Angola to fulfill the German dream of Mittelafrika. Even
though the war aim of Mittelafrika was indisputably formulated in August
1914, it goes by itself that a close reading of the archival material does not
allow for such an interpretation. The incident in Naulila was caused by too
many variables in order to be planned by German “strategists”. Also, the
later course of action taken by the Germans, most of all the cumbersomely
443 BAB R 1001/6645, Telgr KGW to Cdr; KGW to wireless stations; Cdr. to KGW, 24.10.14.
444 BAB R 1001/6645, 126, Telgr Bethe to Lehmann; 90, KGW to Press, 24.10.14; cf. Histori-
cus 2012: 34; Oelhafen 1923: 91f.; Suchier 1918: 32; Hennig 1920: 112.
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long preparation of the campaign against Naulila, does not give the im-
pression of a well-prepared “strategy” to send troops against the Por-
tuguese.445
Fort Cuangar had been erected in 1909, when the lower Kavango area
was first occupied under the command of District Governor João de
Almeida. The Kavango valley became an important corridor for Por-
tuguese colonial activity in southeastern Angola. Cuangar was chosen to
be the administrative center (capitania mor) of the military district Lower
Kavango (Baixo Cubango). It was headed by the Capitão mor Silva Nuňes
later by Lieutenant Joaquim F. Durão. Under his command fortresses
along the lower Kavango were erected: Bunja, Sambio, Dirico, and Mu-
cusso. Fort Cuangar, located around 300 meters off the river on a hill,
could be described as a military “village”, manned in 1914 by two offi-
cers, five non-commissioned officers, five European and around eighty
African soldiers of the “native company 10/V”.446 In the immediate vicini-
ty the families of the African soldiers lived in a “particular village”
(sansala) an enclosure with a diameter of around 50 meters. From time to
time, also Portuguese itinerant traders inhabited the surroundings.447
Around the fort, agricultural works (vegetables) were executed. Governor
Almeida intended to improve the meals of his men and hoped to make his
forts less dependent on canned meat that had to be transported at high
costs from the coast.448 More than twenty mules warranted the transport of
goods and personnel. Even a longboat (called Cunene) anchored in Cuan-
gar. It was used to patrol the river and to supply the smaller forts Bunja,
Sambio, Dirico, and Mucusso.
445 Cann 2001: 147 ref. Stoecker 1986: 284; 1991: 251 cit. Jagow to Zimmermann, 21.8.14.
446 BAB R 1001/6639: 190, testimony of Lt. Santos, 1.7.25 Officers: Commander Lt. J.F.
Durão, supported by Lt. José Souza Machado; NCOs: Sergeant Major Americo Cabral,
Sergeants Julio Santos, Americo da Rocha, Alberto Perreira, José Freire d’Abreu.
447 BAB R 1001/6639: 108, testimony of da Rocha, 30.4.25.
448 PA R 52534, Réplique du Gouv. Portug.: 53,~15.4.29. Allegedly the fields were ‘champs
d’expériences pour les cultures indiquées par les services agronomiques officiels’.
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“Fort Cuangar, Juin 1914”Ill. 18, 19
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“Fort Cuangar”, photo: Carl Singelmann, 1911
In the beginning, relations between Fort Cuangar and the German police
station Kuring Kuru were not free of frictions due to the disputed border-
line from the Kunene to the Kavango River. Kuring-Kuru was founded
(first as a small straw hut) in 1910 in reaction to the Portuguese expansion.
The policemen’s task “was not to implement German law and order in the
region, but rather to observe and control the Portuguese activities”. The
latter understood this move as an infringement of their “suzerainty” over
the Kavango people; also, the Germans prevented their colonial neighbors
from using the river’s southern (“German”) bank. In 1914 two brick hous-
es had been erected, military aspects were neglected. After all, Kuring Ku-
ru was administered by the colonial police and manned not with soldiers,
but with three police officers, five “native police servants” (Polizeidiener),
and three workers. The neighboring villages (~1,000 inhabitants) were
headed by the old Chief (hompa) Himarua and his nephew, the “pro-Ger-
man” Kandjimi Hauwanga. In August 1909, the latter had signed a “treaty
of friendship” with the German Lieutenant Zawada, who prepared the
founding of the police station. Zawada immediately informed Governor de
Almeida of this move. Personal relations of the garrisons became cordial.
The Commanders Lieutenant Durão and Constable Oswald Ostermann
Ill. 20
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regularly visited each other. Since 1910 the Germans reported to have
been “showered with amenities” by the soldiers from Cuangar. In mid-Au-
gust 1914 Ostermann learnt about the war in Europe. He understood that
Portugal had joined the war against Germany and informed Durão.449
At the end of October, the news about the Naulila incident had probably
not yet arrived in Fort Cuangar. The connection over 430 kilometers via
other forts by cable and messengers was tedious, especially since parts of
the area along the German-Portuguese border were known to be “Bush-
man land” not to be crossed by “other natives”, as the German soldier
Mattenklodt described it.450 The Portuguese later claimed that both com-
manders had concluded a gentlemen’s agreement to inform each other
when they received the order “to fulfill their military duty”. Durão there-
fore did not carry out precautionary measures.
In 1914, Fort Cuangar consisted of four long houses arranged in rectan-
gular form, built of either adobe or pão pique (wattle-and-daub). These
buildings were surrounded by an embrasure earthen wall of around 1.70
meters height with two elevated bastions and encircled by trenches, built
in 1909, when the “peaceful character of the natives” had not yet been es-
tablished. However, the trenches were dilapidated and the two rows of
barbed wire fences supposed to cover the earthen wall around the fort
were broken. Cuangar was equipped with two old 7 cm cannons “in very
bad condition”, as the former Sergeant Alberto Perreira remembered.
There was no artillerist to operate them, and there were no maxim guns.
Henry-Martini rifles were available in sufficient numbers, though there
was not enough ammunition. Portuguese witnesses later justified this ne-
glect with reference to the good relations they had with the “per se peace-
able natives” and the Germans. It had thus never been considered to “use
the fort for military purposes”.451 It was claimed that there was even no
surveillance of the immediate vicinity of the fort.452 These testimonies
may also be read as a retrospective rationalization of the unlikely German
449 Eckl 2007: 12; 2004: 187; Zollmann 2010: 327; Santos 1978: 153; BAB R 1001/6639:
201f., testimony M, 5.7.25; R 1001/2185: 132f, Hpt Witte, report on border [~11/1911];
NAN ZBU 1010 J XIII b 4: 211, Report Okavango Expedit., Dias to Zawada, 19.11.; resp.
26.11.09.
450 BAB R 1001/6639: 201, testimony M, 5.7.25; p. 187, Consul Robern to AA, 6.7.25.
451 BAB R 1001/6639: 193f, testimony of Lt. Santos, 1.7.25; p. 201, testimony of ‘M’, 5.7.25;
BAB R 1001/6640: 108, extra-file p.11, testimony of Lt. Perreira, 4./6.7.25;
452 BAB R 1001/6639: 4, extra-file: 22, Questionnaire, 4/24.
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success in conquering the fort. In general, the Portuguese manpower and
equipment was superior to their adversaries.
There were rumors that Fort Cuangar would soon be attacked by the
Germans. At the end of October the Germans had dug trenches on their
side of the river and had piled up sandbags. They tried to hide the arrival
of reinforcements. Lehmann’s ox wagon was left in the bush, but his ar-
rival was reported to Durão. Nevertheless, he was taken by surprise when
the twelve Germans attacked at 4 in the morning on October 31. It has
been assumed that Ostermann “very reluctantly obeyed the order to attack
the Portuguese post at Cuangar”, but he faithfully followed his orders to
“give no pardon”.453 “Their action was prompt, decisive, and brutal.”
Durão slept in his house 200 m away from the fort. Also, the other Euro-
pean and African soldiers did not sleep inside the fort but in their huts
erected 50–100 meters away. During the night of the attack, Fort Cuangar
was guarded by one Sergeant and three to six African soldiers while Lieu-
tenant Machado and four other soldiers slept inside the fort. The German
police squad, equipped with rifles and two maxim guns, had crossed the
Kavango River a few kilometers downstream. They first blindsided the
guards of the fort and killed Lieutenant Machado and four men. Waking
up from the noise, Durão and his sergeants did not know yet that the Ger-
mans had already taken the fort. They ran into the direction of the fort in
order to gain access to their guns but were shot, since the Germans had
mounted a maxim gun on a bastion and fired into the direction of the sur-
rounding huts. They not only killed Durão and other soldiers but also the
trader Nogueira Machado and his family sleeping in their ox wagon.454
The attack lasted for around 1½ hours. Nine Portuguese and 14 African
soldiers were killed during the raid. The unlikely ‘victory’ of twelve
against almost 100 men was soon called a “massacre”. The Portuguese
claimed that the Germans had used dum-dum bullets, had shot wounded
soldiers and killed their wives and children. It was said that the Germans
had been supported by “many natives of chief Assonga” or (Kandjimi)
“Auanga” of Cuangar and others coming from GSWA. Since 1911, the
latter was considered a “German spy tasked with creating border inci-
453 Southern 2007: 10; cf.Morlang 1998: 43; Baericke 1981: 63 Durão Ostermann’s friend.
454 AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5a Rep, Cx.996, telgr. Capitão Mor Alto Cubango to Gov.
Lubango, 15.11.14; BAB R 1001/6639: 109, testimony da Rocha, 30.4.25; Cann 2001: 151.
2. The First World War in Angola and GSWA
139
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
“Station allemande de Kuring Kuru, 1911”
“Station allemande de Kuring Kuru, 1914”
Ill. 21
Ill. 22
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dents.”455 In 1915, a British source reported that “Kanjemi … offered his
assistance … [but] was refused”. He was “however permitted to loot and
to pull down the earthworks”. The fort was dismantled to prevent the Por-
tuguese from using it as base for expeditions against GSWA. The fort’s
livestock was distributed among the “German natives”; the rest of the
booty was taken to Grootfontein.456 The large amounts of food and ammu-
nition found were taken as proof that Portugal was preparing to invade
GSWA.457
After the destruction of Cuangar, Ostermann continued to raid Por-
tuguese forts along the Kavango. On November 4 and 8, he burned down
Bunja and Sambio. The Portuguese soldiers already knew about the de-
struction of Cuangar and had left their forts before the arrival of Oster-
mann. On November 12, the troops in Fort Dirico were defeated and the
fort was destroyed too. Four days later, Fort Mucusso was taken and de-
stroyed by the “marauding Germans” without fighting. Portuguese soldiers
escaped into the ‘bush’. Some arrived in December in Fort Cuito Cua-
navale; a few prisoners were taken to Grootfontein.458 Even the British in
the occupied “Caprivi Strip” learnt that the “fort at Libebe … was cap-
tured and burnt by a German force composed of considerable number of
natives with about fifteen Europeans [on November 26].”459 The Por-
tuguese “post A” (Porto Luso/Caiundo) at the Kavango River was de-
stroyed by Africans after the soldiers had escaped, expecting the Germans
to turn towards them. No doubt, chief Kandjimi Hauwanga sided with the
Germans. Having lived with his people on both sides of the river, he de-
cided to settle on the German bank.460
455 AHM/Div/2/2/60/11, Reocupação do Cuangar, in: Dáskalos 2008: 186; BAB R 1001/6639:
193-6, testimony Lt. Santos, 1.7.25; 203, the spelling of the chief’s name was inconsistent;
Baericke 1981: 21; 63 Seitz prohibited the ‘use of native troops’; Stals 1984: 114.
456 TNA FO 371/2231, Gen Smuts to GG Buxton, 15.10.15; BAB R 1001/6634: 162, Oster-
mann to RMW (27.06.21), Annex 15 Mémoire All., 23.5.22.
457 BAB R 1001/6634: 155, Vageler to KGW (~11/1914), Annex 11 Mémoire All., 23.5.22.
458 AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5a Rep, Cx.996, Report d’Oliveira on Cuangar, 31.12.14; Re-
port Vasconcelos e Sá on Cuangar, 26.1.16; Southern 2007: 11; Oelhafen 1923: 92.
459 TNA FO 371/1882: 80A, Telgr. High Com. South Africa to SoS Colonies, 15.12.14.
460 Damian Nakares account of Kwangali history: 101-121, in: Fleisch/Möhlig 2002.
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“Fort Luzo am Okavango”
After this second border incident, confusion was rampant in Europe as
well as in Africa. The German Foreign Office wondered about a “German
incursion” into Angola.461 The Foreign Office in London was directly in-
formed by Consul Hall Hall from Luanda who had spoken with the Gover-
nor General about the “massacre” in Cuangar. Hall Hall also pointed out
that troops were on the way, but due to the distance could not arrive “for
some considerable time.” It seemed “difficult to see how war between
Germany and Portugal can be much longer postponed.”462 “In south[ern
Angola] panic reigned” after the six forts along the Okavango River had
been destroyed. “Merchants and officers tried to hide their valuables in the
Spiritan mission station of Catoco, assuming, it would not be pillaged by
the Germans. At the same time, it was well known in the region that a
grand army expedition was on its way to fight the Kwanyama and, first of
all, the Germans.463 However, as Spiritan Prefect Keiling deplored, disci-
pline was at a new low. The head of the military Upper Okavango district,
commanded the “misery” “without instructions and is drunk most of the
Ill. 23
461 BAB R 1001/9025, Bl.4, Tlgr AA, 31.10.14; Journal of Afric. Soc. 15 no.59 (1916): 284.
462 TNA FO 371/1884: 438, Brit. Consul Luanda to FO, 17.11.14; 437, internal remark, FO.
463 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 1.12.14.
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time”.464 In Luanda, where pro-British demonstrations had been staged by
the Municipality and the Associação Comercial,465 the Governor General
saw his convictions about German aggressiveness once more confirmed.
He assumed that Cuangar was a German reaction to Naulila. The informa-
tion given to the provincial press at the end of November listed the num-
ber of deaths in both incidents.466 Norton de Matos related the events to
the German Consul and expressed his belief that the Governor in Wind-
hoek did not know about the incidents in Naulila and Cuangar. He also in-
formed Eisenlohr that he had told Commander Roçadas via telegram not
to cross the German border under any circumstances. The official report of
the Governor General on the incidents was available in November. A few
days later Consul Eisenlohr learnt about the incident from a German per-
spective since the expelled Vice Consul Schöss had arrived in Luanda in
the meantime. Schöss knew about the events from Pieter van der Kellen
who had been with Vageler to Erickson Drift where they met the remain-
der of the German patrol.467
Consul Eisenlohr – left without any information from Windhoek and
depending on hearsay – believed in an unfortunate sequel of misapprehen-
sions, but was unable to convince Norton de Matos of it. As a show of
goodwill, he informed the Governor General about Otto Busch’s food
storages.468 On November 20, Eisenlohr even suggested that they might
go together to the border to clarify the situation and to avoid further con-
frontation that may lead to “international imbroglio”. Norton de Matos did
not believe the consul, as he had already received an intercepted German
telegram stating “Franke is marching against the Portuguese”. Pointing to
the general prohibition of the usage of telegraphs, he even refused Eisen-
lohr’s proposal to contact his counterpart in Windhoek via the wireless ap-
paratus of the German steamer Adelaide. It was claimed that Norton inten-
tionally prevented the sending of a peace negotiator, as ordered by the Mi-
nister of Colonies. Instead, the Angolan authorities were eager to procure
evidence of a German complot. Already before the incidents at the border
became known, the press in Angola constantly conveyed the message of
464 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Gallangue) to TRP, 10.11.14.
465 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II), Câmara Municipal de Loanda: ‘Ao Povo’, 25.10.14.
466 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) A Provincia no. 140, 23.11.14. ‘Noticia...a conhecer a morte
de tres oficiais alemães, um official portugues, um sargento e diversas praças’.
467 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consul Luanda to DGL, 25.11.14: 5/9.
468 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) German Consulate Luanda to DGL, 18.12.14.
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the German threat to Angola.469 Consul Eisenlohr deplored widespread
anti-German rumors: The ethnologist Dr. Schachzabel was allegedly the
head of a “negro plot [Negerverschwörung]”.470 Also the consul “had al-
lied [him]self with the Africanos, in order to topple Portuguese rule in An-
gola”. Eisenlohr complained to the Governor General about a “hysteria”
concerning reputed German zeppelins and airplanes in the Benguela hin-
terland. Norton de Matos played down these rumors; but to avoid further
friction or even violence, he asked Eisenlohr to help him with the removal
of all Germans from the interior of Angola to Luanda or Europe.471
The Build-up of the Army in Angola, August–December 1914
Having neither declared war on Germany nor its neutrality, but placing
emphasis on its alliance with Great Britain, the position of Portugal was
ambiguous in the early months of World War I. Unquestionable, however,
was the republic’s stand towards its colonies: defending the overseas terri-
tories at all costs. In Angola this included a double task since the occupa-
tion of Kwanyama territory had been already planned, and suddenly in the
same region a second threat had seemed to materialize – a possible Ger-
man invasion.
In his memoirs, Norton de Matos related how he explained to President
Machado on August 4 that once war was declared, “numerous German
troops … would invade southern Angola” and occupy the harbors of Lo-
bito and Mossamedes”. He therefore urged preparations and sending a
strong expeditionary force. Shortly before he returned to Luanda, Colonial
Minister Lisboa de Lima informed Norton that a declaration of war should
be postponed as long as the troops had not arrived in the colonies and that
negotiations with the British were ongoing about the “collaboration” be-
tween their troops in Africa.472 Thus, Angolan troops were to be rein-
forced with troops from Portugal as soon as possible. On August 18, 1914,
the Minister of War, General Antonio J. Pereira de Eça (1852–1917) or-
dered Lieutenant-Colonel José A. Alves Roçadas (1865–1926) to take
over the task of leading the troops to Angola in order to subdue the
2.5
469 PA Luanda 3 (SW Krieg) Germ. Consul Luanda to DGL, 25.11.14; Baericke 1981: 38; 64.
470 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Schachzabel to German Consulate Luanda, 13.11.14.
471 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Remark German Consulate Luanda, 12.11.14.
472 Norton de Matos 1946 vol. IV: 84, transl. in Baericke 1981: 28; cf. Afonso 1989: 282f.
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Kwanyama, who continued to “raid unpunished the Kunene margins” and
to safeguard the border with GSWA. Rumors about an “understanding be-
tween the Germans and these natives” had reached Lisbon in the mean-
time.473 Roçadas, a former aid-de-camp of King Dom Carlos I., who in
1910 as Governor General in Luanda had organized the colony’s smooth
transition from monarchy to republic, was considered an “experienced
Africa-hand” and “hero” of the war in southern Angola in 1907. Given his
experience, Roçadas was “seen as the natural choice”. He informed Gov-
ernor General Norton de Matos, at the time ‘only’ a major, of his tasks. He
requested the mobilization of Africans and Europeans in Angola, as
agreed with the Minister of Colonies. The cooperation between Roçadas
and Norton, however, remained strained.474
It has been stated that the “colonial policy of the republican regime was
absolutely chaotic.”475 Nevertheless, during the war the government in
Lisbon managed to send thousands of troops back and forth between the
metropolis and the colonies. Roçadas’ expeditionary force of 1,569 men
(infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineering, and ambulance corps) left Lisbon
on two steamers on September 10 and 12. They arrived in Moçâmedes on
September 27 and October 1 (with Roçadas). While it has been argued that
the number of soldiers “showed some naiveté, given the resources and the
tasks assigned”, the climatic, hygienic, and infrastructural aspects of the
bush warfare should also be considered. The decree of the Ministry of War
of August 12, 1914, appropriating 1,000,000 Escudos for war materials
explicitly mentioned that the current state of materials was “insuffi-
cient”.476 However, the money provided did not solve all issues. Por-
tuguese troops in southern Angola had serious problems of adapting to the
African theater of war: According to Portuguese sources the men raised in
Portugal were “less than well kitted out for campaigning in Africa. It was
noted that the soldiers’ poor quality uniforms and boots very quickly came
apart at the seams.”477 It was wise not to send too many soldiers from Por-
tugal. Especially once the rainy season was imminent with its “torrential
downpours … that brought the calenturas, or fevers … Contingent after
473 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Jornal de Benguela, no. 34, 26.8.14; Samson 2013: 77.
474 Pélissier 1969: 87; 100; Southern 2007: 7; Regalado 2004: 83; Norton 2001: 209.
475 Pitcher 1991: 65 referring to Clarence-Smith 1985.
476 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 134: 800, USC General to SoS, 18.8.14 (Decreto No. 753).
477 Southern 2007: 6f., referring to Ferreira 1934: 134f.; Fraga 2010: 125f.
2. The First World War in Angola and GSWA
145
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
contingent of European conscripts sent to support the military manoeuvres
of Portuguese conquest sickened and died away in disabling numbers.”478
Since September, Portuguese authorities in southern Angola were or-
dered to closely watch and report any suspicious German or African action
in or near Portuguese territories or along the coast of the Atlantic.479 On
September 16, when the engineer Schubert of the Study Commission ar-
rived in Lubango he noticed “feverish, warlike activity” to accommodate
more troops. Artillery exercises were held for several days. The Governor
General himself went to Moçâmedes to welcome the troops from Portugal.
He urged Roçadas to wait with an attack on the Kwanyama since the worst
was to be expected from the Germans. But Roçadas neither accepted him
as superior nor did he believe in an imminent German invasion. Two days
later, in Lubango, Norton de Matos lambasted internal and external ene-
mies of Angola in a public address. When Schöss requested an explana-
tion for the war preparations, Norton de Matos referred to the Kwanyama
expedition and refused to inform GSWA’s Governor about these plans.480
In addition to the expeditionary forces, around “2,000 black troops [were
now stationed] in south Angola”. Given these war efforts, the Portuguese
Foreign Minister considered it advisable that the Cape Government should
consult directly with Britain’s Consul in Luanda about defense matters; a
suggestion that “seem[ed] scarcely desirable” to Colonial Secretary Har-
court.481
It took more than a month to transport all men and load across the
desert from Moçâmedes inland. The incomplete Moçâmedes railway
reached only 180 kilometers to Vila Arriaga and could not be fully used.
From the railhead to Humbe it was more than 200 kilometers over bad
roads. For want of trucks 1,200 tons of load, including nine guns and six
heavy machine guns, had to be transported with a limited number of
porters and slow ox-wagons. The lack of water and pasture for grazing
took a heavy toll on animals and soldiers. The forces from Portugal,
Mozambique, and those locally recruited, numbering now around 3,000
(Prefect Keiling even mentioned 5,000482) men, were ordered to march to
Lubango. There, the first column arrived on October 18. “Roçadas then
478 Miller 1982: 23; BAB R 1001/6634: 39f., expt Dossier 2, 1-2 Mémoire justif., ~3/22.
479 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 30, statement Commander Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21.
480 BAB R 1001/6634: 85f., Report Schubert, Ax 1 Memo A., 23.5.22; Baericke 1981: 36.
481 TNA FO 371/1884: 424, BML to FO, 23.10.14; CO to GG South Africa, 26.10.14.
482 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Galangue) to TRP, 2.10.14 ‘5000…en route’.
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took over stewardship of the [Huíla] district and, with his staff officers,
began to prepare his force for possible hostilities.” At the same time sever-
al Afrikaaners were requested by the authorities to take part in the expedi-
tion against the Kwanyama.483
The new District Governor was immediately informed about the ongo-
ing German attempts to transport food across the border to GSWA. The
district’s state of emergency declared on September 12 put Roçadas in a
comfortable position to impede any moves of the Germans. In addition, it
was prohibited to build up victuals for more than eight days; otherwise the
authorities were entitled to confiscate the excess. The addressees of these
provisions were evidently the Germans. King Mandume or other African
leaders, against whom the Portuguese allegedly built up their forces, were
hardly affected.484 In the following weeks the moves of the German
traders were closely watched by Roçadas’ men. It was assumed by the
German Consul that one reason for the Portuguese being so well informed
was that in the interior of Angola officials did not hesitate to open German
letters; after all, the Governor of Huila had requested an interpreter of Ger-
man to “verify” all the information that was coming from the neighboring
colony.485 Roçadas was eager to expose the entire German network in
southern Angola. In Lisbon the daily A Capital even assumed that the dec-
laration of the state of emergency was related to the “espionage” of the
German Consul.486 Vice Consul Schöss was arrested on charge of high
treason. It was claimed that he had spied on Portuguese documents by
bribing a subaltern official to copy for him a military report about the
“neutral zone” between Angola and GSWA. However, Schöss stated to his
superior Eisenlohr that this “unfounded” claim was not related to the bor-
der incidents but was already under discussion since January 1914.487 The
Governor General sent a letter of complaint to the German Consul in Lu-
anda about the conduct of Schöss. Given the embezzlement of documents,
he considered him a German spy who had to leave the colony. Also Piet
du Plessis (who had taken Busch’s letter to Outjo) was exposed for work-
ing for the government in GSWA.488
483 Southern 2007: 7; BAB R 1001/6634: 82, Report Schubert, Ax 1 Memo All., 23.5.22.
484 BAB R 1001/6634: 156, Vageler to KGW (~11/14), Annex 11 Memo Allem., 23.5.22.
485 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Csl Luanda to VK Benguela, 15.11.14; Dáskalos 2008: 184.
486 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) A Capital No. 159, 24.10.14 sent by DGL.
487 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda to DGL, 25.11.14.
488 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Chefe de Gabinete to German Consulate Luanda, 28.11.14.
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Following the Naulila incident and his own enquiry, Roçadas expulsed
all Germans from his southern district which he considered to become
soon a theater of war in case of German retaliation. However, he had diffi-
culties to assess how and where to distribute his troops, assuming the Ger-
mans could attack anywhere along the border, be it across the Kunene or
across the Okavango River. Lack of intelligence on the military situation
in GSWA prevented him from recognizing that a German campaign to
“take Porto Alexandre or Moçâmedes should have appeared remote.” First
squadrons under Major Salgado and Lieutenant Aragão reached the
Kunene River (Vau dos Elephantes, Zwartsbooi Drift, Erickson Drift) on
November 12 to reconnoiter possible German movements and advanced to
Fort Rocadas where they arrived on the 17th.489
In October, the Portuguese government authorized “a special credit of
500,000 escudos to defray the expenses” of the expedition to Angola. Por-
tugal was now “de facto at war”, but no declaration of war followed from
either side.490 The British informed the Portuguese that “cooperation be-
tween Union forces and Portuguese forces in Angola would be impossible
owing to the distance which separates them.” The Portuguese were thus
left alone with the defense of Angola. Luanda requested further reinforce-
ments. Their possible employment in the south was to be “kept secret”.
After all, “the main question” whether Portugal would send troops to
France to fight against Germany, had to be seen now in a different light.491
Minister of War Pereira de Eça, an ardent interventionist, “had ignored the
reality of the army under his command.” There were neither enough men
nor modern equipment available to defend simultaneously Portugal, the
colonies, and a sector of the Western front. The republican reforms aiming
at the modernization of the forces were still being implemented and the
military’s finances were in dire straits.492 Even the mobilization of fresh
troops for the colonies proved difficult. Infantry battalions embarked in
Lisbon only on December 10. For fear of German attacks on the convoys,
the British Admiralty was repeatedly requested to warn H.M. Cruisers “to
keep a look-out for” the Portuguese transports.493 They landed in
489 BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 14; 35, testim. Norton de M., 5.5.26; Cann 2001: 152.
490 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 851, USML to SoS, 31.10.14; Teixeira 2003: 24; 1998.
491 TNA FO 371/1884: 428, FO to BML, 28.10.14; 430 internal remark FO, 28.10.14.
492 Meneses 2010: 42; Teixeira 2003: 24
493 TNA FO 371/1884: 45, Port. Minister London to FO, 8.11.;52, Admiralty to FO, 11.11.14.
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Moçâmedes on December 24 where they stayed until March 1915.494 The
troops were lucky to have missed one of the worst defeats the Portuguese
ever suffered in Angola.
Colonial Armies on the Southern African Battlefield, 1914–1915
It has been argued that one of the characteristics of World War I in Africa
is that it was a European conflict fought by Africans on behalf of their
‘masters’.495 The war in GSWA and the Luso-German border war were
the exception to this rule. The majority of the combatants came from Euro-
pe. The participation of Africans was nonetheless distinct and relevant.
For a better understanding of the political and social context of the
colonial armies that turned into inadvertent foes it will be helpful to ana-
lyze first their institutional background. A brief description of the South
African invasion of GSWA will then be followed by an account of the bat-
tle of Naulila, the resulting Portuguese retreat and the German surrender.
An Ancient Institution – the Portuguese Colonial Army in Angola
Portugal’s armed forces were the guarantor of the Empire, the “stronghold
of sovereignty”; tasked with safeguarding the “integrity of the kingdom”
(that included all colonies, Articles 2; 119 of the Constitution of 1838)
against internal and external enemies. Their norms and values were fo-
cused on these two aims and internalized through centuries of colonial ser-
vice.496 Since the 1870s the importance of “colonial service in military ca-
reers” grew considerably.497 The humiliation of the “ultimatum” in 1890
led to a process of reorganization of Portugal’s armed forces. The need to
create a modern army modelled after European competitors seemed evi-
dent to politicians and administrators. The objective was to render the
troops more operational and to equip them in a way so that they could ac-
complish their duties. “There was no close identification between the
monarch and his army”, but the latter gained in reputation since the con-
2.6
2.6.1
494 Sousa [n.d.~1935]: 13f.
495 Michel 2004: 925.
496 General José A. L. dos Santos, in: Cristóvão 2007: 320; cf. Hespanha 2004.
497 Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa 2006: 113.
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quests in Mozambique which raised patriotic sentiment towards the
colonies. Public opinion in Portugal celebrated the “heroes” of the “gener-
ation of 1895”. In the following years army and navy assumed a more im-
portant national role than hitherto. It was said that officers should be liber-
ated from “ministerial tutelage”.498 For a long time, Portugal’s colonial af-
fairs were jointly administered with the navy by the Ministry of Navy and
Overseas (1835–1910). Only in 1911, after the revolution, was an inde-
pendent Ministry of Colonies established. However, also later the colonies
could count on the 6,000 navy men, “many of its officers carrying out offi-
cial jobs in the colony.” The army consisted of about 13,000 men “scat-
tered all over the Empire; from these less than 4,000 were Europeans”. At-
tempts since 1911 at army-reform laws according to the republic’s needs
had “required funds which were not at hand”.499
Traditionally, the majority of Angola’s troops were stationed in Luan-
da. In 1815, for example, 1,153 soldiers accounted for 25 % of the city’s
total population and for 90% of the administrative personnel.500 In 1874,
six battalions of infantry and one of artillery were stationed in Angola.
America’s commercial agent reported:
“The soldiers are composed chiefly of convicts from Portugal. The officers
are in part from the mother country and in part provincial. These unfortunate
convicts, badly fed and poorly paid … very soon fall victims to the climate.
Their places are immediately supplied out of the fresh arrivals that come by
every mail steamer. A large number of these poor fellows come out here for
trifling offences along with others who have committed hideous crimes. I
have often thought the justice of Portugal too severe in passing a sentence of
three years service as a soldier in Angola.”501
The recruiting of the colonial forces in Angola remained rather particular.
Angola’s “first-line army” staffed by European soldiers barely numbered
2,000 men. The government assumed that “the fewer European recruits
and formal civilian militia the better – since these were a possible threat in
times of discontent”. According to historian Douglas Wheeler, “[o]fficers
for the European part of the army were hard to obtain” and “in short sup-
498 Meneses 2010: 9; Fernandes 2010: 100f.; US Minister Birch assessed acidly that the army
played a ‘vicious role’ in Portuguese politics. He considered the army ‘useless’ and without
‘real benefit to the country’ (NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 1.9.19: 15).
499 Tavares de A./Silveira e S. 2006: 117; Almeida-Topor 2010: 51f; Wheeler 1978: 115.
500 Curto/Gervais 2001: 4; 31 FN 70; 54 Table V.
501 NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 2, USCA to SoS, No. 89, 2.5.1874.
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ply for Angolan service”.502 Traditionally, victories in Africa were less
celebrated “than their Brazilian counterparts, and rewarded much less
richly than military service in Asia.”503 The upper echelons of the army
could view the colonies “as a means of expanding career prospects”.504
Indeed, “military training was the prevailing educational background of
the political and administrative heads of the Colonial Office.”505 However,
for ordinary “Europeans, Angolan service acquired a just reputation of
deadliness: poor pay, unhealthy climate, African hostility, isolation, living
expenses usually twice those in Portugal, long term of service (four to six
years), and few opportunities for advancement at the lower levels.”506
Given the “expenses and European high mortality” Lisbon avoided send-
ing expeditionary forces and used them only in times of extraordinary cri-
sis.507
Considering costs, equipment, and adaptability, “[e]mploying African
troops was considered a wise expedient”. Therefore, the “second-line
force”, the guerra preta (black war), appears to be the most decisive factor
of Portuguese conquest and survival in Angola. An officer once bluntly
stated “that to the African, more adapted to the climate and much cheaper,
the role of chair à canon will be reserved”. Furthermore, “it was expected
that military service would act as a powerful ‘civilizing’ mechanism, or, in
the words of Govenor General Norton de Matos, as ‘one of the most ef-
fective mechanisms for opening a breach in the tenebrous primitive civi-
lizations’.”508 The most legendary of these “native forces”, the French
tirailleurs sénégalais, founded in 1857, appears young in comparison with
similar Portuguese institutions. African auxiliaries were employed since
the sixteenth century. Guerra preta battalions could be (forcibly) raised by
loyal chiefs (sobas), or “ordered on a more regular footing with salaries,
and sometimes uniforms.” The “chief advantage [of this system] …was its
rapid mobilization in a crisis”.509 As in any other African colony, “African
502 Wheeler 1969: 427; 429 on ‘several nineteenth century, European led revolts in Luanda’.
503 Alencastro 2011: 45.
504 Clarence-Smith 1979a: 172; cf. Corrado 2008: 29f.
505 Tavares de Almeida/Silveira e Sousa 2006: 125; cf. Samson 2013: 32.
506 Wheeler 1969: 427.
507 Wheeler 1968: 54,~50% mortality from malaria/yellow fever during expeditions in 1860.
508 M. de Albuquerque, Revista Militar 41 (1889); NdM in: Borges Coelho 2002: 129; 134.
509 Wheeler 1969: 426f.; cf. Corrado 2008: 43.
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collaborators were indispensable”.510 “Most colonial armies were war-
bands of African mercenaries” and Portugal’s colonial army was one of
them.511 The force was according to estimates from 5,000 to 20,000 men
strong. It “was considered the backbone of the armed forces.”512 In the
1850s, Angola’s cavalry, artillery, infantry, and police forces “cost the
colony about 160 million reis, half of the colony’s entire revenue.”513
Also, later on, “Portugal spent abnormally high amounts on [colonial] de-
fense”.514
Despite a tendency in historiography to assume ‘Lusitanian disorder’
when it comes to the institutionalization of structures, it would be wrong
to assume that Portugal’s colonial army was an institution lacking rules. In
1913 a decree laid out the organization of the colonial army. The integra-
tion of Africans was minutely described in this document of 147 pages
(Art. 164–193), stipulating the classification, purpose, recruitment, terms
of service, age (18 to 35 years of age, Art. 175 no.15), and promotion.515
As elsewhere, Africans were excluded from ranks in the high com-
mand.516 Furthermore, the Portuguese recruited “Boer soldiers” since the
1880s to organize “military mission[s] of primitive character”.517
Wars in Angola have been described as les guerres grises (the gray
wars). This wordplay can be understood not only as describing the
mélange of colonial and native adversaries in Africa, but as pointing to the
mixing of “black” and “white” that took place within the Portuguese
army.518 Historians have repeatedly analyzed the “Africanization” of
European institutions in Africa, and colonial armies were no exception to
this tendency. Overall, Portugal’s army in Angola was “a mélange of slave
soldiers, some local militia [often led by officers originating from Luan-
da’s “creole elite”], and the contingents still commanded by African
rulers.”519 Cadornega’s praise in 1681 for the Mestiço soldiers “in the
510 Young 1994: 107; cf. Viotti 1985: 43; Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 55: ‘Collaboration is a
subject which is politically sensitive and often ignored’; Lawrance/Osborn/R. 2006.
511 Iliffe 2007: 199; 205; Pélissier 1977: glossaire ‘guerra preta: horde de razzieurs’.
512 Wheeler 1969: 428.
513 Birmingham 2011: 92 refers to Caldeira, Apontamentos d’uma viagem, Lisbon 1852: 208.
514 Clarence-S. 1985a: 320; cf. on military spending Robinson 1979: 88; Wheeler 1978: 187.
515 AHU MU M. de Amorim, Pt 26 Angola 1917-24, Organização do Exercito Colonial.
516 Michel 2004: 925.
517 NARA RG 84, Lisbon v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 18.10.19: 3 Woods.; Pélissier 1977: 417.
518 Pélissier 1977: 18; 20; Mesquitela 1980: 512.
519 Isaacman 1972; Young 1994: 106; cf. Bührer 2011 on ‘trans-cultural waging of war’
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wars in the backlands against heathen inhabitants” has been often quoted.
Given this historical background, it would be a mistake to speak of the
East African German colonial army under Lettow-Vorbeck as “the first in-
tegrated army”.520
The “ordinary manner of responding to rebellions and threats was to
draw upon manpower within the territory”521; or, if not available or con-
sidered disloyal, to import Africans from other Portuguese colonies.
African professional soldiers, or empacasseiros, were preferably used
against enemies foreign to them. Portugal followed a policy applied also
in other empires. Just as Nigeria’s Haussa soldiers were sent to the Gold
Coast, and the tirailleurs sénégalais conquered Dahomey, and men from
Dahomey served in Cameroon,522 Mozambicans were employed in Angola
and vice versa. Portuguese politicians called this a sign of Imperial “soli-
darity” which included the “obligation to contribute [to] the integrity and
defense of the Nation”.523
However, a “considerable portion of the African soldiers in the An-
golan army under Governor Paiva Couceiro (1907–1909) had been
forcibly enlisted or shanghaied.”524 Often these men were brought from
Mozambique to the Angolan theater of war. In 1909, with the conquest of
Angola’s south in full swing, the “leading Mozambican intellectual of the
early twentieth century”, João dos Santos Albasini (1876–1922), a journal-
ist and political activist, witnessed in his capacity as head of native labor
services in the port of Lourenço Marques the arrival of new recruits. His
description in his journal O Africano is so poignant that it merits to be cit-
ed in full length:
“One afternoon I happened to be on the wharves when the steamship Freire
de Andrade … tied up. At the same moment a military force, headed by a
sergeant, stopped in front of the steamer. Afterwards twenty some men, very
black and very sad, began to disembark, tied together at the neck two by two.
Who were these poor devils? What could be the reason for such a thing? …
On the wharf a sergeant and a captain, weary and sickly, forced that rabble to
get into military formation and assume a martial stance. One of the pitiful
prisoners looked up at the inclement sky and out to the vastness of the sea,
perhaps remembering the liberty he enjoyed as a savage, the loving company
520 Boxer 1963: 30 trnsl. Cadorn., História Geral das Guerras Angolanas; Michel 2004: 925.
521 Wheeler 1969: 428; Walter 2014: 207.
522 Cf. Brunschwig 1974: 58.
523 Ferreira Mendes 1940: 227.
524 Wheeler 1969: 427.
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of ferocious, but less cruel people … and, who knows, perhaps he was re-
membering some three very dirty little black children in the lap of a revolting
black woman …. he cried silently, the tears ran in a ribbon down his large
ebony coloured face. Then one of the soldiers, a bent, crumpled and filthy
man with a low forehead, who always glanced fearfully behind him – one of
the numbskulls necessary for such a roundup – was delighted to catch a
glimpse of his Negro crying … He grabbed the man and was vigorously ap-
plauded by a round of guffaws from his comrades: even beasts cry!
It was five o’clock in the evening. The sun was over the side of Matolla, en-
veloped in its ruby-eyed ray of lights. It was about to set, to hide itself, so not
to see so many things in this grotesque world. Later the blacks, still tied to-
gether by the neck, two by two, surrounded by a square of bayonets which
gleamed in the sun of a just God, traveled along the road of this city
[Lourenço Marques] on their way to the police headquarters – a kind of pur-
gatory where they prepare souls for exalted bliss.
Days after this scene another contingent arrived in this same place with this
same destiny, and in Inhambane another and another, and at this hour other
contingents are en route to serve the country. The country needs soldiers.
Enough is enough!”525
This account portrays the climate of ruthlessness in which African soldiers
were “conscripted”. In his literary style, Albasini elevates the “savage…
as a tower of humanity…amidst debauched cruelty.” With a thinly veiled
parody this “eloquent and passionate man” turns colonial notions of sav-
agery and ferociousness upside-down when he contrasts the African fami-
ly and the Portuguese soldier sending the ‘recruits’ through the hell of a
boot camp to prepare them for the purgatory of war.526 A Portuguese resi-
dent of the Zambezi Valley was scarcely less appalled by the recruitment
practices:
“They [the peasants] are all forced volunteers, except for those who are crimi-
nals, treacherously incarcerated in a manner that the metropolitan government
chooses to ignore. The volunteers are recruited under the pretense of doing a
particular job, and when they arrive they are suddenly detained, until the op-
portune moment when they are transported to military centers where they re-
ceive enthusiastic discourses on the responsibilities of military life. …”527
The much talked-about term “collaborator” that is used to describe “native
police men” and “native soldiers” acquires a different meaning in light of
the violence described by Albasini and others. These colonized men were
not necessarily “willing to play their assigned parts” and yet they helped
525 O Africano, 19.6.1909, transl. in: Penvenne 1996: 444f.
526 Penvenne 1996: 445; 422; cf. Hayes/Haipinge 1997: 85
527 Carlos Wiese: Zambésia, in: BSGL (1907), transl. in: Isaacman 1977: 8.
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the “native policy regime to succeed”528 – because they were compelled to
do so. Given that so many men were shanghaied, disciplining the colonial
agents remained a structural problem for the Portuguese Empire. The
guerra preta not only quelled rebellions and protests; there were also nu-
merous “army mutinies of Angolan troops”.529 Officials thus preferred to
“convoke loyal African chiefs, who would come with their private
armies”.530
It is certain that other African men willingly joined the Portuguese
army. Nevertheless, the term “volunteer” might be problematic since often
those men registered as volunteers were in fact sent by their chiefs, rather
than men who freely chose to join the army. Apart from their ability to
fight, language skills made them indispensable interpreters, clerks and, at
times, officers of military units. The relationship between rulers and the
ruled was more complicated than the image of a dualistic colonial state
might entail. In September 1914, for example, around 200 Christians of
the mission station Catoco in southern Angola were enlisted, much to the
despair of their Spiritan missionaries who saw their work threatened by
the army.531 Novelists have repeatedly analyzed the “basic tragedy” of
Africans serving the colonizers and the resulting “clash of cultures” and
transitions. Castro Soromenho (1910–68) related the conquest of the last
Lunda chief Calendende and described how a lieutenant calls Tipóia (one
of his African praços) a “brave Portuguese soldier”, “which causes the
puzzled African to ask how a black man can be Portuguese.” The author
continues to exemplify in “the faithful black Portuguese” the perversion of
one’s own “sense of values” which is so great that Tipóia “substitutes for
his loss of cultural identity a blind devotion to the government.” However,
once he loses his rifle in an ambush, Tipóia is stripped off his uniform and
banished to the bush after thirty years of service. His “last thread of self-
respect” is broken when he returns to the bush, “symbolically naked as he
came, he is neither African nor Portuguese.”532
The interpretation of the motives and incentives for the “collaboration”
with the colonial state has its own particular history. Albert Memmi, in his
essay The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957) could see “those among the
528 Steinmetz 2008: 608; cf. Lawrance et.al. 2006: 3f.; Zollmann 2010: 90f.
529 Wheeler 1969a: 3; cf. Corrado 2008: 20; 102.
530 Borges Coelho 2002: 131; cf. Birmingham 1978: 532.
531 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Eminence Reverendissime, 9.9.14.
532 Hamilton 1975: 38f. on Fernando M. de Castro Soromenho: Viragem, 1957.
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colonized who worked with Europeans only…in pathological terms.”533 In
the decades since differing interpretations have gained influence that try to
rationalize motives and pay “attention to non-dualistic forms of cross-cul-
tural linkage.” While some African men might have hoped to protect their
own group against “historic enemies” or encroach upon the latters’ terri-
tory, others wanted to reinforce a privileged position, increase their econo-
mic status, or enjoy the prestige of the military. These factors were neither
mutually exclusive nor were they the only reasons for men to become
colonial soldiers.534
A New Breed – the Colonial Army of GSWA
The German army (taking into account the federal structure of the German
Empire: the Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon and Württemberg contingents of
the Reichsheer) was not the guarantor of the German colonies. Though
“the protection of the territory of the Federation” was a national objective
according the Constitution’s (1871) Preamble, Art. 1 defining the “terri-
tory of the Federation” did not mention the German colonies, as there had
been none at the time of its drafting – and they were never included subse-
quently. However, Imperial legislative powers comprised “the military
and naval affairs of the Reich” (Art. 4 no. 14). The Imperial Navy was
thus early on commissioned with the ‘protection’ of German “protec-
torates” that were according to the Colonial Law (Schutzgebietsgesetz,
1886) under the state authority (Schutzgewalt) of the Emperor on behalf of
the Reich. It was a task only reluctantly accepted. Germany’s military
elites of the late nineteenth century were highly critical of the colonial ad-
venture. The former Chief of the Admiralty, Chancellor Caprivi, bluntly
stated “The less Africa, the better for us.”535
This reluctance has found its continuation in historiography. The Ger-
man colonial army, the Schutztruppe (protection, or security force) has
been recently characterized as Imperial Germany’s “forgotten third mili-
tary branch”.536 Indeed, classic treatises on the German military barely
mention the colonial army. Gerhard Ritter’s seminal The Sword and the
2.6.2
533 Cooper 2002: 55; cf. Memmi 1991 [1957]; Shipway 2008: 24f.
534 Cooper 2002: 60; Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 57-61; Michel 2004; Bührer 2011: 138f.; 154.
535 Schwarz 1999; on colonial law cf. Hartmann 2007a: 53f.; Grohmann 2001; Fischer 2001.
536 Bührer 2011: 87.
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Scepter made no allusion to it at all. Contemporary historians could as-
sume: “The Bismarckian Empire and the Prussian army formed an indis-
soluble entity.”537 However, the Schutztruppe was barely part of that enti-
ty, having no traditions and originating from mercenaries and the navy.
The latter being itself a rather new and bourgeois creation that gained in
reputation only under Secretary of the Navy Tirpitz. Yet, the standing of
the Schutztruppe in German politics or popular culture did not mirror the
growing popularity of the navy since 1900. German boys wore sailor suits,
not khaki. It is said that the Schutztruppe acted as the “dumping ground”
for disgraced German officers. Their fluctuation was high, the composi-
tion too heterogeneous to allow for the creation of an esprit de corps.
However, the soldiers attempted to create a myth around their “heroic”
service in Südwest.538
The colonial army in GSWA had very humble beginnings. A small mil-
itary detachment was formed in 1888. Privately financed by a colonial
company (DKGSWA) it consisted of three German officers and twenty
African commoners. Unable to exert any power, Germany’s first commis-
sioner of the colony, Heinrich Göring (1838–1913), requested a force of
between 400 and 500 men, a request rejected by Chancellor Bismarck. In
January 1889, however, the Parliament in Berlin agreed that under the pri-
vate command of Captain Curt von François (1852–1931) around fifty
German “mercenaries” would be detached to GSWA. In the following
years the Schutztruppe, as it was called since 1891, was constantly in-
creased. In 1894, under the new Commander Theodor Leutwein (1849–
1921) the Schutztruppe – no longer a private enterprise – had grown to
540 German soldiers, fully financed by the Imperial budget.539
The German colonial military administration, based on parliamentary
vote and headed by the Chancellor, was a peculiarity within the body of
German military law. Traditionally, the German military was no Parla-
mentsheer. Instead, the Emperor ruled the army and the navy with almost
absolute power. Although mentioned in the constitution of 1871, the mili-
tary remained quasi extra-constitutional.540 Colonial military law as enact-
537 Ritter 1970 [1965] Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, v. II; Rosenberg 1964 [1928]: 1.
538 Olusoga/Erichsen 2010: 120; Kuss 2010: 131-8; Ciarlo 2011: 271 argues ‘[c]olonial troop-
ers became the new hot “brand”, both metaphorically and literally’;
539 Cf. Tiebel 2008: 65-78. The Schutztruppe of GSWA celebrated its 25th anniversary in May
1914, cf. Südwestbote, 11. Jg. no. 47, April 1914, ‘Die Schutztruppe’; no. 64, 29.5.14.
540 Wehler 1970: 14 called the German military an ‘enclave within the constituional framework
autonomous from the parliament’ (‘parlamentsautonome Enklave im Verfassungsbau’).
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ed since 1891 deviated from this tenet. The official justification for this
was that rights and duties of German citizens in the colonies were affected
by military law and therefore a formal parliamentary law (Gesetz) and not
just an Imperial decree (the ordinary form of colonial ‘legislation’) was re-
quired. The decisive step of the Schutztruppengesetz of 1896 was the ex-
clusion of the Naval Office from the colonial administration (including
military affairs), which became henceforth the exclusive realm of the For-
eign Office’s Colonial Department, thus a civilian responsibility. In 1897,
the high-command of the colonial forces, headed by a staff officer, was in-
tegrated into the Colonial Department and thus supervised by the Colonial
Director, himself responsible to the Foreign Secretary and the Chancel-
lor.541 Besides this separation of the German colonial forces from the
army and naval forces, another novelty of the law of 1896 was the fact that
Germans living in the colony could be drafted in the colony (§ 18). The
pension system of the colonial military became far more attractive than in
the army and navy. Contrary to German forces in Cameroon or in East
Africa, commoners were almost exclusively recruited among German vol-
unteers from the army and navy (§ 25, who signed up for three years) or
conscripts from GSWA. They were mostly employed as “mounted in-
fantry” or in the field artillery. “Native troops” (Eingeborenen-Soldaten)
were recruited only reluctantly and in small numbers. While the Germans
in East Africa could count on the (allegedly) “singular fidelity of their
Askari”,542 the Schutztruppe in GSWA had alienated the Baster auxiliary
troops to such an extent that the latter rose against their colonial rulers in
1915.543 There was no guerra preta in GSWA.
Despite the political and military necessity for Schutztruppen if the Ger-
man Empire was to hold onto its colonies, they were generally assigned
“police tasks” to defend Germans and their property against “rebellious”
Africans. Section 1 of the Schutztruppengesetz of 1896 stipulated cau-
tiously: “For the maintenance of public order and security in the African
Schutzgebiete … Schutztruppen shall be employed whose supreme com-
mander is the Kaiser.”544 For anything else they were simply too small, as
541 Cf. Bührer 2012: 2-13; 2011: 103-12; Kuss 2010: 128; Conrad 2003: 202f.; Grohmann
2001 134 the Emperor remained commander-in-chief; he appointed colonial officers.
542 Michel 2004: 919 ‘singulière fidelité de leurs askari’; cf. Bührer 2011: 158; Kettlitz 2005.
543 Details of organization, recruiting, and disciplinary systems were stipulated by Chancellor’s
ordinances (§ 27 SchTrG); SchutztrO v. 25.7.1898; Tiebel 2008: 141; 146; Kuss 2010: 160.
544 § 1 Zur Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Ordnung und Sicherheit in den afrikanischen
Schutzgebieten…werden Schutztruppen verwendet, deren oberster Kiegsherr der Kaiser ist.
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became evident during the first months of the Herero- and Maji-Maji wars
in 1904. Without enforcements from the German army and navy the
Schutztruppen were – at times – almost helpless against concerted African
military action. In this respect, it is important to note, that the civil super-
vision of the German colonial forces, which made it a Parlamentsheer
(parliamentary army), was de facto revoked after five months of the
Herero War, when the General Staff in Berlin took over the command of
the Schutztruppe in May 1904. General Lothar von Trotha (1848–1920)
was dispatched and took over the civil governorship in Windhoek until
November 1905, while Governor Leutwein (himself colonel) was side-
lined. During the war against the Nama, up to 13,000 men were sent in
from Germany. The conduct of the war in GSWA 1904–07 and its “geno-
cidal escalation” remained highly disputed. Faced with criticism, colonial
enthusiasts complained bitterly “about the ‘unpatriotic’ opponents of
‘world policy’, but also about the noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the
war that prevailed in Germany.” Historian Isabel Hull has scrutinized the
development of German military culture in the early twentieth century and
argues that the organizational dynamics inherent in this culture led the
army to annihilate civilians wantonly in the course of war, the African the-
ater of war being no exception.545
Civilian superiority was introduced in 1905. The posts of civil governor
and commander of the local Schutztruppe were divided and the governor
assumed a higher-ranking role in order to avoid “frictions” between mili-
tary and civil administration on the ground. In German colonial politics
and in the everyday administration of GSWA, the Schutztruppe played a
less important role “as the pioneering period drew to a close”.546 The gov-
ernor could determine the leader and strength of a military campaign. He
also decided upon the distribution of the troops in ‘his’ colony. In 1914
GSWA’s colonial forces were organized into nine companies and two ar-
tillery batteries. The Schutztruppe had been reduced constantly after 1907.
Similar to Angola, the Imperial government subsidized the colonial bud-
get. A profitable colonial economy was never achieved in GSWA. The
colonial troops were paid for by the Imperial budget and the majority of
parliamentarians in Berlin insisted repeatedly on further troop reductions;
545 Häußler 2011: 76 points out: ‘The extermination of the Ovaherero was not originally envi-
sioned by the military command, but developed gradually as an option.’; Dedering 1999a:
21; cf. Hull 2005: 1; 33f.; 131f.; Clark 2007: 687f.
546 Gann/Duignan 1977: 93; on colonial law’s nature Hartmann 2007a: 52; cf. Schack 1923.
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the military equipment was mediocre at best.547 In 1914, 1,950 soldiers
(90 officers, 350 non-commissioned officers and 1,500 German common-
ers) and 875 civil servants (incl. 450 policemen) served in GSWA. They
made up 17 per cent of the European population of 14,830.548 Given the
strength of the German army in 1914 of around 800,000 soldiers it is justi-
fied to speak of a “minuscule mounted infantry garrison” in GSWA, a
quantité négligeable. Finally, the merging of the Schutztruppe and the po-
lice in GSWA into a Gendarmerie was discussed. The Colonial Office on-
ly halfheartedly defended the intentions of GSWA’s military to maintain
the numbers of troops. This has later been described as the “weak attitude
of the colonial administration”.549
Rumors about the strength and the purpose of the Schutztruppe in
GSWA were rampant when it was enlarged during the war 1904–07. Por-
tuguese, but also British officials harbored “grave suspicions about the
number of soldiers” that were transferred to GSWA in 1905 to subdue the
Nama. It was considered that 13,000 troops were militarily unnecessary
for this task. Thus, the assumption was made that the Germans aimed at
putting themselves in a position “to squeeze us” in southern Africa, as
Britain’s High Commissioner in South Africa, Lord Selborne suggested.
Also historians have described Germany’s colonial force as “well
equipped and well trained”.550 On the other hand, it has been emphasized
time and again by German officers after 1918 that the Schutztruppe was
not prepared to wage war against Europeans. Neither were the ports forti-
fied against attacks from man-o-war nor was the latest military equipment
made available to the troops.551 This policy was based on the assumption
that the German colonies would be protected in the North Sea. The Ger-
man Navy was not prepared to defend the colonial coasts. Her British
counterpart was aware of this strategy and assured the South Africans that
547 Gründer 2004: 122; 126, ‚For the Reich…the colonies remained…purely a losing enter-
prise.’ In 1914 the support of the Imperial budget to Schutztruppe and police was reduced
from 14.8 million to 12.2 million Reichsmarks. Further expenses of around 6.1 million
were to be born by the budget of the colony. Der Südwestbote, 11. Jg. no. 36, 25.3.14, S. 2;
no. 60/61, 20.5.14: 1.
548 Cf. Michels 2006: 154; DKL 1920 III: 321 ‘Schutztruppen‘; Bley 1996: 233; Seitz 1920:7.
549 Neugeb. 1993: 212; Nasson 2014: 436; Kolonialkrb. 1924: 81 ‘schwächliche Haltung‘.
550 Dedering 2000:46; 2006: 278; Selborne to Lyttelton, 24.5.05 id: 49; Michel 2004: 919.
551 Eckenbr. 1940: 165: ‘Armamemt [of SchTr] was lacking‘; RKA 1918: 23; Tirpitz 1919: 67.
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in case of war the supply lines between Germany and GSWA would be
interrupted.552
The South African Conquest of GSWA (I), September–December
1914
The question whether Africa (outside the realms of the Congo-Act) would
become involved in the war was answered by the Germans: On August 4,
1914 German battle ships bombarded two French ports in Algeria. British
forces bombarded the wireless station of Dar es Salam on August 8.553
Soon after, hostilities (involving German gun boats) broke out along the
Congo River in Neu-Cameroon.554
On August 7, South Africa’s government under General Louis Botha
(1862–1919) offered to support the British government, which responded
with the request to “seize such part of GSWA as will give [the South
African government] command of Swakopund, Lüderitzbucht, and the
wireless stations there or in the interior”.555 In London, the Admiralty con-
sidered the seizure of the “coast wireless stations … an urgent necessity”,
and the capture of Windhoek was also being discussed because of the
wireless station there.556 A sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial
Defence (C.I.D) had a discussion of “offensive operations against” GSWA
on the agenda in mid-August, but no results were minuted.557 The Parlia-
ment in Cape Town decided on September 10, 1914 to declare war on
Germany. It was claimed that Germany had the “desire to possess the
Union”. Already in 1904 scenarios had been considered in case that troops
from GSWA “invade[d] the South African colonies.” On September 14
the Royal Navy bombarded the wireless station at Swakopmund. The
Caprivi Strip in the far north-east of GSWA was “fortuitously secured by
a virtually bloodless” campaign” by Rhodesian forces on September 22.
The British then set up several posts along the Kwando valley along the
2.6.3
552 Dedering 2000: 50; cf. Seligmann 2012; Kuss 2010: 328.
553 Marguerat 2006: 98; Almeida-Topor 2010: 85; Samson 2006: 28f.; 33.
554 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18, 703, Fritz Gerber to German Consul Luanda, 22.12.14.
555 Governor-Gen. to Ministers, 7.8.14, in: Union of South Africa 4/1915: 4; Spies 1969: 47.
556 TNA ADM 137/9: 86, Naval Notes on Expedition to GSWA, 8.8.14; CO 633/83/11:
111-113, Ax C Report , U.G. 46-’16, 12/1916; CO 633/83/8, U.G. 42-’16, 12/1916.
557 TNA FO 371/1883: 172, Agenda, CID sub, 14.8.14; Samson 2013: 69; Nasson 2014:436.
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border between Angola and Northern Rhodesia during the war “to guard
the fords”.558
The Schutztruppe’s mobilization (starting August 7) had been rather
disorganized, transport capacity (four lorries) seemed miserable. The Gen-
eral Staff in Berlin was barely interested in the colonial theater of war and
considered these troops as helpful only to bind enemy forces in Africa.
Governor Seitz was told by the Colonial Office not to engage with South
Africa unless forced to do so.559 Contrary to what was claimed during the
World War, no “large military force” was stationed in GSWA in 1914.560
The Schutztruppe, including all reserves now 5,000 men strong, was not
prepared to face a fully equipped European army. Thus, not so much
GSWA’s “poorly defended frontiers” or military capacity but geography
made the conquest challenging. According to one South African officer “it
was a case of ‘sand, and sand, and sand, and sand, and not a drop to
drink’.”561 “The total [South African and British Rhodesian] forces, which
at one time or another took part in the operations numbered some 50,000,
though probably no more than 40,000 were ever in the field at one and the
same time” under the command of Louis Botha.562 The South African
troops were detached in four columns of 8,000–10,000 men. Three
columns were operating in the south of GSWA targeting the railway junc-
tion at Keetmanshoop: Colonel Beves landed in Lüderitzbucht on Septem-
ber 19 with 16 man-o-wars. The German troops withdrew and the town
with its important wireless station surrendered. Beves then wanted to fol-
low the railway tracks eastwards across the Namib Desert to Aus and
Keetmanshoop. However, the Schutztruppe repeatedly prevented the
South Africans from taking over strategic waterholes.
South Africa’s second column headed by Colonel Grant moved north
from Port Nolloth and overran the German border post Ramansdrift on the
Orange River on September 18, 1914. However, their first attempt to enter
deeper into German territory ended “in fiasco”.563 On September 25 the
Germans led by Commander of the Schutztruppe Heydebreck attacked
near Sandfontein and took 200 rank-and-file and 15 British officers as
558 Crabt. 1915: 4; Park 1916: 115-9; Samson 2006: 21; Yorke 1990: 373; Reyn. 1972: 245.
559 Bührer 2012: 20; cf. Samson 2013: 41; an account full of hatred is Hintrager 1934: 88.
560 Cana 1915: 360f.; Weck 1919: 131.
561 Davenport 1978: 185; Alport 1934: 63; cf. Seitz 1920: 8f; Kraus/Müller 2009: 223-9.
562 Park 1916: 132; cf. Samson 2013: 38f on military organization.
563 Michel 2004: 922; Samson 2013: 76f.; cf. Robinson 1916.
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prisoners of war, including Colonel Grant. Furthermore, to the detriment
of South African war efforts, there “was real opposition” among South
Africans – most of all in the Afrikaaner camp – to war against GSWA. It
had been “[o]ne of the aims of South African leadership … to use the war
to promote greater unity between the Boers and the English speaking pop-
ulation”, but instead a “rebellion” broke out. This held off the South
African advance more powerfully than German resistance. S.G. “Manie”
Maritz (1876–1940), Jan C.G. Kemp (1872–1946), Christiaan Beyers
(1969–1914) and other Afrikaaner officers from the South African War
(1899–1902) aimed at liberating South Africa from the British “yoke”.
Soon their deeds were blamed on “German intrigue”, since much to the
“embarrass[ment]” of the Germans, who wanted to avoid the provocation
of hostilities, Maritz and Kemp joined the German forces with their men
after they were driven out of South Africa. Loyalists under Smuts and
Botha had to fight the “rebels” from October to December 1914. Given “a
little breathing space”, German forces used the time for maneuvers against
the Portuguese.564
An Unlikely Victory – the Battle of Naulila, December 18, 1914
None of the colonial powers had a strategic plan for Africa when hostili-
ties broke out in Europe.565 Neither the German nor the Portuguese colo-
nial army was prepared to fight European adversaries in Africa. Forces
stationed in the colonies were intended to act as the primary vehicle
through which European rule manifested itself towards Africans.
One day after the decision to attack Fort Cuangar was taken by Seitz
and Bethe, on October 25 the governor authorized a “punishment expedi-
tion” via telegram against Angola as proposed by Commander Heyde-
breck. The German target was Fort Naulila. The intended conquest was a
“top secret” affair. GSWA’s most experienced officer, Major Victor
Franke, an alter Afrikaner (old African) in the colony since 1896 was to
be its leader. The first transports left Kalkfontein on October 26 and 27.
On October 29, upon his return to Windhoek from the south with
around 400 men, Heydebreck assessed the situation along the Angolan
2.6.4
564 Davenport 1978: 184; Samson 2006: 8; 83-9; TNA CO 633/83/11, Report U.G. 46-16,
12/1916; Nasson 2014: 436 ; Nasson 2014a: 167; 170.
565 Michel 2004: 920; a contemporary perspective Strümpell in Kolonialkriegerbund 1924: 81.
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border with Seitz. They concluded: It would be “ignorant” to assume that
there was no state of war between the two colonies because Angola’s
Governor General had not notified Seitz formally about the outbreak of
the war (General Botha had neither informed Seitz before South Africa
started its conquest of GSWA in September 1914). Given the Portuguese
silence after the Naulila incident (and the German wireless messages, if
they were sent), the rumors about Roçadas’ army approaching the Kunene
border, and the claims that the Portuguese had extended their patrols into
German territory up to Ondonga, as well as the alleged attempts to insti-
gate a revolt against the Germans, Seitz and Heybreck not only “took it for
granted that a state of war now existed between the two countries”. They
also “had reason to believe because of the size and composition of
Roçadas’ force that the Portuguese were about to intervene in support of
the British.” They resolved that it would be irresponsible to send another
official as negotiator to Angola to demand satisfaction for “Naulila”. Since
previous attempts to contact Portuguese authorities with envoys (Brauer,
Schultze-Jena) failed, they expected that only a strong military expedition
could obtain clarification about the unlikely case that Portugal was not at
war with Germany. It was expected that in this case the Portuguese would
immediately start negotiations to avoid a confrontation.566
The decision to send Franke to Angola was not dictated by “strategic
consideration[s]”, but by the perceived threat of an imminent invasion –
and the intention to revenge (vergelten) the death of the three officials, as
one soldier put it bluntly. The Germans, anxious to defend their porous
southern border along the Orange River and the Kalahari Desert against
South Africa, would have liked to avoid having to “establish a decisive
presence in th[e northern] border region.”567 There were no military forces
stationed north of Otavi and Outjo, almost 300 kilometers south of Ango-
la’s border, whereas six companies were stationed in the south. Further-
more, the decision to dispatch an entire regiment to the northern border
had only been made possible by the anti-British rebellion in South Africa
forcing Botha and Smuts to first turn against the rebels.
During the last months of 1914, the question of Portugal’s decision to
go to war or to remain “neutral” was most puzzling, and not only to offi-
566 BAB R 1001/6645: 131, Telgr Cdr to KGW, 25.10.14; R 1001/6634: 158f., report Seitz
(10.5.21), Ax 13; 161, Eickhoff to RMW (15.11.21), Ax 14, Memo Allm. 23.5.22; Cann
2001: 162; L’Ange 1991: 169; Southern 2007: 11; Stals 1972; Kuss 2010: 136.
567 Hayes 1993: 90; Almeida Tei. 1935a: 10-35; NAN A.424 War Diary Bertling, late Oct. 14.
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cials in GSWA. Contemporaries in Portugal and elsewhere found it equal-
ly difficult to predict the next step. In early October the American Minister
in Lisbon, Thomas H. Birch, met with the Foreign Minister Freire de An-
drade who stated “Portugal would enter the war just as soon as called upon
by the British Government”. Birch then mentioned various manifestations
of a “strong popular sentiment among the masses … against the sending of
troops from Portugal.” The Foreign Minister “expressed himself as anti-
German in feeling, [however,] he personally hoped Portugal would not en-
ter the conflict.” Still, he informed his envoy in Berlin, Sidónio Pais, about
the possibility of Portugal’s entry into the war. The army in Portugal was
partially mobilized.568 Two months later, the German Consul in Luanda
claimed to “know that Portugal is no longer neutral. However, a declara-
tion of war has not yet been issued.” He did not mention how he had learnt
about the alleged decision.569. It was the subtle Norton de Matos, who re-
minded him that the Portuguese Government had never declared officially
its neutrality.570
While these questions were debated, Major Franke was already on his
way north. He had arrived in Windhoek with Heydebreck from Kalk-
fontein and immediately continued with his regiment northwards to elimi-
nate the Portuguese threat along the border and to “retaliate” against Fort
Naulila.571 However, the preparation of Franke’s “expedition” took sever-
al weeks. In early November, a British man-o-war intercepted a wireless
code message from Governor Seitz to Berlin including the line “Franke
marching against Portuguese”. Britain’s envoy in Lisbon, L. Carnegie,
shortly thereafter informed the government in Lisbon.572
Franke’s regiment reached Otjiwarongo by rail on November 1 and it
was clear that the expedition would arrive in Ovamboland in the middle of
the rainy season (lasting from October to April), which would make things
more difficult. However, since the Germans were convinced that the Por-
tuguese were preparing their own attack on GSWA, time seemed of
essence to avoid being crushed between British and Portuguese forces. A
large train of ox wagons was compiled for the remaining 400 kilometers’
568 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 151: 820, USML to SoS, 9.10.; 14.10.; 21.10.; 26.10.; 2.11.;
24.11.14; Samara 2004: 59; cf. Teixeira 1998.
569 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) German Consulate Luanda to VK Benguela, 2.12.14.
570 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) Chefe de Gabinete to German Consulate Luanda, 4.12.14.
571 BAB R 1001/6634: 65f., General ret. Franke to RMW, 23.03.22; Historicus 2012: 36-9.
572 TNA FO 371/1884: 487, GG South Africa to CO, 5.11.14; FO to BML, 10.11.14.
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trek, the hardship of which (most of all the lack of water) was amply de-
scribed by Franke, Suchier, and Bertling. After the tragic death of Com-
mander v. Heydebreck on November 12 due a grenade accident, Franke
had to return from Ombika near Okaukwejo to Windhoek to attend the fu-
neral and to take over the command of the Schutztruppe.573
Historian Ernest Stals poses the relevant question whether the attack on
Naulila was still advisable from a military point of view. Fresh South
African troops were assembling, the commander dead, and instead of the
rainy season, Franke’s soldiers were faced with a drought in the north.
Nonetheless, given the perceived threat from the troops at the Angolan
border, the intention to “take revenge”, and, as Franke noted, in order to
avoid that “our reputation among the Ovambo suffers”, he returned on
November 24 to Ombika, south of the Etocha Pan. His regiment still con-
sisted of around 400 soldiers (four maxim guns, six artillery pieces).574
The rather small number of soldiers – less than ten per cent of the
Schutztruppe’s force level after mobilization – demonstrates the preemi-
nent German concern with the South African invasion. Detachments ad-
vanced to find and deepen waterholes; there was barely enough water for
all men and animals. Hundreds of the 2,000 oxen perished while pulling
weaponry and supplies through the sand. Vageler joined the regiment near
Okaukwejo to guide the men towards Fort Naulila. The government’s na-
tive commissioner Hermann Tönjes, a former missionary, arrived from
Olukonda. For Franke, he was not only an important interpreter, but most
of all he could explain to the Ovambo kings that the Germans were not a
threat to them. Franke also “spoke to the Boer du Plessis” who brought
news from Angola and accompanied the regiment to Naulila. As Schultze-
Jena before him, Franke had to visit Ovambo kings to make “presents” to
those whose territory he wanted to cross. On November 25 he met with
Ondonga King Martin and missionary Martti Rautanen (1845–1928) in
Olukonda. Ongandjera King Tshanika (1887–1930) and Uukualudhi King
573 NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 14: 973, 1.11.14; Oelhafen 1923: 55; 81; Suchier 1918: 39;
Samson 2013: 75 others claim he was killed by a ‘Boer rebel’.
574 Stals 1968: 188; NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 14: 976, 12.11.14; 2. Kompanie, Ukamas
90 men lead by Captain von Watter; 6. Kompanie, Outjo 150 men lead by Captain Erich
Weiss; 1. Batterie artillery equipped with 4 mountain- und 2 fieldguns, 150 men lead by
Franke’s deputy Cpt Georg Trainer; Cpt. Gerhard Sulling; wireless station; Doctors: H.
Greiner, W. Suchier, BAB R 1001/6634: 134, Baericke, Kimmel, Jensen to DGL
(30.04.15), Ax 8 to Memo Allem., 23.5.22; Suchier 1918: 32; Hennig 1920: 113; Baericke
1981: 84; Mattenklodt 1936: 29.
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Mwaala (~1880–59) were hesitant to permit the troops into their land. On-
ly when Franke visited them with an automobile (indicative of his status
as the new commander) they became “more compliant”. Private Bertling
noted in his diary “Mandume and other chiefs absolutely want to join us
against the Portuguese. But they have to do it alone. So nobody can say
later we have instigated [aufgehetzt] natives against whites. Today [Dec.
12] an entire wagon full with gifts was sent to one chief.” Franke had in-
deed ordered the delivery of “100 rifles for Mandume” to the Finnish mis-
sion station Olukonda. Its head, Rautanen, was less than pleased with this
“gift”.575
The (outmoded M 71) rifles had been stored in Outjo following Gover-
nor Seitz’ plan from August 1914 to deliver guns to Mandume in case the
Portuguese instigated a revolt. However, native commissioner Tönjes con-
sidered it “not advisable” to send more than seventeen rifles to the Kings –
five for Mandume and three each for the others. Seitz conceded, but asked
Tönjes to transport the guns to Ovamboland. When the latter visited the
Kings in October 1914 to counter Portuguese advances through the distri-
bution of “gifts (worth 400 M)”, he handed over rifles for the kings only.
Given Franke’s expedition, Tönjes was told to remain in Ovamboland and
to keep the “100 rifles” until the Schutztruppe commander decided about
their distribution; whether he ever did so remains unknown. At least with
Mandume the German gifts had the intended outcome. Through mission-
ary channels, he thanked Governor Seitz for the promised guns, and as-
sured him of his allegiance to the Germans. Later, the King let the gover-
nor know that he looked forward to the death of the three Germans being
revenged. Nevertheless, Franke was eager to avoid that Mandume’s men
join the German forces at Naulila. According to Portuguese sources, how-
ever, he enlisted African support, most of all Shihetekela, the chief (soba)
of Little Cuamato (Ombandja), deposed by Roçadas after the conquest in
1907.576
575 NAN A.424 War Diary Bertling 10.12.14; NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 14: 975; 978,
11.11.; 24.11.14; Baericke 1981: 66f.; Suchier 1918: 35; 46; Historicus 2012: 57; 65.
576 BAB R 1001/6645: 47, Tönjes to KGW, 25.9.; 50, KGW to Tönjes, 30.9.; 53, 64 BA Outjo
to KGW, 1./3.10.; 68, KGW to BA Outjo, 9.10; 132, KGW to Nord-Etappe, 26.10.;
Wulfhorst to KGW, 8.10.; 16.11.14; cf. Historicus 2012: 77; Hayes 1992II: 90; Almeida
Teixeira 1935a: 24
2. The First World War in Angola and GSWA
167
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Capitão Alves RoçadasIll. 24 Major FrankeIll. 25
In the meantime, also Lt.-Colonel Roçadas marched with most of his
forces closer to the border. He was reportedly appalled by Sereno’s acts
and assumed a German invasion was now imminent. Coming from Luban-
go he arrived in Fort Roçadas on November 23, which he had erected in
1906. The Portuguese knew about Franke’s march from as early as
November 12. Rumors poured in about alleged German movements near
the border and the considerable size of Franke’s regiment. Roçadas later
claimed that King Mandume had sent him word about the approaching
Germans on November 5. Given the slow progress of Franke’s column be-
ing still far away, this intelligence was misleading and confused Roçadas.
Expecting an attack, but unaware where Franke might strike, he “left the
bulk of [his] force dispersed along a 35-kilometer front in mutually sup-
porting formation” to protect the roads and the fords. Making matters ever
more complicated, on November 25, the minister of colonies reminded
Roçadas via telegram “all [soldiers must] know that we are not at war with
Germany”. A few days later, also Norton de Matos sent him a telegram
requesting to “maintain [Portugal’s] neutrality” and not to “provoke” any
hostilities. Roçadas was not allowed to cross the border.577
Roçadas was presented with the German prisoners taken in Naulila and
interrogated them. The mysterious German deserter Haunschild had been
arrested north of the borderline. He was allegedly working for Uukuambi
King Iipumbo and eager to prove that he was not one of the “German
577 Roçadas 1919: 166; Machado 1956: 55; 88; Baericke 1981: 69; Southern 2007:12, Cann
2001: 154.
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spies” – whereas the Germans were concerned that he was spying for the
Portuguese. He drew a map depicting all military stations in GSWA and
their composition.578 Carl Jensen later claimed to have warned Roçadas
during his interrogation of German revenge. Jensen, who was recognized
by his former employer Roçadas, lied to him by stating that GSWA had
20,000 troops, four times more than in reality. Roçadas gave orders to
concentrate troops along the Kunene fords to prevent an attack on Humbe
– 300 men were stationed at Erickson Drift (Vau do Calueque). He relied
early on the guerra preta, ordering to provide the Cuamato with weapons
to be used against the Germans. Due to their friendly relations with King
Iipumbo the Portuguese were informed about Franke’s next moves. Ac-
cording to Jensen, “every officer expected war”. From the direction the
Germans were marching a particular target was not discernible. Roçadas,
convinced that the German’s would cross the Kunene River, “saw no rea-
son to concentrate his forces east of the Kunene in a committed defense of
Naulila.” He was eager to protract Franke’s attack. 600 marines from
Moçâmedes were expected to arrive every day.579
When he arrived in the Uukwaludhi area near the Kunene River on De-
cember 11, Franke ordered a reconnaissance of Fort Naulila. Two patrols
were sent to find a campground for the regiment. None of the commanders
had sufficient intelligence about the enemy’s army. Within the administra-
tion of GSWA, the native commissioner Captain Streitwolf was also in
charge of the military affairs of Angola. But, as his biographer writes, this
responsibility always remained an unimportant (onbelankrik) part of his
official duties – the files were only maintained to 1911. Franke set up a
camp south of Erickson Drift around 25 kilometers west of Naulila. A Por-
tuguese camp was located on top of the Kampili Hills across the river ob-
serving everything. In the first skirmish between patrols several Por-
tuguese and German soldiers were wounded, the Portuguese prevented the
Germans from getting closer to the fort. The soldier Baericke lost his
group and was arrested the next day by a patrol under Lieutenant Aragão.
Roçadas, who had arrived in Fort Naulila on December 9, interrogated
him. Using the Norwegian trader and hunter Brodtkorb as interpreter the
commander threatened to shoot Baericke if he did not tell him the strength
of Franke’s regiment. He also asked Baericke about his own estimation of
578 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 30, statement Commander Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21.
579 Machado 1956: 116; Cann 2001: 155; BAB R 1001/6634: 121f., Report Jensen, Ax 4; 6,
Memo Allem. 23.5.22.
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the number of soldiers in Naulila and whether he believed that Franke
would conquer Naulila.580 The captive responded with an estimation of the
Portuguese troops concentrated in Naulila (around 2,000 men) and lied to
him that Roçadas was observing only the advance column and that Franke
has no particular target, but was planning to invade southern Angola in
three columns via Zwartbooi Drift, Erickson Drift and Naulila. In his later
report, Baericke was of the opinion that due to this response Roçadas de-
cided to reduce his troops in Naulila and sent several platoons west to Er-
ickson and Zwartbooi Drift, claiming thus to have contributed to the Ger-
man “success”.581
Following the interrogation Roçadas indeed found it difficult to estab-
lish not only when, but also where Franke would attack, considering the
German encampment 25 kilometers away from Naulila and right in front
of a ford. It seemed that there would be more valuable targets than Fort
Naulila, such as the town of Humbe across the river. Roçadas ordered Ma-
jor Salgado to move with his company to Naulila, but on December 13 he
told him to go to Erickson Drift in order to fortify the hills and prepare for
an “artillery barrage” of the German camp. Mozambican soldiers were
sent nearby to Fort Otoquero.582 Manasse Veseevete, a Herero born in
GSWA who had settled in the Nkumbi-area after 1904 where he joined the
Portuguese army, remembered in 1986 the situation along
“the [Kunene] river where there was war. We were given rifles with tele-
scopes to watch the river where Germans might cross, both where there are
mountains and where there are no mountains. The Portuguese realised that
when the Germans were out of water they were very strong but in the water
they were vulnerable. They thought it wise to overcome the Germans in the
water.”
However, the Germans never tried to cross the river. They were aware of
the danger posed by the observing Portuguese on top of the hills.583 On
December 16, after six weeks, Franke’s regiment had completely arrived
in the camp near Erickson Drift. Of Roçadas’ 3,000 men about 450 Euro-
pean and 300 Mozambican infantrymen and 60 dragoons remained in and
580 Stals 1979: 95; NAN STR 21, II m 1, Bl.22; Baericke 1981: 67;88;101; Historicus 2012:
72.
581 BAB R 1001/6634: 145f., Report Baericke (16.11.19), Ax 9 Memo Allm., 23.5.22.
582 AHM/Div/2/2/21/18: Major A. Salgado, [n.d.]; Cann 2001: 159; Historicus 2012: 83.
583 Heywood/Lau/Ohly 1992: 180, Manasse Veseevet[e] on his youth narrated to A. Kaputo,
30.3.1986; V. then ‘dodged the war’ by pretending to have fever; Suchier 1918: 49.
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near Fort Naulila that was similarly constructed as Fort Cuangar. An un-
known number of “irregulars”, Cuamato combatants, were given guns by
the Portuguese to support them outside the fort by attacking the German
flanks.584 Roçadas’ forces were “deployed south of Naulila in a defensive
arc of some 2,000 metre radius” including three artillery pieces, four ma-
chine guns, infantry and cavalry. “A supporting line was established 200
meters behind the first”. On the 17th in the afternoon the bulk of the Ger-
mans began to march eastwards, moving away from the river (and the ar-
tillery prepared to hit if they attempted to cross) and circling the eastern
(less protected) flank of Fort Naulila, that was by now the clear target. But
Roçadas was hesitant to move additional forces to the defense of Naulila.
Salgado continued to guard the fords.585
“Fort Naulila, 18.XII.1914”Ill. 26
584 Stals 1968: 190; Oelhafen 1923: 90; Hennig 1920: 114; Ferreira Martins 1942: 52-59;
Varão 1934: 59f.; different numbers in Morlang 1998: 46; Mattenklodt 1936: 41f.; BAB R
1001/6634: 134, Baericke, Kimmel, Jensen to DGL (30.04.15), Ax 8 Memo Allm., 23.5.22.
585 Cann 2001: 160; NAN A.424. War Diary Friedrich Bertling, 17.12.14; as the German
march left no room for speculation, the Portuguese could have, as Vageler pointed out,
avoided the fighting by clarifying their neutrality. BAB R 1001/6634: 148f., Vageler to
RMW (10.11.21), Ax 10 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; Historicus 2012: 93-8.
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In Prussian tradition, Franke planned a battle “in which the enemy was en-
veloped and attacked at its flanks… Such a battle risked everything in a
single moment”. The 6th Company of 150 men led by Captain Erich Weiss
and the 1st Artillery battery of 150 men equipped with four mountain and
two fieldguns, led by Franke’s deputy Captain Georg Trainer were ordered
to march eastwards during the night to Fort Naulila and to attack from the
north-eastern direction in the early morning of December 18 under
Franke’s command. The 2nd Company of around 90 men led by Captain
von Watter was to march through the night along the Kunene River. Wat-
ter was to open the battle with an attack on the trenches protecting the fort
along its southern flank, thus preventing the Portuguese from crossing the
Kunene River.
Battle of Naulila
However, things did not unfold as planned. When ordering the attack for
December 18, Franke knew that he was taking a risk. The military theorist
Carl von Clausewitz’ warning regarding “attack[s] on defensive positions”
Map 3
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was not new to him: “One thing is sure …: it is a risky business to attack
an able opponent in a good position.” Roçadas’ men had improved fortifi-
cations, and it was to be seen whether they were “able opponents”.586
Luckily for the Portuguese, Captain von Watter’s guide du Plessis had un-
derestimated the distance to the fort and his 2nd Company did not arrive in
time to open the attack from the south. The other two companies waited in
vain to hear the first German shots. Around 5 a.m., shortly before sunrise,
the Germans were fired at from trenches their reconnaissance patrol had
not noticed. It was pure luck that the Portuguese artillery shot too high; the
thick bush made any orientation almost impossible. Despite their shock
about the miscarried pincer movement and the surprising Portuguese bar-
rage, the Germans correctly positioned their artillery and machine guns
and used them “to great effect”.587 Fort Naulila’s munitions depot was hit
and exploded; all barracks and surrounding huts caught fire. Until 7 a.m.
Franke’s troops came as close as 200 meters to the fort. Roçadas made a
fateful decision: he left the fort, but he did not organize relief forces from
his regiments nearby. The men left behind tried to keep the Germans at
bay by increased firepower. The fort was equipped with four guns and
four maxim guns, the quintessential European weapon of choice during
“expeditions” against “natives” that was now turned with equally great ef-
fect against Europeans.588 In addition, the huge baobab trees nearby
served as base for snipers. The Germans found themselves attacked from
all sides by native franktireurs, who were equipped by the Portuguese and
supported them “excellently”, as they targeted the officers in particular.589
The body of the sacrosanct white colonial master now became the target if
he belonged to the enemy’s army. The Germans were shocked by this ‘tac-
tic’. But the Portuguese were not satisfied either with the guerra preta,
who had allegedly left their left flank unguarded and allowed Franke to
pass during the night without warning the Portuguese. Captain Varão com-
plained in his memoirs that many of the “Cuanhama” (meaning Cuamato)
auxiliaries had escaped the night before the fighting commenced. This
was, he and others assumed, due to the above-mentioned soba Shi-
586 Hull 2005: 161; Clausewitz 1976 [1832]: 535; BAB R 1001/6641: 12, file: 29 testimony A.
Varão, 11.11.21.
587 Southern, 2007: 12; NAN A.424; Bertling 22.12.14; cf. Oelhafen 1923: 86; Morlang 1998:
46; on artillery as the ‘decisive’ weapon of WWI cf. Ziemann 2013: 29f.
588 Ellis 1975: 75; Historicus 2012: 104 claims R. remained in Naulila, but quotes no source.
589 BAB R 1001/6634: 66, General ret. Franke to RMW, 23.03.22 ‘vorzüglich unterstützt’.
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hetekela, who was deposed by Roçadas in 1907 and now took revenge by
supporting the Germans.590 Both sides thus considered – much to their
chagrin – the participation of Africans to be decisive for the battle. Alferes
Sereno, regarded by the Germans as responsible for the “murder of
Naulila” took part in the battle.591
The longer the combat lasted, the greater the absence of unity between
the Portuguese officers and the rank-an-file became apparent. Headed by
Roçadas there was no absence of battle-hardened cadres, but he had left
the fort too early. Tactical mistakes, inadequate commandership, the lack
of preparation of the metropolitan forces, and the lack of motivation to de-
fend the fort at all costs against a numerically inferior enemy became
more and more evident. The troops stationed in Naulila had a rather low
level of combat moral, which led to panic in the ranks the closer the ene-
my got to the fort. Private Bertling observed from his position that the
Portuguese soldiers were “constantly running around haphazardly [plan-
los]. From left to right, and from right to left”, while their artillery was hit-
ting the German baggage train; a cavalry counter-attack was gunned
down. Whereas the Germans at one moment believed the battle to be lost,
the Portuguese evacuated the forward trenches, having run out of ammuni-
tion. Franke was always near the first line, a far cry from his characteriza-
tion by South Africans “as a cautious commander”. When a white flag was
seen, he left his cover, but was shot in the face from a sniper above him in
a tree. Believing his wounds to be deadly and aware that the heavy death
toll would soon make any advance impossible, Franke ordered Captain
Trainer to take over the command and to storm the fort immediately. With
bayonets the Germans charged through the thorn bush fences inside the
fort, whose mud walls had been destroyed by artillery.
Finally, the 2nd Company of Captain von Watter – whom Franke had
already called in November “unreliable” and horribly slow (schreckliche
Transuse) – arrived at the battlefield, convincing the Portuguese that any
counter-strike would be hopeless. Most Portuguese had already escaped
across the Kunene, others surrendered. In one forenoon the Portuguese
had lost not only their face but also “the fruit of their previous campaigns.
590 Varão, 1934: 59f.; Teixeira 1935: 24; Cann 2001: 160; Hayes 1992: 181.
591 AHM/Div/2/2/21/16: 44, ‘Oficiais que tomaram parte nos combates de Naulila’; Baericke
1981: 104 summarizes the rumors about Sereno’s fate: Officially, he was killed during the
battle of Naulila; Vageler and Suchier reported that he was jailed for the ‘murder’; Baericke
was told in Luanda that Roçadas shot Sereno during the retreat near Fort Gambos.
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Inability and inaction of the officers, most of all Roçadas, were responsi-
ble for this reverse.”592 “Fighting terminated after three hours”.593
Directly after the battle, German troopers started to reconnoiter the
vicinity for franktireurs, who were still shooting at them after the capitula-
tion. The fear and horror of the battlefield after the battle, the cries of the
wounded and the destructions were described in Private Bertling’s diary.
He expressed his disgust (widerlich) at the fact that seven Africans, wear-
ing loincloths and no signs of affiliation with the Portuguese – so the Ger-
mans said – were caught with their guns and hanged.594 A drumhead
court-martial (Weiß, Vageler and one lieutenant) had sentenced the “irreg-
ulars” to death.595 “Cruelty [is] probably the strongest sign of power at
all.”596 Five hundred Africans were assumed to have fought for the Por-
tuguese – a rather unlikely estimate. Their soba stated to Trainer that they
had been forced by the Portuguese and had been promised bounty after the
defeat of the Germans. The latter considered it a disgrace that Africans
had seen Europeans fight one another.597 Worse, however, was the fact
that (civilian) Africans had been given guns by colonial authorities and
had been ordered to shoot at Europeans, a situation, Art. 3 of the Congo-
Act (1885) wanted to exclude. Such wars were considered by the Germans
contrary to “reason” and “race consciousness”; they would damage the
“respect” for and the “nimbus of the white man”598 This hysteric debate
continued well into the post-war period.599
592 NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 14: 974, 9.11.14; Morlang 1998: 46; Pélissier 1969: 100;
1977: 485; cf. battle details in Machado 1956: 140-173; Oelhafen 1923: 85-9; Baericke
1981: 69-72.
593 AHM/Div/2/2/25/12: 2, Amaral Polonia, report on J. Pissarra, 3.2.15; Suchier 1918: 55.
594 NAN A.424 War Diary Bertling 22.12.14; BAB R 1001/6638: 25 Leskowski to AA,
13.10.24.
595 BAB R 1001/6641: 224 (28), Trainer Denkschrift, 9.2.29; on war violence Ziemann 2013:
9.
596 Häußler/Trotha 2012: 83 ‘Grausamkeit, das vermutlich stärkste Zeichen von Macht
überhaupt.‘
597 The same was true for verbal abuses among Europeans. The German Consul in Belgian
Congo Asmis, for example, had to endure numerous insults when he had to leave the
Colony. Fellow passengers on the steamer threatened to throw him over bord and, much to
the chagrin of Asmis, explained all the insults to the Germans, their Emperor, and the Em-
press ‘to the natives’. NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18, 703, USC Boma to SoS, 24.9.; Asmis to
GG Boma, 16.9.14.
598 Fonck 1917: 3; Hintrager, 1952: 440; cf. Dedering 1999: 2; Nasson 2014: 454f.
599 On the campaign against French colonial soldiers in Germany, the ‘black shame’ on the
Rhine cf. Koller 2001: 207-61; Maß 2006; 2001; Wigger 2006; cf. chapter 3.3.9.
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The number of men killed, wounded, and imprisoned during the battle
is inconsistent in the literature. At least three Portuguese officers and 65
commoners were killed, but there are also claims that 200 Portuguese sol-
diers died. 75 soldiers were wounded. The Germans took 37 (or 66 as oth-
ers claim) Portuguese prisoners, among them three officers. Nine German
soldiers were killed in action, three men died of their wounds on their way
back.600 Thirty Germans were wounded, Franke among them.601 The sani-
tary and medical conditions made warfare in Africa “particularly cruel”.602
After their victory, German officers tried to interrogate their Portuguese
counterparts. Neither party spoke the other’s language. However, the Ger-
mans did understand that Roçadas had “escaped” from the battlefield.
They soon noticed panic among the Portuguese. The shooting continued,
unabated, the battle seeming to continue with the Germans as mere on-
lookers.
The Power of Rumor – the Portuguese Retreat, December 1914
The worst predictions had come true: Germany, which had been feared by
the Portuguese for the last thirty years, had become a Germany that at-
tacked the Portuguese in Angola. For the first time since the Dutch capture
of Luanda in 1641 and the debacle against the French in Cabinda in 1784,
Portugal was faced with a European invasion of Angola.603
Eighteen Portuguese officers started to retreat with their men from the
right flank of the battlefield and crossed the Kunene River, following the
example of their commander Roçadas.604 The combat ended around 8:30
a.m. The last Portuguese troops crossed the Kunene River around 9 a.m.
and marched immediately to Fort Dongoena where the first men arrived
around 2 p.m.605 Roçadas, who would not believe that 400 Germans had
merely come to the Kunene River to destroy Naulila, was convinced that
Franke’s regiment was just the spearhead of a large invading army. Hav-
ing still massive numerical advantage, Roçadas decided not to go on the
2.6.5
600 NAN A.424 Diary Bertling 22.12.14; BAB R 1001/6638: 24, Suchier to AA, 13.10.24; R
1001/6922: 8-19, ‘List: killed in action’ 1926; Santos 1978: 215; Fraga 2010: 129.
601 Oelhafen 1923: 90; Pélissier 2004: 263; Morlang 1998: 46; Mattenklodt 1936 [1928]: 46.
602 Michel 2004: 925; cf. Brou 1916; Suchier 1918: 65-75; Kuss 2010: 304-10; Proppe 1974.
603 Cf. Penha Garcia 1918: 130; Pélissier 1977: 485.
604 AHM/Div/2/2/21/16: 46 Ax XIX Relação dos officiais e praças; Historicus 2012:123.
605 AHM/Div/2/2/21/14: 1 E. Machado, A retirada de Naulila após o combate do dia 18 [n.d.].
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offensive to reverse the initial setback, as he was concerned the Germans
would cut his retreat. He hoped to block the Germans marching to Humbe
and gaining access to the Huila plateau. But the retreat he ordered was dis-
organized; the morale was broken although there had been no outright de-
struction of Portuguese forces at Naulila. The continuing shooting created
confusion; hundreds of Portuguese soldiers began to run for their lives, no
longer obeying their officers. The retreat transformed into a wild escape
and finally into a stampede that invited catastrophe – but the victorious
Germans did not pursue them. What had happened? African “irregulars”,
being equipped by the Portuguese with guns and ammunition, turned
sides. While the Germans complained that they were still shot at by these
men, others had already began to target the withdrawing Portuguese – an
army that had conquered Cuamato and deposed their soba only seven
years before. Historians of colonialism have repeatedly pointed to the false
dichotomies of resistance and collaboration and emphasized the complexi-
ties of colonial encounters. Motives and strategies of all groups evolved
and changed over time according to their own needs606 – sometimes
abruptly, as was the case after the battle of Naulila.
The German witnesses analyzed this blurred picture of a colonial en-
counter – that ran contrary to the common ideology of European superiori-
ty – as a cautionary tale: The Portuguese had “committed a crime” by
handing weapons to these “irregulars”. They were playing a “dangerous
game” and now that they had lost the battle they could not expect any loy-
alty from Africans, “the arrow had to return to the shooter”.607 The fleeing
soldiers, however, in their panic, could not know whether they were tar-
geted by Germans, or Africans under German command, or Africans on
their own.
In considering the shooting by Africans, Captain Trainer wrote a letter
to Roçadas offering joint action against the “imminent rebellion”. Sending
a Portuguese sergeant with the letter to his commander, Trainer never re-
ceived an answer. He ordered that all Africans had to hand in their guns
and threatened to hang those who disobeyed, but with little success.608 The
Portuguese prisoners complained about the degrading treatment by the
German troops, who forced them, bound together on their necks and hold-
ing a white flag, to form a living shield when the Germans fetched water
606 Cf. Aldrich 2010: 106; Oelhafen 1923: 91; Hennig 1920: 118 Africans took ‘revenge’.
607 BAB R 1001/6641: 222 (15), Trainer: Zur port. Denkschrift, 9.2.29; cf. Hayes 1992: 182.
608 BAB R 1001/6641: 224 (28), Mj. Trainer: Zur portugiesischen Denkschrift, 9.2.29.
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at the Kunene River. All guns were prepared. “We were ready for com-
bat”, had Roçadas’ force used this moment for a counter-strike from the
opposite bank. Contrary to what is still stated in secondary literature, Ger-
man troops did not raid “deep into southern Angola”. After tearing down
the fort, Franke’s regiment returned to GSWA the next day, handing out
presents to the “pro-German” Ovambo and taking with it as bounty a max-
im gun, guns and ammunition, 16 ox wagons and medical equipment. Any
hopes to receive further supplies from Angola were dashed. However, the
threat of a Portuguese attack on GSWA was minimized. The troops were
welcomed back in Outjo on January 12 and were soon sent south to re-
sume a (hopeless) fight against the South Africans who had landed in
Walvisbay.609
Roçadas, on the other hand, who had provisionally assembled his troops
at Dongoena, finally believed in the German invasion, Norton de Matos’
idée fixe. He assumed that an invading army was immediately behind him.
Similar to other sites of World War I, the rumor (boato) developed into its
own truth, verified by the shooting that could be heard, everywhere.
Capitão mor Varão remembered that near Fort Dongoena his troops had
received a letter from the Germans forwarded by a Portuguese soldiers.
The letter demanded the immediate commencement of peace negotiations
and threatened that all Africans carrying weapons would be hanged. It
was, according to Varão, also claimed by the Germans that there were
more troops behind them. The Portuguese did not respond to the letter.
Some spent the night in Fort Dongoena; others left the fort at 7 p.m. head-
ing for Humbe. The next day, December 19, in Humbe, rumors spread that
the Germans had crossed the Kunene. Order was given to vacate Fort
Roçadas and to destroy everything that could not be taken away. A hut
housing all artillery ammunition was set ablaze. The detonation could be
heard in Humbe where soldiers and population alike presumed that they
were under a German artillery barrage. The impossibility of controlling ru-
mors was underlined by the “panic” that followed this “false alarm”.610
Humbe was vacated too and subsequently sacked by Africans. The troops
marched until 10 in the night to Bela-Bela, 25 kilometers north of
Humbe.611 The degree of panic that had stricken the Portuguese can be
609 NAN A.424 Diary Bertling, 22.12.14; Roberts 1986: 496; Teix. 2003: 25; Suchier 1918: 74.
610 AHM/Div/2/2/25/12: 13;19, Polonia, Conclução, 3.2.15; Hayes 1992:183; cf. White 2000.
611 Varão 1934: 59f; Suchier 1918:60 quot. O Mundo, 2.9.15; BAB R 1001/6634: 146, Report
of Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.19), Ax 9 Memo All., 23.5.22 (photos); Baericke 1981: 78f.
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seen from the continued march northwards for the following ten days until
December 28: Mutucua, Cahama, Cavalaua, Binguiro, Forno da Cal. It
was said that Africans pursued the Portuguese up to Fort Gambos, 150 ki-
lometers north of Fort Naulila.612
Lacking any intelligence about their retreat, Roçadas still assumed that
the Germans had continued their invasion and were behind all the shoot-
ing. This assumption led him to his second, “monumental error”: He or-
dered the “evacuation of all forts in the south”. Still ten days after the bat-
tle the commander of Fort Evale believed that “the Germans were in
Humbe”. According to Varão it was predominantly the lack of cavalry that
prevented the rumors from being clarified by reconnoitering the Germans.
Franke had become the “bogeyman” of the Portuguese and Roçadas
thought it necessary to win time and space in order to organize the defense
of the Huíla plateau.613
When the “news” about the Portuguese defeat spread, this was, as mis-
sionary Wulfhorst expressed it, “for all Ovambotribes like a call to rise
against the Portuguese; [e]ven though nothing had been said.” South of
Cuito Cuanavale there was not a single Portuguese fort left between the
Kunene River and the Northern Rhodesian border. Except for the mission-
aries, there was “not a single white in the region”.614 Garrisons were at-
tacked, soldiers ran for their lives, leaving behind provisions, weaponry,
and war materials (40,000 cartridges in Fort Evale alone). The “strong
sense of vulnerability” that has been described for soldiers at Angola’s pe-
riphery proved to be justified in December 1914. The “violence, hunger,
despair, crying, and fear” experienced by the escaping troops have barely
found their way into the sources subsequently, but it is reasonable to as-
sume them to be accurate.615 This “disaster”, as was clear to the observing
missionaries, could have ended up much worse if the boches had decided
to pursue the fleeing troops. But there was no need for that. The Cuamato
and others, assuming “the Portuguese gone for good”, took revenge for the
defeat in 1907 and looted the forts. And with every abandoned fort more
612 AHM/Div/2/2/21/14:1, E. Machado, ‘A retirada de Naulila após o combate do dia 18’[n.d.].
613 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Evale) to TRP, 27.12.14; Varão 1934: 59; Pélissier 1977: 485
‘le croque-mitaine’; on research about rumors in WWI Altenhöner 2008: 2-6.
614 BAB R 1001/6634:146, Report Baericke, Kimmel (16.11.19), Ax 9 Memo All., 23.5.22;
NAN A.505:35, Chronik Omupanda, 20.11.15; Suchier 1918:61 quot. O Mundo, 2.9.15.
615 Roque 2003: 110 on a source from Moxico, 1904; on rumor in Africa White 2000.
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weapons came into their hands. Within days the ‘colonization work’ of
thirty years collapsed – além-Cunene was free again.616
The Portuguese had repeatedly faced the problem that “African soldiers
deserting from the harsh conditions in the colonial army” could turn
against them.617 This time, however, it was not a riot by a makeshift guer-
ra preta, who had been given guns and now turned against their “mas-
ters”; rather, the shooting after the battle of Naulila developed within days
into an open rebellion by peoples the Portuguese had expected to have de-
feated seven years before. While it has been stated about the First World
War in Africa that African people were “always secondary actors and di-
rect victims”,618 the situation in southern Angola following the battle of
Naulila changed dramatically. The Portuguese became secondary actors
and direct victims, being chased northwards and leaving behind their mili-
tary equipment and settlements.
King Mandume, against whom Roçadas was supposed to fight in the
first place, became aware of his adversary’s downfall. His men soon
joined the Cuamato and Vavale and attacked Fort Kafima, east of Evale.
This ended in just another disaster for the Portuguese. Kafima’s garrison
was “completely annihilated” and one lieutenant and one sergeant were
taken prisoner by the Kwanyama. Mandume took his chance, while two of
his adversaries, the Portuguese and the Germans, were about to be defeat-
ed.619 However, a third colonial player entered the scene in GSWA and
Ovamboland.
The South African Conquest of GSWA (II), January–July 1915
Given the complete retreat of the Portuguese, “the Germans did not have
to worry about their northern frontier for the remainder of the war.” But in
December 1914 General Jan Smuts (1870–1950) also crushed the “Boer
Rebellion”, following which he could finally resume South Africa’s
GSWA campaign; “a short clinical campaign … with only 266 deaths.”
The “rebels” ‘Manie’ Maritz and Kemp deflected to the Germans in late
1914. On December 22, near Scuit Drift, Maritz undertook it to attack
2.6.6
616 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz to Faugère, 15.1.15; Meneses 2010: 44; Southern 2007: 13.
617 Clarence-Smith 1976: 220 on ‘bandit groups in the rugged lands of the escarpment’.
618 Bois 2006: 19: ‘des acteurs secondaires et des victimes directes’; cf. Nasson 2014: 442.
619 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Evale) to TRP, 27.12.14; 20.2.15; Hayes 1992: 184.
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South Africa’s third column, headed by Colonel van Deventer, coming
east from the Kalahari Desert. On February 3, 1915 German forces near
Kakamas again attacked van Deventer. However, these skirmishes proved
militarily meaningless. Maritz “complained about the red tape in the Prus-
sian military machine” and “denounced the German soldiers as ‘poor
horse masters’.”620 After reinforcements, van Deventer’s column took
Warmbad and reached Kabus north of Keetmanshoop on April 20. Com-
ing from Lüderitzbucht, the South Africans, now under General Duncan
McKenzie reached Aus in March 1915 and pushed towards Gibeon. From
the east, across the Kalahari Desert, Lt.-Colonel Christian Berrangé ad-
vanced via Hasuur. On April 12 Keetmanshoop was occupied. On May 2
the three united columns of van Deventer, McKenzie, and Berrangé, now
under the command of General Smuts, attacked the German troops near
Gibeon and took 200 prisoners. The remainder of the Schutztruppe barely
managed to retreat towards Windhoek. The fourth column had landed in
Walvisbay (belonging to South Africa) on December 25, 1914 and occu-
pied Swakopmund on January 14. Commander-in-Chief General Botha,
arriving in Swakopmund on February 26, hoped to unite in Windhoek
with his three columns coming from south. German counterstrikes under
the command of Franke proved fruitless considering the South African
manpower. The eagerly awaited German East Asian Squadron from Ki-
autchou under Admiral Maximilian von Spee (1861–1914) never arrived.
The 2,200 men were lost in the battle of the Falkland Islands. As the First
Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, put it: “the clearance of the
oceans was completed”.621 There was no more hope for relief.
The Germans relocated the remainder of the Schutztruppe and the entire
administration northwards. Governor Seitz escaped to Grootfontein in ear-
ly May. On May 12, Botha occupied Windhoek. After a four-week pause
and failed attempts to negotiate a cease-fire until the end of the war in Eu-
rope, fighting resumed. The Schutztruppe, exhausted and lacking any con-
fidence merely administered its own retreat. Military engagements ended
in disaster, the German officers were shocked at the speed of Botha’s ad-
vance. Proposals to link up with GEA were put down as unrealistic. On
July 9, Governor Seitz and Commander Franke signed in Khorab the un-
620 Cann 2001: 162; Samson 2013: 80f.; quote in Dedering 2000: 52; Samson 2006: 89-92; cf.
Walker 1917.
621 Herwig 1980: 158; Seitz 1920: 23; Eckenbr. 1940: 179 Franke offered a reward of 100 M to
whoever reported first the arrival of Spee; Stevenson 2004: 199; Sondhaus 2011: 107.
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conditional surrender of GSWA. The Schutztruppe still consisted of 3,497
men.622 Most of the commoners were put into camps near Aus. Officers
were allowed to keep their weapons and returned to their farms. In subse-
quent years, the “laxity of the rules regarding the treatment of the Ger-
mans” gave rise to protests in South Africa. The Administrator E. Gorges
had to justify his policy before Parliament and argued that such claims
were based on “misleading statements”. German civilians, he emphasized,
were law abiding under British rule. The Magistrate of Omaruru, Major
Thomas O’Reilly, wrote: “the general conduct of black and white leaves
little to criticize and much to be grateful for.”623
Aware of the catastrophic consequences (for the Portuguese) of the
African participation in the border war between GSWA and Angola, the
South Africans taking over GSWA were eager to “warn” the African pop-
ulation, “that this was a white man’s war; that they could take no share in
it”.624 However, the South African troops soon had to turn to a new Ger-
man adversary who did not adhere to this notion of waging a “white war”.
Southern Africa was in turmoil. The war had repercussions in Northern
Rhodesia and Nyassaland, where the Chilembwe rising of January 1915
shortly challenged British authority.625
The Luso-German and the Anglo-German confrontation in Angola and
GSWA had ended. In East Africa, however, the carnage between Por-
tuguese, Belgian, British and German troops had just begun to unfold. Af-
ter first skirmishes in August 1914, Portuguese troops coming from
Mozambique occupied in 1916 the disputed Kionga triangle south of the
border river Rovuma. Then, 1,500 soldiers traversed the Rovuma River
and occupied Newala in German East Africa just to learn that they were
trapped by the troops of Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck (1870–1964).
The battle in November 1916 ended in disaster for the Portuguese. In
November 1917, the Schutztruppe (1700 Askari, 300 Germans) crossed
the border. A nightmare descended upon the people of northern Mozam-
bique. The ensuing odyssey was a hopeless attempt of Lettow-Vorbeck to
survive and to bind allied forces in Africa. The “main weapons of the
Schutztruppe were their legs”. “Bushcraft” was the only response the Ger-
622 NAN A.566, v. 3: 6, Hennig, 5.1.18; Devitt 1937: 92; Samson 2013: 84f.; Nasson 2014:
437; cf. NAN ADM 8, 25/23, German casualties (15 Officers; 134 privates).
623 TNA CO 633/84/2: 4f. Memo, 12.3.17; cf. Raif 1935; Spies 1969: 56f.; Rizzo 2012: 75.
624 Pritchard 1916: 2; cf. Nasson 2014a:167; 178; Keegan 1999:228; Kaufmann; Siebold 1916.
625 Page 1978: 90f.; 1990: Nasson 2014: 445; cf. Vandervort 2009; Vogt 1973.
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mans had against the overwhelming allied forces. Hunger and diseases
haunted the marauding Schutztruppe. Hunted by General Smuts’ troops
they had no particular aim but to find the next Portuguese settlement they
could loot. The few surviving German members compared their deeds to
those of the Landsknechte during the Thirty Years War leaving behind on-
ly terror, famine, and death.626 Despite the Portuguese claim to have sent
altogether 34,000 troops to Africa, the Germans “seemed able to move at
will”, almost reaching the Zambezi River in July 1918. Then Lettow-Vor-
beck turned northwards, he crossed into Northern Rhodesia where he sur-
rendered on November 18, 1918. Throughout the East African campaign,
“the British were much irritated by the lamentable performance of the Por-
tuguese armed forces”.627
Greater than a “Small War” – the “Rebellion” in Angola, 1914–15
Portuguese escape and German retreat did not mean the end of the war in
Angola. For the region’s inhabitants, the battle of Naulila meant the con-
tinuation of an ordeal that had began years ago with the Portuguese at-
tempts to cross the Kunene River. The worst was yet to come. It is signifi-
cant to emphasize the continuity of war in (southern) Angola in order to
assess the situation in late 1914. After continuous attempts at conquest
since 1859, and after a crushing defeat in 1904, the Portuguese had estab-
lished themselves in the region for seven years, albeit marginally, inside
their forts. Beginning in June 1914, even the German Consul Eisenlohr in
Luanda had learned of “native revolts in southern Angola”.628 None of the
colonial administrations had the effective control over Ovamboland it may
have wished for. Therefore it is mistaken to speak of “a power vacuum
[that] was suddenly created” by the border war and the Portuguese re-
treat.629 Rather, when they withdrew from the region, the Portuguese had
found themselves reduced to the role they had played before 1907. Thus,
the kingdom of Kwanyma under Mandume that had economically and de-
mographically dominated Ovamboland since the late nineteenth century
attempted to re-establish a position threatened by the Portuguese advance.
2.7
626 Bührer 2011: 467f.; cf. Pesek 2010; Meneses 2010: 52; Strachan 2004; Samson 2006: 4.
627 Stone 1975: 732; cf. Teixeira 2003: 25; Samson 2013: 175f.; Meneses 2010: 60; 77.
628 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.I) German Consulate Luanda to VK Moçâmedes, 16.8.14.
629 Clarence-Smith/Moorsom 1975: 374.
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Given the “biographic turn” in colonial and imperial history, the rela-
tive power of the elites (of both the Portuguese and the Kwanyama mili-
tary) may serve as a justification for the focus on the leaders. In the no-
table absence of sources that relate the perspectives and the “conscious-
ness” of the “subaltern” classes on both sides of the battlefield, it must be
left to the future to let them “speak” by historiographic means. Historio-
graphic “elitism” that includes colonizing and insurgent subjects will at
least add a layer to the recognition of the interests that guided them and
the conditions under which they acted – that is, their “use of armed force”.
This chapter therefore hints at the under-investigated area of modern
African military history as a potential avenue of further research.630
The “Expedition” under General Pereira de Eça, 1915
The Portuguese in Angola had experienced the “long and complex wars of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”. Against people like the
Kissama, the Portuguese had undertaken “numerous campaigns” for three
centuries. “They had no lasting success.”631 Only with the advent of ad-
vanced military technology, better transport facilities and improved health
services colonial armies won the upper hand in the early twentieth centu-
ry. The contemporary scientific breakthroughs neutralized the geographic
and disease barriers that had hitherto limited European encroachments.632
These technological changes, the new “tools of Empire” are to be taken
into consideration in the following sections on the crushing of the African
“rebellion”. However, neither better equipment nor improved logistics
could exclude military setbacks, as the Portuguese army experienced in
1904 and again in December 1914. Portuguese reactions to the debacle
and its catastrophic consequences were confused and, to a certain degree,
dishonest. On December 20, the Governor General related to Consul Hall
Hall that “about one thousand whites … and large numbers of natives …
attacked inferior Portuguese forces at Naulila”. Norton de Matos assumed
that the Germans, being “driven out of their colony [by the British]” de-
sired to establish themselves in Angola.633 The same day, Norton de
2.7.1
630 Rolf 2014: 6 quoting Osterhammel; Spivak 1988; Moyar 2007: 226f.; cf. Thornton 1999: 2.
631 Thornton 1999: 1; Heintze 1972: 415f. the Kissama were finally subdued around 1917.
632 Cf. Black 2009: 151–71 for an overview on the ‘the victory of the West, 1860–1913’.
633 Headrick 1981; TNA FO 371/1884:424, Con. Luanda to FO, 20.12.14; cf. Rizzo 2012:233.
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Matos informed Eisenlohr about the battle, deploring a “long series of in-
fringements on Portuguese sovereignty by German forces”.634 The news
about the “serious battle” in Naulila soon spread in Angola.635 On Decem-
ber 27, after anti-German demonstrations, Norton “suggested” to the con-
sul (who was an almost daily visitor of the Governor General in his
“palace on the hill”636) to leave Angola immediately, which Eisenlohr did
the same night. Four weeks later, the crew of a British cruiser arrested him
on board a Portuguese ship.637
In Parliament, the Minister of Colonies Alfredo Gaspar (1865–1938)
explained on December 22, 1914 that the Germans had “again” attacked o
pôrto de Naulila, with much superior force than “the first time”. He spoke
of “800 to 1,000 aggressors”. Roçadas had retired and concentrated his
troops to assure a “counter-attack”. He deemed it to be “very urgent to
send more troops” to “maintain our territory”.638 On December 24, a note
of protest was sent to the German government. Portugal’s envoy, Sidonio
Pais, demanded reparations from the German government and requested
an investigation. In Berlin, the news from Angola caused consternation
and disbelief as politicians relied on Portuguese information and had no
intention to go to war with yet another country.639 Further, the German at-
tack on Angola caused “considerable excitement in the press.” Not only in
allied but also in neutral countries reports were published that “Germans
again invade[d]” neutral Portuguese Angola – to tarnish the “German rep-
utation”, as Berlin complained. Politically, the victory at Naulila proved to
be a “disaster”.
In Lisbon, on December 29, a cabinet meeting took place to consider
the details of sending additional expeditionary forces to Angola.640 In the
following weeks, the battle of Naulila occasioned “considerable renewed
activity in Portuguese military circles”.641 While in Great Britain and Ger-
634 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) Chefe de Gabinete to German Consulate Luanda, 20.12.14.
635 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 18.2.15; cf. Rosen 1932: 227.
636 Wheeler 1969a: 18; cf. Norton 2001: 212; NAN A.529 n.2:57f., Busch: Erlebnisse, [n.d.].
637 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg II) Consul to GG, 27.12.14; AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, rmk MNE, [n.d.].
638 Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, 22.12.14: 16f. ‘É urgentissimo mandar mais tropas’.
639 BAB R 1001/6634: 4, DGL to AA, 20.04.21 Whitebook 17.2.19: 201 No.302; RKA 1915:
86.
640 Castro Brandão 2002: 278; Fraga 2010: 129; Wheeler 1978: 107; O Seculo, 30.12.1914;
Morlang 1998: 47; a GEA newspaper reported about the battle, embedding it into the narra-
tive of German victories DOAZ, Jg.17, no.9, 27.1.15: 2 (Wilhelm II. birthday).
641 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 153: 820, USML to SoS, 4.1.15; cf. New York Times 24.12.14: 2.
2. The First World War in Angola and GSWA
185
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
many “military interventions in the non-European world grew increasingly
unpopular”642 following the wars in South Africa and Southwest Africa,
Lisbon’s government could count on public support for its effort to main-
tain Portuguese rule in Angola. After all, the enemies were European in-
truders and their African proxies. A declaration of war on Germany
seemed likely; a step the British deemed “undesirable”, however. Never-
theless, closer cooperation between South African and Portuguese troops
was discussed. Republican circles around Afonso Costa were convinced
that “only Britain could protect Portugal’s colonies in Africa from German
cupidity.”643 Mid-January the government contracted a company to trans-
port men, horses, and ammunition to Angola. This indicated for the Amer-
ican minister in Lisbon “that Portugal is virtually at war with Germany”.
However, due to growing dissatisfaction of officers in Portugal, ongoing
plots and subsequent resignations of ministers, the preparation of the expe-
dition was hampered.644 When the state of emergency was pronounced in
Lisbon following an attempted coup and a new dictatorial government was
formed under General Pimenta de Castro (1846–1918), new troops were
about to embark on their journey to Angola. In the night of January 19,
1915 just before they boarded the ships, officers were arrested for plotting
against the government. There were calls to “desert or to refuse to embark
for operations against the Germans in Africa …; fear among armed-forces
personnel burgeoned once the news” about ‘Naulila’ reached Lisbon.645
In Berlin, the Portuguese envoy received the response that no informa-
tion was available about Angola, but an enquiry would be initiated if the
Portuguese government facilitates the transmission of a cypher telegram
between Germany and GSWA. This request was discussed with British
diplomats in London who argued that the Germans could “communicate
with SWA by wireless”. Foreign Secretary Grey initialed the draft of the
Portuguese response, informing the Germans that Portugal’s government
exercises no control over cables to Africa.646
In Luanda, shortly thereafter, Norton de Matos lost his post; Angola’s
south had become the “Achill[e]’s heel of his governorate”. Bearing the
political responsibility for the disaster, he was axed from his post by Pi-
642 Methfessel 2012: 52.
643 TNA FO 371/2231, Tlgr. CO (Harcourt) to GG SA, 1.1.15; Birmingham 2011: 153.
644 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 153: 820, USML to SoS, 18.1.; 25.1.15; cf. Ramos 2001: 440f.
645 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Port.: 140, FML to MAE, 31.1.;156, 4.3.15; Wheeler 1978: 113/8.
646 TNA FO 371/2231, BML to FO, 7.1.15; remark A. Nicolson, E. Grey, 8.1.15.
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menta de Castro in late January 1915. At the end of February, after having
written a lengthy report about Angola and the numerous “rebellions” in re-
cent months,647 he left a colony that was politically and economically
worse off than in the preceding years.648 Due to the defeat in Naulila, it
was not granted him to present himself as a “second” Salvador Correira de
Sá e Benevides, who had expulsed the Dutch ‘invaders’ from Luanda in
1648.649
In February 1915, Portugal’s new strongman, Pimenta de Castro, who
opposed any intervention on the European battlefield, appointed the for-
mer Minister of War and ardent interventionist General Pereira de Eça to
the post of Angola’s Governor General and Commander-in-Chief. Aged
63, he seemed “an unlikely choice” for this mission. It seems probable that
Castro hoped to have neutralized a possible opponent. Never before had a
general been appointed to lead a campaign in Angola. His mission had
three objectives: (1) Protecting Portugal’s sovereignty against further Ger-
man attacks and revenge for Naulila, if necessary; (2) re-occupation of the
areas and fortresses abandoned in 1914 and (3) occupation of the Kwanya-
ma kingdom.650 Given the Portuguese investments, the South Africans
were concerned that Portugal’s troops could go on the offensive against
GSWA. However, they wanted to “carry through the campaign” all by
themselves. From Pretoria, he Governor General reported to London his
ministers were “anxious that no Portuguese claim to territory [in GSWA]
should arise.” But Foreign Secretary Grey knew that it was “impossible”
to give the Portuguese “an assurance against German aggression” when
they “consider that a serious attack is already in progress.” Grey therefore
refused to “ask them to limit in any way their own action against the Ger-
mans in [GSWA].”651
647 Dáskalos 2008: 181; 188; cf. Norton 2001: 215f.; Pimenta 2008: 94; NdM would have stat-
ed his term was over. GG served short terms of duties. 1900 -10, nine GG ruled in Luanda,
Henige 1970: 232; Wheeler 1969a: 6.
648 Mostly due to the war (German ships could no longer reach Angola) the value of foreign
trade had decreased by ~35 per cent, exports by ~40 per cent; the escudo ‘fluctuated greatly
after the outbreak of war.’ NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 610, USC Boma, Report on Trade
of Angola, 9.9.15; BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 36, testimony Norton de M., 5.5.26;
Da Costa 2008: 212.
649 Norton 2001: 186; Henriques 1995: 83 on Correira de Sá’s historiographic ‘function’.
650 Meneses 2010: 45; Strachan 2004: 80; Pélissier 2004: 271; cf. Teixeira 2003: 25.
651 TNA FO 371/2231, remark A. Nicolson, E. Grey; CO to FO, 8.1.; FO to CO, 12./18.1.15.
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Angola’s new Commander-in-Chief had, just as his predecessor, a ful-
ly-fledged “imperial biography”. The artillery officer made his first expe-
rience in the African theater of war in 1891, when he spent one year in
Mozambique (again in 1897). A “hero” of the conquest of Mozambique,
the Major was sent to Cap Verde in 1903. During the first years of the re-
public the Colonel made himself a name as defender of the new order
when he subdued monarchist plotting in Northern Portugal in 1912 – in
these years the army was regularly called in to intervene in questions of
public order. A few months later de Eça was promoted to the rank of Gen-
eral. Due to his ruthlessness, he soon bore the byname “iron man”. In
February 1914 he became Minister of War in Bernadino Machado’s gov-
ernment. In London, de Eça negotiated Portugal’s participation in the war,
which he favored. However, the Government could not agree on a com-
mon position and, furthermore, failed to prepare the general elections. On
12 December 1914, Machado’ Government resigned.652
In southern Angola, in the meantime, Africans were eager to push back
any Portuguese attempt to reestablish colonial influence. Small platoons
did not stand a chance in the area “abandoned by the [Portuguese] govern-
ment in such a cowardly way”. The thickness of the bush around the
Kunene River benefitted the defenders.653 Of a first Portuguese reconnais-
sance peloton that dared to enter the region, most soldiers were “massa-
cred”.654 Fear for the mission stations and concern of Africans “waiting
for an occasion to plunder” reined among missionaries. But it seemed that
the “promises of the chiefs” not to attack the mission stations were kept.655
It was understood since the end of January that the Germans had “evacuat-
ed Portuguese territories but are inciting the natives near frontier to re-
volt.” However, on February 1, 1915 a German platoon crossed once more
the border, after having been informed about this opportunity by “the
Ovambo”, to take away the artillery that was left in the abandoned Fort
Dom Luís de Bragança.656
In stark contrast with the “classical” Portuguese mode of waging war in
the colonies, more and more metropolitan troops were sent to Angola,
652 Rolf 2014: 9; Da Costa 2008: 124-7; Wheeler 1969: 759; 1978: 107; Minist. da Guerra
1917: 10; Pélissier 2004: 269f.; Teixeira 2003: 24; Malva Novais 2006.
653 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling to TRP, 27.12.14; Hartmann 1902: 229; Kanthack 1921: 329.
654 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz (Huíla) to Faugère, 15.1.15.
655 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huíla) to TRP, 3.2.; (Tyipelongo) 4.4.15.
656 TNA FO 371/2231, telgr. BML (Carnegie) to FO 4.2.15; Oelhafen 1923: 92.
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hastily recruited in Portugal’s countryside. After the disaster of Naulila the
General Staff in Lisbon considered it evident that only heavily armed
metropolitan troops in sufficient numbers would withstand the
Schutztruppe. In early 1915 it did not seem unlikely that the Germans
might attack Angola again since they had “already twice violated the bor-
der.”657 However, the Foreign Minister admitted that the first task of the
reinforcements “would be to restore order among the natives in the
South”. He assured the British Minister Carnegie that no “operations”
against Germans would be initiated “without previous consultation with
[the British] government.”658 When the new reinforcements arrived, the
population of Huíla, relieved that the Germans had not attacked their
town, considered it unfortunate that these troops had no experience. More-
over, the troops had a reputation for being “undisciplined”. It was feared
that they would “panic” on their first encounter with German troops, “just
as in Naulila”.659 General de Eça had similar reservations. After his arrival
in Luanda in March 1915 (replacing Lt.-Colonel Roçadas who had re-
quested that the campaign “be prosecuted by a more senior officer”660) the
General took his time to meticulously prepare the campaign to secure
southern Angola for good. He did not occupy himself with the “revolt” in
the Congo district.
The hesitation of de Eça to push forward against the German border and
the Kwanyama was also due to the difficulties with regard to the reorgani-
zation of the armed forces. The “state of Portuguese national defenses”
was described by one officer as “disgraceful”. “By 1915, the army-reform
laws appeared to be a failure”. The political upheavals in Lisbon, and most
of all the constant ministerial crises worsened the situation. Given the end-
less changes, the role of political direction in the determination of force
structure and military objectives was limited. When Pimenta de Castro
was overthrown on May 14, he was accused of not having acted with
courage against the Germans.661 Norton de Matos was among those in Lis-
bon who worked on bringing him down. Under Prime Minister José de
Castro he was appointed Minister of Colonies in June. France’s Minister
to Portugal, Emile Daeschner, saw it with a sense of irony that Norton de
657 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 18.2.15.
658 TNA FO 371/2231, BML (Carnegie) to FO 26.2.15.
659 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz (Huíla) to Faugère, 15.3.15.
660 Southern 2007: 13; cf. Pélissier 1969: 102; Sousa [n.d.~1935]: 11.
661 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Portugal: 196, FML to MAE Delcassé, 20.5.15; Wheeler 1978: 115.
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Matos, who was recalled after the disaster of Naulila because the army un-
der his responsibility appeared to be “completely unprepared”, found him-
self in charge of providing his successor in Angola with the means neces-
sary for the operations he himself was unable execute. After a cabinet
reshuffle in July 1915 Norton became Minister of War and was responsi-
ble not only for the campaigns in Angola and Mozambique but also for or-
ganizing the departure of Portuguese troops to France.662
Mistrust, lack of discipline and insubordination were rampant in the
armed forces following the revolution; relations between officers and
rank-and-file were strained and deteriorated under war conditions. The
loyalty of officers and civil servants to the republic was openly ques-
tioned. While the troops assembled in Angola, Norton de Matos’ Ministry
of War set up a committee “to investigate the personnel of [its] department
with the view of making such changes as may be compatible with … safe-
ty and harmony of the government”. Monarchist officers were axed while
promotions were granted to men unfit for their positions.663
662 MAELC CPC/NS, v. 6, Portugal: 229, FML to MAE Delcassé, 24.6.15; Norton 2001: 222.
Norton de Matos, ministre de
la guerre du Portugal
Ill. 27 General José Pereira d'EçaIll. 28
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In March 1915 de Eça had 3,700 men at his disposal. In June, the new
government granted his expedition another 1,500.000 Escudos in expens-
es.664 In July, a European army the size of which has never seen before in
Angola was assembled: 265 officers, 7,500 commoners, and 60 guns were
shipped to Moçâmedes; additional personnel and materials came from An-
gola, Mozambique or South Africa. Altogether the forces included 372 of-
ficers, 10,049 commoners (including degredados), 70 guns, 340 ox-wag-
ons, and 82 Fiat trucks. The size of the expedition was thus three times as
large as the one of Roçadas in 1914 and almost reached the size of Portu-
gal’s entire army in times of peace (13,000 men).665 This campaign was
the “most extensive” in Angolan history until the war 1961–74. Further,
the army enlisted Africans; as elsewhere during the World War “in their
search for local combatants, European administrations resorted to an al-
most enslaving form of conscription”.666 And as in all campaigns since the
1880s, the Portuguese could count on Afrikaaner “auxiliaries”. By 1915,
these expeditions were not yet “something of the past”. Looking for Ger-
man movements, since January Afrikaaner guides began to reconnoiter the
drifts to Damaraland. A formal “Boer commando” was established in
May.667
In the meantime, another limiting factor for the campaign became more
and more evident: the drought and the lack of water and transport resulting
from it. De Eça’s strategy consisted of crushing any resistance to his ad-
vance with the sheer number of men, thereby reducing any tactical disad-
vantage of his troops. But the supply of so many soldiers was an exemp-
tion in the way colonial wars were fought by the Portuguese. It was only
possible “against the backdrop of World War I and the threat of German
encroachments”.668 Since 1912, agriculture and cattle raising had made
663 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 153: 801, USML to SoS, 27.7.15, Wheeler 1978: 113.
664 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 142: 800, US CG to SoS, 11.6.15.
665 Pélissier 1977: 489f.; 2004: 272; cf. Iliffe 2007: 219 on the effect of lorries on the colonial
economy; Wheeler 1969: 428; 1978: 114 dispatchments from Portugal usually comprised
less than 1,000 men. From 1914-18 Portugal deployed in Angola 23.445 men, plus ‘several
thousand Cipais-irregular troops’. Troops from Portugal: 392 officers, 11,777 soldiers.
Colonial troops: 292 officers, 1,774 ‘white soldiers’, 9,240 ‘native soldiers’; 3,473 horses
and mules were sent from Portugal (BAB R 1001/6634: 32, excerpt Portug. Memo.,
17.2.19: 336); Hayes 1993: 91.
666 Wheeler 1969: 429; Nasson 2014: 443 on British and French practices; cf. Kuss 2010: 18.
667 AHM/Div/2/2/37/55, Pimento (Lubango) to Estado Mj, 24.9.15; Pélissier 1979: 194;
Stassen 2011: Figure 6.
668 Isaacman/Isaacman 1977:56; cf. scale of ‘African-white’ participation Pélissier 1969:119.
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progress in the administration’s bid to overcome Angola’s dependence on
rubber exports.669 The troops, however, consumed far more than could be
produced locally. Next to expensive imports, the military administration
resorted to violent requisitions of food – and porters to carry it. This
caused upheaval not only in southern Angola. In the north, near São Sal-
vador, Chief Alvaro Buta “found himself pressured by the government to
recruit porters for the campaign against the Germans” and decided instead
to continue a smoldering rebellion. The costs for the expedition were enor-
mous, prices rose in Angola. To make things worse for officers and civil
servants, since early 1915 their salaries had not been paid to incur expens-
es.670
In comparison to previous campaigns the infrastructure available to the
army had improved considerably, and de Eça ordered his men to carry out
further expansions. The need to deploy the army to extend and guard o
Império spawned technical changes such as the laying of new rail tracks or
669 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 610, USC Boma, Report on Trade of Angola, 9.9.14.
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telegraph lines. Most importantly, the challenge to transport weaponry and
personnel across the desert had been alleviated by the construction of the
railway from Moçâmedes eastwards since 1905. The tales about the
twelve days in the unforgiving desert – a “white man’s grave” – and the
hundreds of oxen that “perish[ed] annually in the journey”671 were now a
relict of a legendary past. The “toy railroad”672 had not yet reached the
plateau in early 1915, but had crossed the desert. In March 1915, the first
platoons were transported to Vila Arriaga. They had to cross the Chella
Mountains on foot. In mid-1915 the railways had reached kilometer 183
east of Vila Arriaga, leaving behind the escarpement.673 Furthermore, as a
consequence of the campaigns since 1904, there were, as the botanist
Pearson put it, “at present well-beaten tracks from the plateau down to the
Kunene” following the Caculovar River to Humbe.674 However, de Eça
had to postpone the march down south due to “lack of water and pasture”.
For the Afrikaaners, who had lost much of their ox-wagon business to the
railway,675 the war was a chance to regain profits.
Despite his time-consuming procurement of war materials and shipment
of troops, the situation de Eça faced on the ground was still characterized
by want not only of water and transport facilities. Telegraph lines had to
be set up. Knowledge of southern Angola had improved since the cam-
paign of 1904, but credible maps were lacking.676 Intelligence was scarce;
in Benguela, the General at least met with Prefect Keiling who informed
him about his encounter with King Mandume in January and warned him
of the danger for his men caused by the lack of water. When in February a
few raindrops fell, small troops (with their cattle and horses) could dare to
670 Wheeler 1969a: 6; AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 14.4.15.
671 Rooney 1912: 286. Before the railroad, the ‘whole of the transport of the country … [was]
in the hands of the [Afrikaaner]’ (Cuninghame 1904: 156). Previously, the tsetse fly had
prevented the use of oxen in the area, but ‘as a result of the destruction of the indigenous
buffalo’ at the end of the nineteenth century this ecological ‘shield’ no longer existed
(Kienetz 1977: 568).
672 Wittlesey 1924: 124.
673 Sousa [~1935]: 14; Santos Correira 1943: Mp.1; cf. Wittlesey 1924:124; Dáskalos 2008: 83.
674 Pearson 1910: 508 ‘circuitous, exceedingly rough’ roads to the east; 511; Kuss 2010: 16.
675 AGCSSp 3L1.11b4, Cancella (Kwanyama) to TRP, 21.6.10 via Evale; Pearson 1910: 507.
676 Whittlesey 1924: 114; AGCSSp 2L1.1.1, Carte de l’Ovampo par le R.P. Duparquet, (L.
Wuhrer) ca. 1885. In 1893, the American Consul Heli Chatelain claimed there ‘is no satis-
factory map of the Province’ of Angola. Knowing Kimbundu, he did not trust ‘the misprints
of names’ on Portuguese maps, Chatelain 1893: 304; NARA RG 84, Loanda, v. 4, USC to
SoS, 26.7.92: 463.
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advance southwards; but since the rainy season came to a close the worse
was yet to come. Given the secrecy of the military, missionaries were
doubtful how the officers would decide about their “expedition”.677 Pre-
fect Keiling was concerned that if the Portuguese continued to wait, they
would “not find a drop of water on their way and die of thirst, which is
worse than the bullets of the Kwanyama.”678 Unease about the long period
of preparation grew. In May 1915, a missionary in Huíla wondered why
1,200 men had been sent and did not move, but consumed the little food
that was left. Soldiers, decimated by malaria, were rendered “useless” be-
fore being sent to the battlefield.679 A small expedition staffed with sol-
diers from Mozambique was sent against the people of Tyipelongo. How-
ever, the assembled army did not deter the Kwanyama to continue their
raids which caused a further exodus to the north.680
Finally, preparations were concluded and marching order was given in
June to de Eça’s 10,000 men. Rumors about the Germans’ hopeless situa-
tion had reached southern Angola. Equipment was transported from the
railway terminus via Lubango, Chibia, and Fort Gambos by ox wagons,
motor trucks and thousands of human carriers. Missionaries deplored that
even men from Christian villages were requisitioned, just as the carriages
of private individuals (including missionaries’) and all mission-educated
craftsmen (smiths, carpenters) with their tools, as well as any cattle of
Africans.681
It is said that the Portuguese officers neither had the operational capaci-
ties nor the necessary means available to organize a campaign of this size
300 kilometers away from the point of departure in Moçâmedes. Most mo-
tor trucks broke down. Those still running had to be used to transport wa-
ter, provisions and officers of the General Staff. All others had to march
from the plateau down to the Kunene River and beyond. For the time be-
ing, the “major task” of warfare in the region meant “subduing the forces
677 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 15.4.15; Goepp (Bailundo) to TRP, 7.7.15;
3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huíla) to TRP, 2.3.15; (Tyipelongo), 4.4.15.
678 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 14.4.15; 25.4.15. It seemed ‘consoling’ to
him to know that the Germans were in dire straights too. It was said that they had retreated
to Etosha. ‘They are dying of hunger.’ Rumors had it that Franke had retired to the forts
‘Omtuni [Namutoni] and [O]Kaukueyo’ with merely 200 white and 100 black soldiers dy-
ing from hunger.
679 AGCSSp 3L1.13.7, Tappaz (Huíla) to Faugère, 14.5.15.
680 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Tyayombo) to TRP, 17.5.15.
681 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 25.4.15; 3L1.11b5, 28.7.15.
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of nature”, as one German officer had expressed it already in 1905. Other
concerns were subordinated to the persistent search for water. As in most
previous colonial campaigns, also the Portuguese in 1915 experienced
“nature’s role as a direct threat to [their] armies.” Hundreds of forcefully
recruited porters paid with their lives, dying of hunger, malaria, and ex-
haustion. The horrors of warfare were experienced even without engaging
the enemy. Soldiers drew a “dantesque picture of their march … ravaged
by thirst and diseases”, while decomposing bodies of famine victims were
seen all along the routes. Father Goepp, in a letter to his superior in Paris,
knew who was to blame for all the ruins and bloodshed in Africa: l’horri-
ble Guillaume. And he admitted the “disgrace” he felt about the conclu-
sions drawn by Africans who “could not understand at all that we [Euro-
peans] have killed each other for one year in a row”: “Whites are worse
than all beasts.”682
On July 7, 1915 de Eça reoccupied Humbe whose African population,
weakened by the famine, did not resist. Those still able to bear arms had
probably fled to Kwanyama territory. Simultaneously, de Eca sent 100
cavalrymen and 36 Afrikaaner to raid the western shore of the Kunene
River – a reprisal for the humiliation in December 1914. Near Fort Don-
goena they massacred allegedly 600 indigenas among them the soba of
Dongoena and seized 500 head of cattle. The “Boer commando” then
crossed the river into Uukwambi areas. In mid-July 1915, they made a re-
connaissance tour to Fort Naulila. Not informed about the surrender at
Khorab, they questioned Africans about “German movements”, but most
of all they were establishing roads and water reserves. The whereabouts of
the weapons looted in the forts were of great concern. The risk of Por-
tuguese soldiers being shot with their own guns was high. One officer ob-
tained a Mauser and learnt that the people of Dongoena had sold twenty
Mauser to the Uukwaludhi “whose sóba sides with the Germans.”683
More fresh troops were called in. The 3rd Infantry Battalion, for exam-
ple (in Moçâmedes since early December 1914 and stationed in Vila Ar-
riaga since March) reached Humbe on August 6, where the General as-
sembled his troops. An entire day had to be scheduled to cross the river
682 Pélissier 2004: 273 ref. to Gusmão 1935; François quot. in Lehmann 2014: 533; 535;AGC-
SSp 3L1.11b5, Goepp (Bail.) to TRP, 7.7.15.
683 Pélissier 2004: 274; AHM/Div/2/2/37/55, Pimento (Vau de Caloéque) to Chefe do Estado
Major, 16.7.15.
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north of Humbe.684 Informed about the German surrender and relieved of
the necessity to guard the border, de Eça subdivided his army into four
columns to occupy the areas east of the Kunene River around forts Cuam-
ato, Naulila, Evale, and the Kwanyama region. The Portuguese policy of
conquest was built around the notion of different “tribal” polities that were
to be occupied one by one. Pockets of resistance were to be isolated and
than crushed. The occupation of Cuamato, Naulila, and Evale was realized
without much fighting. King Mandume was now encircled from the north
and the west and found it difficult to concentrate his troops. Ombandja
(Cuamato) Chief Shihetekela Hiudulu was no longer able to organize re-
sistance. De Eça ordered the reestablishment of Forts Cuamato and
Naulila.685 He had “no information about the exact number of Kwanyama
forces” and did not exclude the possibility that Mandume’s men would be
joined by Ombandja – possibly with all the weapons that had fallen into
the hands of the Africans since the Portuguese retreat.686 Nevertheless, de
Eça’s troops began to enter Kwanyama territory.
Reforms and the Coming of War – King Mandume, 1911–15
Modern-day Namibian politics has no want of “heroes of anti-colonial re-
sistance”: Hendrik Witbooi (c.1830–1905), Samuel Maharero (c.1856–
1923) and Jacob Marengo (c.1875–1907) are glorious names in history.
What distinguishes Mandume ya Ndemufayo (c.1894–1917) from most of
these men was not only his young age, but, most of all, his totally uncom-
promising stand on foreign occupation of his kingdom. While his older co-
“heroes of anti-colonial resistance” were, at one time or another, integrat-
ed into the colonial political or economic landscape, located in the “grey
area between domination and resistance”,687 he never was. “Mandume”, as
one of the missionaries stated who knew him best, was “of a fighting dis-
position and would never rest.”688 His “fighting disposition” was based on
personal experiences and historic changes within Ovamboland. These
2.7.2
684 Cf. Sousa [n.d.~1935]: 14f.; Pearson 1910: 506; 511; Hayes 1992 II: 196 (Sheetekela,
27.12.89).
685 Sousa [n.d.]: 11; Pélissier 1977: 491; AHM/Div/2/2/38/27: 1, Ordem do Commando Supe-
rior (Humbe), 8.8.15.
686 AHM/Div/2/2/38/27: 2, Commando Superior (Humbe). Instruções No. 3, 9.8.15.
687 Apter 1999: 589; cf. Kössler 2008: 318 on memorialization of ‘national hero[es]’.
688 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 41, testimony missionary Albert Hochstrate, 26.4.26.
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were not necessarily evident to European contemporary observers. They
mostly assumed that “pre-colonial societies were in a pristine condition
that to all intents … had remained unchanged over aeons.”689 However,
these changes can only be sketched here in order to locate Mandume’s re-
sistance within the political and social history of the region.
Ovamboland, located on the Cuvelai floodplains between the Kunene
and Okavango Rivers, was described by a contemporary geographer, less
than enthusiastically, as “the [Kalahari] desert margin”: “The plain is cov-
ered with thorn which is almost impenetrable in places. … A very scanty
population ekes out a wretched living.”690 The notion of an isolated popu-
lation permeates also historiographic accounts: Even in the 1970s, Ango-
la’s southern border has been described as “one of the least known regions
of Africa.”691 The isolation based on geography was emphasized political-
ly since 1886 by the Luso-German border. From a colonial perspective,
the border cutting Ovamboland in two designated the region to the status
of a periphery and marginality. Similar to Darfur, the Rif, or the interior of
British Somaliland, Ovamboland “remained outside European control” be-
fore the First World War.692
Ovambo societies had developed during the nineteenth century into
several “strong centralized kingdoms”. Missionaries and officials, adher-
ing to the notion of the bounded ethnic groups, usually spoke of “tribes”
whose leaders were called “chiefs”, sobas, or Häuptlinge. Modern histori-
ans prefer the term “King”, in Namibia the term ohamba is also in use.693
Since the mid-nineteenth century the Kwanyama kings of northeastern
Ovamboland were considered “the most powerful” (reigning over a popu-
lation estimated between 45,000 and 80,000 before 1914).694 Among Eu-
ropeans they had a fearsome reputation. The prospector Boyd Cuning-
hame heard in 1903 of “Olulu [Weyulu 1884–1904], the King of the
Kwinhamas, the great raiding tribe… who … have never been sub-
dued.”695 The Apostolic Prefect of southern Angola, Louis Keiling, al-
leged they would “live only on warfare and looting. The military authori-
ties and citizens without defence are terrified when they merely hear their
689 Vansina 1987: 437.
690 Wittlesey 1924: 125; cf. Urquhart 1963; Nitsche 1913; Tönjes 1911.
691 Miller 1977: 108 on the pioneering work of Clarence-Smith; cf. Miettinen 2005: 13f.
692 Clarence-Smith/M. 1975: 365 (pre-1915); Iliffe 2007: 197; Almeida-Topor 2010: 17f.
693 Cf. Miettinen 2005: 56: Corrado 2008: 84 FN 21; Harding 2013: 146-8 on terminology.
694 Clarence-S./M. 1975: 368; cf. Wallace 2012: 11; Oliveira 2010:1057; Wright 1999: 409f.
695 Cuninghame 1904: 164 (did not cross into Ovamboland); on the term ‘tribe’ Jones 1990:76.
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name.”696 Irrespective of any colonial remoteness, Kwanyama territory
was located along a political and economic key frontier: Geographically
“closer to the Angolan slave trade” for which they raided their northern
neighbors and “marked by a higher degree of militarization, the Kwanya-
ma became the most embroiled of all Ovambo in this ‘frontier of vio-
lence’.”697
Combining seasonal rain-fed settled agriculture with cattle herding
(agro-pastoralism) and hunting, Ovambo polities also set up a “vigorous
local trade”. The mode of production in Ovamboland was not only highly
vulnerable to prolonged drought, cattle diseases, and locusts, it was also
increasingly influenced by European traders, missionaries and, later, colo-
nial officials.698 European goods, including clothing, ox-wagons, alcohol,
but most of all firearms were purchased from European traders of Walvis
Bay or Moçâmedes, or Ovimbundu traders from Caconda. By controlling
trade in Ovamboland and beyond, several kings and other chiefs monopo-
lized horses and guns and built up a following of men (omalenga). The
omalenga and modified military organization proved to be the basis for
accumulation through raids and the forcible collection and sale of cattle,
ivory, and slaves. The increasing demand for these items and the accessi-
bility of firearms facilitated their rise to dominance. As in other African
societies, this kind of ‘modernization’ had “counter-evolutionary tenden-
cies”, leading to insecurity and instability.699 For the first time, significant
differences in style of living emerged within Ovambo societies. The
growth of trade and the rising tide of new commodities flooding the region
intensified social divisions. The kings were utterly dependent on European
goods and begun to rely on “internal taxation” (cattle and slave raids, ex-
tortion of tribute) in order to pay for the merchandise and their growing
debt.
“[T]he [oma]lenga, each of whom received a horse and a number of rifles
from the King … led a body of about 100 men on raiding expeditions. The
[oma]lenga now became the tax collectors, and the traditional ritual seizure
of cattle for the King’s court (okasava) became a harsh and arbitrary tax,
which fell mainly on the most vulnerable members of society.”700
696 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling, Rapport sur la Prefecture de la H. Cimbebasie:10 (1911).
697 Hayes 1993: 96, ref. to Miller 1988; cf. Williams 1991 for an overview.
698 Moorsom 1977: 56f.; Siiskonen 1990: 79;92;146
699 Cooper 2002: 50; cf. Dobler 2014: 2-20; Heintze 2011; Bazin/Terray 1982: 22.
700 Clarence-S./Moorsom 1975: 376; Hayes 1993: 97 ‘modifications in military organization’.
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The subjects – who had suffered stock losses as a result of the great epi-
zootic in 1897 and the famines that followed the droughts and floods since
1908 – reacted with resistance. Their impoverishment (caused by the re-
placement of “traditions” with arbitrariness in combination with natural
disasters) led to the erosion of the kings’ and omalenga’s means of accu-
mulation and control. In response, they tried to manipulate the system of
labor migration as additional source of revenue by extorting “tax” from re-
turning labor migrants; whereas many Ovambo attempted to avoid the pre-
dation of the omalenga by resorting to migration.701 Likewise, kings and
omalenga were jeopardized by the actions of the government of Portugal.
The reactions in southern Angola or northern GSWA to the encroachment
of merchant capitalism were manifold. While rulers took their chances and
enriched themselves, others, especially those of lower social strata saw no
alternative but to respond violently. The concept of “social banditry” has
been applied to explain the reactions of these men (and women). In Eric
Hobsbawm’s universalist terms: they either came to “the world of capital-
ism”, “or, what is even more catastrophic, it comes to them from outside,
insidiously by the operation of economic forces which they do not under-
stand and over which they have no control”.702
Thus was the situation when Mandume became King of Kwanyama in
early 1911, succeeding his uncle Nande. The predatory raids and exces-
sive taxation weakened not only societal ties but also the King’s central
authority to contain centrifugal tendencies. The loss of central power was
probably also related to the relationship made in pre-Christian Ovambo
cosmology between the King and his rainmaking powers. The unremitting
droughts undermined the legitimacy of the King. Despite the sacred char-
acter of kingship, kings had been deposed in the past purportedly for fail-
ure to make rain. In a time of fragmented power, immense social pressure,
repeated famines, and rising inequality, Mandume decided to focus his
rule on “internal renovation”. A strong personality who “knew how to in-
spire fear from an early age” and having a “reputation for forcefulness”,
he perceived the legacy of his uncle as a “’degeneration’ of the Kwanya-
ma state”.703 Mandume’s policy is an example of what T.O. Ranger ana-
lyzed as an African reaction to the “stresses of the nineteenth century”:
some African societies “developed both stronger military institutions and
701 Clarence-Smith 1979; cf. Dobler 2014: 7 on kings stealing cattle to pay commercial debts.
702 Clarence-Smith 1986; Hobsbawm 1959: 3; 14 emphasizing the ‘uniformity’ of banditry.
703 Hayes 1993: 97f.; cf. Pélissier 1977: 205; Estermann 1976: 126 on raids; Salokoski 2006.
2. The First World War in Angola and GSWA
199
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
more centralized political machinery.”704 Profoundly traditionalist, the
“essence of Mandume’s reformism was to increase Kwanyama agricultur-
al productivity, reduce dependency on external links with merchant capital
and re-assert the centrality of royal authority at a time when fragmentation
at the Kwanyama state seemed imminent.”705
The omalenga, on the other hand, tried to extend their judicial and mili-
tary power. They presided over their own administrative districts of the
kingdom (oshikandjo). “The tension between kings and omalenga lay at
the heart of Ovambo politics”. King Mandume tried to re-centralize power
and curbed the power of the omalenga and their followers. He not only or-
dered them to cease trying people at their homes, he also prohibited fur-
ther raids for cattle and captives without the King’s sanction and central-
ized tribute exaction under royal control. As a response to the hunger, he
urged his subjects to cultivate more land.706
Finding Kwanyama society in turmoil and involved in several power
struggles (with the colonial powers, between fractions on the royal lin-
eage, between King and omalenga, between omalenga and subjects, be-
tween King and subjects) Mandume made two important decisions after
his accession: He moved his capital southwards to N’giva (Ondjiva) closer
to the German border and since 1891 a Rhenish mission station. He “in-
tended to balance pro-German leanings with an anti-Portuguese stance.”
To this end, he stood in friendly contact with the Rhenish mission (yet at
times, conflicts did occur) and he expelled Portuguese traders from his
kingdom. The population was “ill disposed towards [them] owing to their
charging too high prices for their goods.”707 Mandume is said to have re-
jected their trade in alcohol and slaves. His policies were considered suc-
cessful by Rhenish missionaries, who would try to act as his advisors and
reported in 1911: “Mandume holds himself well. He is not as weak as the
704 Ranger 1969: 296; cf. Mittelberger 1968/69 on Kwanyama ‘religião primitiva’.
705 Hayes 1993: 92f.; cf. Pélissier 1977a.
706 Hayes 1993: 95; 97; 100; 112; 109: ‘In Mandume’s tussle with the military commanders,
the latter had argued that Kwanyama prosperity depended on their raids. Mandume coun-
tered that the only way to obtain sufficient food was to work hard in the fields and that the
real Kwanyama problem was fear of work. This argument … constituted the core of Man-
dume’s populist ‘reforms’ because they were directed most fundamentally at producers, not
the élite. Centralisation and the curbing of the latter were prerequisites for the healing of
society after decades of increasing social division. The healing itself would come with the
elimination of hunger.’
707 Hayes 1993: 99; BAB R 1001/6640:125, extra-file: 40f., testimony A. Hochstrate, 26.4.26.
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deceased Nande. Also, the poor man gets his rights with him. The big peo-
ple, who were previously ruining the country, he holds in discipline.”708
The Spiritans, on the other hand, were not so well disposed towards the
new King. His predecessor Nande had been their “friend”. Prefect Keiling
considered Mandume to be “jealous” of the Catholics’ influence on the
youth. Mandume disliked their connection with the Portuguese authorities
and therefore, Keiling maintained, looked for closer bonds with the Ger-
man Lutherans.709 Furthermore, there were rumors that the Portuguese
prepared an expedition to occupy Kwanyama territory. Mandume seemed
convinced that the Catholic missionaries had requested this expedition.710
The Spiritans, afraid of being caught between the adversaries, decided in
October 1911 to move their mission station north to Evale were they also
hoped to find water.711 In 1912, Mandume ordered the Catholic mission
station to be destroyed.712
Cuamato (Ombandja) to the west of Oukwanyama territory was occu-
pied since 1907. To the north an ongoing war of the Portuguese against
Evale (first occupied in 1909713) ravaged the country. The fate of his
neighbors convinced Mandume of the colonial threat to his sovereignty. It
is likely that this threat also caused Mandume to work against the political
fragmentation of his kingdom since it reduced the prospect of waging war
successfully against either the Portuguese or the Germans. Both could
have used the smaller chieftaincies to pursue a ‘divide and rule’ strategy.
Oral tradition has it that Mandume already during the second meeting with
his councilors after becoming King in 1911 pointed to the possibility of
“war with foreigners who threatened to seize [Ovambo] land.”714 All par-
ties rearmed. The Portuguese set up new fortresses and also Kwanyama
authorities amassed weapons and continued the raids to recoup their loss-
es. Missionaries working in Ovamboland knew the smuggling practices
708 RMG Berichte 1911: 215, transl. Hayes 1993: 102; Hayes/H.e 1997: 77; Becker 2005: 45.
709 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Cardinal, 9.9.16; 3L1.11b6, Keiling to TRP, 8.9.12.
710 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cuanhama) to TRP, 29.10.11.
711 AGCSSp 3L1.11a1, Keiling: Compte-Rendu, Cuanhama, 1.11.11; 20.10.11; 1.5.13.
712 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Congr. de Propaganda Fide, 8.11.13. Keiling sent him two
‘resolute’ Christian Kwanyama to tell him that irrespective of the destruction the Spiritans
had the ‘intention to return to his country.’ Keiling claimed that Mandume received the en-
voys well, gave presents, and claimed to be a friend of the mission that would be welcome
to return.
713 AGCSSp 3L1.7b4, Keiling (Caconda) to TRP, 7.8.09 (excerpts).
714 Hayes 1993: 100.
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quite well: Missionary Wulfhorst remembered that the Portuguese traders
in the Kwanyama area
“sold spirits to the natives, and that weapons were sold to them secretly. The
Portuguese at that time [~1911] were not in possession of that area and there-
fore they could not compel the natives to work. There was originally trade in
slaves, but this became less in Mandume’s time. The Portuguese did not ener-
getically suppress the trade in slave, but carried it on secretly … Mandume
drove away the [Portuguese] traders”.715
As a result of decades of trade in guns, the military capacity of the Ovam-
bo was not to be underestimated. Colonial officials in GSWA had repeat-
edly considered the possibility of attacking individual kingdoms but had
always decided against it. When an official argued in 1912 for the appre-
hension of chief Tshanika, ‘native commissioner’ Captain Streitwolf de-
clared: “we will never apprehend Tschanika. He is chief of Ongandjera
(~15,000 inhabitants, 3,000 warriors)”.716 King Mandume was assumed to
have “30,000 warriors at his disposal of which almost all have guns.”717
In the Brussels Act of 1890, the European powers had agreed to impose
a ban on gun and ammunition sales to Africans. The widespread sale of
modern weaponry across the continent (estimated at 16 million over the
nineteenth century) caused concern and fear among nascent imperialists of
the military modernization (or “revolution”, as historians describe it) tak-
ing place in Africa. The battle of Adua (1896), the “greatest African victo-
ry against foreign invaders”, would soon prove them right.718 In order to
avoid conflicts (and sales) the ‘German’ part of Ovamboland was prohibit-
ed to Europeans. “Nevertheless, certain individuals from South West came
in. The traders who wished to reach the Oukuanyama area had to make a
detour and … had to do so via Portuguese territory.”719 The smuggling of
weapons, alcohol, ivory, and cattle between formally German and Por-
tuguese territories proliferated in both directions. “Ovambo leaders sought
firearms above else in their dealings with merchant capital” since they
needed them for their raids. Also after 1900, it was palpable that neither
colonial power had the means to enforce the “border”:720 In June 1902,
715 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 15, testimony Wulfhorst, 3.5.26; cf. Santos 1978: 172.
716 NAN ZBU 688, F V b 2, Bl.22, Ref 8 to Ref 3, 26.4.12; cf. Eirola 1992: 269–275.
717 BAB R 1001/9027, Bl.107, Dr. P. Vageler, n.d. [~ 12/14].
718 Reid 2012: 108; Iliffe 2007: 196; cf.Tlou 1985: 78.
719 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 49, testimony of missionary Hochstrate, 26.4.26.
720 Hayes 1993: 96; smuggling continued into WWI; cf. Zollmann 2010: 313.
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Angola’s Governor General complained that an “Orlog of Damara-Hotten-
totts” had crossed the Kunene.721 In 1904, the German administration
stepped up its efforts to subdue the weapons trade in Ovamboland, since
guns and ammunition had found their way to the “rebellious” Herero. Two
Greeks were arrested and admitted to have traveled from Moçâmedes to
Kwanyama territory to barter powder and front loaders for cattle for
Rhodesia. Both confirmed that Portuguese and German traders sold “many
guns” to the Ovambo. “Almost every Ovambo bears a gun, Mauser, Henry
Martini, M 71”.722 When GSWA’s Governor Leutwein, encouraged the
German consul in Luanda to request the Governor General to prevent fur-
ther trade (also by German traders via Moçâmedes), the consul deemed
such steps “inopportune”. He did not want to give the Portuguese reason
to utter counter-claims. After his journey across southern Angola the con-
sul confirmed to Leutwein that Portuguese smuggling to Ovamboland was
rampant.723
For decades, the traders bartering between the Kunene and Okavango
were part of the social fabric of the area, just as the missionaries. They
were of military concern to the colonial administrations, but at the same
time these “[b]ackwoods traders were the forerunners of Portuguese ex-
pansion on all the frontiers of the old slaving colony.” Dr. Schultze-Jena,
when still head of the Grootfontein district of GSWA, characterized them
in 1909 as men who “have nothing to lose”.724 Unrestrained by legal or
moral norms they blurred lines of distinctions in many ways. They sought
freedom from social or religious “constraints of their own societies” as
much as economic advantage among Africans. The resulting temptation to
‘go native’ by living with and from the local population made them not
only suspicious to administrators, but also caused concern among colonial
ideologists, since they obscured the clear demarcation of “us” and “them”
on a colonial frontier. Their trade in weapons, alcohol, and even slaves
caused an embarrassment to the colonial administration by pointing out its
inability to act according to international law. The traders and their deeds
721 PA Luanda 4 (Luanda-Politisches) German Consul Luanda to RK Hohenlohe, 25.6.02.
722 PA Luanda 4 (Luanda-Politisches) Minutes: Chr. Metrossuto, C. Roumelioti, 14.10.04.
723 PA Luanda 4 (Luanda-Politisches) German Consul to KGW, 24.11.04: ‘In Angola, in con-
nection with the military operations against Ovamboland, in order to deflect attention to
their own guilt, the accusation has been raised again and again that the high-quality
weapons in Ovamboland were delivered by German traders.’
724 Birmingham 1978: 527; transl. in Eckl 2007: 20f.; cf. Medeiros 1977: 79.
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also challenged the imperial narrative of order and discipline brought to
Africa.725
Reactions of Ovamboland’s élite to the colonial intrusion were mani-
fold. While Mandume expelled traders, others were more welcoming. His-
torian John Iliffe recognizes “one common feature” during the period of
colonial invasion: “African polities were divided. Like the European Pow-
ers, each had its war and peace parties, its hawks and doves.”726 The for-
mation of factions among Ovambo kingdoms and within these societies is
a case at point. While the politics of King Mandume in 1915 underlines
the “juxtaposition of European aggressors against African defenders”, the
history of Ovamboland makes equally clear that the choice of reactions to
the colonial onslaught cannot be confined to these “categories”.727
Cultural differences between individual kingdoms became more
marked. Historians speak of a “cultural mutation” that was “most ad-
vanced among the Ondonga by 1915, for they were most profoundly af-
fected by all aspects of European intrusion”. Finnish missionaries began to
evangelize in Ondonga from 1870 onwards. It was no coincidence that the
last independent King of Ondonga “was the first Ovambo or Nkhumbi
King to be converted to Christianity.”728 A “sense of fraternity” is not dis-
cernible from the conduct of neighboring Ovambo kings. Furthermore,
“the study of resistance has been extremely elitist”,729 but questions could
be posed about splits within Kwanyama society. Who opted to fight, who
wanted to stay neutral or ‘collaborate’?
It appears that Mandume’s assertive personality dominated the decision
to fight. After four years in power, his omalenga were willing to support
him in his confrontation with Portuguese colonialism. Patricia Hayes, a
historian who has written substantially about Mandume, describes the
King as a “forceful leader in both his drive for social renovation and in his
resistance to colonial occupation. [H]e stands out as one of the most com-
pelling figures in Namibian history.” Contemporaries were divided over
his character and policies: After a visit to the King in 1911, German native
commissioner Streitwolf described him as “amiable” (liebenswürdig).730
725 Viotti da Costa 1985: 42f.; cf. Lindner 2011: 320f.; Zollmann 2010a; Penvenne 1996: 459.
726 Iliffe 2007: 200; on the debate about ‘the notion of tribe’ cf. Apter 1999: 582.
727 Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 34.
728 Clarence-S./Moorsom 1975: 380; cf. Lau 1986: 38 on Jonker Afrikaner; Hayes 1993: 96.
729 Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 39; 55 ‘speak of recurring patterns of collaboration’.
730 Hayes 1993: 89f.; NAN BGR 2, F 9 b, Report Streitwolf, KGW to BA Grootfontein,
31.10.11.
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Rhenish missionary sources “suggest that Mandume was impetuous, rest-
less and highly autocratic, reluctant to accept criticism, whether from
headmen, elders or paternalistic German missionaries. “He was intelligent
and thoughtful,” wrote Missionary Wulfhorst, “but very willful” [includ-
ing the killing of ‘many people’].” His intelligence also “greatly impressed
[the Spiritan Father] Keiling”.731 Self-confident but aware of the chal-
lenges that lay before him, Mandume demanded to be on equal terms with
the colonial rulers in their distant capitals.732 In his argumentation he re-
sembled Prince Nicolas of Congo (c. 1830–1860) who had declared in a
famous letter of protest that “the Catholic kingdom of Congo is a friend
and loyal ally, but not a vassal” of Portugal.733 Recognizing the impor-
tance of close relations with the Germans, Mandume went so far as to
speak of the German Governor Seitz as his “brother in Windhuk”. Al-
legedly, in early 1914 he approached the German police station Kuring-
Kuru asking whether he could take refuge there since “he feared a Por-
tuguese campaign of revenge”.734 As shown in the previous chapters,
since August 1914, when Seitz became concerned about possible Por-
tuguese attempts to instigate an Ovambo revolt against German rule, a
sense of alliance is discernable between Mandume and the governor who
promised the King support in case of a Portuguese attack.
Mandume’s enmity to the Portuguese was older than this ‘alliance’ with
the Germans. This might have, first of all, geographical reasons. The Por-
tuguese, since they crossed the Kunene River, were nearby and, with their
soldiers and traders, unsettled the polities of Ovamboland. The Germans,
on the other hand, were far away; the only Germans the King saw regular-
ly were missionaries with whom he seemed to have built a relationship of
trust. The nearest German settlements Outjo and Tsumeb were located at
least 200 kilometers south of Ovamboland, ‘behind’ the waterless and
thinly populated Etosha Pan. Thus, chances for conflict were minimized
and German traders or soldiers were few who could have been raided by
Mandume’s men.
If bounty was a goal of the raids, it was easier to seek in northern direc-
tion. It is to be acknowledged that many reports about the gruesomeness of
the Kwanyama and their relentless raiding of neighbors and colonialists
731 Hayes 1993: 103 on Keiling 1934: 171-5; cf. Estermann 1976: 174, ‘a sadistic youth’; 145.
732 On the tradition of Portug. Kings treating African chiefs as equals Viotti da Costa 1985: 53.
733 Letter of Prince Nicolas to Jornal de Commercio, 1.12.1859, transl. in Wheeler 1968: 58.
734 Südwest, 5. Jg., 28.4.14: 2; NAN ZBU 2365, VII a, Bl.4, KGW, 16.7.14, ‘Rachefeldzug’.
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alike should be judged as colonial exaggeration that served but one pur-
pose: to justify the final conquest. Nevertheless, the reports are too many
from too different sources to dismiss the core, the raids, as untrue.735 As
mentioned above, these raids were controversial also within the Kwanya-
ma court. Mandume aimed at reserving the privilege for himself to decide
about individual raids. Whether it was the unremitting drought, or the in-
tention to provoke and harm the Portuguese who encircled Mandume’s
realm, or mere Kwanyama renegades that stood behind the resumption of
raiding in 1914 must be left open; complaints accumulated. In May 1914 a
newspaper in Moçâmedes reported that a Portuguese supply train was
raided by some Kwanyama. Prefect Keiling related the incident privately
by commencing with the words “as usual” (comme de coutume). Kwanya-
ma had blocked the road leading to Forts Evale and Kafima. Of the 19 sol-
diers and two Portuguese traders only a few escaped, the rest was killed or
taken prisoner. In addition, two ox-wagons and one field gun including
ammunition were taken. The attack was an embarrassment to the colonial
government. But in spite of attempts to better guard the roads between
Humbe and Kafima, the Kwanyama continued their raids northwards
along the Cuvelai river bed on neighboring Ganguella and others, destroy-
ing villages, taking prisoners and many head of cattle.736 Soon thereafter,
Fort Evale to the north of Kwanyama territory was attacked. In June 1914,
Kwanyama troops robbed a traveling party including a priest who sur-
vived severely injured. Pater Keiling was concerned about the security of
his mission. He described a situation of all-encompassing fear. For him,
Mandume was a ruthless overlord in Southern Angola who enslaved
Ganguela and Ambuela people and forced them to pay him “heavy taxes
to save their lives”.737 He mentioned 42 destroyed villages (Ganguella and
Gallangues) and almost 300 killed villagers; 200 were taken prisoner in
August 1914 alone. The Spiritan mission was engaged in paying ransom
for a few of them who were then resettled at the mission station Catoco.738
In August 1914, Father Bonnefoux spoke of a “revolt” led by the Kwanya-
ma.739
735 Nathanael 2002: 1 ‘In his youth my father was himself captured in a tribal war and taken to
a place in north-eastern Oukwambi, now lying across the border in Angola, where King
Mandume ya Ndemufayo of the Kwanyamas kept him as a slave’.
736 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Caconda) to TRP, 19.5.14; cf. Estermann 1976: 130.
737 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Bailundo) to TRP, 14.7.14, ‘impôt assez élevé’; 18.8.14.
738 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Eminence Reverendissime, 9.9.14; 9.9.16.
739 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huíla) to TRP, 11.8.14.
PART ONE. The First World War in Angola in its Historical Context
206
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
For the Portuguese administrators, “Mandume’s audacity” became
manifest in these incursions into territory they had deemed already ‘paci-
fied’. Planned since 1913, the expeditionary force under Alves Roçadas
was sent in September to execute a “punitive expedition” against the “ter-
rible opponent”.740 Given that also missionaries were attacked, Prefect
Keiling had intended in September to visit the “King of these terrible
Kwanyama”, but considered it prudent to wait until the government had
occupied the region manu militari.741 As this attempt came to naught after
the Naulila incident and the battle, and as Roçadas was more concerned
with the German threat, Mandume could send his men to sack Fort Kafima
(Okafima) in late December 1914. Three Portuguese soldiers were cap-
tured by Mandume’s men and taken to N’giva. The King, according to
missionary Wulfhorst, was well aware of the Naulila incident and told
him: “This is how the Portuguese do it.” In “recognition” of Mandume’s
contribution in the fight against “our enemies”, GSWA’s Governor Seitz
presented “his friend” with three horses.742 Still in June 1915, when all
odds were against him, Commander Franke requested missionary Rauta-
nen in Olukonda to express his gratitude to the “chiefs [Kapitäne] who
gave me presents” and to assure them that he would return their favors in
due time.743
King Mandume was now the “most powerful” man in Ovamboland and
beyond. He was so powerful that Prefect Keiling – following the King’s
invitation – deemed it necessary to visit Mandume in January. Despite “in-
trigues of German Protestant missionaries”, the King gave the Catholic
missionary an impressive reception at his palais with his “thirty ministers”
and ample presents. Keiling asked for guarantees for the mission stations
in southern Angola. Mandume’s men had taken hostage 94 Christians
from the Kavango area and Keiling requested them to be released. De-
fending war as “honorable” and “necessary for the upkeep of his court”,
Mandume granted the guarantees and the release. But he made it also clear
that “he did not wish any more Portuguese (i.e. Catholic) mission [sta-
tions].” When asked to release the three Portuguese soldiers captured at
Kafima, Mandume reportedly responded: “Are you a missionary of God or
740 Sousa [n.d.~1935]: 9 ‘a audácia do Mandume’; ‘um terrível adversario’.
741 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Cardinal, 9.9.14.
742 BAB R 1001/9025: 40f, DG Lisbon to Bethmann-Hollweg, 15.12.14; 98, Tlgr. AA, 7.2.15;
NAN A.505: 34, Chronik Omupanda, 20.11.15; Oelhafen 1923: 92.
743 NAN A.566, v. 3 Franke (Otjiwarongo) to M. Rautanen, 14.6.15; Peltola 1958: 179.
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an agent of Mnene Poutou (the [Portuguese] government)?” Promising
Keiling not to hand his prisoners over to the Germans, he did release two
of them to the Lutherans, who had them transported to the German Fort
Okaukwejo.744 The third prisoner, a sergeant, was allegedly killed because
he refused to instruct the Kwanyama on how to use a captured canon.745
According to the missionary Wulfhorst, in April 1915 Mandume re-
ceived a letter of complaint “from the Portuguese”. “He had a headman
who could read a little Portuguese … I [Wulfhorst] said to Mandume,
‘leave the Portuguese alone; if they attack you, you will be destroyed and
all your headmen who influence you against the Portuguese will run away
and misfortune will overtake you.’ Mandume rose and stated that he
would knock their heads off.” He had made a similar statement to Captain
Streitwolf in 1911, and, given the message of Seitz from October 1914,
still “hoped that the Germans would wage war against the Portuguese.”746
Despite the guarantees given by Mandume, Keiling reported about new
raids of Kwanyama men against neighboring villagers. Near Caconda a
village was burnt down in mid-1915, 25 were killed and 45 taken prison-
er.747
Did Mandume make “an attempt to impose his paramountcy over the
whole area [the Ovambo-Nkhumbi population]” following the expulsion
of the Portuguese in late 1914?748 Given what Keiling reported about his
visit in January 1915 of the “the grand Seigneur of all Ovampo” who –
according to Keiling – was able to instate “his own appointees in smaller
Ovambo polities to the north” and who succeeded to play Protestants off
against Catholic missionaries, the King seemed at the height of his power,
being at liberty to act as it pleased him.749 The onslaught of colonialism
threatened all this, including traditions, that were so cherished by Man-
dume and formed the baseline of his reign. Colonial policies to be imple-
mented in the future stood at odds with the Kwanyama way of life. Man-
dume would lose his power to rule. Instead a petty white official would be
placed in a fort near his royal residence, similar to Cuamato or Evale.
Road construction would have brought in more “foreigners” he so de-
744 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling to TRP, 18.2.15; 3L1.11b5, Keiling to TRP, 20.2.15.
745 BAB R 1001/6639: 61, Questions to Hochstrate and Wulfhorst, 1/25; Morlang 1998: 47.
746 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, f:15, testimony 3.5.26; NAN A.505: 39, Chronik Omupanda,
20.11.15; NAN BGR 2, F 9 b, Report Streitwolf: 14, KGW to BA Grootfontein, 31.10.11.
747 AGCSSp 3L1.18.8, Keiling (Huambo) to Cardinal, 15.8.15.
748 Clarence-S./Moorsom 1975: 380 ref. to Eça 1921; cf. Pritchard 1915; Hayes 1992: 184.
749 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling to TRP, 20.2.15; Hayes 1993: 90f.; Vigne 1998: 293.
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spised. They would have carried with them more alcohol and merchan-
dise. Mandume instead aimed at increased self-sufficiency. Tax collectors
and corvée were to be expected and would have driven more Kwanyama
into labor migration. Violent reactions to these prospects were therefore
likely. However, as T.O. Ranger has emphasized, it would be wrong to as-
sume that “resistance … necessarily impl[ies] a romantic, reactionary re-
jection of ‘modernity’”. Mandume enjoyed modern merchandise; he lived
in a house constructed in rectangular European style; he wore European
clothes; he was willing to accommodate missionaries and learnt from them
how to write.750 The ‘distant’ colonialism of GSWA, as he experienced it
through trade and negotiations, was acceptable to him. However, he was
unwilling to directly forego his sovereignty to Portuguese officials, as his
western, northern, and eastern neighbors were forced to do since 1907.
Considering the ongoing attempts at conquest Ovambo leaders seemed to
be left with no option but to acquiesce or to resist. King Mandume made a
decision. His kingdom was the “only state still capable of contesting colo-
nization”. The Kwanyama would resist.751
Battle Between Equals? – Mongua, August 18–20, 1915
In waging a war against the Portuguese, Mandume pursued his goal of
maintaining political independence. He chose to act upon the defeat of the
Portuguese on the hands of the Germans, since his chances of winning had
improved considerably. As in similar cases elsewhere on the continent, the
campaign of 1915 was thus not a “sudden rupture”, but represented “the
dragging out of older and more entrenched animosities” In the war be-
tween Mandume and de Eça the nexus between local initiative and imperi-
al context becomes evident. It is important to keep in mind what historian
John Hargreaves had pointed out already fifty years ago: African rulers
“often pursued clear purposes of their own – the maintenance of indepen-
dence, the retention of power within their dominion, and the elimination of
commercial rivals.”752 And it was the reference to the “racist assumptions
2.7.3
750 Ranger 1969: 305; cf. Dobler 2014: 7 on the ‘European style’ of Ovambo Kings; Shiweda
2011: 143f. on ‘modernity’ among Ovambo.
751 Pélissier 2004: 270; Harding 2013: 76f. on resistance; Walter 2014: 120 on motives.
752 Nasson 2014: 445; Hargreaves 1960: 108; cf. Reid 2012: 14 on the ‘righteousness of war’.
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… of Africans as passive barbarians”753 that made it so easy for Por-
tuguese plaintiffs to claim later a soba could never have fought so
adamantly for his own power without outside support.
However, when de Eça’s forces crossed the Kunene River, years of
famine and social upheaval had “eroded the capacity of societies in Ovam-
boland to overcome drought”.754 This in turn diminished any military ca-
pacity that was left. Nevertheless, colonial warfare in the heydays of impe-
rialism did not mean that well-equipped European soldiers fought against
helpless ‘savages’. When Africans acquired the skills and equipment the
Europeans had used to their advantage, the image changed. This had been
true for African defense against European incursions before the eighteenth
century and it became in part true again, when Africans gained possession
over considerable numbers of firearms in the late nineteenth century.
European technical superiority was challenged by its own means. In strate-
gy and tactics this often resulted in a “particular type of cross-cultural syn-
thesis” in the art of war, as has been described for several African theaters
of war.755 For decades now, historians have established the fact that colo-
nial administrators were “aware of their limitations.” Military or financial
“colonial weakness” has been described as a characteristic of colonial rule
that brought grievances but also opportunities to Africans.756 Since the
days of the descobrimentos the Portuguese had time and again lost hun-
dreds of men to their African adversaries. The memories of the defeat at
Pembe Drift in 1904 and the retreat in 1914 were still fresh. Also, the Ger-
mans in their war against the Herero had suffered “international humilia-
tion of defeat by an African adversary during the first part of 1904”.757
The alleged specificities of colonial wars have repeatedly been ana-
lyzed by contemporaries and historians. Colonel Charles E. Calwell’s
Small Wars (1896) on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency war
became the starting point for an ever-growing literature. Recently these
wars have been called “transcultural” or “asymmetrical”. All these at-
tributes set them apart from the wars fought in Europe. The laws of war,
as proscribed by the Geneva (1864) and Hague Conventions (1899/1907)
were deemed applicable only to “civilized” states and their military. Rules
753 Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 31.
754 Gewald 2003: 217; cf. McKittrick 2002: 160f.
755 Thornton 1988: 360f.; cf. e.g. Bührer 2011; Reid 2012: x on ‘misleading imagery’.
756 Ranger 1969: 298f., pointing to R. Oliver; cf. Iliffe 2007: 206; Osterhammel 2011: 697.
757 Steinmetz 2008: 608; Prein 1994: 102; cf. Dedering 1999a: 207; Lindner 2011: 74.
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about combatants and non-combatants were thus considered irrelevant
when fighting “natives”. Wars against indigenous adversaries were regard-
ed as “domestic” affairs. In international law, the Congo Conference had
“irreversibly exclude[ed] any pretensions to sovereignty that indigenous
communities might have entertained.” The “native” enemy was considered
“unequal”, often degraded into a subhuman category. Legally speaking,
the insurgents were treated as “criminals”, “bandits” – and culturally as
“barbarians”. Europeans called their wars against these adversaries “puni-
tive expeditions”. “According to a widespread notion, other forms and
means of warfare that differed from those employed in warfare in Europe
were both necessary and legitimate when fighting non-European adver-
saries.”758
For example, the chances to ask for mercy, to surrender, and to survive
as prisoners of war were minimal in “small wars”. The taking of prisoners
in colonial wars was deemed “impractical”; they would have needed
guards and provision, therefore the killing of prisoners appeared to be the
“obvious solution”. The shooting was rationalized as a form of penalizing
violence, setting an example for what would happen to those who rebel.
Equally, colonial soldiers could barely expect to survive their capture by
Africans. For example, one African contemporary stated about the Por-
tuguese defeated in 1904: “we just killed them”. The handing over of Por-
tuguese prisoners to the Germans by Mandume was a rare counter-exam-
ple. From the European perspective, ceasefire and capitulation of native
forces after a battle were deemed to be inexistent. “Small wars” ended in
defeat or victory – the latter at times meaning outright annihilation not on-
ly of the “rebels”, but also of the people living in the conquered areas.
More often than not such policies were accepted by the commanding offi-
cers and their superiors. Consequently, colonialism has been characterized
as “structurally latent genocidal”.759
The colonial peace was “armed” and could, by definition, include
“pacification measures”. Ideological justifications for bestialities were
easily found by categorizing the enemy into a ‘lower race’, who would be
defeated by its own ‘savage’ means. African traditions of warfare were
important factors too for the escalating violence in “transcultural wars”.
These practices may have shocked European contemporaries. Reports
758 Koskenniemi 2001: 126f.; Methfessel 2012: 46; cf. Walter 2014: 83; 157; 171; 2008; Reid
2012: 133; Kuss 2010: 17; Hull 2005: 131; Guha 1994.
759 Walter 2012: 90; 99; 97; 2008: 14f.; 2006: 39; Hayes 1992 II: 193 (Sheetekela, 27.12.89).
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about them often had apologetic undertones, justifying and legitimizing
the brutal “pacifying” of “native rebels”. Furthermore, European forces
could directly benefit from those traditions if “native auxiliaries” were
employed who did not concern themselves with the observance of the
European ius in bello.760
At the imperial home front, an easy victory against the racially different
opponents was taken for granted. The number of fallen soldiers from the
metropolis was usually minor (in comparison to the Africans killed in ac-
tion or subsequently). Often these “campaigns”, given their relatively low
loss on the European side, were not treated “as a ‘war’ worthy of the
name.” There was a widespread and strongly held teleological belief that
the “uncivilized native” societies were doomed by history to succumb.761
Taking this background into consideration, it was expected of General
de Eça to win this “small war” by resorting to the utmost force that was
put at his disposal. Until the crossing of the Kunene River, the campaign
was understood to be the suppression of a ‘post-pacification rebellion’.
The war against the Kwanyama, on the other hand, was a colonial war of
conquest. Until mid-August, the Portuguese army was privileged in its oc-
cupation efforts by being able to avoid any major engagement. The logisti-
cal difficulties required that of 11,000 troops under de Eça only about
5,000 soldiers and 500–1,000 African “auxiliaries” were employed east of
the Kunene River. As usual in colonial wars, for reasons of mobility and
logistics the men were further subdivided into (four) columns with 18 ar-
tillery pieces, 28 maxim guns, over 400 ox-wagons, 800 horses, and 73
camels. It belongs to the tragedies of this war that King Mandume was
faced with a colonial army that was equipped to face a different adversary
– the Germans.
Among contemporaries, estimates for the Kwanyama forces under
Mandume remained disputed. The intelligence service of General de Eça
has been blamed for its “amateurism”.762 Portuguese estimates ranged
from a low of 50,000 to a high of 150,000 “rebel fighters”, among them
50,000–60,000 Kwanyama. Also the Portuguese estimates of the number
of weapons of the “rebels” differed greatly: from several hundreds, to
760 Cf. Walter 2012: 108f.; cf. Cook 2006: 638 on the killing of European POW during WWI.
761 Ravlo/Gleditsch/Dorussen 2003: 521. In war-databases colonial wars often have not been
taken into account because they require a ‘threshold criterion of 1,000 battle death [‘for the
system member’, i.e. Europeans]…in a single year.’ ibd: 529; Fulbrook 2011: 31.
762 Pélissier 1977: 491 on the number of Port. forces; Hayes 1992: 190f.; Walter 2014: 76f.
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around 5,000, up to 15,000–20,000 guns.763 German missionary Wulfhorst
later disputed that the “rebels” had “100,000–150,000 men able to bear
arms” and 10,000 guns. He had been with the Kwanyama for many years
and stated
“[t]hey were not in a position to place such a number of men in the field. Dur-
ing that year [1915] there was a famine in the land, for which reason many of
the natives did not go forward. … There was no war until August 1915 … as
far as the fight with Mandume in August 1915 is concerned, there could not
have been more than 4,000–5,000 natives present at such fight.”764
His colleague Albert Hochstrate estimated “the total number of [Ovambo]
able to bear firearms during that time to be between 10,000 and 15,000,
which would include the other tribes”, i.e. other than Kwanyama.765 There
was a colonial “tradition” of extreme exaggeration of the numbers of de-
feated enemies. “Observers might exaggerate the size of armies because
they wished to trumpet the virtues of their partisans” or they included the
porters. “Alternatively, they may have been misled by the way African
armies fought, which made them appear large” due to their “open or-
der”.766 Furthermore, there seemed to be a gap between what the military
claimed in public to know about the enemy and what was put down in in-
ternal correspondence, indicating the General Staff’s ideas about the ene-
my forces. “Knowledge systems are essential for empire. Agents of em-
pire need to understand the behavior and culture of those they rule.” This
functional understanding of knowledge about Africans was essential to
prepare for fighting. Discourses about African “tribesmen”, past or future
military adversaries, were thus part of these imperial knowledge systems
that were created for one foremost goal: to rule.767
A listing of “knowledge” about Kwanyama politics and the way of
fighting can be discerned from the instructions of de Eça’s high command.
“Reportedly there are political divergences between both chieftaincies [Om-
bandja/Cuamato and Kwanyama]. During the attack, they organize all the
firearms in the first line, extending it in a long line of shooters shaped like a
half moon. The remaining combatants, those who do not possess firearms,
wait to reenforce at the time of the assault. The Lengas, warlords, lead their
cuas [platoons] in combat. [They] usually ride on horseback, dressed like Eu-
763 BAB R 1001/6639: 62, Questions, 1/25; R 1001/6638: 138, summary Mascarenhas, 7.6.24
764 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 12f., testimony of missionary A. Wulfhorst, 3.5.26.
765 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 38f., testimony Hochstrate, 26.4.26; Hayes 1992: 192f.
766 Thornton 1988: 365; cf. Walter 2014: 95; Alencastro 2011: 43.
767 Price 2008: 154; cf. Walter/Kundrus 2006; Vansina 1987: 438f.
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ropeans in khaki uniforms.The soba [chief] is not usually showing himself in
front of his warriors. It is likely, however, that Mandume, the Cuanhama
chief, will break with this tradition, and join in the play [the fight] for the des-
tiny of his chieftancy. We must therefore count on the greatest resistance [of
the Cuanhama].”768
The Portuguese knew that they barely knew enough to predict the next
steps of the Kwanyama. It was admitted that nothing could be said about
the number of troops. However, the sober exposition of the enemy’s fight-
ing order indicates the degree to which de Eca’s staff was willing to recog-
nize the rationality of Mandume and his military leaders.
Having sent three smaller columns to the north and west of Kwanyama
territory, the General personally led the largest column of around 2,700
men against King Mandume (the majority being soldiers from Portugal,
most of them illiterate, many had never heard before the word “Angola”).
Most prominent among de Eça’s “mercenaries” was Harunga or Vita
“Oorlog” Tom (1863–1939) with his men. He had already supported João
de Almeida in his conquest of southern Angola and was a “key figure
within the militarized raiding economy” of the Kunene region, having
made a fortune by his “advancement within the military hierarchy”.
Among other tasks he had been a “tax collector” for the Portuguese. Ac-
cording to the above-quoted Manasse Veseevete, the “Portuguese regarded
him as a general.”
The marching order for August 12, the day of departure from Humbe,
acknowledged under the rubrique “situation”: “There is no news about the
situation of the natives of the Cunene and Cubango areas.” The Afrikaaner
commando, arriving from Fort Cuamato and Fort Roçadas, was mostly
ahead of the troops and tried to gather intelligence about the attitude of the
people.769 The actual theater of war, the terrain where the enemy was ex-
pected to wait until the attack, caused extreme operational strains on colo-
nial troops. However, the relative familiarity of the Portuguese military
with the area east of Humbe was a striking advantage for General de Eça
in comparison to previous campaigns. Furthermore, the invading army had
a precise aim to target: Mandume’s royal residence at N’giva.
768 AHM/Div/2/2/38/27: 2, Com. Superior. Instruções No. 3, 9.8.15; Hayes 1992: 191.
769 AHM/Div/2/2/39/18: 1; 4, Com. Superior (Humbe) Ordem de Marcho, 12.8.; 15.8.15;
Pélissier 1969: 107; Rizzo 2012: 53f.; Heywood et al. 1992: 185, Manasse Veseevet[e],
30.3.1986; Bollig 1998: 507; 2004: 261; NAN STR 21, II m 1, Bl.18, Portugal em Africa,
no. 224: 118, 20.4.1910; cf. Stals/Otto-Reiner 1999.
PART ONE. The First World War in Angola in its Historical Context
214
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
African fortifications in Angola were “generally composed of complex
patterns of trenches, obstacles, and palisades”.770 While they had proved
adequate to repel attackers for centuries, with the advent of the maxim gun
and field gun, Europeans could use their technical superiority to devastate
the palisaded hamlets of Ovamboland. Mandume was aware of these
weapons and decided not to wait until the Portuguese had closed in and
would sack his residence. He would try to stop them beforehand.
While Mandume’s troops were able to forage for food, the Portuguese
had to transport everything, which restricted the size of their army and
their radius of operation. Eight cannons and sixteen maxim guns slowed
down de Eça’s trek and made it vulnerable to attacks. Most of all the lack
of water impeded the Portuguese army. Within days pull-oxen and the
cavalry’s horses fell victim to the drought. The soldiers “went crazy of
thirst”.771 There were rumors that the troops had to be re-sized due to the
drought.772
Apart from logistical challenges, another motive for de Eça’s meticu-
lous preparation of his campaign is discernable. Well aware of the
Kwanyama’s reputation as unconquered “great warriors”, he had respect
for his task – in this, he differed from many colonial officers. De Eça’s
campaign is another example that proves wrong the notion of colonial om-
nipotence – the possibility of defeat on the hand of African adversaries
was always given. The African “initiative during the ‘pacification’”, so
clearly emphasized by historian Terence Ranger and many after him,773
can also be discerned from de Eça’s slow march against Mandume.
Missionary Wulfhorst remembered that the first shots of the battle
“were fired on the 15th August, 1915. I was not present at the fight. I was 80
km distant. I saw that Mandume and his warriors went out to fight. They were
mostly armed as natives are, and Mandume also had one or two cannons. I
personally saw one. These were taken from the Portuguese. He was not able
to use the cannons as he had no ammunition.”774
770 Thornton 1988: 370.
771 AGCSSp 3L1.18.8, Keiling (Huambo) to Cardinal, 15.8.15; Pélissier 1969: 107.
772 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 22.8.15 reported most men would return to
Europe after having incurred expenses of 400,000 Contos, only 4,000 men should stay and
wait for the rain before they attack Kwanyama. ‘Dans quel pays vivons-nous!!!’
773 Ranger 1969: 293 ‘Africans helped to make their own history’; Walter 2014: 238.
774 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 10, testim. Wulfhorst, 3.5.26; Vieira da R. 1936: 34f.
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As historians have pointed out, “[t]here is no distinctively ‘African’ way
of war”,775 and African leaders knew that it might be advantageous to
fight colonial forces with their own weapons. Mandume’s fruitless attempt
to break the colonial monopoly of heavy weaponry attests to this; irrespec-
tive whether he lacked ammunition, or whether he could not find an ene-
my soldier willing to teach his men how to use artillery. Instead, he had to
resort to alternative means, counting on the strength of his numbers and
the thirst of the Portuguese. However, the General’s “lifeline” was not cut:
most of the few motor trucks that transported water to de Eca’s men could
pass across Ovamboland unhindered – the “first mistake of the Kwanya-
ma”. On August 16, Portuguese cavalry and African “auxiliaries” reported
the concentration of hostile “natives” at Mongua, near a few small water-
holes (cacimba) at the border of the Kwanyama territory. De Eça ordered
his troops into this direction, where Mandume’s lenga Calola held the pos-
ition with his men and refugees from Humbe. The Portuguese arrived the
next day and set up a bivouac, a defense position to stay over night laid
out in the form of a quadrate. As predicted, Mandume prepared himself to
join his men, after being alerted “in the forest” that the Portuguese were
approaching his territory. Wulfhorst remembered that the King called on
him on the 17th and seemed less self-assured about his victory than ever,
telling the missionary “When the Portuguese arrive, I will shoot myself, I
will die in Ondjiva.”
On August 18, early in the morning Calola, a personal friend of Man-
dume, who had repeatedly campaigned against the Portuguese and eleven
other omalenga attacked the eastern and northern flank of o quadrado
with all force. Two batteries of field artillery, four batteries of maxim
guns, two infantry battalions, and two cavalry squadrons responded with
“a true rain shower of bullets”. This first engagement lasted for three
hours.
The ensuing battle of Mongua, barely mentioned in Anglophone histori-
ography, would constitute – in terms of numbers – the largest sub-Saharan
battle between European and African forces since Ethiopia’s victory over
Italy in Adua in 1896.776 The “roar of canons” was heard up to the mission
station in Namakunde. Missionary Heinrich Welsch (1875–1927) remem-
bered that at first the people believed this to be thunders announcing the
775 Reid 2013: 114; Walter 2014: 211-15.
776 NAN A.505: 33, 41, Chronik, 20.11.15; Sousa [~1935]: 14f.; Pélissier 2004: 269; 275; AHM
Div/2/2/40/32, details on the Portuguese soldiers who took part in the battle of Mongua.
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rain.777 The number of attackers shot by de Eça’s maxim guns and can-
nons is unknown, but the losses were immense. One Portuguese officer
and sixteen privates were killed the first day. Mandume’s men, having at
their disposal abundant ammunition, tried to cordon off the Portuguese
and targeted horses and pull-oxen to immobilize the invaders. While de
Eça was surprised to find his baggage train attacked, the Kwanyama were
forced to rely on the Portuguese rations since there was almost no food left
in their territory. They “endeavored to outflank the Portuguese and to cut
off their rear communication”, Missionary Hochstrate later learnt about
this tactic: “the road of retreat leading through the forest was very narrow,
sufficient only to allow the passage of a wagon, and that it had been barred
by the natives who had thrown trees across it.”778 De Eca was trapped. He
tried to call in support from his other detachments to the west. But despite
the Kwanyama’s efforts and the capture of several ox-wagons, the Por-
tuguese still managed to get supplies from Humbe into the combat zone.
During the night and the next day the Portuguese dug trenches that pro-
tected them against snipers from trees and anthills. A merciless battle
raged over those cacimbas that still held water. Wulfhorst, not an eyewit-
ness of the battle but close to the event, received this description from the
Kwanyama afterwards:
The “Portuguese were surrounded by the natives … they were cut off. For
two or three days the Portuguese were without food or water. The natives oc-
cupied the water hole, and obtained possession of about twenty wagonloads
of provisions and other goods. While they were plundering these, the Por-
tuguese opened fire and drove away the natives from the water hole. The Por-
tuguese then obtained reinforcements”.779
According to this report, lack of discipline and attentiveness in one partic-
ular moment of success lost the Kwanyama the cacimbas; marines and
Mozambican soldiers, the men so ruthlessly enlisted into the army, cap-
tured the ponds on August 19 – the “essential mistake” of the Kwanyama.
When King Mandume arrived that same day in the evening with new sol-
diers, including his personal guard,780 and five ox-wagons of guns and am-
777 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 37, testimony Hochstrate, 26.4.26; R 1001/6634: 210,
Welsch to Gouv Seitz, 2.5.18; Hayes 1992: 193f.; 1992 II: 150 Jer. Benjamin.
778 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 37, testi. Hochstrate, 26.4.26; Gonçalves 1926: 118.
779 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 11, testimony Wulfhorst, 3.5.26; Pélissier 2004: 271.
780 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 20.2.15: 7 describes the guard as com-
posed of 80 chosen men (aged 20-25 years) and all equipped with ‘fine’ Mauser and
Kropatschek guns.
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munitions, he knew that his success depended on the re-capture of the wa-
ter. Being a better strategist than his omalenga, he also ordered to ensure
that no more supplies reach o quadrado. What caused the Portuguese such
apprehension was to find that Mandume did not follow the strategy that
had become “the classic defensive stance of many … African states at war
with the Portuguese in Angola: taking full advantage of [one’s own terri-
tory’s] inaccessibility” and refraining “from open attacks”.781 Mandume
instead appropriated ‘colonial’ forms of fighting and adapted them to his
own needs. He attacked the supply routes of the Portuguese successfully
and introduced volley fire. Contrary to Ovambo “royal taboo” he personal-
ly took part in battle. He had “trained himself to be an excellent marks-
man”.782
On August 20, a ferocious battle raged over the cacimbas. Mandume
had assembled several thousand men ready to assault the Portuguese
camp, shouting “The land does not belong to the white[s]!” According to
Portuguese sources, the King had at his disposal not only Kwanyama sol-
diers, but also men from his traditional enemies, the Cuamato, Vavale,
Humbe, and Uukuambi. Was this the “vast and efficient coalition” of
Africans that rarely ever occurred during the period of colonial conquest,
the Ovambo “league” the Portuguese had feared since 1904? Taking into
consideration the Portuguese exaggerations, René Pélissier points out that,
except for the Italians in Ethiopia, “never in modern times the Europeans
had to face an enemy so numerous in tropical Africa.” General de Eça,
aware of his potentially catastrophic situation, finally managed to send out
messengers to his columns in Evale and Cuamato to call in support. The
enemies shot at a distance as close as 50 meters. But the longer the battle
lasted and the deeper the Portuguese could dig their trenches the more
hopeless the fight became for Mandume, since the Portuguese, having re-
ceived supplies the day before, were not running dry of ammunition.
Without water and against maxim guns and artillery the defense of
Kwanyama territory was a lost cause. As most horses were shot, marines
instead of the cavalry had to launch the counter-strike and Mandume’s
men could not withstand their force. After ten hours of fighting merely 15
781 Pélissier 2004: 276; Miller 1972: 50.
782 Pélissier 2004: 270; Hayes 1993: 104; 98, ref. to NAN RCO 10/1916/1, UG Representative
Namakunde, Notes re Mandume, 29.4.1916; RCO 15/1916/1, RC Ovamboland and Hahn,
Re Ovamboland and Chief Mandume n.d. (ca. 1915-16); Hayes 1992: 195.
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Portuguese had been shot, but Mandume had lost his élite guard in the
trenches. He withdrew southward.783
In three days of fighting, the Portuguese had suffered only 35 casualties
(including four officers) and 57 wounded which attests to the limited oper-
ational success of Mandume’s men.784 Given the low number of casualties
it seems also likely that the Kwanyama forces had fewer guns at their dis-
posal than claimed by the Portuguese. Portuguese officers boasted to
South African Major Pritchard shortly after the battle that their soldiers
had fired in one day between 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. no less than 2,000 rounds of
French 75’ shell grenades. They assumed “immense losses”785 of between
4,000 and 5,000 “natives”, but claimed that only 100 Portuguese soldiers
had participated in the battle.786 The Afrikaaners who took part in the bat-
tle kept their own (glorifying) memories that differed sharply from this
Portuguese version. Most of all they inserted ‘Mongua’ in a long tradition
of
“being called [by the Portuguese] on commando against belligerent native
tribes. In forty years’ time this happened no fewer than twenty-two times, and
the last commando … was during the World War when a native chief, Man-
dumi, and his warriors surrounded a Portuguese Laager of several thousand
Europeans. The Boers had to come and help, and such was the respect which
the natives had for the Boers that the approach of a commando of twenty-two
man caused Mandumi to retire”.787
 
King Mandume, on the other hand, told missionary Welsch afterwards that
he had lost merely 25 men; only 100 were wounded. Wulfhorst, who
spoke to Mandume on the 22nd in N’giva, however, had the impression
that the King’s self-assuredness was “gallows humor”. Apart from self-ap-
plauding exaggerations, rumors about German participation on Man-
dume’s side began to spread after the battle (even though the last German
official visiting Ovamboland had wished his farewell to King Martin and
Marti Rautanen in May). The Portuguese notion of two differing military
783 Pélissier 1969: 105 ‘a terra não é do branco’; 1977: 493; 2004: 13; 211; 271; Hayes 1992:
196; AHU MU DGC Angola 1915-18, Pt 5, 5a Rep, Cx.973, Tlgr. GG to Min. Colon.,
18./25.8.15.
784 AHM/Div/2/2/40/3, Mongua list of fallen; Div/2/2/39/4, Diary Cuanhama campaign 1915.
785 Pritchard 1916: 4f.; cf. Hayes 1993: 91; Diário de Notíçias 17.8.28 ‘Uma acção gloriosa’.
786 NAN SWAA 1496, Report on tour of Ovamboland Mj Pritchard 1915; Gewald 2003: 218.
787 Die Burger cit. in: NARA RG 59, MF 705, roll 28, 853m00/21; USC Luanda to SoS,
10.12.28; On the Afrikaaner self-image during the war 1899–1902 Teulié 2000: 338-45.
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cultures, here ‘rational’ European, there ‘savage’ African, was challenged
by Mandume’s men. But it was unimaginable that African “warriors”
could “learn” themselves how to wage war; thus, European support was
assumed. Not only had Portuguese soldiers seen “2,000 cartridges of Ger-
man guns and more than twenty guns” after the battle of Mongua.788 Also
the tactics applied by the Kwanyama showed, according to the Portuguese,
a European-style military knowledge. Since many of Mandume’s men
“wore khaki uniforms with hats and looked like Europeans”, the Por-
tuguese claimed that Germans or other “white people” had supported
them. Recent Portuguese historiography sustains the claim that the
“Ovambo received sophisticated arms from the Germans”. Indisputably,
Commander Franke handed out 20 (or perhaps 100) guns and Seitz pre-
sented three horses to “his friend” Mandume after the sacking of Fort
Kafima; many of the Kwanyama’s guns were paid for by money earned in
GSWA. But German deliveries of weapons and military training in 1915
were “quite impossible” as Wulfhorst and Hochstrate underlined. They ar-
gued: “The natives themselves possessed khaki clothing and hats. ... These
were brought with them from South West when they returned from their
work on the mines.”789 Evidently, in addition to the guns bought from Por-
tuguese traders, many weapons from the looting of Portuguese forts in late
1914 found their way to Kwanyama.
The days following their victory at Mongua, the Portuguese saw the
abyss opening. It was not yet decided whether the victory over Man-
dume’s army would turn into a disaster. Without any provisions left and
most horses and pull-oxen dead de Eça’s troops were isolated, five days
from Humbe. 2,700 men could neither continue to occupy Kwanyama ter-
ritory nor could they return to Humbe. The victorious Portuguese were im-
mobilized while the defeated King Mandume escaped. It was mere luck
for the Portuguese that he did not decide to return on August 21 or 22, but
rather saved the ammunition that was still left, heading instead for the bor-
der with SWA. Aware of the catastrophic retreat of Roçadas in December
1914, the General decided to wait for relief; a solution that was not avail-
able to his unfortunate predecessors in 1904 and 1914. A convoy arrived
788 BAB R 1001/6634: 48, RMW to Franke, 6.3.22; Eça, in Memo Just., Doss. 9, doc.2: 10f.; R
1001/6634: 212, Welsch to Seitz, 2.5.18; NAN A.505: 42,A. Wulfhorst. Chronik der Sta-
tion Omupanda, 20.11.15; Walter 2014: 251.
789 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 12, testimony Wulfhorst, 3.5.; 38; Hochstrate, 26.4.26;
Morlang 1998: 47; Dáskalos 2008: 181; cf. Peltola 1958: 178.
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from Cuamato and Naulila on August 24 and saved the situation. Finally,
also the column from Evale joined the troops in Mongua. De Eça, now
with 4,000 men at his disposal, ordered the erecting of a fort in Mongua
and continued to push southwards. Again, the Afrikaaner commando that
took part in the battle of Mongua proved valuable on the march to N’giva,
since they “kn[e]w southern Angola like no one else.”790
The remainder of the campaign was conducted with fearful brutality; a
pattern that de Eça had learnt during his campaigns in Mozambique and
northern Portugal. The Herero soldier M. Veseevete recalled soberly that
“when we were on our way to Kwanyama, we came to a certain place called
Otjizemba where the troops gathered. The Hereros were sent to go and fetch
cattle from Owambos, which were to be slaughtered and eaten by the troops.
By that time the people had been to Naulila and back. The Owambos had
started killing the people, and the people had run to Naulila. It was decided
that all Ovambos must be killed, so they were killed.”
Violence was employed purposefully to achieve a political goal – to rule
over the region. The aim to instill terror in order to impress upon the
Kwanyama the futility of further resistance but also to sustain the army
was evident. “[F]oraging armies were a bane in all areas where they
moved as the country was stripped of food and famine followed”.791 Re-
straints in exercising “punishment” were considered inapposite. “Uncivi-
lized races attribute leniency to timidity”, Colonel Callwell wrote in his
Small Wars.792 No colonial soldier wanted to appear weak or timid.793
Many Kwanyama now attempted to surrender. Only a minority under
Calola aimed at continuing the fight – without success. Not only the
sobas, omalenga, and other chiefs were hanged. De Eça, the “great mili-
tary leader”, was alleged to have “ordered the killing of all natives aged
over 10: some were hanged with barbed wire, other crucified.” One author
went so far to speak of a “veritable holocaust. The Portuguese had taken
no prisoners.”794 Two years later opposition members in the Portuguese
parliament read out sworn statements about these “terrible atrocities which
undercut any sense of a Portuguese civilizing mission in [Ovamboland]:
790 AHM/Div/2/2/37/55, Pimento (Lubango) to Estado Major, 24.9.15 ‘são bons guias’.
791 Heywood et.al. 1992: 180 Manasse Veseevet[e], 30.3.1986; Thornton 1999:120.
792 Callwell 1906: 148 was read by colonial officers all over Europe, Kuss 2010: 193f.
793 Walter 2012: 106; Häußler/Trotha 2012: 68; 79 ‘Tensions and fear of death end in a blood-
bath’.
794 Stachan 2004: 80; GEPB 1936 II ‘Angola‘: 662; Goldblatt 1971: 206; cf. Pélissier 2004:
278.
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Portuguese rule there now rested solely on terror.” Refusing a parliamen-
tary inquiry, Prime Minister Afonso Costa defended General Pereira de
Eca, who was now Military Governor of Lisbon and ordered his men to
shoot hunger rioters: “We must not be moved by idealism or forget the
concept, or the estimate, that blacks have of humanitarian respect, which
they view as weakness or pusillanimity.”795
Indiscriminate killing of (potential) rebels and destruction of enemy
agricultural production was considered the ultimate response to deal with
suspicion and to alleviate one’s own fear of being killed by an unrecogniz-
able enemy ‘hiding in the African bush’, thus making nature (seemingly)
the foremost adversary. Historian Dierk Walter pointed to these and other
reasons for the blatant ruthlessness of colonial wars, while he stated that
“racism as a prime determining factor [for the brutal warfare in colonies]
…has often been overestimated.”796 In a similar vein, others have ana-
lyzed colonial wars in a from below-perspective that emphasized the pro-
cesses of brutalization of ordinary soldiers: “brutalization by revenge, by
fear, and by frustration.”797 This departure from top-down-perspective on
ideologies, intentions, and orders of superiors can be fruitfully applied to
the Portuguese soldiers fighting in southern Angola. Similar factors
caused the troops to engage in gratuitous violence: privations, danger,
fear, and the death of comrades. In Angola, the war against “the natives”
began with defeat in late 1914. Looting, killing, and destruction were per-
vasive after the Kwanyama and others took the chance to chase away Por-
tuguese soldiers and traders. After this humiliation, the call for revenge
was widespread and was closely related to the intention to “reestablish”
colonial order. As in other wars, feelings of revenge caused the war to be-
come excessive. It is characteristic of reprisals that they are stronger than
the original attack. The guiding principle is “‘tit for tat’ instead of only ‘tat
for tat’”798
When Mandume attacked the Portuguese in open battle, he allowed
them to use their technical and organizational superiority in leading a war
with artillery, trenches and several lines of defense. The war in southern
Angola was a colonial war, but it was not the typical “small war” in
which, more often than not, guerilleros sought to avoid open battles with
795 In Meneses 2010: 59; 57; 1998: 91-94; cf. Jerónimo 2009; Methfessel 2012: 45.
796 Cf. Walter 2012: 101; 107 ‘Rassismus ist als primäre Determinante…überschätzt worden‘.
797 Häußler/Trotha 2012: 89; cf. Lehmann 2014: 552f.; Walter 2014: 157; 172-79.
798 Häußler/Trotha 2012: 63 ‘Revenge celebrates excessiveness’ ref. Waldmann 2003: 174.
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Europeans and resorted to ambushes, traps, and other guerilla tactics. Gen-
eral de Eça achieved in Mongua what General von Trotha failed to
achieve in GSWA in August 1904: Mongua was a ‘true’ battle on the bat-
tleground, there was a front, and combatants were recognizable. In this
sense, “Mongua” was an “exception” in colonial history and an “ar-
chaism” in 1915. What also distinguished this war from the German war
in Hereroland was the fact that there was a ‘recognizable’ target, the resi-
dence (embala) of King Mandume in N’giva. Unlike in other colonial the-
aters of war, where “conquest was not an event but a dynamic process”,799
de Eça’s war was completed with the occupation of Ngiva (for thirty years
the “Timbuktu of Angola”) on September 2.800
Mandume, aware that the gallows awaited him, escaped to King Martin
of Ondonga south of the border, where de Eça could not follow him.801
2,000 troops remained in the area after the General returned to
Moçâmedes. Six forts were erected in Kwanyama territory. Still in 1916,
under the new Governor General Massano de Amorim (1862–1929) the
districts of Humbe, Cuamato, Cuanhama and Evale were described as
zonas militares.802 After decades Lisbon had reached the frontiers that had
been accorded in 1886. The perceived German threat in 1915 had caused
the provision of sufficient men and materials to subdue the last southern
“tribe”. King Mandume became the most prominent victim of the Naulila
incident.
“The resistance of African societies was bound to be broken in the
end.” The battle of Mongua has been characterized as the “Armagedon of
Ovambo”,803 King Mandume, despite his military wit, did not win the bat-
tle. Given his young age and in power only for four years, he was no expe-
rienced warrior in the fight against colonial forces – contrary to de Eça,
who had learnt to wage a “bush war” in Mozambique. Mandume’s offen-
sive collapsed after three days of fierce fighting. “In a sense, the duration
of an engagement can be interpreted as a separate, secondary success. The
decision can never be reached too soon to suit the winner or delayed long
enough to suit the loser. A victory is greater for having been gained quick-
799 Pélissier 2004: 270; Mann 2002: 199 on the conquest of German East Africa 1888 to 1904.
800 Pélissier 1969: 108; cf. Walter 2014: 87 ref to Callwell; Kuss 2010: 16.
801 AHU MU DGC Angola 1915-18, Pt 5,5aRep, Cx.973, Tlgr. GG to M.Colónias, 6.9.15.
802 AHU MU M. de Amorim, Pt 26 (1915-27) – Angola. Negocios Indigenas. Relatório 1916.
803 Ranger 1969: 297; Pélissier 1977: 492.
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ly; defeat is compensated for having been long postponed.”804 According
to Clausewitz, Mandume’s defeat was thus well compensated by the three-
days duration of the battle. Considering the size of the armies, had Man-
dume won, “Mongua” would have become an important name in history
like “Little Big Horn” (1876), “Isandhlawna” (1879), or “Adua” (1896),
three famous battles where “native people” shattered the invading Euro-
pean armies. However, Mandume did not become a second Sitting Bull,
another Emperor Menelik II. General de Eça was more successful than
Colonel Custer or General Baratieri. The leading History of Namibia does
not even mention the name (O)Mongua.805
What were the (probable) causes for de Eça’s success? What influence
did the social and political problems of the Kwanyama under Mandume
have on the defeat of his large army? Most of all: Kwanyama society was
weakened by years of famine. The tensions between the King and his
omalenga may have had their repercussions on the way the battle was
fought. However, the Kwanyama point of view is entirely lacking in the
sources. The operational difficulties of Mandume’s forces can be deter-
mined by the low number of Portuguese casualties despite the large num-
ber of men (and possibly weapons) at his disposal. General de Eça, on the
other hand, had more technological advantages at his disposal than his
precursors: overland and submarine cables made immediate communica-
tion with the administrative center possible where previously words would
have taken days or weeks to reach the addressee; steam navigation had en-
abled the navy to transport more troops in shorter time across the Atlantic;
medical skills reduced the numbers of soldiers becoming unfit for war;
since the area had seen previous campaigns, it was known to the Por-
tuguese; mechanized transport across the desert was independent of pas-
tures; the employment of motor trucks and ox wagons for the remaining
kilometers proved to be successful since the Portuguese did not run dry of
ammunition. However, there is no reason to overemphasize the use of
technology in warfare when appraising military power. Greater impor-
tance is to be attached to the human factor: the military culture, organiza-
tion, doctrine, operational art, logistics and tactics. More or less disci-
plined Portuguese soldiers managed to hold the Kwanyama at bay and
could finally make use of their superior firepower to inflict enormous ca-
804 Clausewitz 1976 [1832]: 238, ch. Duration of the Engagement.
805 Wallace 2012: 208 speaks of ‘four days of heavy fighting in August’; cf. Reid 2012: 135.
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sualties on the Kwanyama forces. Nevertheless, de Eça, in his report, paid
respect to Mandume’s soldiers, whose morale and capabilities “would
have honored the best white troops.” As a long-term effect, similar to the
French and British also the Portuguese were identifying “martial races”,
and the reputation of the Kwanyama as “the most feared African oppo-
nents of Portuguese expansion” was such that in the 1960s the Portuguese
army resorted to preferably recruit amongst them for the war against na-
tionalist revolutionaries.806
Famine in Ovamboland and the Death of King Mandume, 1915–
1917
Using hunger and famine as a weapon in (colonial) warfare had a long tra-
dition in Africa and beyond. The Germans followed a scorched-earth poli-
cy in the Maji-Maji war in German East Africa. The Portuguese applied
similar methods in their African colonies. In Ovamboland, however, the
famine was older than the latest attempts at conquest, but the war aggra-
vated the situation and the famine “undoubtedly facilitated Portuguese vic-
tory over the Kwanyama in 1915.”807 And from as early as 1908, colonial
administrators had tried to use hunger as a tool to lure young men of the
region away to work in the colonial economy – with growing success.
Southwest Africa’s new administration was eager to continue this policy.
In August 1915, Southwest Africa’s Military Governor, Percival Scott
Beves, sent his Natives Affairs Officer, Major Stanley M. Pritchard (b.
1874) to Ovamboland “to get in touch with the native chiefs in order to
notify them of the establishment of the [South African] Military Protec-
torate”.808 By motorcar, Pritchard and his three officers first reached King
Martin of Ondonga. In his residence they discussed the political changes
2.7.4
806 Eça 1921: 46: ‘Vou terminar, como é de justiça, fazendo também o elogio do adversário,
cuja bravura foi inexcedível. Atacar três dias seguidos um destacamento constituído por
duas baterias de artilharia de campanha, quatro baterias de metralhadoras, dois batalhões de
infantaria, estando estas forças em quadrado e aproximando-se delas com uma insistência
que, no último combate, que durou dez horas, a uma distância que chegou a ser de cinquen-
ta metros, revela um moral e uma instrução de tiro e de aproveitamento de abrigos que fari-
am honra às melhores tropas brancas.’ Wheeler 1969: 432; cf. Frazão 1946: 266; Pélissier
1977: 495; 2004: 279.
807 Dias 1981: 375 referring to Pélissier; cf. Hayes 1992: 185f.; Hull 2005: 156.
808 Journal of the Royal African Society 15 no.60 (1916): 372: ‘Dinners of the Society’.
2. The First World War in Angola and GSWA
225
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
and the sending of young men to work in the south. During Pritchard’s so-
journ in Ondonga, “messengers arrived with reports of serious fighting be-
tween the Ovakuanyama tribe of the Ovambo nation and the Portuguese.”
King Martin expressed his fear that the
“Portuguese would drive the Ovakuanyama far south into Ovamboland and
that the whole country would be thrown into a state of turmoil …, the conse-
quences of which would be disastrous as the people of Ondonga had not suffi-
cient food for themselves, and certainly could not give any help in this respect
to the Ovakuanyama”.809
This concern was not unfounded since King Mandume, after the “disas-
trous” battle of Mongua, “sent word [to the missionaries] that his people
were retiring, and he could give no guarantee as to what they might do. He
had no more power over them.”810 Resistance came to an end “since the
Kwanyama literally die[d] of hunger.”811 Pritchard turned to the border in
an “endeavor to mediate between the natives and Portuguese”. According
to Missionary Wulfhorst “Mandume desired the protection of the British
Government and discussed the matter with me. At his request, [Wulfhorst]
drew up a [German] letter, which was handed to Major Pritchard.”812
Mandume, fleeing from N’giva, met with Pritchard (and Wulfhorst as in-
terpreter) in Namakunde, in the neutral zone. The King, who “had great
hope that the Germans … could render a helping hand against the Por-
tuguese” understood that the Germans were gone for good. He thus asked
“to place my country under [British] protection from the Portuguese”. Safe
passage was granted on the condition that Mandume, whom Pritchard “de-
scribed as a perfect savage”, would no longer fight against the Portuguese.
On the occasion of this agreement a photograph of Mandume and
Pritchard was taken.813
809 NAN SWAA 1496, Report on tour of Ovamboland by Mj Pritchard, in Gewald 2003:218.
810 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 42, testimony Hochstrate, 26.4.26.
811 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 9.9.15.
812 BAB R 1001/6640: 125, extra-file: 19, testimony of missionary Wulfhorst, 3.5.26.
813 Pritchard 1916: 4; Timm 2001: 146; Hayes/Haipinge 1997: 79; Hayes 1992: 197f.; 1992 II:
91; the collection of pictures taken during Pritchard’s tour is available under http://hpra-
atom.wits.ac.za/atom-2.1.0/index.php/report-by-major-s-m-pritchard.
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“Chief Mandume and our party, from left Capt Liefeldt, Major
Pritchard, Capt Bell and Lieut Moroney”, 1915
After the ‘signing’ ceremony, Mandume returned to Wulfhorst in Omu-
panda. He was aware that he had lost the larger part of his kingdom. “He
was very sad. He cried.” That same night, September 2, the Portuguese
forces advanced to nearby N’giva. Mandume “set his palace on fire. Ev-
erything got burned down including the food”. The Kwanyama were flee-
ing southwards and the Portuguese pushed to the border.814 With the royal
grain reserves burnt, hunger, chaos, and panic spread. The refugees were
running for their lives.
How do colonial wars end? There was no formal capitulation of Man-
dume, merely the chance for his men and their families to escape south-
wards. South of the border, people were safe from Portuguese soldiers but
not rescued from starvation. Missionaries reported about “a shocking
Ill. 29
814 NAN A.505: 46, Chronik, 20.11.15; BAB R 1001/6634: 214, Welsch, 2.5.18; Hayes/H.
1997: 80; a signature by Mandume’s own hand is reproduced in: Keiling 1934: 176.
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famine and terrible robbing and stealing”815 A few days after Mandume’s
defeat, King Iipumbo of Uukwambi, located to the south-west of Kwanya-
ma territory appealed to the new masters of Southwest Africa:
“My country is under starvation, my people are dying of hunger, and I beg the
Government for help. I, myself have got nothing. Through the war every road
of buying food have been stopped, and I ask for some flour, rice, coffee and
sugar.”816
On September 11, after the cessation of hostilities, Pritchard visited de
Eça’s headquarters at N’giva, where a “useful provisional agreement was
entered into between him and the Portuguese Commandant with regard to
the boundary line”.817 Provisionally, the disputed 11-km border strip was
to be considered neutral (the 17°23'10" south position was considered the
interim “cut-line border”) and “administer[ed] … jointly by a [Luso-South
African] commission” at Namakunde. According to the line, 70% of the
Oukwanyama lived on Portuguese territory. Following his escape to Na-
makunde, Mandume resettled south of the line at Oihole, from where he
“uprooted” lenga Ndjukuma ya Shilengifa, with whom he shared a con-
flicting relationship since he became King in 1911.818
The administrative advance of both colonial states did not change the
underlying picture of starvation and turmoil. The only food available was
what was found in the “bush”.819 In September, General Smuts ordered re-
lief programs, but they could do little to rescue the situation. The South
African soldiers were depleting their own food stocks. The next rainy sea-
son due starting in November again failed. The harvest in 1915 was “com-
pletely nil” in the area between Humbe to Gambos and Kwanyama.820 In
December 1915 Finnish missionary Marti Rautanen, in Ovamboland since
1870, described an utterly desperate situation:
“The present famine is simply indescribable, as far back as August … one
saw living skeletons from other tribes wandering down to Ondonga. A great
number of such men, women and children died in the forests, being unable to
815 A. Wulfhorst: Erlebnisse 1910-30 (AVEM), transl. in Hayes 1992: 199; Walter 2014: 82.
816 NAN ADM 17, Iipumbo to Government of Damaraland, 26.8.15, cit. in Gewald 2003: 218.
‘This letter was written for Iipumbo by the Norwegian trader and hunter Brodtkorb.’
817 Pritchard 1916: 4f.; AHU MU DGC Angola 1915-18, Pt 5, 5a Rep, Cx.973, Telegr. GG to
Ministro Colónias, 13.9.15.
818 Jour.RAS 15 n.59 (1916): 284; NAN A.450 Map 1915; Vigne 1998: 296; Akweenda 1997:
222; Shiweda 2011: 25; 31.
819 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 27.7.15 ‘nourriture indigène’.
820 AGCSSp 3L1.12a7, Bonnefoux (Huíla) to Direction Generale de la S.-Enfance, 3.12.15.
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reach Ondonga. Those who still had some strength left robbed the weaker of
what little they had and left them lying to die of hunger and thirst. Mothers
with their sucking babes were found lying dead together; in other cases the
mothers threw their living babies into the bush, being unable to carry them
further. In other cases children a little older, after their parents had died on the
road, wandered on alone to Ondonga. Of these children of misfortune I adopt-
ed more than 30 but in spite of attention several have died. Thousands of such
unfortunates have come to Ondonga and distributed themselves more over the
whole tribe. The first refuges were naturally the mission stations and hun-
dreds of people beleaguered our houses begging for food … Thousands of
people have died so that it has become a problem how to get them buried, the
more so as the people are too weak to dig graves in the hard ground.”821
Given the “unprecedented famine”, Pritchard “urged that relief measures
should be undertaken to prevent the natives in some areas from being
completely wiped out by starvation.” During a second trip in November
1915, he again negotiated with Martin and Mandume about sending mi-
grant laborers to the mines and farms in the south. He brought with him
officers to administer Ovamboland: the new Resident Commissioner Ma-
jor Charles Manning, Captain Octavus Bowker, and Lieutenant Carl Hugo
L. Hahn (1886–1948), called “Cocky” by his friends and shangolo (the
whip) by Ovambo, the future longtime Resident Commissioner of the
norther regions of SWA (1921–1946). Pritchard thereby advanced the
South African occupation of Southwest Africa in its entirety. Pritchard,
who mentioned the “complete obedience” of Africans to South African or-
ders, also transported the first batch of relief supplies.822 In a telegram
from Namakunde to Windhoek he warned: “Considerable numbers of
dead bodies seen along the road and natives dying here daily also at other
centres. Instances occurring in which natives resorting to consumption hu-
man flesh.”823
The missionaries in the area credited themselves with having protected
many Africans in their mission stations during the campaign and the
821 NAN RCO 9, Rprt. Rautanen, 26.12.15, quot. Gewald 2003: 219; cf. Miettinen 2005:73.
822 Pritchard 1916: 1f.; 5 ‘The picures he showed of famine stricken natives were truly ap-
palling.’ Thirteen pictures were used by Pritchard during a talk he gave to the African Soci-
ety on May 11, 1916, among them one described as ‘Famine stricken natives wait for food’.
These ‘photographs of the German South-West Africa Campaign, 1915’ are now held by
Cambridge University Library. Royal Commonwealth Society Library (Ref. GBR/0115/
Y3057A) [http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR
%2F0115%2FY3057A;sib0=637; 9.10.2014]; on Hahn Dobler 2014: 22-25; Hayes 1996.
823 NAN ADM 18, telegram Pritchard to Administrator, 27.11.15, cit. in Gewald 2003: 220.
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famine.824 Father Devis estimated that “4,000 blacks” had been saved in
1914/15.825 The stations were “flooded by those dying of hunger”; and the
missionaries were not always able to find the necessary food.826 Prefect
Keiling estimated in March 1916 that a third of the population in southern
Angola had died due to the famine.827 Father Bonnefoux reported that in
certain regions more than 80% had died, while others had migrated else-
where. The population of the Mission District Cunene, in 1914 estimated
at 200,000, had shrunk to 120,000 in 1916; most of all, the children had
succumbed to starvation and dysentery. Even in 1916, skeletons and hye-
nas abounded along the roads.828 The Portuguese authorities calculated
that 154,412 people had died in the district of Huíla due to the “German
invasion in southern Angola and the ensuing native rebellion”, i.e. the
famine.829 Southern Angola and Northern SWA had been turned into a
“great cemetery”. Modern research speaks of “the death of around a quar-
ter of a million people from starvation between 1911 and 1916” in the re-
gion.830
The famine of 1915 was called “the famine that swept” – Ondjala
yawekomba. It “is one of the most fundamental events in twentieth century
Namibian history.” Due to famine and colonial conquest the traditional
economy based on agriculture, cattle, and trade collapsed, resulting in ut-
ter violence and a “suspension of a functioning social order”.831 Sustain-
able living conditions were only to be found elsewhere. After the defeat,
many of the surviving Kwanyama voted with their feet and moved south-
wards into the South African part of Ovamboland. The situation was com-
824 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Eminence Reverendissime, 9.9.16; Hayes 1992: 203.
825 AGCSSp 3L1.11a1, Devis, Sur la mission du Cuanhama, pour son retablissement [8/1920].
826 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 26.11.15, ‘inondé par les affamés’.
827 AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to TRP, 9.3.16; cf. Mittelberger 1956.
828 AGCSSp 3L1.12a7, Bonnefoux (Huíla) to Direction Gen. de la S.-Enfance, 12.9.16;
3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux to TRP, 20.8.16; BAB R 1001/6634: 216, Welsch to Gouv Seitz,
2.5.18.
829 BAB R 1001/6634: 39, excerpt of Dossier 10, no.1 Mémoire justificatif, ~ 3/1922.
830 Dias 1981: 375; Pélissier 2004: 279; 272 deems this ‘exaggerated’; Wallace 2012: 207.
831 Gewald 2003: 213; 238; Hayes 1992: 199-207 (201); cf. e.g. Ndeikwila 2014: 2 ‘My grand-
father, Ndeikwila, was killed by his close relatives [Aiyambo and Nailenge] … during the
famine of 1915. Armed with a rifle, they came early in the morning to his homestead ... As
my grandfather was coming out of his sleeping hut, Aiyambo fired a shot … [my grandfa-
ther] died instantly. The two brothers had assumed that there were mahangu grains in his
granaries, which they did not find. They raided the homestead, taking everything of value
they could lay their hands on.’
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parable to Mozambique, were peasants “expressed their discontent by mi-
grating in the illusory search for a more benign form of colonialism.” The
existence of a related ethnic group facilitated the migration.832 From April
1915, missionaries reported on the migration, since people had to look for
new pastures for their herds.833 But in search of survival and work thou-
sands moved further south. Considering that people perished on the road,
the South African administration began in late 1915 to “set up feeding and
holding camps along the route from the north.” In need of workers for the
farms and mines, officials concentrated the majority of Ovambo famine
victims who managed to reach the center of Southwest Africa in the town
of Karibib. A camp was set up for over 4,000 inmates to recuperate (some
famine victims were given horse fodder) before the men, women and chil-
dren were sent to their employers. The horrifying conditions in this camp
have been amply described by historian Jan-B. Gewald.834
The Ovambo migrant labor system had its early start in the 1890s. It
had brought (due to famines and the discovery of diamonds near Lüder-
itzbucht) soon after 1910 around 10,000 Ovambo per annum to GSWA
and developed after the First World War into the economic backbone of
Ovamboland.835 The working conditions in the mines and elsewhere were
often horrendous. Ovambo knew well that “entering into migrant labor
was a process that approached death.”836 The South African administra-
tion, despite describing the workforce as “idle”, could not run the econo-
my of the mandated territory without contract labor.837 Thousands of
young men worked annually in the farming and mining sectors of South-
west Africa from where they returned after six months for the harvest. The
effects on the social life and the cultural changes were drastic. Older insti-
tutions such as matrilineal kinship, polygamy, and kingship lost in impor-
tance. Permanent occupation “of the whole area in 1915 was followed by a
general increase in conversions” to Christianity. The Portuguese govern-
ment had made it clear to the Spiritans already in 1914 that it wished to
see a mission station erected “in the heart of Kwanyama after the expedi-
tion”.838 In the first fifteen years (1900–1915) the Spiritan mission station
832 Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 50f. referring to 50,000 peasants escaping to S. Rhodesia.
833 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Tyipelongo) to TRP, 4.4.15.
834 Gewald 2003: 224; 236.
835 Cf. Clarence-Smith/Moorsom 1975: 372-7; Shiweda 2011: 105-114; Dobler 2014: 11-18.
836 Gewald 2003: 233 ref. to the return home of a laborer: ‘I see that you are alive once again’.
837 Cooper 1999: 130 (Report of the Administrator 1922: 21); Humboldt 2000: 143f.
838 Clarence-S./M. 1975: 380; AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 10.11.14.
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Evale, for example, had baptized only 380 individuals and counted merely
76 Catholic families. Often, the converts were freed slaves and used by the
missionaries “in their attempts to socially engineer Christian communi-
ties.”839
The war-related social disruptions, famine, and diseases played an im-
portant role as a catalyst to the rapid expansion of Christianity since 1916.
“The new religion was felt to have proved itself the more effective.”840
Prefect Keiling spoke of indescribable scenes after the “last grain of rice
and corn” had been distributed. Many of the baptisms in 1915/16 were ex-
ecuted in extremis due to the famine.841 He remarked, with a sense of
black humor: “The famine has its good sides too.” This belief that
Africans “needed catastrophe to bring them to their senses” was not un-
common. Also missionaries in the Eastern Cape made a strong “associa-
tion between catastrophe and conversion” after the Xhosa cattle killing in
1856/57.842
The “famine broke the Ovambo kingdoms.” Also the direct effect of the
fighting on the societies and politics in the region was disastrous. Follow-
ing the loss of most of his men, King Mandume found it harder to mobi-
lize resistance. South African officials were able to enter Ovamboland
peaceably in 1915. However, despite the occupation, unrest remained a
challenge to colonial rule. Missionary Welsch complained about the “lack
of any authority”.843
Few weeks after the battle of Mongua missionaries feared that a new
“rebellion” may erupt. Mandume, from his new embala in Oihole in the
neutral zone continued “to wage war against the Portuguese in the north”
and then withdrew south.844 Recognizing the tactical advantage the border
offered to him, he was neither willing to renounce his kingship over his
subjects in Angola, nor send more men to work. Instead, “Mandumes’ in-
cursions [into Angola] continued”. The Portuguese demanded his extradi-
tion. But the King also “increasingly defied the terms of South African
839 Maxwell 2013: 79; cf. AGCSSp 3L1.11a1, Keiling, Situation Evalé, n.D. [January 1916]: 2.
840 Ranger 1969: 316; cf. Hayes/Haipinge 1997: 95 Kaulinge: ‘so many people were convert-
ed’; Gordon 2006: 125 today, Namibia ‘is statistically the most Christian country in Africa
and the heavily populated north has the highest density of Lutherans in the world.’
841 AGCSSp 3L1.11a2, Keiling to Eminence Reverendissime, 9.9.16; Compte-rendu annuel,
1916; 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huíla) to TRP, 5.10.15 on baptism of ‘moribund’ individuals.
842 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Humabo) to TRP, 10.9.16 ‘a son bien aussi’; Price 2008: 136.
843 Gewald 2003: 238; BAB R 1001/6634: 217, Welsch to Seitz, 2.5.18; cf. Rizzo 2012: 77.
844 AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux (Huíla) to TRP, 5.10.15; Vigne 1998: 294.
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‘protection’”. Officers visited him to bring him to reason. Yet, in October
1916 (missionary Bonnefoux had just reported that all was “calm, even
among the Kwanyama”845), a Portuguese patrol was ambushed by Man-
dume’s men, killing one officer and 16 privates. General Botha was so up-
set that he told Mandume to explain his conduct in Windhoek. He received
the response that Kwanyama law prohibited the King from leaving his ter-
ritory. Mandume had his “own proud view of his actions – ‘My heart tells
me I have done nothing wrong’.” In early 1917, open conflict between
Mandume and South Africa’s recently appointed Resident Commissioner
Manning erupted and the King uttered his famous warning: “If the English
want me, I am here [in Oihole] … I am a man, not a woman and I will
fight until my last bullet is expended.”846
Refusing joint operations with the Portuguese, who “thirst[ed] for his
blood”, the South African administration deemed it sufficient to send in
700 soldiers under Colonel de Jager against Ovamboland’s once most
845 AHD 3p ar.7 m48, GG to MinCol, 21.2.16; AGCSSp 3L1.13.6, Bonnefoux,13.9.16.
King Mandume and Lieutenant “Cocky” Hahn at Oihole, 1916Ill. 30
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powerful ruler. Over the previous year, Manning and “Cocky” Hahn had
collected enough intelligence on the King to make feasible an open attack
on him. King Mandume, who “embodied the ethnic nationalism of [his]
dependents“, was killed in action on February 6, 1917 near his embala in
Oihole. “It is widely alleged that [Ndjukuma, whom the King had dis-
placed from from Oihole to Omhedi,] collaborated with the South African
troops to dispose of Mandume.” Portugal’s most important enemy in An-
gola was dead. But other “rebellions” followed suit in the north and the
east. The Seles and Amboim rose in 1917, and in 1919 the Portuguese led
an expedition against the Dembos. Others would follow. After around 350
years of constant military campaign somewhere in the colony the “era be-
fore the complete military control and conquest of the present area of An-
gola” ended only in 1926.847
The narration and “interpretation” of the death of King Mandume is a
striking example of the difference between “official” (paper-based) and
“public” memory: “Colonial officials believed that his death in battle was
as a result of machine gun fire. But the belief that spread on the ground at
the time and which has continued to persist in oral history is that Man-
dume, after being wounded, committed suicide before he could be killed
or taken by the enemy.” By doing what he had announced to his followers
before, he upheld honor at his death. Reverend Vilho Kaulinge (1900–
1992), a relative of the King and one of his officers in 1917, stated in 1989
that the South Africans cut the King’s head off and “they showed us his
head” in Ondangwa.848 “This suicide in oral history is the most socially
846 Silvester/Wallace/Hayes 1998: 9; Pélissier 2004: 279; Hayes 1992: 214; Silvester 1992:24.
847 Vigne 1998: 294; Coquery-Vidrovitch 1988: 66; Shiweda 2011: 25; Pélissier 1977: 509;
Hayes 1992: 234.
848 Hayes 1993: 91; 111, ref. to: AGCSSp 476-A-IV, Situation des missions 1911-30: 205;
NAN RCO 10/1916/1 v 1, Jan Vennel statement, 8.9.1916; RC Ovamboland to Secretary
SWA, 3.7.16; RC Ovamboland to Deputy Secretary SWA, 14.5.16; RC Ovamboland, notes
for discussion with Mj Fairlie, 6.5.16; Hayes/Haipinge 1997: 86-92;75; cf. Timm 2001:
145f; Wallace 2012: 209; Shiweda 2005: 48; NAN A.306 no. 5: 22, Expedition 1917; no. 6:
24 Report of meeting 14.2.17 Col M. de Jager; no.19: 80 photograph ‘Chief Mandume
killed Ovamboland 1917’ which suggests that Mandume was beheaded (Ndongo 1998: 290
writes that ‘Mandume and some of his warriors were shot dead.)’. The Resident Commis-
sioner Ovamboland Manning (1877–1944) stated that the King was buried according to
Kuanyama rites, but according to oral history his head was buried in Windhoek.
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healing explanation for his death, which could hold together a conquered,
divided and kingless Kwanyama nation facing colonial rule.”849
Tragically, the reign of King Mandume, which aimed at achieving “or-
der out of chaos” and replacing the instability and hunger of the reigns of
Namhadi, Weyulu, and Nande with “peace and plenty”, ended in anarchy
and starvation. In 1917, Kwanyama Kingship was abolished.850 The long-
term impact of the war in Ovamboland was similar to other areas in Africa
affected by the World War: social destabilization, closer colonial control,
the definitive end of “primary resistance”, in short: the “consolidation” of
the colonial state – that once more earned its name “crusher of rocks”.851
“Chief Mandume killed Ovamboland 1917”Ill. 31
849 Hayes 1993:108 ‘Such explanations… are frequently the reaction to loss of power’; 1992:
236; Nathanael 2002: 1.
850 Hayes 1993: 110 quot. Kaul.; cf. Estermann 1976: 52; 180; Kreike 2004; Shiweda 2011: 25.
851 Young, 1994: 134; Michel 2004: 927 ‘l’avènement réel de l’État’; Nasson 2014: 433.
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2.7.5 Inverted Chronology – POWs, Seizures, and the Declaration of War
African prisoners of war in European hands were an exception to the cus-
tom according to which African adversaries after a battle were either slain
or left to escape. As mentioned before, “savages” were not considered to
be entitled to the legal “privilege” of prisoner-of-war status reserved for
European soldiers.852 After the Naulila incident, the Portuguese arrested
the two “Police Servants” August and Andreas from GSWA, who were
part of Schultze-Jena’s group, but apparently they were not heavily guard-
ed since they managed to escape soon. This was also the situation after the
battle of Naulila. Major Trainer reported later that Portuguese “native sol-
diers” were not among the prisoners since they had “managed to es-
cape”.853 It was not reported that the Portuguese took any prisoner during
or after the battle of Mongua.
European soldiers, however, were taken prisoner. 37 (or 66 as Germans
divergingly claimed) Portuguese soldiers, among them three officers, were
taken to GSWA. The treatment especially of the officers became a con-
tested issue after the war. While the Portuguese emphasized the dishonor-
able treatment on the hands of the Germans, the latter pointed to the cus-
tomary ‘hardship’ of war and the dishonorable behavior of the Portuguese.
Captain Aragão had allegedly gone to his knees to beg for his life.854 In
January 1915, the Portuguese were joined by two comrades who had been
taken prisoner by the Kwanyama during the raid on Fort Kafima and were
handed over to the Germans.855 As mentioned, a third soldier was alleged-
ly killed for having refused to teach Mandume’s men how to use the ar-
tillery captured from the Portuguese. All Portuguese soldiers were re-
leased after the surrender of GSWA in July 1915 and received a “heroes’
welcome”. It was reported that masses marched through Luanda and
Lourenço Marques to celebrate the victory over the Schutztruppe “as if it
were a triumph of the Portuguese”.856 This way, prisoners (of war) were
taken and released even before a state of war was declared between the
two states.
852 The ‘exception’ is enslavement – an anachronistic practice no longer applied in WWI.
853 BAB R 1001/6634: 59–61, Major ret. Trainer to RMW, 17.03.22.
854 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, MNE to Min Col., 2.6.15; BAB R 1001/6634: 146, Report Baericke
(16.11.19), Ax 9 M All., 23.5.22 photo of POW in GSWA in rpt; Casimiro 1922: 212f.
855 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Cubango) to TRP, 20.2.15.
856 AHM/Div/2/2/31/2, POW Naulila, 1915; DOAZ, Jg.17, no.90, 5.11.1915: 2 ‘Bothas Sieg’.
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German soldiers and civilians were also arrested following the Naulila
incident, the battle of Naulila and afterwards. On October 27, 1914 private
Georg Kimmel and the farmer Jensen were transferred to Fort Cuamato,
where they were interrogated by the Capitão Mor.857 Interrogations con-
tinued in Lubango by Lt.-Colonel Roçadas about the size and strategy of
the Schutztruppe and the incident.858 Following the Naulila incident, Gov-
ernor General Norton de Matos wanted to avoid confrontation between
Portuguese and German citizens in Angola. To that end he asked Consul
Eisenlohr to order all Germans living in the interior of Angola without
proper employment and residence to return to Luanda or to Europe.859To
avoid further rumors about German machinations in the hinterland,860
Eisenlohr also urged the ethnologist Dr. Schachzabel, trader Busch and
engineer Kéry to return to Luanda.861 However, Schachzabel had already
been brought to the fort of Benguela with three other Germans. Here they
were joined by Fritz Schwarzer and Otto Busch, who were arrested in Ca-
conda. The head of the Study Commission Schubert was accused to be a
spy too and was taken to Luanda; Pieter J. van der Kellen faced similar
charges.862 On November 19, the state of emergency was declared for the
entire Province of Angola; all Germans were to be taken aboard ships and
concentrated in Luanda. Altogether 143 Germans were deported to the
Azores Islands. Busch was handed over to the British before the ship en-
tered the harbor of Lisbon.863
Max Baericke, caught before the battle of Naulila, was, following his
interrogation, also taken to Luanda and met Jensen and Kimmel. Their le-
857 BAB R 1001/6634: 134f., Baericke, Kimmel, Jensen to DGL, 30.04.15, Ax 8 M All,
23.5.22. Jensen was told Sereno was ignored by his co-officers and had to take dinner
alone.
858 BAB R 1001/6634: 104f.; 121 Reports of Jensen, Ax4; 6 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; cf.
AHM/Div/2/2/23/3: 67, Relatório pedido pelo Capitão-Mor de Cuamato, 22.10.14.
859 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Chefe de Gabinete to German Consul Luanda, 11.11.14;
Vageler estimated in 1914 that there were around 30 ‘Angola-Germans’ BAB R 1001/6634:
149, Vageler to RMW (10.11.1921), Ax 10 Memo Allem., 23.5.22; p.157; 154, Vageler to
KGW (~11/1914), Ax 11; BAB R 1001/6640: 95, Dr. Vageler, excerpt: ‘Die Bahnfrage auf
dem Planalto‘, 15.7.1919.
860 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda to DGL, 16.11.14.
861 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) Cnsl. Luanda to VK Benguela, 15.11.14; Santos 1978: 174.
862 PA Luanda 3 (Krieg, v.II) VK Benguela to German Consul Luanda, 25.11.; 1.12.14; NAN
A.529 n.2: 51, Busch: Erlebnisse...in Angola, August–24.12.14; Baericke 1981: 32.
863 PA Luanda 3 (Südwest Krieg) German Consulate Luanda to DGL, 25.11.14; NAN A.529 n.
2: 58, O. Busch: Erlebnisse...in Angola, Anfang August–24.12.14 [n.d.]; Stassen 2011: 82.
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gal status as “criminals” or “quasi” prisoners of war caused the Portuguese
administration much consternation. The three (it was never accepted that
the Danish national Jensen was a farmer) remained imprisoned in the me-
dieval Fort São Miguel when their compatriots were deported to the
Azores. Stating “[we] cannot complain about treatment and food”, they
tried in April 1915 to contact the German envoy in Lisbon to obtain their
release; but to no avail.864
Over the course of 1915, Luso-German relations deteriorated further.
Neither the Portuguese nor the British were in doubt about the reasons:
“In regard to [Foreign Minister] Senhor Soares’ observations respecting the
breaches of neutrality committed by Portugal in virtue of her alliance with
Great Britain which might involve her in war with Germany, Mr. Carnegie
[the British Minister in Lisbon] was directed to state that His Majesty’s Gov-
ernment fully recognized these facts, but that if the Portuguese government
themselves declared war on Germany it must be on their own responsibility
and they must not say that they are obliged to do so in consequence of the
Alliance.”865
Afonso Costa, upon becoming Prime Minister at the end of 1915 and still
believing in the virtues of joining the Allies against Germany, searched
eagerly for an opportunity to bring his country into the conflict. The allies’
shortage of naval material seemed to offer this opportunity. When Britain
finally requested the Portuguese Government under the alliance to seize
all German ships (around 80) in their ports, the requisition (despite the fact
that there was formally no war between both states) “was done in such a
way as to cause maximum offence to German sensibilities.” Following the
seizure in February 1916, the German government lost patience.866 Calling
the Portuguese “a vassal of England”, it declared war on Portugal on
March 9, 1916; thereby rendering superfluous the tiptoeing of the Al-
lies.867 In 1916, the Portuguese government handed over to the British at
864 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, GG to Min Colon, 8.3.16; BAB R 1001/6634: 134f., Baericke, Kimmel,
Jensen to DGL, 30.04.15; Baericke 1981: 106.
865 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, BML to MNE, 27.10.15.
866 Meneses 2010: 48; Stone 1975: 732; SBRT, v. 307, 39.Sess., 5.4.16: 851 (Bethmann).
867 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, BML to MNE, 2.2.; 1.3.; MNE to DGL, 3.3.; DGL to MNE, 9.3.16. So
dependend were the Portuguese on the British that before Germany declared war due to the
seizure of ships the British Legation in Lisbon drafted for the Portuguese Foreign Ministry
the justification for the seizure to be provided to the German Legation; cf. NARA RG 84,
Lisbon, v. 156: 700, USML to SoS, 13.3.16; Wheeler 1978: 128; Wolff 1984: 373 (# 347:
26.4.16).
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least 25 German steamers and three sailing vessels.868 While Portugal’s
participation in the fighting “occurred, in many ways, against Great
Britain’s wishes”, also among Portuguese politicians the participation re-
mained disputed. But the majority of the Republican Party under Prime
Minister Costa recognized the war as an opportunity to portray Portugal as
a modern nation, consciously fighting on the side of ‘civilization’ against
German ‘militarism’. The national effort to win the war would, it was
hoped, strengthen patriotic sentiment and alleviate the nation from any
doubt by foreigners as to its ability to stay independent and to develop the
Portuguese Empire.869
Being formally at war now, on April 20 the Portuguese government is-
sued a decree on the status of enemy subjects, banishing all German sub-
jects from mainland Portugal. Sequestration and liquidation of German
property was ordered. German men between the age of 16 and 45 were to
be “removed to whatever locality the government may see fit.” Their
wives and children were permitted to join them, provided they paid all ex-
penses.870 Prefect Keiling reported from Angola that since the declaration
of war, the “entire colony is in excitement”. As one of seven Alsaciens
among the Spiritans he was concerned that they would be interned too.
Leaving no doubt about his allegiance to France and his believe in
France’s victory over the boches,871 he turned to the French consul for as-
sistance (which was granted). Several of the Portuguese patres were called
to arms.872 German property was seized and liquidated, trade with Ger-
many was prohibited. After protesting, the German government responded
with similar provisions towards Portuguese nationals and property as
“reprisal”.873
All Germans in Lisbon, on the Azores Islands, in Mozambique and
Goa, Portuguese India, were incarcerated. Consul Wallenstein from the
Azores (and his Portuguese wife) apparently took these security measures
with a certain sense of humor, speaking to his American colleague about
the “‘gay prison’ in which they all live … the [Portuguese] authorities are
868 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 711, German vessels, n.D. [1916]; cf. Gaurier 2014: 715f.
869 Meneses 2010: 38-69; 77; Wheeler 1978: 129 Costa ‘wished to reestablish the good name’.
870 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 157: 800, USML to SoS, 10.5.16; Isay 1923: 123.
871 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Humabo) to TRP, 20.12.16; 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo) to
TRP, 30.11.16 ‘Quand donc ces sales Boches cesseront-ils de torturer notre cher pays?’
872 AGCSSp 3L1.11b5, Keiling (Humabo) to TRP, 26.3.; 10.5.; 10.9.16.
873 SBRT, v. 307, 60.S.,6.6.16: 1519; v. 308, 68.S., 27.10.16: 1838; cf. Livermore 1967: 325.
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in every way considerate and civil to all”.874 US Consul Bardel, charged
with the care of German interests after the declaration of war, reported
about the 110 inmates of three “concentration camps” on the Azores:
“they are resigned to their lot, do not complain, and, as I am told, are very
well behaved.”875 The conditioned worsened over the course of the war.
German submarines operated in Portuguese waters. In December 1916, a
U-boat sneaked into the harbor of Funchal, Madeira, sunk three French
and British ships and bombarded the city; Ponta Delgada, Azores, was
bombarded too.876 In Mozambique, Portuguese troops “suffered great re-
verses” against the invading troops of Lettow-Vorbeck.877 At the same
time, deadly epidemics of typhoid fever broke out in the camps and chi-
canery by the Portuguese guards became more marked.878
The three Naulila-prisoners were still in Luanda. After 2½ years, during
which they lived from German money transfers, they were sent to Lisbon
in October 1917. Here they were put in solitary confinement in the
Santarem prison. When in December 1917 another military coup in Lisbon
brought the former Envoy to Berlin, Sidonio Pais, to power, he ordered the
Germans to be transferred from the military prison to an internment camp
for civilians on the Azores Islands, where the conditions were “very
good”. It took both governments almost one year after the armistice to or-
ganize the departure of their respective prisoners: 7,740 Portuguese POW
held by Germany found it excruciatingly difficult to obtain from Lisbon
the necessary means to return home. In October 1919, the German govern-
ment chartered a Woermann ship to return the 650 German inmates of the
Azores Islands camps. They arrived in Hamburg on November 11,
1919.879
The war was over, but, as demanded already in late 1914 by Sidonio
Pais, the Portuguese government was determined to recuperate from Ger-
many all expenses not only for the prisoners of war, but also for all costs
and damages caused by “German aggression” since 1914.
874 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 703, USC St. Michael to USML Lisbon, 16.5.16.
875 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 703, USC St. Michael to SoS, 23.5.16.
876 BAB R 3301/2284: 58, Marineleitung to RMW, 28.2.21 ‘German U-boots at Funchal’
877 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 711, USML to SoS, 6.12.; 17.12.16.
878 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 703, USML to MNE, 6.12.16; 5.1.17.
879 BAB R 1001/6634: 147, Baericke, 16.11.19; Baericke 1981: 101f.; Rezendes 2014: 146f.
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The Arbitration Procedure and Awards
The Luso-German Arbitration Procedure 1919–1928
Following the armistice, the Allies were confronted with the task – among
many others – of claiming German reparation payments and to avenge al-
leged German war criminals. The peace treaty signed on June 28, 1919 did
not resolve these questions conclusively. The Allies’ governments and
most of all their administrations subsequently undertook to negotiate and
work out the details. Germany’s international relations after 1919, on the
other hand, “were governed by the conflict over the consolidation, modifi-
cation or destruction of the status quo established in [Versailles].”
The peace treaty, a massive bilingual volume of over 200 pages with
440 articles plus annexes, had to regulate many complex issues in great
detail. The indemnification of the damages that had arisen from German
acts since the beginning of the war (July 31, 1914) and before that Allied
Power formally entered into the war was among these issues. In the fol-
lowing chapters the preparations for as well as the initiation and proceed-
ings of the legal dispute concerning the war in the African colonies be-
tween Portugal as claimant and Germany as defendant will be analyzed.
According to the peace treaty, the dispute was to be referred to arbitration.
First, interstate arbitration will be examined in its historical context before
and in the course of the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Versailles.
Second, the personnel involved in the Luso-German arbitration and their
respective competences will be briefly mentioned. Third, the legal proce-
dure itself will be considered by analyzing the Portuguese claims and Ger-
man responses during an exchange of written arguments, followed by oral
testimonies and finally the pleadings of the party representatives before
the arbitrator.
During the war, representatives of the Allies claimed that they were
“engaged in the defense of international law and justice”. These aims were
considered “common” and “obvious”. But also Germany attempted “to
claim the international-legal high ground.” Considering the atrocities since
1914, former US Secretary of State Elihu Root was less convinced. In
1921, he remarked that during the war “the world went on for several
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question now is: How far do they exist?” The Luso-German dispute,
fraught with legal problems that grew out of customary international law
or provisions of the peace treaty, proved the “indestructible vitality” of
these rules. But the dispute was also fraught with questions of internation-
al politics and (colonial) history. Further, the interest of the Portuguese
public in the indemnification of damages (or – in the German case – the
refusal of it) played a significant role in the initiation of the arbitration
procedure. And these political influences will thus be taken into considera-
tion too.1
The Treaty of Versailles and Arbitration
In historian Gerald Feldman’s frank assessment, the Treaty of Versailles,
“no matter how understandable in its historical context,… must be ac-
counted as disaster of the first rank.” For defeated Germany this seemed
certainly true, even though the existence of one German nation state was –
at least – not called into question by the treaty. Apart from the loss of ten
per cent of its population, the loss of the colonies and industrial capacity,
Germany was liable for reparations. The final sum to be paid was yet to be
announced.2
With its numerous provisions the treaty “marked a fundamental turning
point in the history of international law.” Two aspects are of particular rel-
evance in the context of the Luso-German arbitration. First, the Treaty was
the “starting point for the era of international organizations”, including in-
ternational tribunals. Second, the Treaty was also “the first punitive peace
between sovereigns since the late Middle Ages”.3 Of course, also previ-
ously victorious nations stipulated payments in their peace treaties. The
Franco-German Treaty of Frankfurt 1871 set forth the payment of a
French war indemnity of five billion francs. However, the Treaty of Ver-
sailles went beyond these pecuniary aspects and was a far cry from the
classical vocabulary of “oblivion” as used in peace treaties such as the
Treaty of Westfalia in 1648. In addition to the fact that “Germany re-
nounce[d] all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions”
3.1
1 Kolb 2007: 7; 189; Hull 2014: 1f. quot. Bower (1916); Root 1921: 225; Isay 1923: iii.
2 Feldman 1997: 148; cf. Day 1920: 312 ‘no man on earth…could compose the conflicting in-
terests and win a perfect peace’; Boemeke/Feldman/G.1998: 3 TV ‘the best compromise’.
3 Lesaffer 2004: 5; cf. Hirschfeld/Krumeich 2013: 289 TV was ‘quite a respectable effort’.
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(Art. 119), Article 227 charged the Emperor Wilhelm II, with offenses
against international morality. These provisions caused particular outrage
in Germany. Most saw these Schmachparagraphen (articles of ignominy)
as deliberate attempts to humiliate Germany.4
Considering the way in which the peace treaty was negotiated and con-
cluded also historians assume that one of its purposes was “to make visi-
ble the humiliation of Germany”.5 The most decisive characteristic about
the negotiations at Versailles in spring 1919 was the fact that these negoti-
ations – which attempted to create a new world order after the collapse of
the old – were about the defeated nations, most of all Germany, but were
not conducted with them. Indeed, it was a Diktat rather than a genuine
treaty between two parties.6 Altogether, more than 10,000 councilors par-
ticipated in one way or another in the negotiations. Never before had the
“expansion of the international system” since the nineteenth century be so
visible than in these treaty negotiations with lawyers from all corners of
the globe. They were organized in over fifty committees and subcommit-
tees; all reporting to the Council of Foreign Ministers and, finally, the
Council of Four (Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, George
Clemenceau, Vittorio Orlando). Only in late April 1919, when all the arti-
cles of the Peace Treaty were virtually formulated, were the Germans or-
dered to send their representatives. When the German delegation under
Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau (1869–1928) received a completed
document on May 7, 1919 he, the German government, political parties,
and the public were hit “as if by a cudgel”. And still, the Treaty was
signed on June 28, 1919. The German Parliament, recognizing the hope-
lessness of the resumption of war, ratified the document after a stormy de-
bate on July 7, 1919.7
In Portugal, despite being among the victorious nations, the situation
seemed equally desperate. Since 1917/8, both republics were plagued by
political violence and governmental and economic instability. Both repub-
lican regimes lacked, in the view of many Germans and Portuguese, politi-
cal legitimacy. Among German contemporaries there was a “perception …
that the previous certainties of their social and moral world were being
4 Kraus 2013: 38, the Dutch government refused to extradite Wilhelm II; cf. Schwengler 1982:
94f.; Krumeich 2001; MacMillan 2003: 157f.; Speitkamp 2010: 160.
5 Kolb 2011: 10 ‘Sichtbarmachung der Demütigung Dtls‘; cf. Cohrs 2006: 51; Krüger 1986.
6 Kraus 2013: 11 ref. to G. Krumeich; 23f.; Myerson 2004: 206; cf. Scott 1920: 64-79.
7 Keene 2012: 479; Kolb 1988: 295; 2011: 47-53; 69; 75; cf. Lorenz 2008: 59-108; Boden 2000.
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radically shattered.”8 In both countries, political formations tended to-
wards the extremes: declared enemies of the republican order like monar-
chists, fascists, conservatives, but also socialists and communists gained at
times more influence than the constitutional orders could possibly bear. In
Portugal, the dictatorship of the charismatic Sidonio Pais and his assassi-
nation in December 1918 further divided the country and resulted in a
brief civil war between republicans and monarchists under the “colonial
hero” Paiva Couceiro. In early 1919, the American Minister Thomas
Birch, when considering the political situation of Portugal, drew a grim
picture of the republic since its inception. He concurred with his British
and French colleagues who “view[ed] the situation as hopeless.”9 When
the Luso-German arbitration was initiated, politicians in Portugal and Ger-
many were barely able to form stable governments; irrespective of the fact
that in Portugal the Republican Party dominated the ballots. The outcome
here was similar to the German case: Internal faction fighting hindered ef-
fective government.
Interstate Arbitration – a Historical Overview
Throughout the nineteenth century third-party arbitration was employed
for the settlement of disputes between states. In principle, interstate arbi-
tration stood in contrast to state sovereignty, since a sovereign state (repre-
sented by its government) was considered the sole judge of the truth or fal-
sity of any charges laid against it. Furthermore, there was no institution
above state parties that could have enforced the execution of an arbitration
award. Nevertheless, governments committed themselves to numerous ar-
bitration cases. Mostly, the involved states agreed ad hoc to refer a dispute
to a third party for resolution. And the arbitration tribunal (a mixed com-
mission or a head of state) to which the dispute was referred was created
ad hoc for this single dispute. In the second half of the century, states be-
gan agreeing in advance to make arbitration available in cases of conflict.
These bipartite agreements were, however, limited in scope. In particular,
the United States concluded arbitration treaties with other countries. “The
issues at stake concerned mostly boundary questions, debt recovery, mar-
3.1.1
8 Fulbrook 2011: 42; cf. Nolte 1999: 74; McElligott 2014: 35-38; 42; Müller 2014 emphasizes a
more positive, ‘optimistic’ reading of German democracy after 1918.
9 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 14.1.19; cf. Meneses 1998a: 109f.
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itime seizure, territorial questions, private claims, mutual claims, claims
after insurrection or civil war, claims made due to act of war, illegal arrest,
and fisheries.” Researchers have identified more than 220 tribunals. Dur-
ing the First Peace Conference at The Hague a Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration (PCA) was created by the “Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of International Disputes” (July 29, 1899; revised during the Second Peace
Conference by the Convention of October 18, 1907). In 1900 seventeen
signatory states had ratified this Convention. However, states that were
party to the Conventions of 1899 and/or 1907 were not obliged to employ
the means provided by the PCA. The set-up of “special arbitral tribunals”
was a valid alternative to the recourse to PCA tribunals.10
When Arthur Nussbaum, shortly after the Second World War, spoke of
the century from Waterloo to the Marne as the “most progressive” for in-
ternational law, interstate arbitration procedures as well as the faith placed
in their effectiveness played part in this notion. Arbitration awards were
generally accepted as being an important source of international law and
its “development and enhancement”. Major cases such as the Alabama
claims or the Fur Seal arbitration (USA vs. GB, 1872; 1893) “enriched in-
ternational law directly or indirectly with recognized rules.”11 “Progress
both in the conduct of arbitration and in the negotiation of agreements to
arbitrate paved the way for a regularization of the process of arbitration”.12
Portuguese governments had had their own experiences with interna-
tional arbitration awards, especially in the colonial context. Since 1870,
Portugal had had several disputes with Great Britain (Bolama, Delagoa
Bay, Barotseland) and the Netherlands (East Timor) related to the delimi-
tation of boundaries and the sovereignty over colonial territories, which
were referred to arbitration.13 Some of the awards had been favorable to
10 Riemens 2010; Langhorn 1996: 52; cf. Vec 2011; Herren 2009; Justenhoven 2006; Hudson
1933: 441; Myers 1914.
11 Nussbaum 1947: 238; Isay 1923: 417 ‘Höherentwicklung des Völkerrechts’; cf. Wehberg
1913: 301.
12 Hudson 1933: 441; cf. Isay 1923: 410-416 cf. Koskenniemi 2001: 98; Gaurier 2014: 659-63.
13 RIAA: Portugal vs. UK reg. the dispute about the sovereignty over the Island of Bolama,
21.4.1870 (v. XXVIII: 131-140); UK vs. Portugal reg. territories formerly belonging to the
Kings of Tembe and Mapoota, on the eastern coast of Africa, including Delagoa Bay,
24.7.1875 (v. XXVIII: 157-162); UK vs. Portugal reg. questions relative to the delimitation
of their spheres of influences in East Africa (Manica Plateau), 30.1.1897 (v. XXVIII:
283-322); UK vs. Portugal reg. the Barotseland boundary, 30.5.1905 (v. XI: 67-69); Nether-
lands vs. Portugal reg. the boundary of East Timor, 25.6.1914 (v. XI: 490-517); Fisch 1984:
407-25; Mártires Lopes 1970.
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Portugal. On the other hand, Portugal also had to face the fact that the
willingness to arbitrate a particular dispute was often considered a conces-
sion by the other party and recourse to force was still a possibility. In 1890
the Portuguese had hoped that the above-mentioned dispute with Great
Britain about the upper Zambezi territories could still be decided by an ar-
bitrator. However, Lord Salisbury “cut this hope short by refusing to con-
sider outside mediation” about Matabeleland.14
Even though Germany was “averse to international arbitration law as a
matter of principle”, it nevertheless ratified the PCA Convention. Since
1889, Germany had been party to a number of international arbitration
cases, also in a colonial context.15 This practicability and feasibility of in-
terstate arbitration raised high hopes for its contribution to an extended
peace in Europe and beyond; “conclusion of arbitration agreements pro-
ceeded at an almost feverish pace.” In retrospect, the world before 1914
“looked as if it were developing a system of conciliation and arbitra-
tion”.16
The Cost of War – Portuguese Finances and Claims for Reparations
The British and American delegates to the Peace Conference in Paris were
probably “the most prepared” in January 1919 to push through their agen-
da.17 However, the Portuguese government had also initiated preparations
for the upcoming negotiations, most of all to achieve two objectives: the
territorial integrity of the colonies (and if possible an extension) and suffi-
cient reparations in kind and in money from Germany and its allies. A few
weeks after the armistice, Portugal’s President Sidónio Pais sent his For-
eign Minister Egas Moniz (1874–1955) to London to meet Arthur Balfour.
The two discussed Portugal’s participation in the peace negotiations. As
3.1.2
14 Nowell 1947: 16; cf. Ralston 1929: 228.
15 Petersson 2009: 96; cf. Carl 2012; Schlichtmann 2003: 384; Ralston 1929: 232; RIAA: Ger-
many vs UK relating to Lamu Island, 17.8.1889 (v. XXVIII: 237-248); Germany vs. UK,
USA reg. Samoan Claims, 14.10.1902 (v. IX: 15-27); Germany vs. Venezuela (Mixed
Claims Commission) 1903 (v. X: 363-476); Germany, France, UK vs. Japan reg. real estate
tax, 22.5.1905 (v. XI: 51-58); Germany vs. France reg. consular jurisdiction (Casablanca de-
serters), 22.5.1909 (v. XI, pp. 126-131); Germany vs. UK reg.Walfish Bay, 23.5.1911 (v.XI:
263-308).
16 Hudson 1933: 441; Mowat 1933: 674; cf. Arcidiacono 2005:14f.; Kennedy 1997: 132.
17 Samson 2006: 149; cf. Kolb 2011: 56; MacMill. 2003: xxviii; 3; Burnett 1940; Lansing 1921.
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they continued to prepare for the Paris conference – and following the as-
sassination of Pais on December 14, 1918 – Moniz’ delegation soon found
itself trapped between forces close to the exiled republicans under Bern-
hardino Machado and Afonso Costa working to undermine Moniz’s pos-
ition and the unfriendly attitude of fellow Allies. Most of all the French
pointed to an alleged pro-German leaning of Pais and were eager to mini-
mize Portuguese representation in the upcoming negotiations. Considering
their conflicting national interests, the Allies had to invest considerable ef-
forts into reaching an agreement among themselves about the question of
how to deal with Germany. Nevertheless, Moniz managed to secure mem-
bership for his country in four of the commissions of the Peace Confer-
ence. He provided the Reparation Commission with a first estimate of the
Portuguese losses during the war, putting the total at £130,420,000, of
which £75,433,000 had been spent on military operations. Portugal’s offi-
cials had high hopes for the outcome of the conference: the settlement of
(war) debts “through a mix of reparations and a deal with London”
seemed an inevitability given Portugal’s sacrifices during the war. The
delegation also intended to seek compensation for the damages done by
Germany, most of all in the colonies, and, finally, a share in the battle fleet
seized from Germany.18
With the republican forces gaining the upper hand in Portugal’s civil
war, Moniz’s position weakened. In February 1919, a new government
was formed in Lisbon that informed him that the Portuguese delegation
was to also include Afonso Costa and Norton de Matos, “the most impor-
tant figures in the interventionist pantheon.” On March 17, Moniz, who
had dueled Norton de Matos in 1912 over a political dispute, had to make
way for Afonso Costa. The latter hoped to use this position “to redeem in-
terventionist politics and revive his own career.” However, the former
Prime Minister, and the men he summoned to his delegation, Augusto
Soares, Norton de Matos, Teixeira Gomes, and João Chagas, Portugal’s
ministers in London and Paris during the war, “arrived too late on the
scene to have any significant influence over the … content of the
Treaty”.19
18 Meneses 2010: 79-85; Pitcher 1991: 65, from 1914-1918 ‘[m]uch of the government’s fi-
nance was devoted to the war efforts … costs were estimated at between £60,000,000 and
£80,000,000, £10,000,000 of it in Africa … raised through borrowing or printing money’.
19 Meneses 2010: 89f.; Meneses 2009a; Norton 2001: 178; 268f.; cf. Costa 1914.
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As the crisis in Portugal “reached a peak in the years 1919–20” and the
rural and urban masses suffered great misery, Afonso Costa, hoping for
the solidarity of the Allies, drew a grim picture in Versailles of the dam-
age the war had done to Portugal and the resulting financial and social sit-
uation:20
“The extraordinary expenditure borne by the Portuguese State on account of
its military participation in the war on land and at sea, in Europe and Africa
… amount to £79,007,000 … The Portuguese economic loss occasioned by
the war, in accordance with the calculations of financial experts, amount to
£225,000,000... which represents 37 to 47½ per cent of the Portuguese public
wealth … Having regard to these figures and to the economic situation in Por-
tugal before the war, it will easily be seen that the reconstruction of the coun-
try will be impossible unless the war costs and the economic damage be re-
paid.”21
During the negotiations in 1919, “it turned out [that Costa] was more re-
vanchist than even the French”. No Wilsonian vision of a new world order
could “replace the punishment of Germany and the redistribution of its
wealth as the most immediate Portuguese goals.”22
At the same time, fact-finding missions led by former governors were
sent to Angola and Mozambique. They were charged with assessing of the
“damages caused by the Germans” and had to obtain “proof” from “small
commissions” set up for the purpose of collecting the claims of individuals
and government entities.23 Since 1915, the Portuguese administration had
begun to prepare its arguments for reparation claims. The army had col-
lected reports from soldiers who had witnessed the German attacks along
the Kunene and Kavango Rivers.24 Since 1918, different governments in
Lisbon had attempted to assess the entire Portuguese war costs. A first
20 Wheeler 1978: 126; AHD 3p ar 25 m 12-Reparações, 2e S.Com. Séance 28.3.19, Ax 3: 11.
21 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, Peace Conference, Prot. no.6, 6.5.19: 43. The US Consul
in Funchal (Madeira) described a destitute population. The poor ‘often have only one meal
[of porridge] a day…the poverty here at this time exceeds that of any place I have ever visit-
ed.’ NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 169: 848, USC Funchal to USML, 28.2.19. In comparison to
1914, in October 1919 the prices for bread had increased by 310%, for wheat flour by 483%,
for potatoes by 566%, for coal by 900%. Government attempts to alleviate the shortage end-
ed in failure, as the law professor A. Salazar criticized. NARA RG 84, Lisbon v. 169: 850.1,
USML to SoS, 18. 10.19; Madureira 2010: 654; Wheeler 1978: 127; Meneses 2009: 22;
Birmingham 2011: 157.
22 Meneses 2010: 66; 94; 97; cf. Leitão de Barros 2005; MacMillan 2003: 45; 57.
23 BAB R 3301/2284: 3, A. Costa: Notes complémentaires, Paris, 29.6.20.
24 AHU MU DGC Angola, Pt 5, 5a Rep, Cx.996, Varão: Auto de averiguações sobre os acon-
tecimentos ocoridos no forte ... de Naulila, 5.2.15; Vasconcelos e Sá on Cuangar, 26.1.16.
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memorandum was presented by Moniz in Paris in February 1919 detailing
the “immense losses” caused by the Germans in Africa. But in 1920 Afon-
so Costa had to “urge Lisbon to hurry the process of establishing the com-
plete Portuguese reparation bill”. Finally, in May 1920 Costa presented a
memorandum on the damages suffered by the Portuguese state and its citi-
zens to the Supreme Council and the Reparation Commission: “34,457
soldiers sent to Africa and 63,062 to France; 3,800 killed in Africa, 40,000
wounded, or rendered incapable of work (including locally recruited men);
1,787 killed in France, along with 12,483 wounded. … 273,547 people
had lost their lives in the colonies as a result of the conflict”. Costa
claimed that due to the invasion and German “incitement” the revolt in
Angola lasted for more than two years (a German official noted with irony
on the page margins that German forces had surrendered already in “Ko-
rab 9.7.1915!”). Two maps of southern Angola attached to the memoran-
dum showed the degree of devastation and indicated the mortality among
the population “due to the German invasion” at 70 per cent among the
Cuamatos, Humbes, and Dongoenas; the losses of the Kwanyama were as-
sessed at 30 per cent. In total, Costa claimed “8,641,159,994 GM” (or
£432,057,994) in reparations. He added that the total definitif “will still be
higher”. However, this “truly staggering sum” was dismissed by Britain’s
delegate to the Reparations Commission, John Bradbury (1872–1950). As
one of the British government’s foremost economic advisors, he was eager
to avoid further burdens being laid upon Germany preventing it from
restarting the economy and becoming able to pay reparations.25
There seemed to be a “general belief in [Portugal] that Dr. Costa would
succeed in obtaining financial reparations from the Peace Conference.”
However, the American minister in Lisbon was unable to confirm the fig-
ures presented in Versailles. But he – even assuming an exaggeration by
Costa – admitted a financial situation in Portugal “critical in the extreme”.
When he demanded reparations in Versailles, Costa, “the most beloved
and most hated of Portuguese”, was fighting for his political survival. Yet,
the “weeks and months that followed saw the systematic defeat of Afonso
Costa at the negotiating table”: Portugal would not be a voting member of
the Inter-Allied Commission on reparations; Portugal would not be one of
the recipients of the 20 billion gold marks Germany had to pay immedi-
25 Meneses 2010: 128f.; BAB R 1001/6634: 30 (transl.) Memo, 17.2.1919; BAB R 3301/2284:
13, Costa: Notes complémentaires, 29.6.20 ‘Montant des dommages’; 28 ‘Sud de l’Angola’.
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ately to some of the Allies; the worst of all: future reparation payments
would not included military expenses or the war’s impact on international
trade. While Costa, Soares, and Norton de Matos had “hoped that the
[T]reaty … might rehabilitate [war] interventionists”, the “inescapable
conclusion” from these points was: “Portugal had been defeated at the ne-
gotiations in Paris.”26
The seizure of German ships in 1916 “represented the only important
increase of national industrial income accruing to Portugal through the
war.” Not the least the domestic turmoil and the excessive government
spending had resulted in an international loss of face that weakened Cos-
ta’s position at Versailles. Despite hyperinflation, a mounting budgetary
deficit, growing debts and without tangible sources of income Portugal’s
government was unwilling to sell its colonies or to apply rigid austerity.
“Instead, Portugal appeals to the Peace Conference for financial aid and,
in spite of growing deficits, she increases the budget for each ministry …
and continues to increase outlays on her useless army and obsolete
navy.”27
During the negotiations in Paris and afterwards, the Allied representa-
tives found it most challenging to restrain the hopes of their electorate re-
garding gains and reparations to be obtained from Germany. After more
than four years of merciless warfare and relentless propaganda that depict-
ed the war almost as a crusade for one’s own ideals and the corresponding
demonization of the enemy (“hell is too good for the hun”), moderation
seemed inapposite. Furthermore, the totality of Germany’s defeat was ag-
gravated by the fact that at the end of the war there were no relevant neu-
trals left who could have mediated between the parties during the negotia-
tions and who may have prompted the victors to show restraint.28
Whose Slice? – the Fate of Germany’s and Portugal’s Colonies,
1919
During the war, German politicians hoped for considerable gains in
African territory following an armistice – most of all the Belgian Congo
3.1.3
26 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 1.9.19; Meneses 2010: 163; 99; Wheeler
1978:132.
27 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML, 1.9.; 830, 23.9.19; cf. Norton 2001: 269.
28 Kolb 2011: 42.
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and Portuguese colonies.29 After the defeat, by far most German political
groups were in agreement that German colonies should be “returned”. Pro-
paganda efforts to that effect were pervasive and even a few “Afro-Ger-
man activists” promised in a petition their loyalty to Germany if provi-
sions of German colonial law discriminating against Africans would be
abolished in a future German colonial empire. The Allies, on the other
hand, concurred that Germany must not be permitted to return to the
colonies. The question of their allocation and administration, however,
haunted Allied policy makers before and during the Peace Conference. As
a result, Germans saw themselves reduced to the position before 1884
when “German imperialists were aspiring to something the country did not
have. This perceived lack of empire … spurred irredentism after 1919”.30
During and after the war the accusation of the enemy to be unfit to rule
over “natives” was an argument regularly used. It was part and parcel of
the general propaganda war that pitted “barbarism” against “civilization”.
In 1915, pro-German circles distributed a pamphlet in the United States
entitled “British Rule in India” that left no doubt about the brutality of
British officials.31 The British government, after the occupation of
GSWA, ordered the collection of material that would prove German atroc-
ities. This material was not an end in itself, since the protectorate’s admin-
istrator E.H. Gorges was requested to “giv[e] reasons why … GSWA
should remain under British rule”. The resulting Blue Book, printed as Par-
liament Publication in August 1918 brought to light a grim picture of the
“treatment of the natives under German rule”. It was, as one official in
London’s Colonial Office stated after reading the draft, “a most effective
and moving document.” Quotations from Africans about horrifying bes-
tialities committed by Germans were underlined by photographs showing
executions or the results of excessive flogging.32 Accoding to the Gover-
nor-General of South Africa, Lord Buxton, the Germans “have shown
themselves to be totally unfitted for the responsibility of governing the na-
tive races of [GSWA]”. In contrast with “British and South African benev-
olence”, the critical evaluation of German colonization was to show that
29 Cf. Wolff 1984: 289 (# 222: 28.9.15) on a meeting with W. Solf about future colonies.
30 Gerbing 2010: 86; Gissibl 2011: 161; cf. Samson 2006: 137-170; Carrington 1960: 434.
31 TNA FO 115/1905: 140, Br. Amb. Was. D.C. to FO, 17.8.15; Cana 1915: 365 ‘Their in-
trigues in South Africa … stamp the German government with indelible shame and warrant
in full the complete expulsion of Germany from Africa.’; cf. Louis 1967.
32 TNA CO 532/109: 280 Davis, 26.3.18; 284, Gorges to L. Botha, 21.1.18; Gewald 2003.
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the practices in GSWA violated the norms of ‘civilized’ colonial powers.33
Thus, in “the interest of the natives it would be criminal to hand back [the
colonies] to Germany”. Concepts such as “civilization, humanity, and
ethics” became part of a colonial dispute. Evidently, however, the “colo-
nial subjects of Germany never experienced any moment of liberation.34
At least half of the German nationals living in GSWA, GEA, or other
colonies were repatriated in 1919. Their property was often expropriated
by the Allies. According to Article 297 b–i Treaty of Versailles, Germany
was obliged to pay reparations to its nationals for the liquidation of their
property in the colonies. Back in Germany, the Kolonialdeutschen found-
ed pressure groups that fought in vain for ‘fair’ reparation payments. The
government – for years – was willing to pay only sums that accounted for
hardly ten per cent of the amounts claimed.35
For Portugal having sided with the Allies did not “remove the threat to
the empire’s survival.” Once more, it seemed threatened by foreign “ex-
pansionism”. The political and financial conditions in Portugal were so
grave that the liquidation of its colonies was considered “possible” in 1919
when the re-ordering of the map of Africa was negotiated.36 However,
having lost two empires in the past, the spice trade in the ‘East’ during the
seventeenth century and Brazil in the nineteenth century, politicians in
Lisbon were not inclined to administer a third colonial demise of Portugal
in Africa – Africa that had since the fifteenth century “bec[o]me ... a labo-
ratory of expansion, the primordial space of imperial and colonial cam-
paigns”37 Similar to the British who had discussed war aims in Africa, the
Portuguese had their own intentions with regard to the disposal of the Ger-
man colonies. Britain and Portugal were not only cooperating, they “re-
mained rivals” during and after the war. In 1914, the British government
had pressured Portugal not to become belligerent, suspecting Lisbon
would make “inconvenient demands for more territory” in Africa. In 1919,
33 TNA CO 532/109: 908, Buxton to CO, 15.2.18; Hartmann 1998: 272. Germany was consid-
ered unfit to be entrusted with a mandate by the League of Nations to ‘civilize native peo-
ples.’ Thus it was no longer among the ‘progressive nations’ and was denied a place in the
League of Nations cf. Grewe 1982: 476; RKA 1919; Klotz 2005: 141; Kuss 2010: 336.
34 TNA FO 373/6/13, GSWA. Foreign Office Handbook, No.119, 3/1919: 19; Poley 2005: 12.
35 Wallace 2012: 215; Aas/Sippel 1997: 76; 90-4, payments were lost during the inflation.
36 Roberts 1986: 496. NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 11.8.19; Penha Gar-
cia 1918: 132; 134. When Germany put its conditions for peace in 1918, including the repar-
tition of Africa, Portuguese politicians feared seriously for the integrity of the Empire.
37 Blackmore 2009: 1; on negotiations in 1919 about mandates cf. MacMillan 2003: 98f.
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the Portuguese indeed claimed the south of GEA. They demanded to be
given a mandate too over German colonies if Belgium would receive a
mandate. In the end, Belgium secured Burundi and Rwanda (as mandate)
and Portugal merely received the small Kionga triangle which rounded of
Mozambique south of the Rovuma River (as sovereign possession). Both
nations were not present during the debates on the allocation of man-
dates.38
The fact that German troops had entered Mozambique and continued to
loot its northern provinces for months without being repulsed by its troops
was just as humiliating for Portugal as the need for Allied support to drive
out the invaders in 1918. Some argued that the South African troops under
Smuts deliberately aimed at “forc[ing] Lettow-Vorbeck into Portuguese
East Africa, which would enable the South Africans to capture that
colony.” The poor Portuguese military performance as well as the ap-
palling conditions of Africans witnessed by British officers during their
sojourn in Mozambique gave rise to demands to place Portugal’s colonies
under the mandate system of the League of Nations just as the German
colonies. Britain’s Foreign Secretary Balfour argued for such a solution in
1919 and demanded an inquiry into the Portuguese administration of
Mozambique. Given the reports that called for an end of Portugal’s rule
characterized as “corrupt, inefficient, and cruel”, the colonial “capacity”
of the Portuguese was questioned. This echoed an older “Victorian con-
cept of imperialism in that if Portugal was unable to fulfill its colonizing
mission, then the ‘white man’s burden’ should pass to those more capa-
ble.”39
The Portuguese delegation fought hard against this notion widespread
among Allied officials. Lecturing the Supreme Council about Portugal’s
“unforgettable services to Humanity and Civilization, especially in the
African continent, which it has been watering with its blood since the 14th
century”, Costa keenly rejected doubts about Portugal’s “colonizing abili-
ty”.40 Seeing the Portuguese position shaken by these accusations, he re-
quested in April 1919 Bernhardo Botelho da Costa (1864–1948), a judge
having served in Goa, Angola, and Cape Verde, to “verify the state of re-
lations between the authorities of Mozambique and the native population”
in light of the British reports. After one year of travels across Southern
38 Samson 2006: 5; Stone 1975: 732; cf. Ferreira Mendes 1940: 229; Nowell 1947: 14.
39 Samson 2006: 26; 2013: 214; Almeida-T. 2010: 98; Cann 2001: 146; cf. Norton 2001: 270.
40 Transl. in Meneses 2010: 120f.; cf. Jerónimo 2009; Samson 2006: 157; 163.
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Africa and numerous interviews da Costa concluded that the reported
“abuses …[were] of relative insignificance”; violence was due to the war.
Pointing to inconsistencies in the British accusations, he affirmed that “our
colonial administration, in terms of native policy, is on a par with our
neighbors’”.41
Apart from the British accusations, the Portuguese were faced with a
second (sub-) imperialist “threat”. While “hopes of securing a position of
domination in South Africa” and aspirations for Angola and the Congo
were held vigorously against the Germans in 1918,42 Louis Botha and Jan
Smuts were eager to “extend South Africa’s influence on the [African]
Continent”. Since 1917 Smuts had attempted to organize a land swap with
the Portuguese, leaving South Africa with southern Mozambique, includ-
ing the harbors of Lourenço Marques and Beira, in exchange for the south-
ern part of GEA. He continued in Paris to press for this plan, but it failed;
just as Smuts’ scheme to incorporate Southern Rhodesia into the Union of
South Africa. Already during the war, the South African government de-
sired to fulfill the “age old dream” of incorporating GSWA into the Union.
However, this kind of annexation was prevented by President Wilson. The
Treaty of Versailles merely trusted the Union with the administration of
the “mandated” territory of SWA, overseen by the League of Nations. A
great redistribution game of colonies, as envisioned by South African and
French colonial enthusiasts with an eye on the Portuguese and Spanish
“enclaves” in West Africa, was eagerly avoided by the Americans and the
British.43 From Paris, Afonso Costa warned of the “South African preten-
sions to Portuguese territory as ‘a terrible danger’”. On Costa’s request
Mozambique’s Governor Álvaro de Castro and former Foreign Minister
Freire de Andrade arrived in Paris to meet with Botha and Smuts in April
1919. Their response to the South African plans was an outright rejection
of any incorporation and the promise to enhance development. Also subse-
quent schemes for land swaps were refused by all Portuguese govern-
ments.44
41 Newitt 1981: 41; Hespanha 2010: 184-9; cf. Great Br. 1920; MacMillan 2003: 48;105.
42 TNA CO 532/109: 285 E. Gorges to L. Botha, 21.1.18; cf. Nasson 2014: 457; Millin 1937.
43 Davenport 1978: 189; Samson 2006: 7; 90; 139; 154; TNA CO 532/109: 16, GG Buxton to
CO, 10.1.; 244, 31.1.18; Andrew/Kanya-F. 1978: 12; 1974: 80; 89; 98; cf. Wallace 2012:
216f.; Botha 2007: 18; Berat 1990: 4; Hyam 1972; Koller 2001: 190 on demilitarization.
44 Meneses 2010: 94f. ; Samson 2006: 160f.; 2013: 182; 219; Pimenta 2008: 104.
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Arbitration before Reparations – § 4 of the Annex to Art. 297–298
TV
Among the victorious nations, the Treaty of Versailles derived its legiti-
macy also from the promised exercise of legal proceedings in order to
bring to justice perpetrators and to establish exact amounts of reparation
payments. Prime Minister Lloyd George (1863–1945) promised to “put
the Kaiser on trial”. Most famous is the vow by the First Lord of the Ad-
miralty Eric Geddes (1875–1937) during the British elections in December
1918: “The Germans … are going to pay every penny; they are going to
be squeezed as a lemon is squeezed – until the pips squeak”. In June 1919,
the Allied governments responded to a German rebuttal of the draft peace
treaty: “Justice … is the only possible basis for the settlement of the ac-
counts of this terrible war, [and] reparation for wrongs inflicted is of the
essence of justice.” The emotional debates about the definition of “repara-
tions” to be paid by Germany to the Allies – the “thorniest issue of the im-
mediate postwar period” – have been recurrently analyzed.45 A mere
sketch of the resulting Part VIII of the Peace Treaty will suffice here: For-
eign Minister Rantzau’s offer of February 1919 to pay 100 billion gold
marks as German compensation for war damages (if Germany was to re-
tain its territorial integrity of 1914) was turned down. Against the inten-
tions of President Wilson, the British and French delegations fought hard
for a broad definition of “reparations” in order to incur not only (private)
damages to property but (as far as possible) the entire costs of war, includ-
ing the pensions of soldiers, widows, and orphans – an obligation never
before included in a peace treaty. In addition, Germany had to supply
weaponry, coal, chemicals, hundreds of vessels, machinery, construction
materials, agricultural implements, livestock etc. to enable the reconstruc-
tion of areas destroyed by the war. Placed at the beginning of Part VIII of
the Peace Treaty, Article 231 (the so-called “war guilt” clause – that inci-
dentally makes no mention of war guilt) was designed to stipulate Ger-
many’s overall legal obligation to pay reparations (in the future). But Arti-
cle 232 in fact narrowed German responsibility to “compensation for all
damage done to the [Allied] civilian population … and to their property
3.1.4
45 Quot. Gomes 2010: 14; Hull 2014: 10; Cohrs 2006: 60; cf. MacMillan 2003; Stevenson
2004: 420; Ronde 1950; Scott 1920: 160-9; George 1933; 1938.
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during the period of belligerency”.46 Since Allied experts could not agree
about Germany’s ability to make such payments, no total amount of repa-
ration obligations was laid down in the Treaty of Versailles. Instead, Arti-
cle 233 set up a reparation commission to determine the amount of dam-
age and to announce the total amount to the Germans latest on May 1,
1921; in the meantime, Germany had to pay 20 billion gold marks, in mer-
chandise, ships, gold, or otherwise.47
In Germany a “curious mix of fury, hatred, disappointment and deep
depression” dominated after signing the Treaty in June 1919. The legiti-
macy of the Treaty’s obligations was never accepted. The “wonder” that
Germany’s unity was maintained and the “compromises” upon which the
Treaty lasted were not recognized by most Germans.48 There was a gen-
uine feeling that the new order was unjust. The subsequent months saw
German attempts fail to influence the Allies towards a more lenient policy.
Germany’s foreign policy stood at its lowest point (Tiefpunkt).49
The reparation provisions were heavily criticized in some circles, most
notably by John M. Keynes (1883–1946), who served in Versailles as
deputy of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer. In defense of these pro-
visions David Lloyd George later referred to precedents of massive repa-
ration payments by France in 1815 and 1871 and reminded his readers:
“The liability to pay compensation for damage done by a wrong-doer, and
the payment by the defeated suitor of the costs incurred in a vindication of
justice are among the integral principles of law in every civilized commu-
nity. States are not immune from the application of that elementary doc-
trine of jurisprudence.”50 French President Raymond Poincaré (1860–
1934) argued in a similar vein: “It surely did not seem unnatural that Ger-
many, who declared war on France and lost, should be obliged to pay her
46 Art. 231 ‘The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsi-
bility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and
Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the
war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.’ Marks 1978: 232; cf.
Hershey 1921: 415; Parker 1926: 177f.; Lamont 1930: 336f.; Kolb 2007: 30; 189. Art. 231
became the focus of German protests against ‘Versailles’. It was called a ‘lie’ and most Ger-
mans interpreted its rationale as a moral discreditation of Germany, cf. Hiller 1932: 50; My-
erson 2004: 201; 207.
47 Kolb 2011: 64f.; Marks 1978: 231; Ferguson 1998: 406; Krumeich/Hirschfeld 2012: 242;
Cohrs 2006: 58f.
48 Kraus 2013: 31f. ‘Mischung aus Wut, Hass, Enttäuschung und tiefer Depression‘.
49 Kolb 1988: 302; cf. Feldman 1997: 147 ‘peace terms … constituted an immobilizing shock’.
50 D.L. George: The Truth about the Peace Treaties, London 1938: 437, in: Myerson 2004: 196.
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creditors at least as fully as France creditors expect to be paid, and that
wanton damage done by Germany on French soil should be repaired by
Germany rather than by France.”51
The question what Allied nation would receive which proportions of the
German reparations was eagerly contested between the Allies. And the
dispute was exacerbated by its “distinct transatlantic dimension”: The
Americans demanded the repayment of inter-allied war-debts in full; caus-
ing Britain and France “to put screws on the German reparation ‘debtor’.”
This is not the place to penetrate the “arcane mysteries of Reparations
Commission prose”. However, during the negotiations it became evident
that “Minor Powers” (as official terminology put it) would receive only
minuscule percentages: In 1920, Portugal was accorded 0.75 per cent of
all German reparation payments, which in 1921 were fixed at 132 billion
gold marks. Future agreements foresaw further reductions of the Por-
tuguese fraction of the total amount of payments to 0.66 per cent.52
While the disappointment in Portugal about the reparation provisions
was undisputable, it was clear at least to the politicians present at the
negotiation table that the details of German payments were yet to be de-
fined in future negotiations. In Lisbon, the government encountered stiff
opposition to the ratification of the Treaty considered by many deputies as
disrespectful to the sacrifices of Portugal. Afonso Costa himself did not
hide his disappointment. During the negotiations he had “vehemently op-
posed the terms” sanctioned by French, British, and American jurists. But
conceding the “open-ended nature” of the Treaty’s reparation-sections, he
urged ratification. He knew that “German reparations [were] an excruciat-
ingly tangled thicket” and that there were additional provisions, in part
hidden in Annexes to the Treaty, which foresaw further German payment
obligations.53
Among those, the Treaty provided for a number of cases where arbitra-
tion procedures should be applied to determine the amounts of payments.
Article 304 (in the Treaty’s “longest and most complicated” Part X, “Eco-
nomic Clauses”) provided for Mixed Arbitral Tribunals (MAT) that had to
investigate claims not by governments but by Allied nationals who had
51 Poincaré 1929: 528; cf. Day 1920: 303f.; Boemeke/Feldman/Gl. 1998: 4; Gomes 2010: 27.
52 Cohrs 2006: 68; Marks 1969: 356; Miller Memo, 21.11.18, FRUS 1919: 355; Pfleiderer
2002: 22; 306 on distribution keys of Spa Conference (1920) and Young Plan (1929); Santos
1978: 240.
53 Meneses 2010: IX; 90; 102; Marks 1978: 231.
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suffered damages since the beginning of the war.54 When the MATs began
their work the lawyer Hermann Isay (1873–1938), Germany’s leading ex-
perts on the Treaty, spoke of a “bitter reality that mendaciously and dis-
ruptively interferes with German economic life.”55 It seemed a matter of
fact that these private claims should not be adjudicated before ordinary na-
tional courts as this would have run counter to the principle of internation-
al law that no sovereign state was to stand before foreign courts. Given
more than one-hundred years of Anglo-American experience with inter-
state disputes being referred to arbitration, the solution to refer to arbitra-
tion also private claims against Germany growing out of the war seemed
thus “self-evident”.56
§ 4 of the Annex to Articles 297–298 (hereinafter § 4), which formed
the legal basis of the claims laid against Germany by Portugal, did not re-
fer to an MAT, but to a single arbitrator, appointed by the Swiss federal
president and president of the ICRC, Gustave Ador (1845–1928). Accord-
ing to § 4, “[a]ll property, rights and interests of German nationals within
the territory of any Allied… Power and the net proceeds of their sale,…
may be charged by that Allied… Power… with payment of claims grow-
ing out of acts committed by the German Government or by any German
authorities since July 31, 1914, and before that Allied… Power entered in-
to the war.” The arbitrator had to assess the “amount of such claims”.57
54 Scott 1920: 173; cf. Isay 1921; Art. 297 (e) ‘The claims made in this respect by [Allied] na-
tionals shall be investigated, and the total of the compensation shall be determined by the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal …’; Art. 304 (a) ‘Within three months from the date of the coming
into force of the present Treaty, a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal shall be established between each
of the Allied and Associated Powers on the one hand and Germany on the other hand. Each
such Tribunal shall consist of three members. Each of the Governments concerned shall ap-
point one of these members. The President shall be chosen by agreement between the two
Governments concerned.’
55 Isay 1923: iii; 421 considered the Franco-Ger., Anglo-Ger., and Belgian-Ger. MAT the most
important; their case-law unfolded the greatest influence upon later tribunals.
56 Isay 1923: 147 ‘Im X. Teil des VV erscheint zum erstenmal ein in dieser Form und in diesem
Umfang allen früheren Friedensverträgen unbekannter Gedanke: die Begründung von
vermögensrechtlichen Ansprüchen einzelner Staatsangehöriger der Siegerstaaten gegen den
unterlegenen Staat.‘ ref.to Art. 297 e, f; Art. 298, Annex § 4; Art. 300 e-f; p. 423; but Kauf-
mann 1923: 19, aus § 4 ergebe sich kein ‚Individualanspruch, sondern er ist lediglich dem
Staat als solchem gegeben, dessen Neutralität durch Schädigung seiner Bürger verletzt wor-
den ist.‘; cf. Sauser-Hall 1924; Göppert 1931.
57 § 4 ‘All property, rights and interests of German nationals within the territory of any Allied
or Associated Power and the net proceeds of their sale, liquidation or other dealing therewith
may be charged by that Allied or Associated Power in the first place with payment of
amounts due in respect of claims by the nationals of that Allied or Associated Power with
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This sort of claims was included in the Treaty on request of the United
States, since they “would cover any claims the United States might desire
to make on account of the sinking of such vessels as Lusitania [May 7,
1917, when the US was still neutral]… or on account of other pre-war acts
committed by the German authorities in violation of the rights of the
American citizens.”58
Given the complexity of the wording of § 4, mentioning three cat-
egories of claims, there was barely any question arising out of it that was
not disputed. The “frequent obscurities” and “numerous lacunae” of the
Treaty left much room for legal arguments – a few of which will be men-
tioned here: It started with the question who was entitled to claim under
§ 4. Traditionally, German jurists defined “international law as a jus inter
gentes in the strictest sense; its subjects are the independent states only
and never individuals”.59 However, Hermann Isay in his monumental
work on “individual rights and interests under the Peace Treaty” argued
that individuals were entitled to claim under § 4, as its enumeration com-
menced with “claims by [Allied] nationals”.60 On the other hand, German
government lawyer reasoned that contrary to Article 297 (e), claims ac-
cording to § 4 were not open to individuals of the Allied Powers. These
claims were open only to the Governments themselves whose neutrality
had been violated by an act committed to one of their nationals. In accor-
dance with general principles of law, claimants under this article were on-
regard to their property, rights and interests, including companies and associations in which
they are interested, in German territory, or debts owing to them by German nationals, and
with payment of claims growing out of acts committed by the German Government or by
any German authorities since July 31, 1914, and before that Allied or Associated Power en-
tered into the war. The amount of such claims may be assessed by an arbitrator appointed by
Mr. Gustave Ador, if he is willing, or if no such appointment is made by him, by an arbitra-
tor appointed by the MAT provided for in Section VI. They may be charged in the second
place with payment of the amounts due in respect of claims by the nationals of such Allied
… Power with regard to their property, rights and interests in the territory of other enemy
Powers, in so far as those claims are otherwise unsatisfied.’ Cf. Scott 1920: 176; list of MAT
Isay 1923: 444; on liquidation Gaurier 2014: 715.
58 Baruch 1920: 104; cf. Isay 1923: 199; Fuchs 1927: 264; Parker 1926: 175; 178.
59 Masters 1930: 361 ref. to Hatscheck; on Art. 4 Weimar Constitution and int’l law ibd. 381f.
60 Isay 1923: 425 ‘Unklarheiten‘, ‘Lücken‘; 198 Es ‘können die StA…Ansprüche auf
Schadensersatz gegen [Dtl.] erheben‘; 148f. He underlined that § 4, while making Germany
the debtor of the Allied nationals, did not establish direct liability of Germany towards these
nationals. Next to the wording of individual articles, this was justified by the systematic ar-
gument that the TV did not establish claims under private law, since it was concluded under
international law.
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ly entitled to damages which arose directly out of the alleged violation of
(inter-)national law and were causally connected to it. Furthermore, only
damage to property, rights and interests and no damage done to individu-
als could be claimed under § 4.61 The basis of claims raised under § 4 was
not particularly defined. However, the provision that the claims must grow
out of “acts committed” by German authorities during a period between
July 31, 1914 and before that Allied Power entered into the war, made it
clear that these acts would have to bear the features of a delinquency62 and
must thus be acts violating an existing domestic or international norm.63
The mentioning of an arbitrator in the Lusitania-clause was one of the
few negotiation successes of the German delegation in May 1919. After
the Germans had received the treaty text on May 7 they were given four-
teen days to respond. Most of the German proposals were rejected in the
Allied response (Mantelnote) of June 16. However, the Allies agreed to
organize a plebiscite on the future of Upper Silesia. And they conceded to
the German request to have assessed by an arbitrator all Allied “neutrality
claims”; thus giving up government control over the amounts to an inde-
pendent lawyer.64
Provisions similar to § 4 were included in the Treaties of Saint-Ger-
main-en-Laye, Trianon, and Berlin. Isay assumed that “probably only
American claims will come into question.” However, § 4 gave rise to hun-
dreds of claims of individuals against Germany or Austria that were han-
61 BAB R 1001/6637, Dt. Staatsvertreter Anglo-German MAT [Detmold] to RMW, 23.7.23;
similar Kaufmann 1923: 19; Isay 1923: 198f. cf. Schmid/Schmitz 1929; Fuchs 1927: 261; the
reading of § 4 by British officials differed. It was stated that the claims under this provision
‘are dealt with in exactly the same manner as if they were claims under Article 297’. TNA
CO 323/877/29, v. 27: 488, Notes on the procedure, Encl. III a; 492, Encl. III b (1921).
62 Baruch 1920: 296f.: ‘it is in the quality of illegality alone which in law gives rise to a right of
reparation. International law and the municipal jurisprudence of all civilized nations are in
accord in this respect’; Kaufmann 1923: 19.
63 An arbitrator deciding a case of a British national against Germany discussed the meaning of
‘acts committed’. He dismissed that it would included ‘any measure of the German authori-
ties which may have the character of an exceptional war measure.’ Having no ‘neutral mean-
ing…the acts contemplated in § 4 are such as were considered by the framers of the Treaty as
acts to be blamed, acts which were wrong, and which therefore imply a liability on the part
of Germany. § 4 is not limited to such acts as constituted a distinct violation of a clear rule of
international written law. There is no provision in § 4 which may warrant such limitation and
it must be remembered that, precisely with regard to warfare, international law, even to-day,
leaves a very wide field open to controversy.’ TNA FO 328/1: 14, X/3, Chatterton vs. Ger-
many, 8.11.23.
64 PA R 52528, AA to DG Bern, 10.12.20; Isay 1923: 63; Fuchs 1927: 265f.
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dled by numerous arbitrators starting in 1922 and lasting at least until
1930. The claims were often dismissed (e.g. for not having proved that
German authorities had “committed” acts before the outbreak of the war);
payments awarded were rather small, amounting from £20 to £300.65 The
Luso-German arbitration was thus exceptional not only in that it was
brought against Germany by the Portuguese Government on behalf of its
nationals and for loss of government property and revenue, but also be-
cause it was by far the most expensive and most politically charged.
Given the “systematic defeat of Afonso Costa at the negotiating table”
in Versailles, the Portuguese government tried to insert all governmental
and private claims into the arbitration under § 4: The legal proceedings
were expected to deliver the results that could not be secured diplomatical-
ly in 1919. In Berlin, the arbitration was meant to ensure that Germany
would not have to pay damages in addition to what would be agreed in the
negotiations subsequent to the Peace Treaty. This arbitration procedure
was part of the question of German reparation payments and this brought
about the continuous presence of the war after the Peace Treaty.66
Personnel Involved
It has been repeatedly remarked that there is no “sociology of international
law”.67 Among those who deplore this gap in the research literature is
Martti Koskenniemi, who calls for a “social history of international law”
that could, among other things, “connect international law’s development
to the development of international law as a professional practice. Who
have been the international lawyers? How have they been trained? What
types of activity have they been engaged in? Have foreign offices fol-
lowed their opinions?” The following sub-chapters aim at responding to
these questions for the Luso-German arbitration, thereby situating the in-
volved lawyers in their “real world [context] where agents make claims
and counterclaims, advancing some agendas, opposing others.”68
The legal discourses of the arbitration proceedings took place in a com-
plex environment whose structural frame can be described as follows. (1)
3.2
65 Isay 1923: 199 also on Belgian claimants; TNA FO 328/1, Arbitrations under § 4, 1922-30.
66 Meneses 2010: 163; Kolb 2011: 94.
67 Luhmann 2008: 339 FN 94 no ‘Soziologie des Völkerrechts‘; cf. Huber 1910: 62.
68 Koskenniemi 2004: 65 on ‘possibilities for a historical sociology of int’l law’; 2014: 123.
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The “producers” of the discourses, the party representatives, were univer-
sity trained lawyers, or more precisely high-ranking functionaries of dif-
ferent ministries, supported by colonial (military) officials who were more
well versed in the factual situation on the ground. (2) The “addressees” of
the discourse were the arbitrator(s), who had to be convinced of the accu-
racy and the plausibility of the party representative’s statements. As the
award would be published in the end, the (political) public also indirectly
became an addressee (in rare cases, also the arbitrators became ‘produc-
ers’ when they issued ordinances to the parties). (3) The setting or milieu
where these discourses were developed and finally presented to the arbi-
trator(s) consisted first of all of the ministerial and lawyer’s offices. But
the international social environment should also be taken into considera-
tion: the long train journeys to Lausanne, Berlin, Paris, and Lisbon where
the party representatives applied the finishing touches to their arguments;
the grand hotels, legations, and court houses where they met their adver-
saries and the arbitrator(s); testimonies were also given in the colonial set-
ting of SWA and Angola, which went into the discourses of both party
representatives. (4) The tools used by them were the doctrinal techniques
and contemporary modes of legal discourse as taught in law schools and
refined by experience in court proceedings. The writings (legal memoran-
da) and pleadings during the arbitration procedure were not academic ex-
ercises, but statements compiled for one specific aim: to convince the arbi-
trator and win the case.
Both parties were aware of the fact that the future arbitration award
would depend not only on the applicable norms, the witnesses and the evi-
dence presented during the procedure, but most of all also on the arbitrator
himself. Like any other individual, he held convictions, had a political
standpoint, interests, preferences, and disinclinations; all of which could
influence his assessment of the evidence presented and ultimately his arbi-
tration award. These are basic assumptions of legal sociology and must be
taken into consideration when studying how both parties evaluated their
chances of success. Like any other party to a legal dispute, both parties
had to ask for the conditions of a favorable award right from the start.
All persons involved in the case (with the exception of some witnesses)
were accomplished, well-paid, polyglot gentlemen, wearing dark suits and
working in elegant, wood-paneled bureaus. They belonged to the adminis-
trative (and in part the political) elite of Portugal and Germany. Many
originated from the silk-gloved world of pre-1914 ministries and diploma-
cy. The arbitrator(s) and representatives were qualified jurists who knew
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well their elevated rank in society. Over the next decade they were to meet
each other throughout Europe not only for the Luso-German arbitration
but also for numerous other conferences, arbitrations, and signing of con-
ventions. They were part of “the highly mobile cosmopolitan European
middle and upper classes of the late nineteenth and twentieth century, at
home throughout Europe and meeting in its large hotels.”69 In addition to
their intelligence, eloquence, experience, and legal wit, their self-confi-
dence and the conviction that they were representing a just cause before an
international audience were pivotal for the ultimate success. Not the least
their self-assurance was based on the “sense among international lawyers
that they were part of a cosmopolitan project that had a long pedigree”.70
Who is to Decide? – Appointing an Arbitrator, 1920
In October 1918, Portugal’s government appointed a commission to col-
lect and examine information about the property, rights and interests of
German nationals within Portugal and about Portuguese property, rights
and interests in Germany.71 Afonso Costa knew that his most important
task would be to secure reasonable terms for Portugal and its nationals in
order to receive compensation for the damage caused by Germany. Once
the Peace Treaty was signed, he urged Foreign Minister Melo Barreto to
initiate its ratification. Only “those who had ratified it would be able to
pursue their interests”, namely “pressing Portuguese claims for all kind of
reparations” and would be able to ask for the appointment of an arbitrator
according to § 4. However, still in January 1920, Costa had to remind the
Minister that he could only initiate the arbitration procedure after the rati-
fication. By February 1920, “Teixeira Gomes had met Gustave Ador, who
had shown his willingness to name an arbitrator… – but this, of course,
3.2.1
69 E.g. the Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law,
13.4.30 (The Hague-Conference for the Progressive Codification of International Law) was
signed by Göppert for Germany and by Caeiro da Mata, Barbosa de Magalhães, d’Avila Li-
ma for Portugal, League of Nations, Treaty Series, v. 179: 89, No.4137; Schmale 2010: 20.
70 Koskenniemi 2004: 61; cf. Galindo 2012: 89; 97: ‘Trying to argue the existence of a certain
consciousness in international law of the past is different from saying international lawyers
of the past were aware that they shared a certain consciousness.’; Koskenniemi 2001: 102.
71 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 165: 860, Senator José E.C. de Almeida to USML, 23.11.18.
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could only happen if the treaty was ratified.” This happened finally on
March 31, 1920.72
The Portuguese delegation in Paris was now in a position not only to
press for a more favorable interpretation of Article 237 TV on the distribu-
tion of German reparation payments among the Allies. It could also initi-
ate the arbitration procedure according to § 4. This was all the more press-
ing since it had become evident that compensation for the damages suf-
fered by Portugal in Africa before March 1916 would not be discussed at
the reparation commission’s meeting in Spa (July 1920). There, the Allies
agreed on the percentage of German reparation payments each of them
would receive; the total amount to be paid, however, was still to be negoti-
ated. At the same time, the Portuguese were faced with demands from
Great Britain for repayments of the wartime loans to Portugal.73 Payments
from Germany were thus a matter of urgency for Lisbon. However, the ap-
pointment of an arbitrator became more complex than anticipated by the
Portuguese party.
Unlike the MATs, which were composed of three-person-bodies (each
party appointed one national who in turn had to agree on a [neutral] third
arbitrator to head the MAT), § 4 provided for one “arbitrator” only. It did
not stipulate his nationality or “neutrality”. But the fact that the Swiss Fed-
eral President Gustave Ador was named to appoint the arbitrator indicates
that the framers of this provision assumed that Ador would appoint either
one of his nationals or a citizen of another neutral state; thereby avoiding
the potential characterization of § 4 as a tool of “victor’s justice”. § 4 nei-
ther stipulated a particular place of trial nor limited who should determine
the place. This was another major difference to the MATs.74 As § 4 did
not stipulate who should request Mr. Ador to appoint an arbitrator, the
Portuguese lodged requests with several institutions to initiate the arbitra-
tion.
In April 1920 Portugal’s Minister in Paris and Afonso Costa ap-
proached the French Foreign Minister Jules Cambon requesting him to
take the matter of appointing an arbitrator to the Conference of Ambas-
sadors, which was charged with overseeing the execution of the Peace
Treaty. However, the Conference of Ambassadors, consisting of Cambon
and representatives from the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan,
72 Meneses 2010: 108; 110 (Costa to MNE, 22.10.19; 5.1.; 23.2.20).
73 Cf. Meneses 2010: 113; Kraus 2013: 41.
74 Isay 1923: 424; cf. Strupp 1923: 662; Miller 2011:19 illusion of neutral third; Bass 2000: 9.
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concluded in May “that it is for Portugal to inform Mr. Ador directly”.
The Portuguese delegation took this as an affront. Costa complained that
the Conference “tells an Allied Nation… that it has nothing to do with the
matter, and that she must look after herself”. Was there an intention to re-
duce Portugal’s rights? Were the Great Powers distancing themselves
from the Portuguese claims? After Costa’s protests, the Conference recon-
sidered the issue and passed a formal resolution that Portugal could “ad-
dress Mr. Ador directly”.75
In the meantime, the Portuguese minister in Bern had met with Ador in
April 1920 who, after having asked details about the payment of the arbi-
trator, requested Aloïs de Meuron (1854–1934) to take over. § 4 did not
stipulate anything about the qualifications of the “arbitrator”, but it was
apparently self-evident that only a man with legal training would be quali-
fied for this task. De Meuron, a Protestant lawyer from Lausanne who was
renowned for his pleas in important criminal cases, accepted. On August
15 he was formally nominated arbitrator of the Luso-German dispute.76
The German Minister in Bern, Adolf Müller (1863–1943), informed his
Foreign Office that de Meuron was a liberal-democratic member of the
Swiss National Council (Nationalrat) since 1899. After further investiga-
tion he characterized de Meuron as one of the “most reputable lawyers of
Lausanne, he is considered an able jurist and a respectable personality”
with “considerable influence” over the Gazette de Lausanne, whose ad-
ministrative council he presided. It was said that de Meuron had had Ger-
man clients before the war; however “he had never made a secret of his
anti-German disposition”.77
75 TNA FO 893/4/2: 61, Notes of Meetg No.36,4.5.;542, No.45,26.5.20; Meneses 2010: 126.
76 de Meuron studied law (member of Zofingia fraternity) in Lausanne, Heidelberg, and Paris.
He was admitted to the bar in 1879. From 1899 to 1928 he was member of the National
Council and was member of several parliamentary and interparliamentary commissions. The
Lt.-Colonel was member of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Legal Com-
mission of International Aviation, the Interparliamentary Union, and participated in several
commissions set up by the Locarno Treaties. www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/f/F4340.php.
77 PA R 52528, Ador to DG Bern, 15.9.20; DG to AA, 17.9.;8.10.20; cf. Kaufmann 1923: 18.
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Aloïs de Meuron
The practice of international law was excellently remunerated. In 1921 de
Meuron received 10,000 Swiss Francs (around 115,115 Marks) “advance
payment” from both parties. In 1924 de Meuron requested from them an
“additional advance” of 10,000 Swiss Francs and another 10,000 Swiss
Francs were paid to him in July 1928, before the arbitration award was
published.78 The German Finance Ministry repeatedly expressed its dis-
comfort with these extraordinary amounts that were paid by the Foreign
Office upon mere request and without any formal (contractual) basis.79
How to Decide? – the Competences of Arbitrator de Meuron
Already in spring 1915 the German Minister in Lisbon, Rosen, attempted
“to come to some amicable settlement [with the Portuguese government]
Ill. 32
3.2.2
78 PA Bern 1763, de Meuron to DG Bern, 7.7.28.
79 BAB R 1001/6638: 35-39, AA, 5.12; 27.11.24; 43, AA to RFM, 5.12.24. The RFM request-
ed an ‘accounting from de Meuron regarding the usage [of the money]...or hope[d] that the
Portuguese demands will be turned back and that Portugal must return the advance. At any
rate, the 10,000 Swiss francs can no longer be considered for a repayment from the Reichs-
diamanten funds.’ Cf. cpt 5.1.
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about the African questions”. However, in June he judged these attempts
in a letter to the American Minister to be “impracticable” in light of the
“manifested hostile intentions towards Germany”.80 Convinced that “jus-
tice” was not exclusively a result of the application of the law, Germany’s
government attempted also after the war to find a diplomatic solution with
the Portuguese to avoid legal proceedings. But after the formal nomination
of an arbitrator this proved unlikely. In October 1920, de Meuron asked
the parties to nominate their representatives for the case and invited them
to a meeting to discuss formal aspects of the arbitration.81
Within the German Foreign Office, a guessing game about the Por-
tuguese intentions began, since it was not known what kind of damages
the Portuguese government or individuals would claim. It also did not
seem easily apparent for which claims mentioned in § 4 the arbitrator
would have competence to decide. The Foreign Office informed the Min-
istries of Justice, Finance and Reconstruction (Colonial Department – the
former Colonial Office) about the new case. It was assumed that the Ger-
man Minister in Bern would suffice to represent the German interests for
the time being.82 The Foreign Office and the Ministry of Justice agreed
that de Meuron could assess only the so-called neutrality damages. The
German Minister Adolf Müller was accordingly instructed. He responded
that de Meuron did not know yet either what kind of claims the Portuguese
would raise and whom they would appoint as their legal representative.
For the planned negotiation with the Portuguese and de Meuron Müller
was eager to receive details about the rules of procedure from other arbi-
tral tribunals (Müller, a social democrat, was a trained medical doctor83).
Before the first meeting took place, the Foreign Office provided Müller
with an additional instruction that he should insist that the arbitrator would
have to decide not only on the amounts due for the claimed damages but
that he would have to decide first and foremost on the merits of the Por-
tuguese claims. Only if this had been established for each individual case,
the arbitrator could assess the amount of damages Germany would have to
80 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 700, DGL Rosen to USML Birch, 22.6.15.
81 PA R 52528, de Meuron to DG Bern, 18.10.20.
82 PA R 52528, AA to Ministries of Justice, Finance, Reconstruction, 8.11.20.
83 Doß 1977: 258; Pohl 1995. This appointment of an ‘outsider’ was a rare exception in the
history of German diplomacy and was possible only in the context of the German revolution
and the reforms of the Foreign Service. The Legation in Bern was one of the first among
German legations that integrated the Consulate General and the commercial reporting into its
realm.
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pay. The procedural rules of the MAT were considered inapposite for an
arbitration under § 4. Rather, the German Foreign Office emphasized the
necessity to allow each party to present their case in writing and to re-
spond to the reasoning of the adversary. In line with domestic rules, oral
proceedings could also be envisaged.84
On January 21, 1921 the Portuguese Minister to Switzerland, Bar-
tolomeu Ferreira, the legal counselor at the German Legation Dr. Köhler
and de Meuron met in Bern. Given the Swiss arbitrator, the Portuguese
and German Legations in Bern would over the next years serve as the link
between de Meuron and the Foreign Ministries that administered the arbi-
tration for their respective governments. De Meuron and, according to the
minutes, also Ferreira agreed to the German point of view that under § 4
only those cases could be decided by the arbitrator that occurred between
July 31, 1914 and before Portugal entered into the war (March 9, 1916).
Other cases would be discussed before the Luso-German MAT in Paris.
While the Germans assumed that only a very limited set of cases could be
brought before arbitrator de Meuron, Ferreira made clear that Lisbon
aimed at bringing a considerable number of claims to the fore. The gov-
ernment had called on its citizens to report their individual claims and had
documented them. Therefore, it was necessary to appoint experts to repre-
sent the Portuguese government. Contrary to the German intention of min-
imizing costs and efforts and to solving most of the claims diplomatically,
Portugal insisted that the entirety of its claims would be presented to the
arbitrator, who would then forward them to the German envoy in Bern for
a response from the German government and finally decide on the entirety
of the case.85
While the Portuguese reparation commission concluded its calculations
of the § 4-claims from Germany, the Germans were still not aware of the
nature and the cause of these claims. Germany’s Minister in Lisbon (the
legation reopened in July 1920),86 Dr. Ernst Voretzsch (1868–1965), how-
ever hinted to the probable basis of the claims: the costs for the “Angola
expedition” in 1914/15. Indeed, the Imprensa de Lisboa reported not only
about the newly appointed Luso-German MAT (Art. 304 TV), but also
mentioned the “German incursions in Naulila and Cuangar” and the Por-
tuguese claims for damages in this respect, (“direct and indirect in goods
84 PA R 52528, AA to DG Bern, 10.12.20; 10.1.21; DG Bern to AA, 17.12.20
85 PA R 52528, Guex, minutes of meeting, 21.1.21; AA to DG Bern, 26.2.21.
86 AHD 3p ar 25 m 2, CdR to MNE, 26.4.21; PA Lissabon 176 (Vorkrfrdg.), DGL, 13.7.20.
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or persons, for the state or for individuals”) amounting to 1.9 billion Escu-
dos (“at current exchange rate 11 billion Marks”). Voretzsch considered
that after the disappointing outcome at Versailles, Bernardino Machado’s
government would aim at keeping the question of reparations in the fore-
ground for two reasons: first, Machado’s “Entente friendly policy” during
the war would become plausible to public opinion if Germany pays large
reparations; second, the money obtained from Germany could enable the
government to postpone the unpopular but urgently needed tax reform.87
Even though they were unable to attend the first meeting in Bern, the
Portuguese government in the meantime appointed two representatives:
Dr. Barbosa de Magalhães, Professor of Law in Lisbon, and Captain
Manuel da Costa Dias. Arbitrator de Meuron appointed a secretary for the
arbitration: Dr. Robert Guex (1881–1948), Professor of Law, affiliated to
the Federal Court in Lausanne (Greffier) and Secretary General of the
Franco-German MAT.88 The German Foreign Office, in 1921 headed by
Friedrich Rosen, who knew the case well from his service in Lisbon, in-
volved the Colonial Department of the Ministry of Reconstruction early
on to procure evidence and prepare potential responses to Portuguese
colonial claims. However, the German diplomats still hoped to solve the
reparation issue diplomatically and to avoid arbitration as far as possible.
The Portuguese government was asked by the German Minister in Lisbon
to provide all their claims to Berlin first to discuss the matter and to refer
to de Meuron only those cases that could not be solved diplomatically.
Similar notes were sent to de Meuron. However, these attempts failed
soon.89 The parties could not even agree on the formal questions of Ger-
man liability for indirect damages, the inclusion of “natives” (as Por-
tuguese nationals) into the reparation provisions of Art. 231 TV, the defi-
nition of pension, or the categories of damages.90
De Meuron invited the parties to a second meeting in Lausanne on
April 18, 1921 on procedural issues and to determine the delay within Por-
tugal would have to provide him with its claims. Against Germany he de-
cided that all claims would have to be presented to him, since Portugal
could not be forced to provide its claims first to the German government,
when it intended to refer them to an arbitrator under the Treaty of Ver-
87 PA R 52528, DGL to AA, 7./8.3.; 16.3.21; Imprensa de Lisboa, 7.3.21.
88 PA R 52528, DG Bern to AA, 17.1.21.
89 PA R 52528, AA to DGL; to RMW, 14.4.21; 22.4.21; DG Bern to AA, 15.4.21.
90 BAB R 3301/2284: 68, Tlgr AA to RMW, 15.3.21 on Portuguese response.
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sailles.91 In Lausanne, Portugal was represented by Professor Magalhães
and Captain Dias, whereas Germany had still not appointed its expert rep-
resentatives; so, again, councilor Dr. Köhler was in charge. In the meeting
it was clarified that the Portuguese representatives acted legitimately on
behalf of those Portuguese nationals (as their mandataries) who had suf-
fered damages. It was not intended by the Portuguese government that in-
dividuals would turn to the arbitrator. A dispute ensued between the repre-
sentatives whether the arbitrator would have to decide on all three cat-
egories of claims mentioned in § 4 (so the Portuguese argued) or only on
the last category (neutrality-damages as argued by the Germans). Maga-
lhães disputed that during the first meeting an agreement on this question
had been reached. Further, the Germans challenged the Portuguese as-
sumption that the arbitrator under § 4 would have to decide only on the
amounts due for the claimed damages, but argued that he would have to
decide first on the merits of the Portuguese claims (had there been an “act
committed”?) before any amounts could be assessed. De Meuron therefore
concluded that it was his task to determine this question and asked the par-
ties to provide him with their written statements on the arbitrator’s compe-
tence until May 31, 1921. De Meuron also set forth the proceeding of the
arbitration (similar to those of the MATs): a first written part for which the
Portuguese would have to provide their claims in a memorandum until Oc-
tober 1, 1921. He would then grant the Germans a similar period to pre-
pare a counter-memorandum; followed by a Portuguese replique and a
German duplique. After this, a second, oral part with testimonies and
pleadings would be scheduled. The German representative was concerned
that the delay for the German responses would be sufficient, since the pro-
curement of evidence would be difficult whereas Portugal had already
many years to prepare all claims. De Meuron asked the parties to provide
all their memoranda and documents in three copies each in the French lan-
guage. A set of rules of procedure would not be necessary for the written
part of the arbitration. He pointed out that the parties were free to solve
claims diplomatically without his involvement. The question of cost bear-
ing would be decided by him later.92
91 PA R 52528, de Meuron to DG Bern, 16.3.21; DG Bern to AA, 8.4.21; 23.4.21.
92 PA R 52528, Guex, minutes of meeting, 18.4.21; Ordonance de Meuron, 26.4.21. Though
§ 4 did not stipulate the language to be used during the procedure, given that de Meuron was
a French native speaker, French was, as a matter of fact, the language of the arbitration. This
limited the number of candidats for the position of national representative, as the oral pro-
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The Portuguese and the German Minister provided the statements of
their governments on the competences of the arbitrator in due time.93 De
Meuron concurred with the German point of view and decided on August
11, 1921 that he had to decide on the merits and the amounts of the claims
and that his competence was limited to arbitrate on Portuguese claims for
neutrality damages. He justified his decision with reference to the context
of § 4 and its history. De Meuron, however, also emphasized that the Por-
tuguese had stated in any case that they would claim only damages for
German acts committed before Portugal entered into the war in March
1916.94
Instead of Prosecution and Defense – the National Representatives
The procedures of interstate arbitration bore semblances to domestic court
cases in certain respects, but differed greatly in others. Most importantly,
the arbitrator was confronted directly with both parties: there was no pros-
ecutor bringing the case for Portugal, and the German government re-
sponded to all claims not by a defense counsel in the stricter sense of the
word. Both parties instead appointed national representatives who present-
ed their governments’ cases to arbitrator de Meuron.
Knowing billions at stake, the Portuguese government was quick to en-
gage one of its most brilliant lawyers to represent Portuguese interests in
the arbitration: José Maria Vilhena Barbosa de Magalhães (1879–1959).
In December 1914 the professor of law had been appointed to be a re-
markably young Minister of Justice for the left-leaning Democrats. How-
ever, the cabinet under Vitor de Azevedo Coutinho (1871–1955), although
embraced by Afonso Costa, was “dubbed [by the opposition] les miser-
3.2.3
cedings required (almost) the eloquence of a native speaker. However, while in other proced-
ings the Germans deplored the difficulties that arose out of the fact that the MAT’s language
was determined by the claimant (mostly French or English), in the Luso-German arbitration
no-one required the Germans to speak Portuguese. Cf. Isay 1923: 424; 428; 437.
93 PA R 52528, Magalhães, memorandum on § 4, 21.5.21; Müller, memorandum, 27.5.21.
94 PA R 52528, de Meuron to DG Bern, 11.8.21. This procedure to establish the arbitrator’s
competences differed from earlier arbitrations. Interstate arbitration had no generally accept-
ed rules of procedure. It was common to detail such rules in the arbitration agreement (com-
promis) between both parties. The US-British Jay-Treaty of 1794, often used as an example,
defined the task of the mixed commission to ‘decide the claims in question according to the
merits of the several cases, and to justice, equity and the law of nations.’ Isay 1923: 417f; cf.
Lingens 2011.
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ables … and offered little hope of stability.” Magalhães, who was de-
scribed by Costa as “one of the republic’s most dedicated servants and
most distinguished jurists” stayed in office for merely four weeks. “In late
1914 parliamentary obstructionism became an obsessive art.” Accidental-
ly, his appointment came just a few days after the battle of Naulila.95
There was a long tradition in Portugal of “intimate links between the
professoriate and the Portuguese political elite, something which gave rise
to the term catedratiocracia”96 “Given Portugal’s small academic elite, to
reach professorial status was to risk … being called to government.” In
1917, the professor returned to politics as Minister of Education and Mini-
ster of the Interior in Afonso Costa’s last government. Magalhães was an
offshoot of the small Portuguese middle-class from where the republic re-
cruited its cadres. The American Minister characterized this political class
with little sympathy:
“They have superb orators of the tragic, bombastic style capable of swaying
and leading the mob; but as administrators they are not successful”. He con-
tinued to characterize the Republican Party members: “They are positivists in
philosophy, illuminati, and anti-clerical … They look to France for inspira-
tion. For them the ideal is French republicanism. They have had no political
training, especially, in matters of public administration and finance. Journalis-
tic opposition has taught them practically all they know about politics. They
have intrigued in the Cortes, written bitter seditious articles, and frequently
gone to prison. The rest was theory.”97
Being a confident of the republican strongman Afonso Costa, Magalhães
was invited in 1919 to act as financial advisor to the Portuguese delegation
at the Peace Conference in Paris. Here, he became acquainted with the le-
gal technicalities of the reparation cases brought against Germany. Due to
the constant postponement of the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles,
he returned to Lisbon in March 1920 where he was tasked with represent-
ing Portugal in the Luso-German arbitration according to the Treaty.
In this, he was assisted by Captain Manuel da Costa Dias (1883–1930).
The former Member of Parliament had more than two years of first hand
experience in the conquest of southern Angola and was thus an excellent
complement to the lawyer Magalhães. From 1910 to 1912, Dias was in the
95 Meneses 2010: 44; Wheeler 1978: 107/9; Diário da Câmara dos Deputados, 22.12.14: 16;
Ilustração Portuguesa, 2.ª série, n.º 461, 21.12.1914: 773 showing portraits of ministers.
96 Gallagher 1979: 397; under A. Salazar at times ‘a quarter of his ministerial helpers [came]
from one single university faculty, that of Law in Coimbra’; cf. Lewis 1978: 646.
97 Meneses 2009: 32; NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 157: 800 USML, 12.2.16; Wheeler 1978: 17.
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staff of João de Almeida when the latter undertook to occupy the area be-
tween Kunene River and Kavango River. Subsequently, he published on
the “colonization of the Planalto”. In March 1915 he returned with Gener-
al Pereira de Eça to Moçâmedes and was in charge of administrative ques-
tions. In August 1915, he belonged to the columns that crossed the
Kunene River and was tasked with the re-occupation of the Cuamato area.
Following the battle of Mongua, Dias joined de Eça in N’giva and re-
turned to Lisbon in November. From 1917 to 1919 he was member of the
Portuguese Expeditionary Corps in Flanders. Consequently, he was ap-
pointed Professor at the War College and became member of the Por-
tuguese reparation commission. During Magalhães’ term as foreign minis-
ter, he served as his chief of cabinet.98
The “almost frantic” ministerial turnover in Lisbon (45 governments in
sixteen years) did not affect Magalhães’ position as the “devoted represen-
tative of the interests of our country” (Diário de Notiçias) throughout the
arbitration procedure. It proved to be an invaluable asset for the Por-
tuguese administration that the arbitration procedure was run not by a min-
istry but by Magalhães as an “independent” lawyer. He stayed in charge of
the Luso-German arbitration even while he served as Foreign Minister
(Feb. 6 to Nov. 30, 1922). The average cabinet duration was four months,
some lasted only for days.99 The State President found it increasingly dif-
ficult to find politicians who accepted Premiership. “[O]ften there was a
hiatus of at least several days or a week or two between the resignation of
one ministry and the finding of a new premier. During the hiatus, effective
governance was virtually impossible.” Due to the permanent parliamen-
tary crisis the “ministers were beginning to lack initiative and were prov-
ing incapable of handling the day-to-day business of their portfolios.” Cor-
respondence addressed to the colonial minister, for example, took at times
seven years to be “acknowledged”.100
This “administrative chaos” in Portugal during and after the World War
hampered the efforts to obtain redress from Germany. Before parliament
the former head of the Portuguese Comissão executiva da conferencia da
98 Meneses 2010: 112; 137; PA R 52528, DG Bern to AA, 17.1.21; cf. Ramos 2001: 415f.;
Dias 1913; on Tenente-coronel Manuel da Costa Dias cf. http://epsservicos1gg.com/o-pro-
jeto/investigacao/personalidades/personalidades-do-sam.
99 Tavares de Al./S. 2006: 124; Diário de Notíçias 18.8.28; cf. Madureira 2010: 648; 651.
100 Wheeler 1978: 88, from 1910–20 there were 366 cabinet changes. The Foreign Ministry’s
head changed 41 times; the Ministry of Colonies changed 33 times, the Prime Minister 27
times. NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 172: 800.2, USML to SoS, 2.4.20; Smith 1974: 657.
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paz in Paris, Vitorino Guimarães (1876–1957) estimated that all claims
amounted to two billion Escudos, but complained about the difficulties to
obtain the justifying documents. These were necessary to substantiate each
claim. No proper institutions seemed to be in place to collect the data
about war damages and related costs like pensions. In the resulting debate
on these difficulties, Foreign Minister Domingos Pereira (1882–1956)
promised to sufficiently prove to the reparation commission Portugal’s de-
mands. With respect to the reparations, Prime Minister Machado boasted
that Portugal had “absolutely nothing to lose.”101
When the Luso-German arbitration was initiated, Portugal’s political
situation was, as The Times put it, a “vicious water swirl round; political
disintegration, financial chaos.”102 The situation in Germany was barely
better. Intellectuals begun their “discursive assault upon the Weimar Re-
public”, and in both republics, assassins targeted the highest state repre-
sentatives. In Portugal, Prime Minister Antonio J. Granjo was shot in 1921
by “revolutionaries”. In 1922, Germany’s Foreign Minister Walther Ra-
thenau was murdered by right wing extremists. From 1919 to 1923 Ger-
many experienced ongoing right wing and left wing (military) attacks on
the republican government in Berlin that put into question the very exis-
tence of the state.103 During the war years and the revolution, the almost
general perception of lawlessness, demoralization, “and a sense of in-
evitability” was aggravated by the breakdown of the administration. In
“[public] offices, previously bulwarks of conscientiousness in the German
lands, bribery had become a general practice.”104 This political context
needs to be taken into consideration since it explains in part the despair by
which the parties sought the payment of damages – or the avoidance of it.
The German Foreign Office, staying in charge of the arbitration proce-
dure’s administration throughout its duration,105 was not immune from
these ups and downs. Until 1922, the departments were regularly restruc-
tured according to a regional system plus departments for legal, personnel,
and cultural affairs. The organizational reforms (1918–20) of Director Ed-
mund Schüler (1873–1952) remained incomplete and resulted in few
changes in personnel. Regardless of Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau
101 Labourdette 2000: 559f.; BAB R 1001/6634: 13, Imprensa da Lisboa, 12.3.
102 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 179: 800, The Times, 30.12.21: 5790.
103 McElligott 2014: 1; cf. Wehler 2003: 397 on ‘civil-war-like crises’; Barth 2003.
104 James B. ‘Memoiren eines deutschen Juden und Sozialisten‘, quot. in Fulbrook 2011: 42.
105 Cf. Doß 1977: 217 FO stayed in charge of all foreign affairs; Lauren 1976.
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claim that “new men will be necessary” after the war, most diplomats after
1918 had served under the Imperial administration. The aristocratic-con-
servative attitude dominated for years to come. A “sense of independence”
from domestic affairs and parliamentarians remained strong. However –
M A J O R D O S . A . M. 
P R O F E S S O R MANOE L D A COST A DIA S 
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despite an indisputable continuity –, the structure of the Foreign Office
changed after 1919. The “two-class-system” of diplomatic and consular
careers came to an end. Thus, for its foreign policy, the new republic had a
“loyal and flexible instrument at hand” which understood how “to work
efficiently”.106 In general, commercial and legal affairs obtained a more
prominent role. New challenges posed by the League of Nations, interna-
tional tribunals and international law resulted in new principles and
practices of foreign policy.107
Legal affairs between states had been massively complicated in the
course of the war and its aftermath due to the peace treaties in 1919. Most
of all, the reparation questions and the details of payment schedules occa-
sioned a new quality of international entanglement. The distinction be-
tween private and public international law was less clear than ever. The
legal problems of the Treaty of Versailles were innumerous and German
government lawyers were slow to appreciate the difficulties that arose out
of the fact that the Treaty’s terminology was based on concepts of French
and English law. The first German attempts to win cases before the MATs
proved “practically inadequate”. The Treaty could “not be mastered with
the eyes of a German lawyer”. They were hindered in the preparation of
their defense cases, as they did not fully comprehend certain individual
provisions nor did they have available the protocols and materials from the
Paris Peace Conference that would have made intelligible the rationale of
complex provisions. In 1923 H. Isay was thus “happy” to diagnose that “in
the meantime the academic familiarization with the questions created by
the [Treaty] has begun.” However, he still deemed the current stage of re-
search (Sonderuntersuchungen) “insufficient”.108
106 Doß 1977: 147f.;152f.;166; continuity 188; 214; structure 222; 311; cf. Conze et.al. 2010:
31; Jacobsen 1968: 21f.; Krüger 1985: 13; Hildebrand 1995: 416; Döscher 1987: 21.
107 Kraus 2013: 87; Döscher 1987: 35; Krüger 1985:10; Schöttler 2012: 369; Müller 2014:75.
108 Isay 1923: iii; 425; cf. Strupp 1923: 665; Jacob 1930: 139; Nörr 1988: 102; Basedow 2001:
4f. In 1926 the Institute for Foreign and International Private Law was created for several
reasons. One was the unenviable position in which German jurists found themselves under
part X TV, which regulated economic relationships between Germany and its citizens vis-à-
vis victor and associate states and their citizens. ‘Since the German translation was not au-
thentic, the solution to legal questions concerning contracts, debts, property rights, unfair
competition, shipping, intellectual property, judgements, prescription, and social insurance
had to be found in French and English legal concepts (such as dette, debt), interpretation
methods, and legal institutions and traditions (for instance, tribunal, court).’ Clark 2001: 42
ref. to E. Rabel and H. Isay; Jacob 1930: 146; 139: ‘Ce n’est que depuis 1925 que les
études du droit international se developpent avec plus de vigueur en Allemagne’.
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As a result, the workload that was put on the national administrations
and in particular on the Foreign Office’s legal department grew immense-
ly after 1918. Already in 1921, the German Foreign Office published a
memorandum lauding itself for the measures undertaken in executing each
of the articles of the Treaty. On Articles 297 and 298 alone, dealing with
German property in former enemy territory, seven decrees were enacted.
The Foreign Office followed a bifurcated approach: On the one hand, “[i]n
Weimar Germany, revision of the Treaty of Versailles was the chief aim
of foreign policy”. The “guilt office” (Schuldreferat) under the future For-
eign Secretary Bernhard W. von Bülow (1885–1936) was set-up to “build
a legal case disproving Germany’s ‘war guilt’” (Article 231) and publish
these arguments against the Treaty in Germany and abroad. An “inno-
cence campaign especially targeted the United States and American histo-
rians.” “It was remarkably successful”. On the other hand, German offi-
cials were working on a daily basis with all provisions of the Treaty. For-
mer Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf, who had become ambassador in
Tokyo in 1920, expressed it most adamantly: “Whether or not the Ver-
sailles Treaty was good or bad, necessary or unnecessary, it is law. We
have to deliberate and behave within the parameters of these laws, even if
it causes us undue hardship”.109 From 1921 (the London Ultimatum) to
1923, the German government attempted a “policy of fulfilment”, ordering
its officials to execute the Treaty with the least possible ‘damage’ to Ger-
many, thereby aiming to “expose the impossible and unjust nature of the
[Treaty] terms”. The German Foreign Office, previously a bulwark of
sovereignty-centered reasoning about international law that opposed any
‘infringement’ of the nation’s sovereignty, recognized the political neces-
sity to offset Germany’s military weakening by a greater degree of obliga-
tions under international law that would bind – to Germany’s advantage –
the victorious governments. In 1921, the Legal Department was renamed
“Legal Affairs and Peace Treaty” (Abteilung VIII) to reflect the relevance
of the legal provisions agreed at in Versailles. It was headed in 1919/20 by
Dr. Ernst von Simson (1876–1941) who became Secretary of State and
was replaced in 1920 by Dr. Otto Göppert (1872–1943), who had worked
in Paris in the Peace Delegation. Göppert, who was later appointed “Com-
missioner for the MAT” (1923–31), and the deputy-head of the legal de-
109 PA Lissabon 176 (Friedensvertrag), Die Erfüllung des Vertrages von Versailles durch
Deutschland bis zum 1.4.1921; Hull 2014; 8;11; Solf in Hempenstall/Mochida 2005: 199.
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partment, Dr. Georg Martius (1884–1951), in charge of international law,
would stay intimately connected to the Luso-German arbitration for years
to come.110
Next to the legal department, the remainder of the German colonial ad-
ministration – first as part of the Ministry of Reconstruction, than re-inte-
grated as department into the Foreign Office – became involved in the Lu-
so-German arbitration when it became evident that mostly the factual mat-
ters having taken place in Africa would dominate the dispute. The director
of the Colonial Department (1920–1924) in the Ministry of Reconstruc-
tion, Dr. Anton Meyer-Gerhard (b. 1868) had been head of the subdivision
for GSWA (Referat A3) in the old Imperial Colonial Office and was in
charge also of all affairs relating to Angola and South Africa. He oversaw
Dr. Julius Ruppel (1879–1949), who administered the drafting of the Ger-
man memoranda as legal specialist and would become the German com-
missioner at the reparation commission in Paris. Also Meyer-Gerhard’s
successor, the head of the Foreign Office’s Colonial Department, Dr. Ed-
mund Brückner (1871–1935), had extensive colonial experience. In 1911–
12, he was Togo’s Governor. In 1927, Ruppel, himself a former colonial
official (stationed in Cameroon) was appointed Germany’s first represen-
tative in the Permanent Mandate Commission, but also previously he was
intimately connected to all questions of Germans and their properties in
the former colonies. It was left to an ex-military administrator from
GSWA, Hugo Franz, from the Ministry of Reconstruction to collect all da-
ta and draft the legal memoranda. They all would, “from beginning to end,
devote their inexhaustible energies to avoiding or reducing [Germany’s]
payments.”111 Germany’s representatives during the arbitration and all
those working towards its preparation were civil servants. No money was
spent on outside legal consulting. It was one of the major differences to
the Portuguese strategy that for many years of the arbitration changing
representatives would be assigned ad hoc to take over the case for Ger-
many.
110 Kolb 2007: 193; McElligott 2014: 43; cf. Schifferdecker 1931; Kraus 2013: 95; Neitzert
2012: 443f.; Stevenson 2004: 434; Krüger 1985: 15; Doß 1977: 225f.; 151, Göppert partici-
pated at the Hague Conf. (1907), the London Conference on the Laws of the Sea (1908/9)
and was involved in reforming AA staff’s training; cf. Göppert 1938.
111 Marks 1978: 255; cf. Eberhardt 2007: 134 on the Mandate Commission; 104; Ruppel 1912.
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Portuguese Claims and German Responses. Four Memoranda
Arbitrator de Meuron gave the Portuguese representatives until October
1921 to provide him with their memorandum on all claims. Upon request,
he granted an extension until December 1.112 In the meantime, the German
Foreign Office, concerned about yet another arbitration whose (perhaps
catastrophic financial) result could not be predicted, still hoped to avoid
the arbitration at all and tried to solve Portugal’s claims diplomatically.
Again, all attempts were in vain.113 On December 1, 1921, de Meuron re-
ceived three copies of the “Memorandum on the Portuguese reclamations
by the representative of the Portuguese Republic”. He provided one copy
to the German Legation in Bern from where it was sent to the Foreign Of-
fice in Berlin.
The Portuguese documentation consisted of over one thousand pages.
The memorandum itself had 106 pages and attached to it were 14 dossiers
with around 400 claims, and justifying reports, maps and photographs. In
July 1922 the German government, acting under extreme pressure to find
witnesses and to receive all their reports and documents in time, respond-
ed to these claims with its own “Memorandum concerning the Portuguese
reclamations” (101 p.; 29 Annexes of 226 p.); a Portuguese “replique” fol-
lowed (190 p.) and in March 1923 a German “duplique” (135 p.).114
The following sub-chapters will not merely follow the trail of twists
and turns of evidence and counter-evidence in relation to the Luso-Ger-
man dispute but rather, by showing international law in the making, they
will focus on a number of argumentative patterns that were asserted and
reasserted by both parties. Thereby, different layers of historical contexts
can be identified that shaped the way the parties presented their argu-
ments, hoping to convince arbitrator de Meuron. However, due to space
limitations, such a synthesis requires the historian to make choices and se-
lect a limited number of themes to be analyzed. While it might be a legal
historian’s ideal to understand “the applicable history and law … as fully
as possible”,115 choices lead to omissions, inevitable as they are – for the
3.3
112 PA R 52528, DG Bern to AA, 7.9.21.
113 PA R 52528, AA, remark Frölich, 7.11.21. When the arbitration had already begun, former
Foreign Minister Freire d’Andrade went to Berlin as special envoy to discuss the outstand-
ing issues. Cf. NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 179: 710, USCG to USC Gen. London, 13.12.21.
114 BAB R 1001/6634: 17, AA to RMW, 03.01.22; R 1001/6635, État recapitulatif, 1922 .
115 Berat 1990: ix.
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memoranda, the staggering number of annexes and testimonies add up to
several thousand pages alone.
The subject of the arbitration procedure, German payments for (war)
damages, was highly emotional and politicians had to justify the results in
front of their constituencies. As historian David Felix has pointed out:
“There are no innocents or villains in this story [of reparation negotiations
and payments 1919–32]…. Both the Germans and the Allies were doing
what had to be done.” Germany, for its part, “saw no reason to pay and
from start to finish deemed reparations a gratuitous insult.” It seems rea-
sonable to assume that while receiver countries hoped for more, “Germany
tried to get out of reparations, but … this [is] neither very surprising nor
very shocking.”116 This chapter thus puts different versions up against
each other. The authors of the memoranda wrote on the subject of the
damages, the “Naulila incident”, the battle, and the “native rebellion” from
the standpoint of claimants and defendants purely at the service of their
nation’s cause.
US Senator Hiram Johnson (1866–1945) is said to have argued in 1916:
“The first casualty when war comes is truth.” But despite claims to the op-
posite, legal procedures are not necessarily about “the truth”, especially
for the disputing parties, who may have reason to hide certain facts and
exaggerate others. However, it is not the foremost aim here to assess the
‘validity’ of each side’s claims, but to put them into historical perspective;
thereby providing insights into the motives of each party to bring forward
a certain argument, into their colonial past, as well as into the changing
nature of international law.
Claims for Damages, Amounts, and Applicable Law
Portugal based its claims for damages against Germany on three different
occurrences before Portugal “entered into the war”: (1) attacks on Por-
tuguese border posts in Angola and Mozambique; (2) requisitions by Ger-
man authorities of property of Portuguese nationals in Belgium; (3) sink-
ing of Portuguese vessels (among them the Cysne).
Dossiers 1 to 11 of the Portuguese memorandum of 1921 contained the
claims of the Portuguese state, amounting to 3,073,773,090 GM. The
3.3.1
116 Felix 1971: 178; Marks 1978: 255; 1972: 361.
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damages claimed were mainly caused by the “fighting and the native re-
bellions” in Angola (to a lesser extent in Mozambique). Even though § 4
spoke of the damages suffered by “nationals/resortissants”, Lisbon was
not shy to include into the calculation of damages military expenses, com-
prising the campaigns by Lt.-Colonel Roçadas and General de Eça, or the
costs for the upkeep of the German prisoners of war (121,482 GM). Portu-
gal also claimed payments for the loss of revenues, since 68,193 Africans
were used as carriers (and could thus not work elsewhere) and for 86,219
Africans who starved to death or died due to other reasons during the “re-
bellion”. The Portuguese calculated reparations of £ 1,000 for each of
these 154,412 women and men according to no. 5 of annex 1 to Art. 244
TV. Magalhães emphasized that “indirect damages” were not included in
these calculations. Nevertheless, material losses to the Portuguese state,
such as non-payment of taxes were claimed. Equally, he demanded pen-
sion payments for surviving members of the family of those perished dur-
ing the war.
Dossiers 12 to 14 amounting to 43,386,171 GM contained the claims of
Portuguese nationals (about 400 claims) from the colonies deriving from
material damages and lost profits, assumed to be fixed at 30% p.a. Point-
ing to the invasion of its territories, Portugal claimed, in addition, “2 bil-
lion gold mark for infringement of Portuguese sovereignty and interna-
tional law”. The damages claimed totaled thus according to German calcu-
lations at “around 3,125 billion GM” plus the 2 billion GM. Especially the
latter claims seemed to be based on the expectation of direct payments
from Germany, irrespective of the fact that the provisions of § 4 explicitly
did not refer to such direct payments, but only mentioned the liquidation
of German property. In § 4, “as in so many other aspects of reparations,
appearance and reality diverged.”117
Right on the memorandum’s first page, Magalhães pointed to Art. 231
TV as having “established the responsibility of Germany … for all loss
and damages of Allied Governments and their citizens as a consequence of
the war.” Thus, he took for granted that the Treaty had “recognized” the
(legal) “responsibility to indemnify” and that it was only left to the arbitra-
tor under § 4 to establish the amounts in question. Accordingly, and de-
117 BAB R 1001/6634: 41, excerpt Dossier 11, no. 27 Port. Mémoire justificatif, ~ 3/1922; Isay
1923: 198f. ‘Ansprüche gehen ausdrücklich nicht auf Zahlung durch Deutschland, sondern
nur auf Befriedigung aus dem Erlös der Liquidation des deutschen Vermögens‘; Marks
1978: 232.
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spite de Meuron’s award of August 1921 that he would decide on the
amounts and the merits of the claims, the cover page of the memorandum
bore the title Arbitral Commission nominated for the fixation of the
amount [fixação de montante] of damages before the declaration of war.
As maintained by Magalhães, these claims for damages were based on in-
ternational law and, pointing to “a lack of applicable international legisla-
tion”, equity and by analogous application of certain Articles of the Treaty
of Versailles. To give authority to this statement, Magalhães, in one of the
few allusions to canonical texts of international law, referred to the treatis-
es of A. Mérignac and Dionisio Anzilotti. Finally he demanded that Ger-
many, having caused the damage, should bear all costs of evaluating the
losses and of the arbitration.118
For contemporary politicians and lawyers there was no want of prece-
dents for indemnity payments after war. Whereas the Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907 (arts. 3; 47-56) stipulated only an obligation to compen-
sate individuals who had suffered at the hands of invading armies, “puni-
tive levies” had been imposed by Imperial Germany on France in 1871 (5
billion francs) and by Imperial Germany on Bolshevik Russia in 1918 (6
billion GM). As we have seen, at Versailles the questions of Germany’s
reparation liability became a “divisive issue”. Portuguese politicians were
among those who demanded full reparations from the Germans amounting
to the restitution of all war costs.119 “Sums as high as 800 billion gold
marks were mentioned.” But no explicit amount was stipulated in the
Treaty of Versailles. While the Luso-German arbitration was in its early
stages, in April 1921, the final amount of German “total indebtedness of
132 billion [GM]” (payable in annuities) was fixed; apparently the “lowest
figure which was politically feasible” for French and British politicians. A
sum, the German parliament accepted on May 10 after an Allied ultima-
tum. Over the next decade, several payment schedules regarding the annu-
ities were arranged and broke down within short periods of time.120
118 PA R 52529: 4;6;105, Magalhães: Mémoire justificatif des reclamations portugaises, 1921
(Mérignac: Traité de Droit Public Internationale: 527; Mérignac: Traité d’arbitrage: 294;
Anzilotti: Corso di Diritto Internazionale: 110); BAB R 1001/6634: 17, AA to RMW,
03.01.22; R 1001/6635, État recapitulatif, 1922. Minor sums refered to acts committed by
German authorities against Portuguese in occupied Belgium (~3.9 million GM) and at sea
(~3.1 million GM).
119 Cf. Kent 1991: 17-40; Gomes 2010: 3; 7; Barnich 1923: 9; Bergmann 1927.
120 However, ‘while maintaining the fiction of a higher figure [132 billion] for the sake of pub-
lic opinion in receiver countries’, most of the debt (82 billion) was deliberately ‘consigned
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Given Moniz’s claims of 1919 and Costa’s memoranda of May and
June 1920 demanding even higher sums (8,641,159,994 GM), the 5.1 bil-
lion GM claimed in Magalhães’ memorandum and the arguments to back
them up did not come as a surprise. Also, the first German responses com-
piled by former colonial officials (Governor of GEA Schnee [1871–1949]
and financial councilor Kastl [1878–1969] from GSWA, who had ordered
Schultze-Jena to go to Erickson Drift), rejecting Costa’s claims as “ridicu-
lous” and “unjustified”, had already been received in 1921 by the Ministry
of Reconstruction and formed the basis of the German counter-memoran-
dum.121
While Magalhães’ memorandum with its hundreds of claims was being
verified by German officials for its correctness (or legal flaws), news ar-
rived from Lisbon that the former Minister of Trade and delegate to the
Portuguese reparation commission in Paris, Velhinho Correia (1882–
1943), had admitted that fraud was rampant among individual claimants.
Claims amounting to fantastic sums were raised by colonial entrepreneurs
who had allegedly lost business or the opportunity to do so and were thus
asking damages from Germany. According to Correia, the Portuguese
commission in most cases willingly accepted these claims without looking
into the details of the fraudulent lists of damages. Diario de Noticias quot-
ed numerous examples of such exaggerated colonial claims. The German
press spoke of “reparation scandals” in Portugal.122 The officials of the
Ministry of Reconstruction in charge of drafting the German response to
the Portuguese memorandum began to assemble examples for “excessive”
claims that were raised by government entities or individuals. Councilor
Franz pointed out that Germany “shall be held responsible even for dam-
ages that were due to third parties or own neglect.” He assumed that these
claims were based on the “conviction le boche payera tout.” He recom-
mended raising the awareness of the public for a number of those claims
to never-never land’ through the opaque formulations of the London Schedule of Payment
(debts were divided into A, B, and C Bonds; C Bonds [82 bn] ‘were only fiction’ [Marks
1972: 362]). Marks wondered ‘in what fashion [the Germans] celebrated…when they re-
ceived the ultimatum of May 5.’ Others have pointed out that also the remaining 50 billion
gold marks were ‘a terribly damaging problem in the German economy.’ Felix 1971: 178/3;
Marks 1972: 360; 1969: 357; 359; cf. Hershey 1921: 412; Ferguson 1998: 411f.; MacMil-
lan 2003: 180; Gomes 2010: 70f.
121 BAB R 3301/2284: 13, Costa: Notes compl., Paris, 29.6.20 [£432,057,994]; 41; 46.
122 BAB R 3301/2284: 101f transl. Diário de Notíçias, 8.12.21; 100, Der Tag, 12.3.22.
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he considered particularly “scandalous”; this might be advantageous “for
the negotiations in Lausanne”.123
Among those who had high expectation about future German repara-
tions was also Norton de Matos, who had been appointed in the meantime
as High Commissioner of Angola, being allegedly more independent than
he was as Governor General (1912–1915). In September 1921 he sent his
request for Angola’s share in the German reparation deliveries to the
Colonial Ministry. The “Caligula of Africa”, as his critics called him,
hoped most of all for the provision of railway materials: thousands of kilo-
meters of rails, 70 locomotives and 1,000 wagons.124 Such high demands
for reparations in kind were disputed also within Portugal. It was said that
officials in Lisbon’s colonial ministry were “smiling” about “Mr. Norton
de Matos’ wish-list”.125 The Journal de Comercio considered the list as a
“deliberate looting of Germany”.126
Arbitrator de Meuron was also unsatisfied with the way the Portuguese
government had assembled and listed the individual claims. He deplored
that the amounts were not indicated “in francs and centimes for each of the
claimants”, that details for each claim were missing, and that he was not
given a total amount. He thus requested from the Portuguese party to pro-
vide him with a general overview, “indicating for each claim the name of
the claimant and the amount claimed. When he received the overview in
March 1922, the Portuguese government had reduced its claims for dam-
ages to 2,859,089,911 GM (plus 2 billion GM).127
The German counter-memorandum of July 1922 stated that such “enor-
mous amounts” based on claims from the colonies were completely “out
of the question”. The Germans tried to argue that Portugal’s “fantastic”
claim of around 5 billion GM was out of proportion for a nation of 5.96
million inhabitants: Belgium, the theatre of war for more than 4 years,
claimed 11,5 billion GM, and Serbia, heavily impaired by the war,
claimed 6,8 billion GM. In comparison to the damaged suffered by these
nations, the damages in the Portuguese colonies before Portugal joined the
war in Europe 1916 were characterized as “insignificant” (Kastl assessed
123 BAB R 3301/2284: 135f, RMW (Franz) to AA, 12.5.22; 147, remark Franz, 29.4.22.
124 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 11.8.19, transl. Diário de Notíçias,
7.7.19; Leal 1924.
125 PA–188 (Schiedsgericht Vol.I), DGL to AA, 29.9.21; on Norton Livermore 1967: 329.
126 PA–188 (Schiedsgericht Vol.I), DGL to AA, 13.12.21.
127 BAB R 3301/2284: 141, AA to RMW, 30.3.22; de Meuron to DG Bern 6.3.22.
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the entire property damage [Sachschaden] in Angola due to the war at
“under £1,000”).128
The Germans also pointed out that the amount of 2,859,088,911 GM
stipulated in the latest Portuguese calculation did not square with the sum
of all dossiers of the Portuguese memorandum. Furthermore, the Por-
tuguese claims were stipulated in the national currency Escudos and then
converted into gold marks at different exchange rates between 1:4.44 and
1:4.57. However, as the German memorandum stated, one Escudo was no
longer worth around 4.5 GM, an approximate value before the war.129 Fur-
ther, the gold mark was not a means of payment recognized in all coun-
tries but rather a means of calculation for the contracting parties of the
Treaty of Versailles. It was meant to administer the immediate German
payments of “reparations” to the Allies specifically foreseen in this treaty
(Article 262) and could therefore not be applied to potential payment obli-
gations resulting from “international law in general” as in § 4. It was, ac-
cording to the Germans, common practice between states to regulate the
payment of damages in the currency of the debtor state. Since there was
no legal reason to deviate from this practice, the amounts due – to be es-
tablished by the arbitrator – should be paid in Germany’s currency, en
marcs papiers. Considering the galloping inflation and the deplorable state
of the German budget, this alternative seemed most attractive to the Ger-
man councilors. However, the Portuguese replique rejected it emphatical-
ly: Magalhães argued that Germany profited from the inflation, and ut-
tered the accusation, similar to other contemporaries, that German politi-
cians had caused the inflation intentionally. Indeed, according to modern
research, “it was impossible not to conclude that the German national
economy had profited from the inflation and hyper-inflation by liquidating
most of its internal and non-reparation foreign-debt.” On the other hand,
the “inflationary reconstruction” came to an “end in the fall of 1922, and
1923 was disastrous, the index of industrial production falling from 70 to
46 in 1923”. It was thus no surprise that the German duplique of March
128 BAB R 1001/6635: 38f., Mémoire du Gouvernement Allemand concernant les réclamations
portugaises, 7/1922 (p. 3); BAB R 3301/2284: 44, Kastl to Litter, n.d. [~2/1921] ‘kann …
noch nicht £1000 betragen‘.
129 GM was an abstraction based on the US$, 7/14:1$=4M; 5/21: 1$=60M Felix 1971: 173.
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1923 rejected the claim of German profiteering from the inflation with
equal zeal.130
The demand of two billion gold marks for the alleged violation of inter-
national law was only dealt with in passing by the German memorandum
since according to its reasoning there was no violation of international law
– except for the German attack on the Portuguese post Maziua in Mozam-
bique for which reparations had been offered in 1914. Thus, the Germans
wondered why Germany should be held liable to pay for troops being sent
to southern Angola in 1914–15 when the Portuguese argued with the ne-
cessity to protect Angola’s border. “The right to protect one’s borders
goes along with the obligation to bear the costs for such undertaking.”
Contrary to the Portuguese who wanted the Germans to pay for all arbitra-
tion fees, the Germans suggested that the arbitrator should decide on the
cost bearing.
Also in their reading of § 4 and its application the Germans were (still)
completely at odds with Magalhães. The discussion of one year before
was repeated on an advanced legal level. The Germans underlined that the
objective of this regulation was to merely designate reclamations of Ger-
man properties within the territory of any Allied power – or the net pro-
ceeds of their liquidation. As a special provision, § 4 provided for amounts
that may be charged “with payments of claims growing out of acts com-
mitted by … any German authority since July 31, 1914, and before that
Allied or Associated Power entered into the war.” The arbitrator “may as-
sess” the amounts of such claims. An indication as to whether or how the
claims can be considered as valid was provided neither by § 4 nor by any
other disposition of the Treaty of Versailles. A neutral state’s rights to
reparation payments from a warring state should thus be defined according
to “the principles of international law”. For the assessment of its damages,
Portugal, as a neutral state, according to the German point of view, did not
deserve to be put in a legal position more advantageous than any other
neutral state.
The Portuguese statement that the rules of international law are insuffi-
cient with regard to the disputed claims and should therefore be comple-
mented by the arbitrator according to the “principles of equity” and analo-
gies was categorically refuted: During an international arbitration proce-
130 Feldman 1997: 838, 1913 = 98; 1928 = 100; cf. Köppen 2014: 368; Balderston 2002; Feld-
man et.al. 1982; BAB R 1001/6636: 15-84, Duplique du Gvt Allemand, 3/23 (p. 11f.)
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dure only the rules of international law – customary and treaty law – could
be applied, if not otherwise agreed in advance by both parties.131 The Ger-
man lawyers demanded the strict application of international law as they
were convinced that according to its principles the Portuguese claims
would prove to be mostly unjustified. They demanded that each act of the
German authorities must be examined to be contrary to international law
and that finally the contravening act must be causal for the claimed dam-
age. In the dossiers the Portuguese had, according to the Germans, not ad-
hered to these basic preconditions, e.g., the private claim for damages of a
woman who fell into the hands of “the revolting natives” and was forced
to become the chief’s “mistress”. An act not contrary to international law
could not create a state’s obligation to pay damages, except when interna-
tional law specifically prescribes such payments. Even though Magalhães
had stated that according to international law payments were due only for
direct and not for indirect damages, he had not adhered to this principle, so
the Germans argued. The “loss of business opportunity” or the refutation
of “revolting natives” to pay taxes, for example, could – even if one as-
sumes a causal relation between the “rebellion” and the frontier incidents
in 1914 – barely be called direct damages. The Portuguese claimants,
however, seemed to assume that the German participation in the war in it-
self qualified for the definition under § 4 of “acts committed by the Ger-
man Government”.
The German memorandum emphasized that § 4 regulates only the
charging of German goods within Allied and Associated territory and enu-
merates the categories of claims in this regard. No regulation of the man-
ner of payment had been included in this section. The arbitration award
thus was to stipulate only the amount due for those claims and should not
anticipate the execution of payments. The Germans also stressed that in
the “system of the Treaty of Versailles” the German payments to the repa-
ration commission have priority in order to pay for the debts caused by the
Allied reparation claims. These reparation payments, however, would
completely exhaust Germany’s payment capacity.132 In the Portuguese
131 However, in 1914, in the Luso-Dutch Arbitration Award (Timor Case), arbitrator C.E.
Lardy considered facts also from ‘the point of equity, which is important not to lose sight of
in international relations’, RIAA XI: 490-517 (508).
132 BAB R 1001/6635: 41; 44, Mémoire du Gouvernement Allemand, 7/1922. Besides the ar-
bitration, Portugal participated in the reparation payments and deliveries as agreed in fol-
low-up conferences. For example, in 1921 the Portuguese delegation in Paris requested the
delivery of agricultural machines from Germany (PA Lissabon 188, DGL to AA; Diário de
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replique and in the German duplique both parties insisted on their points
of view.
“History” as a Legal Argument – a Portuguese Claim
The Portuguese Whitebook presented in February 1919 to Foreign Secre-
tary Arthur Balfour did not shy away from making reference to the
rhetoric of “Portugal’s glorious (overseas) past” when it argued that with
sufficient reparation payments from Germany, Portugal would be enabled
to fulfill its “colonial mission”. Egas Moniz’ delegation pointed to the
“beautiful republic of Brazil, the blossoming Portuguese colonies in the
United States (California and Massachusetts), and the colonies São Thomé
and Principé and Zambesi” to prove the “civilizational” achievements of
Portugal around the world.133
When he included historical arguments in the legal dispute, Magalhães,
in his memoranda of 1921 and 1923, chose a strategy different from this
grand imperial narrative. As a member of the Portuguese delegation in
Paris he must have become aware of the reputation of Portugal’s colonies
as “the worst administered territories in Africa.”134 He thus focused not on
Portuguese, but on German history. When the arbitration case was in a
way a continuation of the war by other means, then ‘history’ – not law –
became its foremost weapon. This, however, meant that “the past” was
seen through the necessities of “the present” in order to support an argu-
ment and win the case; similar to Portugal’s previous arbitration cases in
which historical claims played a paramount role. “[M]ethodological con-
cerns” for dealing with the past could not be expected. In the inter-war era,
3.3.2
Notíçias, 19.5.21). After the conference at Spa, Afonso Costa listed the ‘economic gains’
obtained and to be expected from the war: next to German Navy ships and the liquidations
acc. to § 4 (in the future), ‘0.75% of half the amount paid by the Germans and another
[0,]75% of what is paid by other enemies.’ (quot. NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 175:800,
USML to SoS, 16.4.21) However, all this ‘fell far short of what Costa had announced pre-
viously he was willing to countenance as a minimum [first he claimed 8%, then 2,5%].’ In
the end, ‘very little money ever materialized’ (Meneses 2010: 136;140;143). The German
Minister in Lisbon assumed that Portugal received in 1922 and 1923 reparations of ~
£500,000 p.a. (BAB R 3301/2284: 177, AA to RMW, 20.3.23); Santos 1978: 242f.
133 BAB R 1001/6634: 26, Port. Memo, 17.2.19: 296; cf. Jerónimo 2009; Silva 2007: 411.
134 Smith 1974: 658.
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this was certainly a permissible strategy, since, “[f]rom the outset, [inter-
national law’s] self-understanding was historically informed.”135
When he put German history on trial, Magalhães used a two-part ap-
proach in this section of the memorandum. First, he laid out Germany‘s
quest for world hegemony, and second, he explained in great detail sinister
motives and German acts in preparation of the annexation of Angola from
1898 to 1918. The German councilors considered this strategy rather dis-
turbing. In their counter-memorandum they explicitly pointed out that
more than 40 pages (out of 106) of the memorandum were reserved for
such “violent and injurious attacks” that had but one goal: to create an
“unfavorable impression of Germany” (a claim, the Portuguese replique
denied).
Detailing the alleged plans of German world hegemony before 1914,
Magalhães started with a bold statement: the war did not come as a “sur-
prise” to those who “had followed European politics since 1870” and who
knew the “German aspirations” to rule the world. He backed up this argu-
ment with a plethora of names not only of politicians, but also of “poets,
philosophers, and scientists” who had “nurtured in the Germans the belief
in their own superiority (Goethe, Schiller, Humboldt, Giesebrecht, Cham-
berlain and many others)”, and who had created “a cult of force… (Karl
Marx, Wagner, Arndt, Hegel, Nietzsche etc.)”. Magalhães’ historico-
philosophical commencement of his memorandum resonated with a dis-
course throughout Europe during the war. The Portuguese (academic) elite
made use of it already at the beginning of the war in the above-mentioned
“protest” written after the destruction of Reims. Teófilo Braga, a professor
(in modern literature)-turned-politician, and his followers argued:
“Germany is a typical example of moral madness, characterized by its mega-
lomania and its criminal tendencies, aggravated by its irrepressible lack of
scruples. Tacitus noted that the Germans attacked without reason. … And, as
if the atavistic impulses that make Germany a permanent international threat
are not enough, there are some philosophers who proclaim the immoral doc-
trine that success is the law: some of these scholars, through schooling, have
promoted the selfish principle that the entire world should be subordinated to
this nefarious empire; many of its politicians advocate the corrosive motto
‘Might is Right’, while many of its military writers hold the view, without the
135 Cf. Jones 1990: 79 who analyzed similar strategies of using the past in colonial Africa. On
lawyers dealing with the past Galindo 2012: 101; Koskenniemi 2004: 61; cf. RIAA XI: 590.
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least foundation, that their reason for being i[s] the complete annihilation of
enemy states.”136
Also elsewhere the question was raised whether German idealism as the
leading philosophical movement in Germany would consider “atrocities
and rigor necessary in order to get on (um vorwärts zu kommen) or would
be ethically justified”. Professor of International Law Franz von Liszt
(1851–1919), when faced with this question by the Svenska Dagbladet,
resolutely responded that German idealism would not justify atrocities and
rigor, “except in case of self-defense”. Indeed, most Germans “were con-
vinced they were waging a war of defense”, as Foreign Minister Brock-
dorff-Rantzau in May 1919 tried in vain to explain to the Allied delegates
assembled at Versailles.137
Philosophical and historical justifications of German aggressive warfare
were looked for by European commentators most of all in the writings of
historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834–1896) and his disciples. Émile
Hinzelin in his 1914, Histoire Illustrée de la Guerre du Droit, written dur-
ing the war, pointed to a long line of continuity from Treitschke’s justifi-
cations of the war in 1870 or the aggressive attitude of Chancellor Bismar-
ck to the current conflict. According to Hinzelin and many other French
and British authors, Treitschke personified the German conviction that
war would permit everything; he had established a code de la barbarie
mystique. Magalhães could take up this line of thought about the origins of
German aggressions when he, like others before him, underlined the rele-
vance of General Friedrich von Bernhardi’s Deutschland und der Nächste
Krieg (1912) for the German public opinion and an alleged consensus
among German military thinkers that “war as an act of violence” could
have no limits.138 In Magalhães’ memoranda, but also later during testi-
monies, allusions were made to the aggressive tone that permeated speech-
es of the Kaiser or politicians and German literature. The Luso-German
arbitration is yet another example that Bernhardi’s “writings have played
such an uncommon prominent role in the war guilt debate”. Bernhardi’s
book
136 O protesto de Portugal contra os vandalismos alemães, entregue aos senhores ministros da
Bélgica e da França em 4 de Outubro de 1914, Lisboa 1914, transl. www.cphrc.org/
index.php/ documents/firstrepublic/463-1914-10-04-german-vandals [14.10.2014].
137 Liszt in Fetscher 2003: 242; Brockd. in McElligott 2014: 41; Scott 1920: 43; Hull 2014: 9f.
138 Quot. in Fetscher 2003: 246; cf. Fischer 1967: 31; Gerhards 2013: 140-69; 270.
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Germany and the Next War “became a best seller and a political disaster. …
no other book ever did so much harm to the reputation of the German General
Staff. The fact that it was written in a purely private capacity by an outsider
not in the General Staff’s good grace was completely ignored. It was cited on
countless occasions as proof that the German General Staff was systematical-
ly fostering war, with the aim of making Germany the principal power in the
world.”139
Regarding Germany’s quest for colonial hegemony since 1884, Magalhães
tried to show how Portugal became a “victim” of the “late-comer”. The
“traditional fears among [Portugal’s] educated groups” (“at times border-
ing on mania”) were present in one way or another throughout his memo-
randa: loss of the African colonies and loss of Portugal’s independence.
According to Magalhães, Germany’s colonial expansion was inextricably
linked to aggression against Portuguese colonial possession. The history
of GSWA served as an apposite example which Magalhães quoted directly
from the bestseller A expansão alemã – causas determinantes da guerra
de 1914–1918 (1919) by General José Morais Sarmento (1843–1930). He
concentrated his narration on Africa:140 what had been a small harbor post
(Faktorei) in Angra Pequeña (Lüderitzbucht) developed within two years
into a huge colony that infringed upon Portuguese sovereignty north of
Cape Frio, Angola’s southern border until 1886. After the defeat of the
Afrikaaner republics in 1902 the dream of a Germanic Southern Africa
and aspirations for a link between GSWA and Transvaal vanished. How-
ever, an even greater scheme was soon ventured about: a link between
GSWA and GEA by annexing Portuguese Angola and Belgian Congo.
Smaller nations became the “preferred victims of an insatiable [German]
hunger” for colonial expansion. Germany’s disrespect for Portugal became
evident in the Anglo-German conventions of 1898 and 1913 on the parti-
tion of Portugal’s colonies (Magalhães was eager to state that Britain was
“forced” into these treaties). This policy was accompanied by a German
propaganda campaign amongst “the natives of Angola” against Portugal’s
sovereignty as well as by economic, scientific, and missionary penetration
of this colony and by propaganda against the Portuguese colonial adminis-
tration in European journals. Magalhães cited ample material from Ger-
man publications demanding the execution of the Anglo-German conven-
tion of 1898 and declaring that Portugal, “a nation of mulattoes” and “a
139 Ritter 1970: 112; cf. Hull 2008: 370 on contemporary critics of German military ideology.
140 Wheeler 1978: 18; 177 on Sarmento.
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decomposing state”, had lost “her historical rights” to colonize. The an-
nouncements of Heinrich Ziegler’s Angola Bund about Angola (the harbor
of Tiger Bay in particular) as a “necessary compliment” to GSWA served
equally as evidence of “Germany’s appetite”141 and its justification by a
“might makes right” philosophy: “from exploration to annexation”. The
quintessence of all these announcement was, according to Magalhães,
“force and nothing but force as suprema ratio”. The Portuguese replique
quoted extensively from João de Almeida’s Sul d’Angola (1912) relating
border infringements from GSWA. The explorations of southern Angola
by the Study Commission led by Schubert and Vageler were in Maga-
lhães’s analysis nothing but military reconnaissance tours. Germany’s eco-
nomic and scientific undertakings in Angola in 1913 and 1914, most of all
the railway schemes were meant to support the annexation. When neutral
Belgium was invaded in August 1914, Portugal was thus forced to send
troops to Angola and Mozambique to defend its neutrality and integrity.
Consequently, Portugal was entitled to repayment of all costs for these ex-
peditions, whose necessity was proven by the German incursions since
August, before Portugal’s troops arrived.
Overall, a “weakened Germany aimed to use history to discredit the le-
gal underpinnings of the [T]reaty [of Versailles] by attacking the ‘war
guilt’.” However, the German memorandum did not attribute great impor-
tance to history in general. In constructing a counter-narrative to Maga-
lhães’ historical argumentation, the German councilors focused their re-
sponse mostly on “the facts” of what had happened in southern Angola in
1914. Here they went into great detail, whereas they intended to refute
Germany’s alleged plans for world hegemony before the war by merely
pointing to the recent publications of diplomatic documents of the Reich.
This, they argued, demonstrated Germany’s willingness to transparently
prove the “truth” about the underlying aims of its policies.142
The German lawyers called it an idée absurde to think that Germany, in
the moment when she was faced with Europe’s “most formidable” powers,
141 The story of Ziegler’s Angola Bund had become widely reported in Allied newspapers
across the globe, e.g. Evening Post (New Zealand), XCI/53, 3.3.1916: 7 ‘Portugal’s
Treaties’.
142 Hull 2014: 9; Kraus 2013: 95; Schöllgen 2010: 11. In 1920, the Main Archives of the For-
eign Office were founded in order to organize and ‘publish as soon as possible’ the files of
the FO from before the outbreak of the war. These publications, it was hoped, would show
the ‘truth’ about Imperial Germany’s foreign policy. In ‘record time’ almost 16.000 docu-
ments (1871–1914) were printed in 54 volumes until 1927; cf. Stevenson 2004: 434.
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would have attacked Portugal’s colonies, although GSWA and GEA were
themselves threatened by a superior British army and although Germany
had never prepared for war in the colonies. According to the counter-
memorandum the true motive for the sending of Portuguese forces was not
the concern of German troops attacking Angola and Mozambique; rather
to the contrary, the Portuguese forces were sent to be able to launch an at-
tack on the German colonies. The Germans, as we will see, put particular
emphasis on their claim that Portugal was never, in fact, neutral and all de-
cisions to send troops to the colonies were made in Lisbon already before
the border incidents. As to the assertions of plans for an economic penetra-
tion of the Portuguese colonies by Germany, the counter-memorandum ar-
gued that those activities had been welcomed by and were agreed on be-
forehand with Portugal’s authorities. Schubert’s mission was received in
Lisbon by Prime Minister Machado and was under the “special protection
of the Portuguese government”. Two high-ranking Portuguese officers had
been part of the expedition, who ensured that nothing was done against
Portuguese interests. Undertakings such as railway construction in the
south to open up Angola’s “most important and most fertile parts” were
most of all in Portugal’s interest. Moreover, considering these rather his-
torical questions, the Germans asked how the alleged political aim of an-
nexation could form the basis for a legal obligation to pay the expenses of
Portuguese forces being sent to Angola and Mozambique at the beginning
of the World War.
However, arguments grounded in the past have been “omnipresent in
international lawyer’s discourse, in the making of their doctrine or in their
statements before international courts.” After all, history for the Por-
tuguese or the German party remained “a mere tool in order to prove an
argument or the existence of a certain state of affairs.”143 The Portuguese
party aimed at presenting the dispute with Germany as a major interna-
tional question (as part of reparation payments) that had deep historical
components. The sociologism still dominating Portuguese legal thought
around 1920 put a premium on the understanding of the historical evolu-
tion of legal problems or concepts. Methodologically, such evolution was
laid out – as legal historian António Hespanha has described it – in an
“impressionistic and literary” manner with multiple references to extra-ju-
143 Galindo 2012: 87 quot. Craven 2007: 6 and Gordon 1996: 124.
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ridical factors and not always bound by “the empire of the document”.144
Magalhães’s memoranda are an apposite example of this broad under-
standing of legal reasoning that put the exegesis of precise norms not at
the forefront of a lawyer’s tasks.
Just War, Right of Self-Defense, Reprisals, and Anticipatory Attack
Political theory had developed over centuries a European “just war tradi-
tion” that required the fulfillment of several conditions for the legitimate
resort to force: among them were just cause, right intention, proper author-
ity and public declaration, last resort, probability of success, and, dis-
putably, proportionality. These “traditional norms”145 were, in one way or
another, addressed in each of the memoranda. Both parties attempted to
prove to arbitrator de Meuron that the “enemy” had launched in 1914 (or
was about to launch) an aggression against the colonial borders; thus, self-
defense was necessary and legitimate and gave a just cause to one’s own
resort to force.
The law of bellum iustum in a colonial context was usually referring to
the legal titles justifying the conquest of “heathens” and their land. There
was a “specific colonial international law”. The Spanish naturalists had
“provided highly convenient ideologies for the empire-builders of the six-
teenth century”146 And also later on, “[w]henever a chief decided to resist,
the [Portuguese] intruders would find an excuse for declaring ‘just war’
against him”.147 When, however, European forces fought against each oth-
er in the colonies, the principles of the droit public de l’Europe were ap-
plicable. In the nineteenth century, with the fading of the ‘just war’ doc-
trine, this included the sovereign right to make war at will and to acquire
title to territory by conquest. It was a heritage of the nineteenth-century
that “the resort to force became unregulated and a sovereign right of
States.”148 However, considering “international morality” resort to force
3.3.3
144 Hespanha 1981: 427f. but see his caveat at 434 ‘un profond respect…devant le droit posi-
tive.’ Since 1914, Magalhães headed the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law at Lisbon
University; on ‘international legal method’ Kennedy 1997: 131-4.
145 Orend 2000: 525f.; Butler 2003: 232.
146 Grewe 1982: 453 ‘besonderes KolonialvölkR‘; Schwarzenb. 1962: 53; Korman 1996: 49.
147 Viotti da Costa 1985: 54 ‘The Portuguese could always find a theological justification’; 56.
148 Gardam 2004: 29; cf. Becker Lorca 2010: 495f.
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needed to be justified and self-defense was probably the most legitimate
reason of all.149
§ 4 spoke of “acts committed” by the German authorities as the legal
basis of Germany’s liability, and the Portuguese memorandum’s foremost
argumentative goal was thus to prove that such illegal acts had been com-
mitted when Germany resorted to force. The German motives were laid
out in Magalhães historical exposé describing German acts that aimed at
the annexation of Angola. Aggressions against Portugal’s sovereignty
gave it the right of self-defense. In the analysis of Magalhães, Portugal’s
defense measures were acts of resistance to the Germans. Self-respect, na-
tional pride, and love for independence formed the baseline of this argu-
ment.
The Germans, on the other hand, argued that the Portuguese had not
made a public declaration of war (calling themselves “neutral”) although
the positive stance towards and active support of British war efforts was
unmistakable. Thus, German motives to resort to force were dictated by
military necessity to defend GSWA against an enemy approaching from
the north. This was all the more legitimate as it fell under the definition of
a lawful reprisal. A large part of all four memoranda and the attached re-
ports of witnesses were thus concerned with the events leading to the
death of three Germans in Naulila and the battle in December 1914.
The Portuguese memorandum and the replique claimed that the troops
from Portugal that had landed in September and October 1914 in southern
Angola were tasked with the protection of the border against German at-
tacks and with subduing the unruly “natives”. In response, the German
councilors admitted that Portugal had an “undeniable right” to protect its
borders and to prevent the “natives” to rebel; but they wondered – as said
before – why Germany should bear the costs for this. Furthermore, it
would not have been to the detriment of Portugal’s dignité if Governor
Seitz had been informed about the troop movement near GSWA’s border
and its claimed rationale; especially since Governor General Norton de
Matos had shortly before agreed to abstain from a campaign against the
Kwanjama on request of Governor Seitz. The latter had even offered to
Portugal German assistance against King Mandume at a later point in
time. The Portuguese replique justified Norton de Matos’ silence in 1914
with the assertion that Germany had instigated “the natives” against Portu-
149 Korman 1996: 61 on ‘international morality’ and connections to ‘civilization’ discourses.
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gal and he therefore did not want to inform the Germans of the counter-
measures. The Germans called this an “unproven claim” and deemed Gov-
ernor Seitz justified in his conclusion in October 1914 that the troops
marching towards the border of GSWA were not targeting the Kwanyama.
This conclusion, the Germans underlined, was also drawn by the Angolan
press: the Benguela Post of October 1914 claimed the troops are destined
to “assist England” and to “attack Damaraland [GSWA]”. The Portuguese
replique called this article the result of journalistic “fantasy” beyond the
government’s responsibility. The German duplique insisted with a view to
the military situation in GSWA that the “indiscretion” of the Benguela
Post was a realistic expression of convictions held in Angola. Since
GSWA was under attack from an overwhelming British force coming
from the south and the east and having the sea to the west, the only way to
retreat was towards the north and, irrespective of its neutrality, “Portugal
had to close the hole in the north.” The Portuguese troops were thus not
necessarily meant to “conquer” GSWA but to create a threat in the back of
the German troops being in a precarious situation due to the British. This
conclusion is supported, the Germans wrote, by the declaration of the state
of emergency for southern Angola on September 12, 1914 that was target-
ing Germans and Afrikaaners with the prohibition of commercial trans-
ports but had barely any influence on the Kwanyama. Magalhães coolly
justified this measure as a legal prerequisite for the requisition of food and
means of transport for the recently arrived troops.
The Portuguese memorandum labeled Schultze-Jena’s convoy as an
“armed detachment … invading Portuguese territory”, allegedly in search
of a German deserter; resulting in “yet another violation of [Portugal’s]
sovereignty”. The Germans had aimed at illegally transporting goods from
Angola to GSWA and used the occasion for military reconnaissance.
Quoting extensively from Roçada’s report, Magalhães highlighted that in
Fort Naulila Schultze-Jena had threatened the unarmed Sereno with his
gun and therefore the latter acted legitimately in self-defense when he or-
dered his men to shoot. The German lawyers refuted the claims that
Sereno was justified and that the German expedition to the Kunene consti-
tuted a violation of international law. They considered the incident and the
battle of Naulila to be “cause and effect.” The Portuguese critique that the
German group at the border was too large and armed for not being under-
stood as a threat, was countered with the argument that it was out of
question to cross “tribal areas” for 300 kilometers alone and unarmed.
Further, an official mission would require a certain apparatus to make its
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importance apparent. The repeated claim, Schultze-Jena had crossed into
Portuguese territory was rebutted by stating he had done so upon the ex-
plicit invitation of a Portuguese officer. The German camp at Erickson
Drift was, according to German maps, on German territory. After
Schultze-Jena’s death, Governor Seitz had repeatedly tried to inform his
counterpart in Luanda, about the incident in Naulila by sending messages
to all surrounding wireless stations, without, however, receiving any re-
sponse. According to the German memorandum, Seitz concluded that the
Portuguese “astonishing” silence could be understood as an approval of
Sereno’s act and that there is a state of war between Portugal and Ger-
many, of which he could not be informed since connections to Germany
were cut off. The authorities in GSWA therefore were entitled by interna-
tional law to seek justice on their own when they ordered the destruction
of the Kavango fortresses and, shortly later, Fort Naulila.
Referring to Lassa Oppenheim (International Law, 3rd ed, Vol.II, p. 44)
the counter-memorandum defined reprisals as acts, in themselves contrary
to international law, committed by one state against another state which
are exceptionally permitted since the state committing the reprisal is seek-
ing satisfaction for a previous act by the other state that was itself contrary
to international law. Reprisals may include military force, as the Germans
stressed, naming three examples of international practice: the sending of a
warship to Venezuela by the Dutch Government as reprisal for the expul-
sion of the Dutch Minister (1908); the British military occupation of cus-
toms offices in Nicaragua (1895); and the French seizure of Ottoman cus-
toms office in Mitilini (1901) following unlawful acts of the Ottoman au-
thorities against French nationals. As reprisals require a previous act vio-
lating international law, the Germans emphasized that it is the key
question whether the Portuguese shooting of the Germans was a lawful act
or whether it was contrary to international law and would therefore legit-
imize the subsequent German reprisal. Since reprisals are permitted by in-
ternational law, no damages could be claimed from Germany.150 Already
in the German declaration of war to Portugal on March 9, 1916, the Ger-
man government characterized the “measures” undertaken following the
Naulila incident as “retaliation”.151 The Germans also claimed that the
Portuguese expected a reprisal after the incident in Naulila, as the Por-
150 BAB R 1001/6635: 64f., Memo Al., 7/22; cf. Gaurier 2014: 698; Kalshoven 2005: 4; 33.
151 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156:700, USML to SoS, 13.3.16; Congresso Sess. 9, 10.3.16: 51.
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tuguese memorandum itself implied. It would have been therefore up to
the Portuguese to approach Governor Seitz to rectify the situation diplo-
matically; even more so, since he had informed Norton de Matos via wire-
less message about the Naulila incident and the latter had received this
message.
The Portuguese replique attempted to make clear that there was no legal
basis for any “reprisals” since all prerequisites were missing: First, there
was no prior violation of international law by the other state since Sereno
did not breach international law but acted in self-defense. Second, there
was no serious attempt to find an amicable solution. And third, asserting
that Governor Seitz was not entitled to order a reprisal, there was no prop-
er authority and no order for the reprisal by the state’s government. And
neither was the “massacre of Cuangar” a reprisal but vengeance for the
Naulila incident. It was also not a surprise coup, since there was no previ-
ous declaration of war, but a treacherous raid.
However; there was no authoritative definition of “reprisal” under inter-
national law. The governmental conferences of 1874 (Brussels), 1899 and
1907 (The Hague) “refrained from … openly dealing with reprisals.” Ger-
many in particular had ensured that “reprisal was … not to be curbed by
positive law.” Rather, German jurists aimed at leaving the regulation of
reprisals to “military usages”. This “suggests how strongly Imperial Ger-
many associated reprisal with punishment, rather than as a way to return
a[n offending] state to following law.” Given this state of affairs, the law
professor T.J. Lawrence admitted in 1915 that reprisal “is used in a bewil-
dering variety of senses”. In fact, reprisals were an undeniable “reality” in
state intercourse and they “constituted a recognized institution of interna-
tional law”. Thus, the parties in the 1920s were free to continue their de-
bate on the characteristics of legitimate reprisals under international
law.152
The German councilors insisted in their duplique that the battle of
Naulila should be considered a lawful reprisal against previous Portuguese
violations of international law. The order to resort to force was given by
the Governor, the bearer of the public order in GSWA and representative
of the Emperor. At the time he had no direct contact with his superiors in
Berlin and was entitled to proceed with the reprisal according to interna-
152 Kalshoven 2005: 66f.; Hull 2014: 65; 276-8; 2010 357; T. Lawrence quot. in: Darcy 2015:
881; on the (disputed) relation b/w reprisal, punishment and revenge ibd: 882; Tucker 1972.
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tional law. While Magalhães emphasized that the “massacre of Cuangar”
was not causally linked to the Naulila-incident but was carefully planned
before, the Germans argued that the measures taken against Cuangar and
the other Kavango fortresses proved to be insufficient to obtain “satisfac-
tion” from Portugal and to release Jensen and Kimmel from captivity.
They refuted that on October 29, 1914 the order to attack fort Naulila was
given together with the order to attack the Portuguese forts along the low-
er Okavango River, when it was not yet clear whether the Portuguese
would release Kimmel and Jensen. The Germans argued that colonial ge-
ography makes it commonsensical that when Ostermann had received the
order on October 29, it must have been given in Windhoek days earlier,
since from the town of Grootfontein to Ostermann’s station Kuring Kuru
only a courier could convey the message. The preparations for Franke’s
expedition, however, took several weeks and could have been ceased im-
mediately in case the actions against the Portuguese forts along the Oka-
vango River would have led to the Portuguese reactions desired by the
Germans. The German duplique stressed that Major Franke’s action in
Naulila was necessary since the Portuguese, in December 1914, were still
in breach of international law (holding Kimmel and Jensen captive). The
acts of German self-help along the Okavango River had proved to be in-
sufficient.
The decision to send Franke’s expedition was based, according to the
German lawyers, on Governor Seitz’ conviction – given the Portuguese
conduct and news from Angola – that Portugal and Germany were at war.
Seven ‘facts’ spoke for Seitz’ conviction: (1) the incident in Naulila; (2)
the subsequent silence of the Governor General of Angola (neither a com-
plaint about an alleged violation of Portuguese territory nor an apology for
the shootings); (3) the incursions of Portuguese patrols into German terri-
tory; (4) reports from Angola (by du Plessis, whom the Portuguese consid-
ered a German spy) that the Afrikaaners were ordered to either hand in
their weapons or fight against the Germans; (5) the refusal to permit postal
shipments from and to GSWA via Angola, eventhough this would have
been permissible for a neutral state; (6) the arrival of troops from Portugal
in Moçâmedes before the incident; (7) these troops were currently march-
ing towards GSWA. His colony was cut off from any connection to Euro-
pe, and Seitz believed – as he stated in his attached report – that he just
could not be informed about the war with Portugal from Berlin. The Ger-
man councilors thus implied – and attached German reports stated this
openly – that the Portuguese had caused the German governor’s error and
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did nothing to rectify the wrong impression about the alleged state of war.
The silence of the administration in Luanda seemed to support Seitz’
wrong impression. The consequences of this silence (the forceful
“reprisals”), should therefore not give the Portuguese government a pre-
texte for reparation claims.
The Portuguese replique stated that there were no wireless stations in
place in Angola and that the government in Lisbon would have to deal
with the difficult situations and not the administration in Luanda. Pointing
to the wireless equipment aboard the ships anchoring in Luanda’s harbor,
the Germans responded that had there been good will on the Portuguese
side, the Naulila incident could have quickly solved amicably between the
two colonial governments.
Given the possibility of contact between Luanda and Windhoek, the
German memorandum argued that Seitz did not resort easily to war. Once
the decision to dispatch a regiment to Naulila was reached, it took
Franke’s soldiers seven weeks to reach the Kunene, and negotiations could
have been opened by Portuguese anytime. Thus, the sending of troops did
not amount to aggression per se but was still a mere threat and the Por-
tuguese were free to choose how to react – to ask for an apology or to
fight. On the other hand, the German memorandum argued, in light of the
eminent threat of a Luso-British pincer movement from South and North,
the Governor of GSWA had to take swift preventive military action to
ward of incursions quickly before all would have been lost. The German
memorandum urged the arbitrator to take into consideration the wartime
situation and the overwhelming nature of the British attack. GSWA had to
be defended.
What the Germans tried to describe here – as a sort of subsidiary argu-
ment – can be referred to, in modern vernacular, as anticipatory attack –
an attack thus irrespective of prior wrongs (as requirement for lawful
reprisal) or the state of war (that would make superfluous the need to justi-
fy the resort to force). For centuries, questions of “prevention” and “pre-
emption” have been discussed by just war theorists with inconclusive re-
sults; according to current international law, an anticipatory attack must be
aimed at an imminent danger; it must be a threat which is concrete, not
merely abstract. Three elements have been outlined that justify an antici-
patory attack: First, there must be “a manifest intent to injure” (for exam-
ple by recent threats). Second, “a degree of active preparation that makes
the intent a positive danger” must be apparent (for example build-up of of-
fensive forces along the border). Third, the situation must be one “in
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which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, greatly magnifies the
risk [of being attacked].”153 According to these criteria, the attack on
Naulila may well have qualified for the justifying adjective “anticipatory”,
if the assumptions of Seitz and Heydebreck were taken into consideration.
Recent historiography also states the “strafexpedition [against Naulila]
represents a good example of active defense on the part of the Ger-
mans.”154
Proportionality and Necessity of Military Reprisals
When mentioning the term “reprisal” the German memorandum included
a conception of what must be considered a “lawful” reprisal, which they
themselves referred to as “proportionality”. When discussing the battle of
Naulila, the Germans rhetorically asked whether the alleged violation of
international law committed by Sereno had been compensated or “re-
paired” by the subsequent German destructions of the Portuguese Kavan-
go forts. The German memorandum postulated: “For that party which
takes reprisals, doing nothing other than responding to an act contrary to
international law by another act, it is evident that the harm caused by the
latter act must be proportional to the harm caused by the former.” The
Germans even stated: one could think that the death of three German offi-
cers in Naulila and the loss of equipment may be “compensated by the
death of nine Portuguese, eleven natives” and the destruction of the forts.
This sounded like an echo of Lt.-Colonel Roçadas, who was said to have
stated his surprise about the German attack on Naulila, since he believed
that after the destruction of the Kavango forts both sides had “offset” their
losses. However, the German memorandum argued that this was not the
case: The Portuguese had acted in “bad faith”, dishonored the inviolability
of an envoy on official mission and illegally captured Jensen and Kimmel.
By doing so, the Portuguese had violated the “national honor of Germany”
and therefore the actions of Constable Ostermann could not be considered
a “sufficient” reprisal. His platoon was too small to obtain the required
“satisfaction” and the prisoners taken in Naulila were not released by the
Portuguese. The Governor of GSWA had thus to resort to stronger mea-
3.3.4
153 Orend 2000: 539 cf. Hull 2014: 318; Walzer 1991: 74; Reichberg 2007: 5; 32; Rodin 2002;
Mitchell 2001: 157; Gazzini 2005: 149.
154 Cann 2001: 162; cf. Kelly 2003: 22; on ‘guerre conditionelle’cf. Séfériadès 1935: 163.
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sures and the actions of Major Franke were a continuation of the German
reprisal that begun in Fort Cuangar in the legitimate attempt to end the vi-
olation of international law by Portugal.155
When speaking about “proportionality”, German councilors used a term
that formed one of the tenets of contemporary German (administrative)
law, with a pedigree, however, that reached back to the origins of any no-
tions of justice. Proportionality, as Aharon Barak explains, “is an embodi-
ment of the notion of justice and can therefore be found in the image of
Lady Justice holding scales.” The requirement that punishment be propor-
tional to the offense is an ancient one:
“’an eye for an eye’ was considered a measured response. In the Jewish reli-
gious sources we find the Golden Rule which says: ‘That which is hateful to
you, do not do to your fellow’. … The classical Greek notions of corrective
justice (iustitia vindicativa) and distributive justice (iustitia distributiva) have
also contributed to the development of proportionality as a rational concept.
Early Roman law recognized the notion as well. …During the Middle Ages,
the international law doctrine of ‘Just War’ made use of the term [proportion-
ality]. According to the doctrine, there was a need to balance the overall utili-
ty of the war with the damage it may inflict.”156
Also in contemporary international law the principle of proportionality
had found its expression, even though it was never undisputed. The Caro-
line Case (1842), dealing with a military border incident between the US
and British Canada, led to correspondence between American and British
representatives that established formulations of necessity and proportion-
ality still representing the “position under the United Nations Charter sys-
tem”. The American Secretary of State Daniel Webster (1782–1852) elab-
orated on the necessity of self-defense by requiring the British government
to show a “necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
155 BAB R 1001/6635: 69, Memo Allem., 7/22 ‘le mal causé par le second de ces actes doit
être proportionné au mal causé par le premier.’; cf. Hull 2014: 278; 288 ‘The Great War
was disfigured by wave after wave of violent reprisals exercised with lethal stubbornness,
particularly against prisoners of war.’; German officials already then debated about the ‘use
and proportion’ of reprisals. The Germans explicitely resorted to measures of reprisals not
only by acts of war. The Government-Gazette of 1915 published an addendum to the Prize-
Order of 1909 and justified this as ‘reprisal against England’s’ acts contrary to the London
Declaration on the Laws of the Sea (26.2.1909): ‘In Vergeltung der von England … abwe-
ichend von der Londoner Erklärung über das Seekriegsrecht vom 16.2. 1909 getroffenen
Bestimmungen‘ wurde Grubenholz (Nr. 20 VO) zur ‘absoluten Konterbande‘ erklärt (PA R
52535, Ax RGBl 1915, Nr. 49, VO betr. Abänderung der PrisenO 30.9.09).
156 Barak 2012: 175; 177; cf. Nolte 2010: 245; Gardam 2004: 32-8; Butler 2003: 232.
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choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.” Webster continued by
stipulating the requirements of proportionality: “It will be for it to show,
also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of
the moment … did nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justi-
fied by that necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity,
and kept clearly within it.”157 However, as Judith Gardam stresses, with
the wording found in the Caroline correspondence “the idea that the use of
force must be both necessary and proportionate was by no means from
then on established in the practice of states.” Up to the First World War
there were “no developed customary rules that limited the situations in
which states could resort to force.” Lassa Oppenheim, for example, whose
International Law was quoted in the German memorandum for a defini-
tion of “reprisal”, “deals with the necessity aspect of the Caroline Incident
but does not mention proportionality.”158
The concept of reprisals as a European legal institution developed to
address denials of justice abroad. By the nineteenth century it was the case
that “all reprisals are public reprisals taken by the State itself and any in-
ternational wrong done to the State or its nationals is a just cause for
reprisals.” Doctrinal aspects developed over time to define legitimate
reprisals, including the requirement “that the reprisal taker had previously
attempted to obtain redress from the wrongdoer.”159 Thus, “one of the re-
quirements of legitimate reprisals was that they be necessary in light of the
failure of other methods to achieve satisfaction. Whether or not legitimate
reprisals also had to be proportionate was a matter on which views dif-
fered.” In the second half of the nineteenth century reprisals as state prac-
tice of a coercive nature “were of considerable significance”, as the three
cases referred to in the German memorandum show.160
It has been stated that historians of public international law should give
“more regard … to internal divisions in the discipline, the way particular
concepts or doctrines reflect national, cultural or political differences.”161
The contrasting treatment of the issue of proportionality in the competing
Portuguese and German memoranda may give an example of such divi-
sions in the discipline. The German lawyers did not adhere to the notion
157 Quot. Gardam 2004: 41; cf. Somek 2014: 110; Vranes 2009: 9; Reichberg 2007: 32 FN 88.
158 Gardam 2004: 42f. ref. Oppenheim 1906: 177-81; cf. Kalshoven 2005: 67; Kelly 2003: 25.
159 Carter/Trimble/Bradley 2003: 971 quoting H. Waldock 1952.
160 Gardam 2004: 31;46; cf. Carnahan 1998: 228; Hull 2014: 67-72; 2010: 353f. on necessity.
161 Kosekenniemi 2004: 65.
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that military actions would have to accept any kind of quantifiable limits
(number of attacks, number of deaths or damages) in order to be permissi-
ble. In their understanding, “the state” was free to defend its sovereignty
and honor, most of all during a war, be it formally declared or not. The
Germans, when explicitly invoking the principle of proportionality and ar-
guing that it was upheld during the attacks on Cuangar and Naulila, as-
sumed two tenets to be self-explanatory: First, the context of the World
War (the conceived threat of a Luso-British pincer movement) warranted
acts of war (a sovereign state right) as an urgent necessity after attempts to
contact the Governor General were turned down by the latter. “[M]ilitary
necessity is sometimes characterized as the source of the requirement that
warfare be proportionate.”162 And second, a punitive element of the attack
was a legitimate part of the reprisal. The punitive, retaliatory aspect was
highlighted repeatedly by Germans during the war. Even the German Mi-
nister in Lisbon, Dr. Rosen, spoke in 1915 of a “punitive expedition [that
was] sent [to Naulila] to chastise the aggressors”. The settlers in GSWA
and the Schutztruppe used harsher terms and demanded “revenge” for the
“murder of Naulila”163
Revenge and punishment, however, are supposed to be severe to be ef-
fective, as they are meant to lead to an intended result (apology, repara-
tions etc. – here, punishment was considered a means to an end). The de-
struction of the Kavango forts achieved nothing in this respect. For the
German councilors, a proportionate reprisal thus did not mean “an eye for
an eye”; their guiding principle was “‘tit for tat’ instead of ‘tat for tat’.”
And similar to the contemporary debates about the “Belgian atrocities”,
“[t]here is every reason to believe that Imperial Germany thought its ac-
tions legal, permissible, or at least excusable”. The Germans “were af-
fronted by charges of lawlessness”, feeling dishonored by “being judged
criminally. Yet”, as historian Isabel V. Hull has stated recently, “Ger-
many’s legal counterarguments, its justifications and rationales, were of-
ten strikingly narrow and technical; they were somehow sharply lawyerly
162 Gardam 2004: 7 ‘One of its earliest formulations is contained in Article 13 of the Lieber
Code, drawn up in 1863 during the Americ. Civil War: “Military necessity … consists of
the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war,
and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war”.’; cf. Hull 2014: 27;
276; Neff 2010: 64; Carnahan 1998: 215.
163 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 152: 700, DGL to USML Birch, 22.6.15; Suchier 1918: 25; 63.
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without partaking in the gravity or principled sweep characteristic of
law.”164
It was exactly this “unique” understanding of the relation between inter-
national law and military necessity that caused so much anger among the
Allies during the war. The “most renowned international lawyer of the
day, France’s Louis Renault” defined in 1917 as one of the “goal[s] of the
present war … the destruction of the German theory that necessity justifies
the violation of all the laws of war.” The councilors of the Berlin Foreign
Office were well aware of this resentment to the “latitudinarian views [on
military necessity] current in Germany”, but they continued also after the
war to use this “uniquely robust doctrine” in their legal argumentation.165
It was to be seen whether they would convince arbitrator de Meuron or
whether he considered the German reprisal excessive.
Violence, Non-Combatant Immunity, and War Crimes
“After the war came the reckoning.” Considering the horrifying atrocities
committed during the war and the demand to hold the perpetrators ac-
countable, the question of postwar (punitive) justice was an international
issue (during and) after the World War I. In Constantinople, a military tri-
bunal was charged in December 1918 with investigating and prosecuting
politicians and military leaders involved in the Armenian genocide. In the
Treaty of Versailles, the German Government “recognize[d] the right of
the Allied … Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of
having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war” (Arti-
cle 228). In 1919 and 1920, Germans accused of such deeds were awaiting
their trial in Britain, France, and Belgium. “Reflecting the hold of interna-
tional law on definitions of ‘atrociousness’, the Allies were determined to
charge the enemy legally for its transgressions.”166 However, the extradi-
tion of alleged German war criminals did not take place. While the Allies
had originally intended to try 896 individuals, the German government
convinced the Allies that the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) in Leipzig
3.3.5
164 Häußler/Trotha 2012: 63 consider it characteristic for retaliations (Vergeltungsmaßnah-
men) that they are stronger than the original attack; Hull 2014: 58; 331; cf. Stephan 1998.
165 Hull 2014: 329; 1f. quot. Renault 1917; ix; 25; on German debates Toppe 2007.
166 Horne 2014: 582; cf. Dadrian/Akçam 2011; Felman 2002: 16; Hull 2014: 312f.; Ziemann
2013: 56; Horne /Kramer 2001; Kramer 2007; 1993; Scott 1920: 150.
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would indict the men for war crimes. From 1921 to 1927 ten verdicts were
published (four acquittals and six indictments), all other cases were
dropped.167
This context stood in the background when both parties to the Luso-
German arbitration related the fate of their soldiers in the African theater
of war. In addition, the situation coloniale had a major imprint not only on
the way battles were fought, but also in the way lawyers talked about mili-
tary engagements in the colonies.
Death was a constant element of colonialism. It figured high among the
dramatis personæ in the power games of European imperialists. The
recognition of an intimate link between colonialism and violence has de-
veloped into a historiographic tenet over the last decades. A treatise on
colonial questions could barely be imagined without mentioning the vio-
lence of settlers and soldiers.168 Contemporaries were aware of this con-
nection too. Some deplored it, others took it for granted and did not at-
tempt to pussyfoot around. In Portugal and in Germany, as elsewhere in
Europe, based on “white race superiority, the premise asserting that the
conquest and exploitation of African territories and people were totally le-
gitimate was widely accepted.” In the age of empire, “international
lawyers shared a sense of the inevitability of the modernizing process”.169
However, after July 1914 brutalities committed by the European “enemy”
in the colonies suddenly became a source of condemnation. Relations be-
tween the enemies were poisoned by reciprocal accusations of atrocities
committed in Africa. In October 1914, the British started to interview
Africans in Cameroon and to collect “reports” and “evidence”, “all indi-
cating that cruelty … has been shown to the native inhabitants by the Ger-
mans”. Evidence was forwarded to London of the use of “expanding bul-
lets” “which is contrary to the provisions of the Hague Convention.”170 In
August 1914, when the cruelties committed by Germans in Belgium had
begun to make headlines, Germans in Togo were accused of using dum-
dum bullets and arming Africans they would not control. Germans re-
sponded with similar charges of barbaric acts committed by French troops.
When France and Britain started to employ troops from Africa, India, and
167 PA Lissabon 176, Millerand to Lersner; Note, 3.2.20; At. Gen. to MoJ, 21.5.20; Scott 1920:
159: Bass 2000; Hankel 2003; Wiggenhorn 2005; Gomes 2010:33; Kraus 2013: 38.
168 Pélissier 1979: 9; cf. Osterhammel 2011: 531f; 697-701; Simo 2005: 110.
169 Corrado 2008: 66; Koskenniemi 2001: 109; cf. Hull 2005: 332.
170 TNA FO 371/1883: 459, General Dobell to CO, L. Harcourt, 28.10.14.
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Indochina in Europe, both were condemned by German propaganda “for
betraying the white race”. Throughout the war, the conscription of the
“colored mob” (farbiges Gesindel) remained in the focus of the German
propaganda.171 According to historian Marc Michel, of all the grievances
the heaviest burden also for the future was the claim of having humiliated
the “white” adversary by exposing “white” prisoners of war to the “brutal-
ities and mockeries” of “black” guards.172
The Luso-German arbitration was about the payment of damages, not
about war crimes and criminals. No soldiers faced the threat of being im-
prisoned for crimes he had committed in southern Angola. The legal pro-
cedure left no room for the analysis of individual suffering during and af-
ter the acts of war. Especially from the Portuguese side almost only high-
ranking officials were invited to write reports to be attached to Magalhães’
memoranda and to speak during the testimonies. Violence was seen here
as having caused financial damages and as an infringement of national
honor. “[Only i]n the wake of Nuremberg [1945/6], the law was chal-
lenged to address the causes and consequences of historical traumas.”173
But still, the former war enemies accused each other of war crimes.
Magalhães referred to German atrocities in Europe, thereby creating an
argumentative link to the debate in Europe during the war about German
disrespect for international law and barbarism and thus making more cred-
ible the brutalities in Africa. He accused the Germans of having indiscrim-
inately shot civilians during the “massacre of Cuangar” (including a trader
and his son). However, the legal concept that “there should be a distinc-
tion between civilians and combatants in armed conflict… was [still] of a
very general nature”. Before the World War “there was as yet no sugges-
tion of any legal requirements to protect civilians from the impact of
armed conflict, although contemporary commentators talked … of the ille-
171 Klotz 2005: 139; cf. Koller 2001; 2002; Hull 2014: 53; Close 1916 POW in GSWA.
172 Michel 2004: 927. Asked by a journalist about German intentions to ‘force German Kultur
upon the world’ novelist Thomas Mann responded in late 1914 with a drawing of a ‘Sene-
gal negro guarding German POWs … gurgling “One should butcher them. They are barbar-
ians”.’ This discourse of shame would be reiterated on a national scale in Germany, when
Africans were among the French troops occupying the Rhineland in 1921 causing the cam-
paign against the ‘Black Horror on the Rhine’ (schwarze Schmach). Th. Mann: An die
Redaktion des Svenska Dagbladet, in Fetscher 2003: 241; cf. Ciarlo 2011: 317: Kolb 2011:
97; Poley 2005: 163f.
173 Felman 2002: 1; on the question of soldiers’ testimony of war Hewitson 2010.
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gitimacy of wanton and disproportionate warfare.”174 German ruthlessness
was further underlined by claiming the use of dum-dum bullets during the
raid and the killing of wounded soldiers point blank.175 “Natives” were al-
legedly instigated by the Germans and supported them brutally against the
Portuguese.
The German councilors expressed their regret about the 22 men killed
in Cuangar, but rejected the Portuguese characterization of a “massacre”.
They insisted that the Portuguese soldiers were not treacherously mur-
dered but died in open combat. Portuguese soldiers were shot dead, as the
German memorandum insisted, with their guns in hand. “Surprise” consti-
tutes a legitimate element of military attacks. The heavy Portuguese losses
were, according to the Germans, due to the “incoherence of the Portuguese
defense”. The Portuguese soldiers were allegedly not prepared to defend
the fort, but instead of surrendering to the German attackers, they attempt-
ed on an individual basis to take up their arms.
Further, the German memoranda provided a tu quoque response – a
rather weak response to an accusation, since it can never refute the accusa-
tion. The German councilors tried to point out that the Portuguese had vio-
lated the laws of war in multiple ways. They sought to show first that the
“murder” of the “envoy on official mission” Schultze-Jena and his party
was a manifest violation of international law, and that during the battle of
Naulila the German soldiers were, contrary to what had been maintained
by Magalhães, far outnumbered by the Portuguese. The latter had
equipped Africans with guns to be used against German attackers. The
Portuguese accusations of German war crimes were countered by clarify-
ing that indeed seven Africans were hanged after the battle since they had
allegedly continued to shoot at the Germans after the Portuguese had sur-
rendered. When they were caught, these men were not wearing any uni-
forms or other signs of their Portuguese affiliation. They were “men of
neighboring tribes” equipped by the Portuguese with guns to enlarge their
174 Gardam 2004: 29; 53; cf. Gallo 2013: 259; Cramer 1991: 85f.; Hull 2005: 320.
175 Cpt. Trainer’s letter to Roçadas of December 18, 1914 demanded to commence negotia-
tions immediately and threatened that all Africans carrying weapons would be hanged; Eu-
ropeans carrying dum-dum bullets would be shot (Varão 1934: 59f.). Portugal had not
signed the Hague declaration of 1899 on the prohibition of dum-dum bullets, together with
Great Britain and the United States. ‘The Germans during the First World War repeatedly
raised the accusation that the British Army was using Dumdum bullets … the accusation
could never be proven.’ Gross Art. ‚Dumdum Bullets‘ in Hirschfeld et.al. 2012: 481; cf.
Hull 2014: 281; Koller 2001: 103; Walter 2014: 156.
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firepower. The German councilors pointed out that this Portuguese strate-
gy of involving civilians violated the laws of war as agreed to also by Por-
tugal in the Hague, stipulating that militias would have to bear signs of
their affiliation and would have to observe the laws of war. The German
troops were, so the German councilors, entitled to punish the men who
had violated international law. Magalhães, on the other hand, argued fac-
tually by asserting that all Africans hanged by the Germans after a court-
martial were neither loin-cloth wearing warriors nor in breach of interna-
tional law, but regular Mozambican soldiers in uniform who had faithfully
fulfilled their duty when they shot at German soldiers from the trees.
Another German accusation against Portuguese troops in Naulila was
the abuse of the white flag that the Germans understood as a sign of sur-
render; whereas the Portuguese continued to shoot at them. Later, during
the testimonies in Lisbon, General Roçadas stated that he had not given
the order to hoist a white flag, since he had no intention to surrender. He
had given an order to retreat. Major Aragão, however, explained that the
white flag hoisted (a handkerchief) concerned only the 90 men under
Lieutenant Marques who had been surrounded by Germans.
Both parties argued that “the enemy” had not adhered to the military
rules of de-escalation after the cessation of hostilities. The Germans
claimed that Portuguese soldiers had continued to fire after the white flag
was shown and auxiliary troops had shot after their officers had already
capitulated. The Portuguese, in contrast, accused the Germans of having
targeted medical services and to have beaten Portuguese soldiers after the
storming of the fort. Brutalities of soldiers were justified by both parties
with reference to the threat posed by the foe. In the heat of the battle the
soldiers had done their duty by defending themselves and advancing
against the enemy. They were depicted as victims of the other side – an
argumentative strategy that grew into an outright “victim myth”. The hier-
archical command structure of the military excluded any personal respon-
sibility.176
176 Cf. Kühne/Ziemann 2000: 27f. ‘the victim myth transforms … aggression in defense‘.
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Portugal’s Neutrality – a German Claim
International law stood as the “basis” of the Treaty of Versailles and of
“each individual article”. Considering the ongoing arbitration procedures
initiated by the Treaty, the lawyer H. Isay reasoned in 1923 that it has be-
come “obvious that international law is Germany’s most powerful pillar
and weapon in the battle for reconstruction. …Today, faith in Germany’s
continuity as a state… can be based only on the faith in the power of inter-
national law.”177 § 4 was thus first and foremost to be read in light of the
doctrines of international law and this included the definition of the period
of its own competence: “since July 31, 1914, and before that Allied or As-
sociated Power entered into the war.” The framers of § 4 did not use the
term neutralité; nevertheless, this is what this section was all about: claims
for damages during neutrality (Neutralitätsschäden). The Portuguese were
thus eager to underline that they did not “enter into the war”, but stayed
neutral until Germany’s declaration of war on March 9, 1916.
As we have seen, already in 1915 Foreign Minister “Soares [was aware
of] the breaches of neutrality committed by Portugal in virtue of her al-
liance with Great Britain” and “His Majesty’s Government fully recog-
nised these facts”. But in 1920, Afonso Costa during a financial confer-
ence in Brussels lashed out at the German delegates, accusing “Germany
of having caused the country’s deficits and expenses, which so burden its
present situation, through its treacherous attacks against the Portuguese in
Africa before any declaration of war.”178 The German memoranda, on the
other hand, maintained that the Portuguese government was since 1914
constantly in breach of neutrality.
Before the outbreak of the World War, the term “neutrality” had al-
ready acquired a status in international law doctrine that few other terms
would ever reach. Rights and duties of states declaring their “neutrality”
during a war were codified in international treaties (1907 The Hague;
1909 London), the elaboration of which had developed into an important
3.3.6
177 Isay 1923: iii, VölkR als ‘Grundlage…des VV als Ganze[m und] seiner Einzelbestim-
mungen‘. The German-American Mixed Claims Commission agreed to base its decision on
‘general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and, subsidiarily, on Rules of
Law common to the US and Germany established by either statutes or judicial decisions.’
As in previous and later memoranda in interstate disputes (Bothe 1976: 292; 283), argu-
ments based on comparative legal analysis of municipal legal systems were made by the
Portuguese and German representatives.
178 AHD 3p ar.7m48, BML to MNE, 27.10.15; Dia.de Notíç., 18.10.20 in Meneses 2010: 138.
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field among academics of international law. During and after the war
“neutrality” had become a key term in the (legal) disputes, since the war
“begun with an international crime: Germany’s violation of Belgian neu-
trality.” The Allies, on the other hand, had occupied the German
colonies.179
The neutrality of European overseas possession has been a disputed le-
gal (and military) question that dates back at least to the seventeenth cen-
tury. European powers repeatedly signed treaties that were supposed to en-
sure that wars in Europe did not spill over to the Americas, Asia, or
Africa. However, European armies attacked each other outside the Euro-
pean theater of wars throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century,
the Dutch “occupation” of Angola in 1641 during the Thirty Years’ War
being an example. With the onset of the scramble of Africa, the members
of the Berlin Congo Conference (1885) were aware of the risk of future
(European) wars in Africa. However, they could not agree on a formally
guaranteed neutrality of the Congo basin (that excluded GSWA). Espe-
cially France and Portugal were concerned about this limitation of state
sovereignty (to wage war). The resulting Article 11 stipulated “that the
territories … may be, with the common consent of this Power and of the
other party or parties belligerent, placed for the duration of the war under
the regime of neutrality and considered as belonging to a non-belligerent
State”. Thus, the powers were entitled but not obliged to jointly declare as
“neutral” their territories in the Congo basin.180
At the beginning of the war, the authorities of Belgian Congo expressed
their “desire … that Congo maintain its neutrality during the present con-
flict in Europe”. However, the “French government denies absolutely to
the Germans the advantage of the General Act of Berlin, 1885.” In early
August, French troops blockaded those parts of the Congo River that had
been ceded in 1912 to German Cameroon and seized several German bor-
der posts. German troops tried to occupy French and Belgian territory in
the upper Congo region.181 The British government also decided that it
was “not practical politics to treat any of the German possessions in Africa
179 Hull 2014: 16; cf. Neff 2000; Delaunay 2004: 858; Poincaré 1929: 529; Gaurier 2014: 855
on ‘les limites des règles applicables à la neutralité et leurs lacunes’.
180 Fisch 1984: 99; cf. Walter 2014: 107; Bührer 2011: 359; Klöckner in: Kolonialkriegerbund
1924: 58; Reeves 1909: 115: ‘The neutralization [of the Congo basin] was not compulsory
or imposed upon the territories within the zone, but it was voluntary’.
181 NARA RG 84, Boma, v. 18, 718, USC Boma to SoS, 8.8.; 820, 14.8.; 16.9.14.
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as neutral.” In September 1914 the Germans requested the neutralization
of African colonies, but considering the already ongoing campaigns the
Allies turned down this suggestion. At this point in time the neutrality of
Portugal was already questioned by the administration in Windhoek. As
we have seen, the Portuguese government affirmed on August 7 in parlia-
ment that Portugal continues to observe its obligations from the alliance
with Great Britain. A formal declaration of neutrality was never given and
during the war the British acknowledged that “Portugal ha[d] invariably
shown from the outbreak of hostilities complete devotion to her ancient al-
ly.”182
While the Portuguese memoranda maintained that Governor Seitz knew
from wireless messages that Portugal was neutral, the German councilors,
referring to the annexed report of the former head of Windhoek’s wireless
station, argued that there had been no contact with Berlin any longer since
the destruction of the stations Daressalam in GEA (August 8) and Kamina
in Togo (August 27). The Windhoek station was not designed to directly
contact the station Nauen near Berlin. On August 9, 1914 Windhoek re-
ceived via Kamina the message: “Until now we are not at war with Portu-
gal.” However, given the news about troop movement towards the border
with GSWA and alleged incursions, this may have changed. It was one of
the objectives of Schultze-Jena’s mission to clarify Portugal’s neutrality.
In the same vein, the German memorandum rejected Magalhães’ char-
acterization of Schultze-Jena as smuggler (contrebandier). Instead, the of-
ficial had intended to ask for a Portuguese permission to purchase the
goods from Angola. Irrespective of an alleged prohibition of exports from
Angola (of which Schultze-Jena was not aware), the German councilors
were eager to stress that such procurement in a neutral state would have
been in line with the provision of the V. Hague-Convention respecting the
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land.
Furthermore, the German memorandum continued, Article 32 of the An-
nex to the IV. Hague-Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (1907), guarantees to the parlementaire inviolability. Al-
182 Samson 2006: 633f.; 2013: 30; AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, BML to MNE, 17.2.16; Teixeira 1998:
187-210 on Portugal’s ‘ambiguous’ neutrality. Portugal’s neutrality had also in previous sit-
uations favored GB. The support granted to the British in Mozambique during the South
African War 1900-02 was not only pivotal against war efforts of the Afrikaaner. By permit-
ting British troops to pass its territories, Lisbon aimed at strengthening the ties with London
in order to obtain ‘the guarantee of the integrity of Portugal’s African empire.’ Pélissier
2000: 575 quot. Costa, F.: Portugal e a Guerra Anglo-Boer, Lisbon 1998: 6.
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though the two countries were not at war and Portugal was allegedly neu-
tral in 1914, the rules concerning parlementaires would have to be applied
analogously. The fact that Schultze-Jena, being on a special mission as
representative of the Governor of GSWA, did not wave a white flag could
not count against him being an envoy since he was entering Portuguese
territory upon Sereno’s invitation. Furthermore, the telegrams sent to and
from the district officer of Humbe about negotiations with Schultze-Jena,
as quoted in the Portuguese memorandum, indicated according to the Ger-
man councilors that Schultze-Jena was considered an envoy. The Por-
tuguese memorandum stipulated itself motives for the Germans coming to
the Kunene River: negotiating with the head of district in Lubango, receiv-
ing news/telegrams about the war in Europe, and asking permission to
purchase foodstuff. Those motives were, according to the German memo-
randum, in line with Articles 7 and 8 of the V. Hague-Convention: “A
neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on be-
half of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in
general, of anything which can be of use to an army”. Nor was there an
obligation to prevent them to use telegraphs. Portugal, as a neutral state,
was entitled to permit the food deliveries or the usage of telegraphs; and
the question of such permission or refusal was to be negotiated between
Schultze-Jena and a Portuguese official.
The German councilors followed a twofold, at times contradictory, ap-
proach, accusing Portugal of breach of the laws of neutrality and at the
same time, explaining that Portugal had, in fact, never been neutral. While
Magalhães was eager to reduce this discussion to its formal aspects, em-
phasizing Portugal’s neutrality in 1914 (the formal basis of any claims un-
der § 4) by pointing out that neither side had issued a declaration of war,
the German memorandum presented the arbitrator with a rationalization of
Portugal’s motives for the decision not to enter into the war. Allegedly,
the Portuguese merely waited for a favorable moment. In a report attached
to the memorandum, one witness pointed out that neither after the destruc-
tion of Cuangar nor after the battle of Naulila, Portugal declared war on
Germany. He therefore assumed that Portugal felt “guilty”.183 The true at-
titude of Portugal towards Germany, according to German perception,
would become clear when reading the Portuguese Whitebook presented at
Versailles in 1919, excerpts of which were attached to the German memo-
183 BAB R 1001/6634: 93, Report A. Schubert, Ax 1 Memo All., 23.5.22 ‘fühlt sich schuldig‘.
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randum. There, Portuguese Ministers were quoted as having repeatedly
confirmed the alliance with Great Britain; even negotiations about the de-
livery of guns to France in September 1914 were mentioned as well as the
permissions given to British ships to use Portuguese harbors or British
troops to cross Portuguese (colonial) territories. Therefore, the German
councilors assumed that a close reading of the Whitebook allows but for
one conclusion: that Portugal had, from the beginning of the hostilities,
aimed at supporting Great Britain and that Portugal was eager to immedi-
ately enter the war on the British side. The Portuguese neutrality should
thus be considered a pretext to support Allied war efforts. This impression
was allegedly confirmed by Egas Moniz’ Um ano de Politica. He stated in
his book that “Portugal had never been a neutral state. We had always
been on the side of England and never declared our neutrality.”184 A trans-
lation of the relevant pages of this book was annexed to the German mem-
orandum of 1922.
Given the Portuguese additional claim of 2 billion GM for Germany’s
infringement of international law and violation of Portuguese sovereignty
the German duplique of 1923 left it to the arbiter to “examine” the Por-
tuguese attitude towards Germany before the formal state of war was de-
clared in 1916, an attitude that was in contradiction with the stated “neu-
trality”. Only in consideration of this (adversarial) attitude the subsequent
Germans measures, called an “infringement of sovereignty”, could be un-
derstood.
This dispute underlines what Jan H. Verzijl later stated about the term
“neutral”: It “is in fact itself a neutral term in the sense that it lacks, even
in the legal field, a well-defined meaning and has many connotations.”
From a political perspective the issue was considered less ambiguous – at
least from a British perspective: a certain sense of gratitude for Portugal’s
handling of its neutrality was perceptible. Still in 1927, the British Foreign
Office was well aware of the importance of Portugal’s ‘specific’ neutrality
to Britain: Had the Portuguese “been neutral in the sense that the Sweds
were neutral” the situation in 1914 would have been “more dangerous and
difficult” and this “might indeed have cost Britain the war.”185
184 BAB R 1001/6634: 24, excerpt (German transl.) Moniz: Um ano de politica, 1919: 257f.
185 Verzijl 1979: 12; Stone 1975: 733.
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Discourses of Honor and Dishonor
On March 9, 1916, after German ships anchoring in Portuguese ports were
requisitioned (on British request), Germany declared war on Portugal.
Next to the requisitions, several instances of “violations of neutrality” by
Portugal were mentioned in the declaration of war: Passage of British
troops across Mozambique were tolerated four times; while “British war
ships were permitted to remain for a long period in Portuguese ports”,
German ships could not even load coal in Portuguese harbors; Portuguese
weapons were delivered to the British, who could also “use Madeira as a
naval station”. “Besides this, expeditions were sent to Africa with the
openly avowed purpose to fight against Germany.”186 Portugal’s Foreign
Minister Augusto Soares “emphatically repudiate[d] the accusation” that
Portugal would be in breach of neutrality: “no one in this matter should
suspect us of dissimulation or treachery, incompatible with our honor.”187
Such rhetoric of “honor” permeated the argumentation also during the
arbitration procedure. The notion of “honor” – even though its meaning
was never spelled out – to be upheld and defended under any circum-
stances was considered a key motive for the fighting in Southern Angola.
Capitão mor Varão, for example, was of the opinion that Alferes Sereno
had acted in Fort Naulila like an “energetic officer, virtuous and diligent”,
et un homme d’honneur.188 Conversely, the “enemy” was accused of hav-
ing acted dishonorably. Magalhães’ narration of the German attack of Fort
Cuangar emphasized German malintentions by recounting that allegedly
the commanders of Cuangar and Kuring Kuru, after the outbreak of the
war, concluded a gentlemen’s agreement to inform each other in advance
in case they would have to “fulfill their military duty”, i.e. to attack their
neighbor. Since Commander Durão had trust in Constable Ostermann, no
security measures were undertaken. Ostermann, however, violated his
word of honor, attacked the fort treacherously and massacred soldiers and
3.3.7
186 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 700, USML to SoS, 13.3.16 German declaration of war;
AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, BML to MNE, 1.3.16; MNE to DGL, 3.3.16 So dependend were the
Portuguese on the British that before the Germans declared war on Portugal the British
Legation in Lisbon drafted for the Portuguese Foreign Ministry the justification for the
seizure of ships, which the Portuguese translated and sent to the German Legation; Wheeler
1978: 128.
187 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 156: 700, USML to SoS, 13.3.16; Congr., Sessão 9, 10.3.16: 53.
188 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 37f., statement Antonio F. Varão, 11.11.21; Ministry of
War, register Sub-Lt. M.A. Sereno, 3.7.25.
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civilians. The German councilors responded that – in case such agreement
did exist – it would have lost its value for a German official learning about
the murder of German officers in Naulila. Furthermore, an agreement be-
tween subalterns such as Ostermann and Durão would not create obliga-
tions between states.
Also other “scenes” of the border war put competing narratives of
(dis)honorable behavior up against each other. The same occurrence could
occasion two different grievances leading to many questions not only in
the memoranda, but also during the testimonies. After the capture of Fort
Naulila, Captain Trainer was outraged by the abusive (as he saw it) hoist-
ing of the white flag ordered by Lieutenant Marques even though the
shooting continued. When the latter surrendered with his men they were
rounded-up by Germans and Marques was said have pleaded to Trainer:
“It is not the fault of these men [that the others continue to fire], shoot me
but not my men.” Trainer did not understand Portuguese. He believed
Marques insulted him and threw his field glasses (or hat) at him, thus vio-
lating the officer’s honor in front of his subordinates. Over the years, sev-
eral accounts of this incident were collected:189 According to the account
of Marques, this incident occurred after Trainer had asked him about the
numbers and equipment of the Portuguese troops. When he responded that
he had no obligation to answer, Trainer punched with his field glasses at
Marques’ chest.190 Private Bertling, who witnessed the scene, described it
four days later in his diary. He noted that Portuguese soldiers went to their
knees and begged for their lives when they saw how Trainer had ordered
to hang the first African. Then, a Portuguese officer, fell on his knees, his
hat in his hands, begging Trainer for the lives of his men. “Trainer pushed
him aside and threw his hat in [Marques’] face.“191 In 1929 the question
whether Trainer treated his prisoners dishonorably was still ventured
about, and Trainer tried to argue that it were the Portuguese themselves
who acted shamefully: “There was no brutal attack, merely the shaking off
troops bare of any discipline or honor.“192
189 BAB R 1001/6638: 126f., questions Franke, 15.1.25; 262, testimony Aragão 6/24.
190 BAB R 1001/6638: 128, questions Trainer, 14.1.25; 173, testimony Marques 6/24.
191 NAN A.424, War Diary Bertling, 22.12.14.
192 BAB R 1001/6641: 224 (28), Mj Trainer: Zur portugiesischen Denkschrift, 9.2.29 ‘sondern
lediglich das Abschütteln einer von jeder Disziplin und Ehre entblößten Truppe ‘. The treat-
ment of POW was a sensitive issue after the war. During WWI, Germany had captured ~
2.5 million soldiers and civilians, most of them were put to work in part under horrendous
circumstances. Treatment and death rates of POWs and deportees was the issue of protract-
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Next to the comportment of soldiers on the battlefield, another question
loomed large throughout the arbitration: the nation’s honor. In this sense,
the German councilors were faced with the question whether the “viola-
tion of the individual honor of nationals by non-nationals … [was] a viola-
tion of national honor. Ultimately, the question [arose] how the medium of
national honor should codify [normieren] individual conduct.”193 While
the Portuguese depicted Sereno as un homme d’honneur, the Germans
found that by dishonoring the inviolability of an envoy on official mission
and illegally capturing two Germans, the Portuguese had violated the “na-
tional honor of Germany”194
It seemed a matter of course that not only individuals, but also “the
State” possessed honor; its defense was considered legitimate, if necessary
even by force. In one of Friedrich Schiller’s most popular theater plays,
arguments in this vein were uttered: “Base, indeed, the nation that for its
honor ventures not its all.”195 Also historian Heinrich von Treitschke de-
manded the defense of the state’s honor at all costs:
“Any insult offered, even if only outwardly, to the honour of a State, casts
doubt upon the nature of the State. We mistake the moral laws of politics if
we reproach any State with having an over-sensitive sense of honour, for this
instinct must be highly developed in each one of them if it is to be true to its
own essence. The State is no violet, to bloom unseen; its power should stand
proudly, for all the world to see, and it cannot allow even the symbol of it to
be contested. If the flag is insulted, the state must claim reparation; should
this not be forthcoming, war must follow, however small the occasion may
seem; for the State has never any choice but to maintain the respect in which
it is held among its fellows.”196
It would be too far fetched to argue that the order of Governor Seitz to at-
tack Cuangar and Naulila was ‘predetermined’ by this notion of the rela-
ed disputes after the war and the German government issued lengthy reports about prison-
ers. Germany had captured 6,836 [or 7,740] Portuguese soldiers (mostly in France) of
whom 163 deceased during captivity. The soldiers were repatriated in 1919. Cf. Spoerer
2006: 127f.; Oeter 1999; Speed 1990.
193 Koller 2003: 95, ob die ‘Verletzung der individuellen Ehre von Nationsangehörigen durch
Nichtnationsangehörige…die nationale Ehre verletzte. Letztlich geht es also auch um die
Frage, wie das Medium der Nationalehre individuelles Verhalten normieren sollte.‘ Cf. Best
1981; Kolb 2011:71 on Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau: ‘Ehre und Würde waren die
Fixpunkte seines Weltbildes; an ihnen orientierte sich sein außenpolitisches Agieren.‘
194 PA R 52535, Mémoire du Gouvernement Allemand concernant les réclamations portugais.
195 Earl Dunois: ‘Nichtswürdig ist die Nation, die nicht alles freudig setzt an ihre Ehre.‘, in:
Friedrich Schiller: The Maid of Orleans (I, 5), 1801; cf. Kesper-B./Ludwig/Ortmann 2011.
196 Treitschke 1916: 595, Cpt. ‘International Law and International Intercourse’, ‘Sovereignty’.
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tion between individual and national honor. There were other reasons for
the attacks that were stressed by the German councilors. However, Tre-
itschke’ influence is undisputable and recent research underlines that the
German military was locked into the dialectics of “honor” and “disgrace”:
“as defined by soldiers’ honor, defenseless[ness] is similar to dishonor-
able[ness]”.197 And according to the sociologist Norbert Elias not only the
German military but also parts of the Bürgertum had developed combative
(kriegerisch) traditions that focused on foreign relations; a tradition ex-
pressed in conceptual symbols “like courage, obedience, honor, discipline,
responsibility, and loyalty”.198 Furthermore, when the German councilors
deemed it worth mentioning that the killing of Schultze-Jena and two oth-
er officers had violated the “national honor of Germany”, they were aware
that also previous disputes in public international law had been ‘triggered’
by the alleged violation of a (European) nation’s honor, for example in
Venezuela (1908) or Turkey (1901). Just as in municipal law, honor was
thus a subject of legal relevance in foreign relations.
For both, Portugal and Germany, colonial possessions seemed a matter
of national honor. Following the war, defeated Germany was considered
by many in the Allied countries a “pariah” among the nations. As shown
above, the assertion that Germans were “unfit to govern native races” and
the taking over of all colonies by other powers was deemed by most Ger-
mans a grave offense against the nation’s honor. After all, the possession
of colonies had been declared by German politicians early on as a “matter
of honorableness“199 The German councilors thus, in their memoranda,
also aimed to argue against the qualification of Germans as “unfit” colo-
nial administrators.
Also Portugal’s honor seemed tarnished. “Of all the effects on Portugal
… which derived from participation in World War I … the most important
was the question of ‘the honor of the army’.” The (poor) performance of
the army in Africa and Flandres “became a myth, threaded with ethnic
jokes about the Portuguese”, whom a British source had described as “our
noble but nimble allies”. Magalhães’s memoranda had to take into account
197 On Treitschke Gerhards 2013: 178f.; Offer 1995 asks ‘Going to War 1914. A Matter of
Honour?‘; Koller 2003: 87; 90 quot. W. Sulzbacher 1929: ‘Die Ehre der Nation‘ muss fähig
sein, ‘Angriffen mit Waffengewalt zu begegnen und imstande sein, angriffsweise vorzuge-
hen‘; ‘im Sinne der Soldatenehre ist wehrlos gleich ehrlos.‘; Speitkamp 2010: 149f.
198 Elias: Studien über die Deutschen, 1989: 235 ‘begriffl. Symbole‘, in Koller 2003: 92.
199 StS Marschall: ‘Das ist eine Frage der Würde des deutschen Reiches‘, in Koller 2003: 116.
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these discourses in Europe. He was eager to counter the narrations about
fleeing Portuguese soldiers with images of heroism in Africa. Indeed, Por-
tugal’s “first republicans were anxious to earn the respect of civilized Eu-
rope.”200
As the European concert of nations was considered acutely hierarchical,
in military as well as in economic terms, European foreign politicians used
thinly veiled warnings of the Portuguese fate to push their own colonial
agenda, referring to former first class nations that were now relegated to
the fourth rank.201 Britain’s Foreign Secretary Grey knew “it would be
better that Portugal should at once sell her colonies.” But he also knew
that “Portugal won’t part with her colonies … for when nations have gone
downhill until they are at their last gasp, their pride remains undiminished
if indeed it is not increased. It clings to them as Tacitus says the love of
dissimulation to Tiberius at his last gasp.”202 Pointing to the ongoing (his-
toriographic) debates about the explanations of Portugal’s decline since
the sixteenth century, the French Minister in Lisbon observed in 1911 that
leading intellectuals had stylized la question coloniale to be a “question of
life and death” for Portugal. The colonies “are for her [the Portuguese na-
tion] most of all a remembrance of her former glories, the witnesses of the
important role she has played for the discovery of Africa and the Indies. It
is through the history of its colonial role that this people has become
aware of its personality as a nation.”203 Given Portugal’s lack of “energy”
the Minister predicted the downfall of o Império. During his inaugural ad-
dress in 1919, President António José de Almeida (1866–1929) pointed to
such “defective elements saying our race is indolent”. The President, how-
ever, emphasized that his compatriots had “always given proofs of vigor
… throughout the world.”204 The “notion of the ultimate development of
Angola and Mozambique” was part of the “official thinking” about the
colonies. Yet, the defeat of the Portuguese army on the hands of the Ger-
mans in Angola and Mozambique and the discussions before and after the
war on Portugal’s “ability” to administer its colonies, were considered by
many Portuguese politicians a grave humiliation of their nation’s history
200 Wheeler 1978: 178; 261. This motive was familiar in Portuguese foreign policy. Already
the abolition of the slavetrade was discussed (and finally executed) in Lisbon, ‘because na-
tional honour was at stake’; cf. Marques 2006: 253; Lourenço/Keese 2011: 226.
201 Jules Ferry, 28.7.1885, in Stengers 1962: 484, nations ‘descendues au ... quatrième rang’.
202 Grey to Goschen, 29.12.1911, in Langhorn 1974: 369; cf. Sowash 1948: 232 on Timor.
203 MAELC CPC/CP/NS/8, Portugal: 199, FML to MAE, 2.12.11; cf. Wheeler 1978: 6-16.
204 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800.1, USML to SoS, 10.10.19, transl. inaugural speech.
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and honor. “The weight of tradition soaked the colonial discourse in impe-
rial mysticism”.205
Foreign Influence and Missionaries
For decades already historians are haunted by the question how to deter-
mine the influence and ‘relevance’ of “the Empire” for the European
metropolis and “national” politics. Depending on the sources and perspec-
tives detrimental responses have been given. Bernhard Porter’s Absent
Minded Imperialists (2005) on the British case is a pertinent example.
Apodictical verdicts have also been given about the German206 or French
public, for whom their colonial empires were, it is said, “of only trivial
interest” before World War I.207 The Portuguese case seems different. The
public, most of all in Lisbon and Porto had, at least since the British Ulti-
matum of 1890, shown a profound interest in colonial affairs. This interest
“waned” only after the ‘pacification wars’ had ended in the 1920s.208
Modern research speaks of a “consensus” in Portuguese politics as to the
preservation of o Império. Among the Portuguese elites the belief domi-
nated that Portugal could not be herself without overseas possessions.
These were considered a conditio sine qua non to maintain Portugal’s in-
dependence (against Spain) and formed an integral part of the nation.209
Following the Dutch “occupation” of Angola (1641–1648), apprehen-
sions never abated in Lisbon that some foreigners, with support from with-
in, might take away again the colony.210 During the nineteenth century,
foreign consuls were repeatedly accused of having complotted with “na-
tives” aiming to expel the Portuguese. Irrespective of Brazilian or British
consuls denying such claims, in 1883 the Luandan journal O Pharol do
Povo had asked for the first time “If we think about the independence of
the province …?”211 Given the Matabeleland-dispute, the Anglo-German
conventions, and the discourses about Portugal’s “incapable” colonialism,
the fear of the loss of the colonies was inextricably linked to the concern
3.3.8
205 Smith 1974: 654; Corrado 2008: 22 adds ‘and the Angolan case is no exception.’
206 Cf. Blackbourn 1998: 435; Seemann 2011; Strandmann 2009: 464; Dedering 1999a: 215.
207 Andrew/Kanya-Forstner 1978: 11; cf. Cooper 2002b: 16f.; Jansen/Osterh. 2013: 120f.
208 Duffy 1959: 246; but cf. Smith 1974: 653f.: ‘Portuguese society [was] uninterested.’
209 Labourd. 2000: 531f; cf. Meneses 2010: 9; Corrado 2008: 25; Wheeler 1972: 176; 1978: 3.
210 Hamilton 1975: 3 on these fears in the 1970s; Curto/Gervais 2001: 6f. on French advances.
211 Corrado 2008: xv on the relevance of these voices for the founders of MPLA; 167; 174.
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of foreign “secret agents” working to undermine Portugal’s rule. This con-
tinuous concern found its way in (semi-) official historiography.212 Por-
tuguese politicians, the press and “many observers remained paranoically
fearful of foreigners” and their pretensions on Portuguese colonies.213
Before, during, and after World War I, however, the claim that foreign
“secret agents” stirred up discontent with the neighbors’ colonial rule was
not limited to the Portuguese. In 1904 the Germans accused the British
and the Portuguese of having provided the Herero and Nama with guns.214
On the other hand, following the disaster at Pembe Drift in 1904, rumors
were rampant that “the Ovambo” with German support would form a
league to expel the Portuguese from southern Angola.215 Similar claims
were laid against Germany in 1914 in British and French colonies.216
Frederick Lugard (1858–1945), Governor General of Nigeria, complained
about Turkish and German endeavors to incite the Muslim population of
his colony with Arabic pamphlets against British rule.217 Also, rumors that
Germans would want to wrest colonial possessions from other nations
were not limited to Portuguese possessions. In South Africa claims were
made about German machinations with the Afrikaaners against British
rule for which “the Germans are to get Bechuanaland and Gordonia.”218
“German commercial penetration” of South Africa seemed to constitute “a
direct threat” to Britain’s dominance in the region.219 And the “Maritz Re-
bellion” in late 1914 allegedly proved right all concerns about “German
intrigue”.220
It is against this backdrop of (perceived) threats to Portugal’s colonial
Empire, its status, its historic achievements, and its economic develop-
ment that the importance Magalhães assigned to the question of Ger-
many’s involvement in Angola becomes intelligible. In 1919, when the
case against Germany was still being prepared in the chanceries of Lisbon,
the Diario de Notiçias already assured its readers: “there can be no doubt
212 GEPB 1936, v. 2, Art. Angola: 663 ‘agentes provocadores’; cf. Pélissier 1993: 8.
213 Smith 1991: 502; cf. Vasconcellos 1926: 3f.
214 MAELC CPCOM/CP/NS/7, Portugal: 222b, French Ambassador Berlin to MAE, 7.4.04.
215 Pélissier 2004: 211; Sousa [n.d.~1935]: 7.
216 Cana 1915: 364; cf. Dedering 1999: 5f. on the Nama war and the British as ‘scapegoats’.
217 TNA FO 371/1884: 530, GG Nigeria to CO, 6.11.14; cf. Nasson 2014: 447; Hanisch 2014:
13.
218 Dedering 2000: 50 (report, 26.1.06); 58 (Ferreira Raid, 1906); Samson 2013: 28.
219 Van-Helten 1978: 369, ‘conflict between German and British commercial interests.’
220 TNA CO 633/83/11: 78, Report Judicial Commission of Inquiry, U.G. 46-’16, 12/1916.
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that in May, June and July of 1914 her [Germany’s] agents were preparing
a raid with a view to occupying the territory lying between the south fron-
tier of Angola and the railway line from Lobito”.221 In his case against
Germany, Magalhães thus never ceased to write within the Portuguese tra-
dition of accusing other powers to mingle with its colonial affairs.222
In addition to Germany’s intended penetration pacifique of Angola by
commercial ventures and “scientific” expeditions in support of an annexa-
tion (cf. 3.3.2), Magalhães put a special emphasis on the subversive role of
German missionaries in Angola. Relations between foreign missionaries
and Portuguese officials or traders in Angola were strained already for
centuries. After the Revolution in 1910 Afonso Costa, the “personal sym-
bol of the republic’s anticlericalism”, pushed through parliament anti-
Catholic (“Jesuit”) legislation that would “undermine the political consen-
sus” for years.223 Also in Angola (foreign) clergymen were expelled. And
the concern of foreign missionaries denationalizing the “overseas
provinces” would still haunt the officials of Salazar’s Estado Novo.224
With the onset of formal colonialism, missionaries were never com-
pletely “outside the colonial state”. They “paved the way for conquest …
by offering comprehensive representation of the indigenous popula-
tion.”225 In his memoranda, Magalhães uttered this accusation quite literal-
ly: The German missionaries had paved the way for German soldiers to
conquer southern Angola by guiding them across Ovamboland, negotiat-
ing with the “native chiefs” and convincing the “natives” that German rule
would be advantageous to them. King Mandume’s action in late 1914,
when he attacked Portuguese forts, confirmed all the Portuguese adminis-
tration’s previous conceptions of the destabilizing role of the Rhenish
Mission in Ovamboland. Magalhães went into great detail when he de-
scribed the menace the German missionaries posed in Ovamboland (N’gi-
va, Omupanda, Matenda). And so did the annexed reports and the Por-
tuguese witnesses during their testimonies, explaining how the German
Protestant missionaries educated Mandume and taught him to disrespect
the Portuguese administration.
221 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 11.8.19, transl. Diário de N. 7.7.19.
222 Cf. Henriques 1995: 83 historiogr. ‘function’ of ‘British interventions’; Silva 2007: 411.
223 Wheeler 1978: 69; Madureira 2010: 648; AGCSSp 3L1.11b6, Keiling (Huambo), 27.12.13.
224 Cf. Dores 2015: 95f.; Birmingham 2011: 170f; Corrado 2008: 24.
225 Steinmetz 2007: 598, on German missionaries in GSWA, Qingdao, and Samoa.
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Such accusations of the Portuguese resident at Namakunde, for exam-
ple, against the activities of the Rhenish Mission were eagerly rebutted by
the German councilors. They highlighted that the “tireless work” of the
missionaries, who had “renounced all the amenities of life and lived com-
pletely isolated from European civilization”, was directed at the “natives”.
The councilors had requested the accused missionaries Wulfhorst,
Hochstrate, Welsch and Tönjes to respond to these accusations and arbi-
trator de Meuron was referred to their annexed responses. With equal zeal
the German memorandum refuted the Portuguese accusation that German
missionaries had supported the German war efforts by arranging meetings
between Franke and Mandume, with missionary Wulfhorst serving as in-
terpreters.
Names, Citizenship, and “Races”
“Deus fệz o negro e o branco. O portuguệs … fệz o mulato.” [God made the
black man and the white man. The Portuguese … made the mulatto]
This celebration of “Lusitanian miscegenation”, attributed to novelist Eça
de Queirós (1845–1900) and an often quoted bit of ‘wisdom’ ever since,
expresses “Lusotropical patriotism” that (self-exoticizingly) wishes to set
apart the social realities of Portugal’s colonial empire from any other.226
Such an assumed difference between the Portuguese and the German
colonial empire became a question of law after the war. Differing notions
of “citizenship”, “race”, and “being an African” or “being a European”
would have a significant influence on the amount of damages Portugal
could claim from Germany. Thus the status of individual claimants led to
disputes between the German and Portuguese representatives. In 1919/20,
the delegation in Paris under Afonso Costa aimed at claiming damages for
each and every person who had died as a consequence of the war. How-
ever, it “seemed” to Costa that some would “object to the inclusion of na-
tives” into the calculation of damages. He thus went into great detail to
elucidate that neither Portuguese laws nor the Treaty of Versailles would
make a distinction between races, nor would this be admittable given the
“humanitarian principles inspiring the Treaty”, nor from an “economic
point of view”. He claimed that especially “natives living in villages …
3.3.9
226 G. Bessa Victor: ‘Mistica do império’ (1943) , transl. Hamilton 1975: 49; Pélissier 1993: 8.
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had already acquired a certain degree of civilization, some are public offi-
cials, others participate in the exercise of public functions, others exercise
a profession. All are, to use the common term, ‘assimilated’.” Costa also
argued that the Portuguese state had a (financial) obligation to the “non-
assimilated natives” who had lost their relatives during the war. Assuming
154,415 casualties in southern Angola, he admitted that the families of on-
ly 20 per cent of those passed away (30,882) had been identified. For these
families he claimed pensions amounting to 20,000 GM or £1,000 per per-
son, but he insisted that also for the remainder reparation payments would
be necessary. Altogether, in 1920 Lisbon claimed damages for the families
of “107,441 Europeans and natives who had acquired a certain degree of
civilization” amounting to “2,148,817,777 GM”; and “199,929 other na-
tives” whose heirs were unknown at the time amounting to “3,998,577,777
GM”.227
These numbers were confusing and not well explained. During the ne-
gotiations in the Reparation Commission the Portuguese were ‘reprimand-
ed’ by the British, French, and Belgians for including the number of
Africans killed during the war in the calculation of damages owed by Ger-
many. While the British charged the Portuguese for not having understood
“the exact scope of the reparation provisions of the Treaty”, Afonso Costa
“denied that loss of life in the colonies, mostly of civilians, fell outside the
scope of the reparations.” With a certain sarcasm, considering Costa’s
apologetic stance towards General Pereira de Eca’s policy in Angola 1915,
historian Filipe Meneses notes that Costa “suddenly developed a sense of
racial equality, arguing that what was good for Europeans was good for
Africans as well: many families in Angola and Mozambique had been left
without their breadwinner, and the Portuguese government had, he
claimed, stepped in to make up the shortfall.”228
The German officials who dealt with the Portuguese claims ventured on
to ascertain the legal situation of Africans in the Portuguese Empire in or-
der find ways to postpone, refuse, or reduce payments. One official sug-
gested in 1921 to ask the Ministry of Justice for a report in this respect.229
Next to the tenet that Germany would be liable only for direct, not for in-
direct damages, the principle that this liability would be limited to Allied
governments and their “nationals” (Article 231 TV), thus excluding “na-
227 BAB R 3301/2284: 7f, Costa: Notes compl., 29.6.20; 13, ‘Montant des dommages’
228 Meneses 2010: 130;132f. (Oliphant to Bradbury, 5.6.20).
229 BAB R 3301/2284: 49, Karpinski (Reichsentschädigungskommission) to RMW, 19.2.21.
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tives”, was to develop into one of the most often invoked German argu-
ments during the arbitration. The Germans demanded that only “nationals”
should be included into Portugal’s list of claimants. One of the drafts
bluntly spoke of “white” or “European” nationals, but this was crossed out
by his superior.230
It seemed simply incomprehensible that non-Europeans also were listed
in the Portuguese memoranda as victims entitled to compensation due to
the destruction of their property. From a German perspective, they were
thus put on the same legal level as “whites” in a double sense: First, being
“white” is “bound up with [individual] ownership”231; second, only
“whites” could have the legal standing of plaintiff in court (in particular
against the state). The lists did not include a rubric of “race”. However, a
few names appeared “suspicious” to the German councilors. They doubted
whether all claimants mentioned in dossier 14 were Portuguese citizens.
The Portuguese replique clarified that these men were hindustanis, natives
(naturels) of the Portuguese Estado da India, Goa, Damão, and Diu, living
in Mozambique.232 Evidently, also persons who would have been labeled
“Africans” by the German colonial notion of “white” and “black” were
among those of the list. However, they were not recognized as such by
German lawyers since often the “name forms are typically Portuguese”
and “their [Christian] names also suggest a certain level of acculturation”
to the Portuguese colonial society.233 According to the paternalistic stan-
dards set by German colonial law, Africans (Eingeborene/natives) had,
similar to minors, no legal standing in court and were not entitled to any
claim – “Natives were not able to speak legally”. The practice of colonial
law as applied by the German administration and the courts aimed at the
complete exclusion of those considered African and entrusted them to
their “traditional customs” as applied by the “native chiefs” and the Ger-
man “native administration.”234
230 BAB R 3301/2284: 35, remark, ~2/1921; German officials took note of the decree of 19.11.
1920 stipulating legal equality in terms of civil rights between Europeans and ‘assimilated’
Africans. Ibd.: 32, decree No. 7151, 19.11.1920, Diário do Governo 1. No. 237, 22.11.20.
231 Nuttall 2001: 133 with regard to post-apartheid South Africa.
232 PA R 52530, Portg. replique, doss. 14, doc. 1-49; cf. BAB R 10001/6635, État recapitula-
tive des reclamations, dossier 12 doc. 321, Muene Handengue, Chibia; doc. 323, Nambonde
Iá Tuida, Caculovar; doc. 327, Odonga, Lubango; doc. 339, Circonscription Civile de Chib-
ia (au nom d’indigènes); dossier 14, doc. 49 Sakoor Hajee Habib, Beira.
233 Curto 2002: 41; similar issues in Birmingham 1978: 531 regarding witchcraft.
234 On this ‘ancient’ tenet of colonial law Nuzzo 2011: 207f.; cf. Schaper 2012: 68-86
3. The Luso-German Arbitration Procedure 1919–1928
325
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Both, Portuguese and German colonial societies were deeply racist so-
cieties. However, as historian Henri Brunschwig remarked forty years ago,
prejudices based on color are not a “stable” but a “variable condition”.235
The Portuguese and the German policies towards “the native question” at-
test to this. During the Luso-German arbitration this “question” transpired
in two sets of debates: First, with regard to the above-mentioned possibili-
ty to include “natives” into the list of “nationals” entitled to damages. And
second, with regard to the involvement of Africans in the fighting in
southern Angola. The Portuguese representative’s stand was ‘multi-
faceted’: on the one hand Magalhães argued according to the principles set
forth by Costa that both, “natives” and “Europeans” should be entitled to
payment of damages; a claim categorically denied by the Germans. And
simultaneously he joined the German defendants in accusing the other par-
ty of having made a “white man’s war” “black”.236 The difficulty to define
the difference between “black” and “white” individuals was not expressly
laid out in the memoranda. It seemed the representatives assumed the oth-
er side knew what his counterpart was talking about; only over the course
of the procedure it became clear that this was not the case.
In theory, both sides agreed to what the British Foreign Office had stip-
ulated in 1911: a European war in Africa would “be of great detriment to
the prestige of the white races.”237 Implying this notion of prestige, the
Germans accused the Portuguese to have enlisted irregular African com-
batants to fight white soldiers during the battle of Naulila. The Portuguese,
on the other hand, accused the Germans to have extended their war efforts
by using, equipping, and instructing African “savages”, so Mandume
could rebel and face the Portuguese. In Magalhães’ chronology, German
“acts committed” contrary to international law continued well after the
battle of Naulila and had begun long before. Germans were accused of
having recruited Africans (Kandjimi “Auanga”) for the “massacre of
Cuangar”, and Shihetekela in Naulila. And the war in Ovamboland in
1915 was represented in the Portuguese memoranda and annexes in simple
terms that placed Portuguese forces in opposition to Mandume’s and Ger-
235 Brunschwig 1974: 60 ‘Le préjugé de couleur est…une donnée variable’; Corrado 2008:51.
236 Cf. cpt 2.2.6; Cornevin 1969: 389 ‘The war was strictly a white man’s affair’. Germans
concurred in the notion of the war in GSWA as ‘a white man’s war’, but accused the British
of having employed ‘colored forces’ in the battle of Sandfontein cf.Weck 1919: 130; Wal-
lace 2012: 212; Koller 2001: 103; this looked different in GEA, where thousands of
Africans served for Germany cf. Bührer 2011: 401-77; Michels 2009.
237 Quoted in Samson 2006: 22.
PART TWO. The Arbitration Procedure and Awards
326
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
man troops who allegedly acted as instructors and even took part in the
battle of Mongua.
The dispute about the legal standing of non-Europeans triggered by a
list of names made obvious the stance of German colonial thinking to-
wards Portuguese policy. The Germans considered themselves to be the
more “modern”, more strict colonial administrators adhering to the “posi-
tivist view that uncivilized peoples were not legal entities” and had no
concept of property and had no legal standing.238 “The native” was sup-
posed to be invisible, he had to have no name – and if so it was conferred
upon him (as a kind of joke) by his master. The practice of first names and
surnames to distinguish individuals beyond any doubt was supposed to be
to the exclusive benefit of Europeans.239 The usage of non-European
names made individual claimants and their (Indian) background visible on
the list; an inadmissible situation according to German understanding
since configurations of citizenship and all the legal ramifications it en-
tailed remained in Germany’s colonial empire a “configuration of white-
ness”. However, individuals of Luso-African descent may have attached
great importance to the surname of their grandfather from Portugal and
bore complete Portuguese names. Thus, on the claimant list they remained
undistinguishable from other Portuguese. A “European surname [may
have] reflected at least one European ancestor in the past few generations,
but in many other cases it reflected a patronage or godparent relationship,
not a birth relationship.”240 German councilors would have liked to pre-
vent them from “passing for white” and have them made “visible” by “ex-
otic” names, but abstained from allegations about the ‘pedigree’ of
claimants.
The Portuguese representative, on the other hand, could unhesitatingly
present the claims of those individuals as indicated to him by the colonial
administration and he did not bother to enquire their ethnic origin. “A
strict application of a color bar was not only against Portuguese law and
tradition, but would have been impractical in the face of the realities of
colonial family structures.”241 At the time of the Luso-German arbitration,
however, the “Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire” were
changing profoundly. A short overview of these historical developments
238 Anghie 1999: 50.
239 Zollmann 2010: 105f.; 126
240 Penvenne 1996: 457.
241 Newitt 2007: 52 on the Afro-Portuguese elite and Portugal’s assimilado policies.
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in contrast with German policies will thus serve to explain and put into
historical perspective the status of some of the Portuguese claimants.242
The long held “article of faith with many Portuguese that their country
has never tolerated a color-bar” has long been deconstructed by at least
three generations of historians.243 Yet, prior to the twentieth century the
“practice of miscegenation and cultural assimilation was surely the only
means by which the Portuguese could respond to … such an adverse envi-
ronment” as Angola.244 Since the offspring of these colonial unions, called
mestiços, proved useful for the upkeep of the Empire, their legal status,
but also that of other Africans was strengthened by the liberal regime in
Portugal after 1820, as long as they were considered assimilated to the
Portuguese culture: “citizenship and equal rights [were conferred] on all
individuals who were considered to be Portuguese, regardless of their eth-
nic background.”245 Thus, a tiny faction of Africans (less than 1%) be-
came “certificate-bearing citizens … whom colonial authority acknowl-
edged as ‘civilized’”; that is assimilated, as distinct from the indigenas
(natives).246 As a result of this policy there were “virtually no legal restric-
tions … to access to jobs, education, or voting rights” for those later-on
called assimilados.247 A colonial bourgeoisie, an “indigenous middle so-
cial strata began to emerge”. Most of all their command of the Portuguese
language had become the reason as well as the measure of their privileged
status.248 As a result, “the mulatto population grosso modo identified itself
ideologically, politically, and economically with the whites, together
forming the preponderant element in urban Angolan society.” In the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, the extravagant luxury of the Euro-African
elite’s lifestyle, importing “furniture from Venice” and following “trends
dictated by Paris or London”, impressed not only foreign visitors.249 En-
joying a “sentiment of exclusivity”, they held and inherited private proper-
242 Even though any attempt to distinguish between two historically specific modes of colo-
nialism runs the risk of constructing and setting apart two stick figures. Interestingly, there
are barely any comparative studies on colonialism and racism. Cf. Lindner 2011: 300 FN.
243 Boxer 1963: 1; on Boxer cf. Arenas 2011: 9; Matos 213.
244 Corrado 2008: 3 ‘only chance of survival’; xvii; cf. Newitt 2005: 257; Rodrigues 2009: 34.
245 Smith 1991: 504; cf. Silva 2010; Roberts 1986: 497; on previous centuries Boxer 1963: 38f.
246 Birmingham 1991: 166; Duffy 1961: 295, 1950 ~30,000 assimilados among 4 million
Africans.
247 Wheeler 1969a: 9; cf. Corrado 2008: 116 236 on terminology; Steinmetz 2008: 593.
248 Hamilton, 1991: 315; cf. (ironic) summary of assimilação policies in Duffy 1961: 294.
249 Corrado 2008: 5; 46f. on Dona Ana Joaqina dos Santos (Ná Andêmbo) from Luanda; 77.
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ty, thus allowing for the accumulation of riches within one family. Some
of the “great creole families of the nineteenth century” like the Van-
Dúnem traced back their ancestors to the Dutch occupation during the
1640s and have “provided military leaders ever since.”250 They formed “a
tiny fragment of Angolan urban society … [, were] reprovingly involved
in the slave trade”, and distanced themselves from low class Africans and
slaves, distastefully referred to as macacos (monkeys – the hatred was mu-
tual251) and living in the musseques (shantytowns).252 Only few of the “old
assimilados” were “racially classified as mestizo from having a distant
white male ancestor,… the majority were black”. They professed to the
Catholic Church, lived in the “elegant residential areas of Luanda”, “spoke
Portuguese as their preferred or only language and punished their children
for using Kimbundu vernacular.”253 Historian Patrick Chabal calls the Lu-
anda Creole community “undoubtedly both singular to Angola and of pro-
tracted significance.”254
Angola’s bureaucracy required not only African interpreters, but also
white collar workers such as customs officials, tax collectors, district ad-
ministrators, scribes and clerks. The government in Luanda was willing to
draw them from the local population to include them in the lower and mid-
dle ranks of the colonial state structure. No doubt, it was a “minefield that
those who wanted to acquire assimilado status had to traverse” in the
“slavocratic society” of Angola’s capital.255 Peculiar relations of patron-
age tied individuals to powerful patrons. Especially the “sophisticated,
European-dressed African of Luanda in the post 1850 bureaucracy” had
250 Birmingham 1988: 94; Dias 1984: 64; cf. Boxer 1965; the Van-Dúnem family is still influ-
ential. Law professor Fernando José F. Dias Van-Dúnem was twice Prime Minister of An-
gola (1991-92; 1996-99); Alencastro 2007: 192-9; Chabal 2007: 5; Hamilton 1975: 154
‘The Van-Dúnems of Luanda form the nucleus of an extended family whose roots go deep
into Kimbundu tradition. This tradition had been sustained by a set of moral and cultural
values that have given old African families a sense of pride and identity in a larger societal
framework that generally denies the philosophical validity of an African tradition. The Van-
Dúnems place a premium on formal, Western education, but, along with other extended
African families, they reject the condescending categorization of assimilation.’ Cf.
Pepetela‘s novel about the family: A gloriosa familia, 1998.
251 Bontinck 1969: 119, on the murder of Dom Nicolau, ‘un mundele-ndombo (un blanc noir)’.
252 Corrado 2008: xiv; Tams 1845: 99 quoted in Heintze 2007: 378; cf. Birmingham 2011a.
253 Birmingham 1991: 166 on Messiant 1989; cf. ibd. 2011: 144; Corrado 2008: xx; 76.
254 Chabal 2007: 3f. ‘The most salient pre-colonial historical consideration has rightly been the
very special place occupied by the Luanda Creole community.’
255 Newitt 1996: 175; Curto/Gervais 2001: 37; cf. Corrado 2008: 6
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formed his own traditions within the hierarchies of Angola’s colonial soci-
ety, so colorfully depicted by the prose of Oscar Ribas.256 Politicians in
Lisbon preferred to administer the colonies with the assimilados because
of their “very low salaries”.257 At the beginning of the twentieth “century
the bureaucracy contained many of the scions of the old creole families”.
However, their “economic and political marginalization” and the demise
of their “oligarchies” had already begun, most of all due to the end of slav-
ery and restrictions on foreign trade.258 The “product” of “fierce autodi-
dactism” and at times masonic inspired, some of the filhos da terra (sons
of the land) still “rose to achieve significant managerial positions,” but the
relations with the administration were tense: “rather than stigmatize West-
ern civilization, they denounced Portugal’s failure to implant that civiliza-
tion in Angola.” Irrespective of the “colonial censorship being constantly
on the watch”, they published their own newspapers, some of them bilin-
gual (Portuguese-Kimbundu), “thus giving proof of an acculturated elite’s
interest in preserving part of its African heritage.” In these journals a
“small vanguard of creole intellectuals” begun to develop an “Angolan”
identity (giving rise to the terms angolanidade and crioulidade) and
“protested against social injustices and claimed their own social emancipa-
tion.”259
Evidently, life of the ‘ideal’ assimilado diverged dramatically from the
realities of racism and corvée labor most Africans had to endure under
Portuguese rule according to the official “indigenous code”. Furthermore,
discourses and policies changed. With more European immigration and in-
creasing competition for jobs the “heyday of the assimilados’ position in
society” was over. Following the revolution in 1910 – hailed by most fil-
hos da terra as the beginning of an era that would bring them equal oppor-
tunities – “began a long period of decline” for the “old creoles”. Dashing
all hopes, republican administrations set more ‘lines of demarcation’ be-
tween the “races”. It started with the raising of formal educational require-
ments that could not be fulfilled by Angolans since except for the Semi-
256 Wheeler 1969a: 9; cf. Pélissier/Wheeler 1971: 94f.; Hamilton 1975: 47 on Ribas’ Uanga.
257 Clarence-Smith 1979a: 168; Vansina 2005: 2 on district administration by (Luso-) Africans.
258 Birmingham 1988a: 6; Dias 1984: 61; Corrado 2008: 45.
259 Corrado 2008: 8f.; 167; 230; Dias 1984: 62; 81; Wheeler 1969a: 10f.; 1972a; already in
1882 Fontes Pereira complained that the ‘Government of the metropole and their delegates
… depriv[e the filhos da terra] of the exercise of the first public offices now filled by cer-
tain rats they send us from Portugal’, transl. ibd.: 15; Hamilton 1975: 27f.; cf. Dáskalos
2008: 139f.
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nary there were no secondary schools until 1919. Under Governor General
Norton de Matos “racism became [formally] a criterion for preferment in
the bureaucracy”. He continued this policy in his second term as High
Commissioner since 1921. Thus, Angolans were more and more excluded
from public life.
Nevertheless, the “carpet-baggers of the Portuguese revolution” arriv-
ing after 1910 “in search of petty government employment … [who] drove
out the old creole functionaries with loud racist self-justification”, often
married African women. “Marrying light has always been the racial ambi-
tion of social climbers in Luanda.”260 Some immigrants even accepted to
be circumcised and to pay customary bride-wealth. Irrespective of any
contradiction with their own history of becoming bureaucrats, they wanted
to see “their brown children properly educated and integrated into the state
sector of employment.” These “new creoles” were mostly an urban phe-
nomenon, but not limited to Luanda.261
Within a lifespan notions of “race” had changed: For members of the
African bourgeoisie of the colonial centers like Luanda or Lourenço Mar-
ques, born before 1880 their life began “in a time and place where race,
ethnicity and class were quite malleable categories, but during [their] life-
time they hardened and chafed”262 In 1909 a disillusioned minor official
and journalist, Pedro da Paixão Franco (1869–1911), born to an African
family from Dondo, still dared to plead for Portuguese fraternity (Todos
somos portuguezes – somos irmãos). But with the First World War the
“gilded age of the creole community was definitely over.” After 1920,
“new statutes were given to natives, Europeans and the ‘assimilated popu-
lation’, … legal discrimination got a more stable legal framework.”263 In
the end, “racism characterized every dimension of the system”. In re-
sponse to the rise of the relevance of “whiteness” in Portuguese colonial-
ism, the emergence of an “Angolan nationalism” became more and more
visible; the official prohibitions of African (political) groups like the Liga
Angolana in 1922 attested to this process considered a threat to colonial
rule.264
260 Birmingham 1988: 95; 2011: 157; Wheeler 1969a: 12f.; Hamilton 1975: 54; Dias 1984: 74;
on education Corrado 2008: 121; on African coffee growers: this ‘black enterprise’ ended
after the arrival of republican administrators Birmingham 1982: 344; Heywood 1987: 359f.
261 Birmingham 1988a: 6f.; 1994: 148; Clarence-Smith 1979: 179; Penvenne 1996: 445.
262 Penvenne 1996: 457; on ‘identity crises’ of Luso-African intellectuals Hamilton 1975: 20.
263 Dias 1984: 89; Corrado 2008: 15; 109; Tavares/Silveira 2006: 118; cf. Dáskalos 2008: 21.
264 Cooper 2002b: 139; Gonçalves 2005: 194; cf. Newitt 2007: 50-3; Errante 2003: 10f.
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These complex webs of historical developments over three to four cen-
turies and notions of otherness, hybridity, integration, and racial toleration,
later blurred by Gilberto Freyre’s euphemistic and ‘mystical’ concept of
lusotropicalismo as justification of a perceived Portuguese ‘exceptional-
ism’,265 were impervious for most German contemporaries.266 In his first
speech as Germany’s Colonial Secretary, Bernhard Dernburg (1867–1937)
claimed: “All colonizing nations of Europe are solidly united with regard
to their policy towards natives.”267 However, things were more complicat-
ed than this. The “deeply entrenched … Lusitanian traditions … in Luso-
phone Africa”268 conflicted with the (still rudimentary) strategies of clear
cut race relations the German administration had begun to implement in
the colonies based on an “empirical definition of race”, namely physical,
“racial characteristics” and descent. While in GSWA a few (church) mar-
riages between German troopers and African women were concluded in
the 1890s,269 official “race” policy changed afterwards, following a “pan-
European paradigm change” around 1900 that was based on a hierarchical
concept of two separate biological “races” reflected in morphology,
“black” and “white”.270
Questions of German citizenship became inseparably tied to the “race”
of individuals. After 1900 interracial marriages became not only contro-
versial; in 1905 the administration in Windhoek stipulated anti-miscegena-
tion laws. In GSWA, “questions of moral purity and sexual contamination,
mixed with nationalist sentiment, surely drove some of the arguments that
were put forward” to justify this restrictive policy. The way in which
265 Cf. Wheeler 1969a: 16f.; Bender 1978: 4f; Voigt 2009: 14f referring to Freyre 1946; Burke/
Pallares-Burke 2008; Lourenço/Keese 2011: 229.
266 Torgal 2009: 493 ‘[O] multirracialismo foi ... o grande mito da politica colonial ... por-
tuguesa.’ Perhaps nothing describes the differences between the Portuguese and German
case more poignantly than the burial of João dos Santos Albasini, ‘the leading journalist
and critic of Portuguese colonial administration in Mozambique’: ‘the funeral [in 1922] was
attended by an estimated 5,000 people. Among the mourners were Mozambique’s acting
head of state, every member of Mozambique’s Legislative Council, João Belo (the future
Minister of the Colonies), representatives of every local newspaper, all the local clergy, Al-
basini’s cousin Queen Sibebe of the Maxaquene clan of the local Ronga-speaking people
and her entire entourage.’ High Commissioner Manuel de Brito Camacho ‘considered Al-
basini both a close friend and an intellectual soulmate.’ Penvenne 1996: 425; 448.
267 SBRT, 28.11.06, translated in Methfessel 2012: 58.
268 Birmingham 1988a: 2.
269 Lindner 2011: 330 on Mischehen in GSWA; Haney-L. 1994: 135; cf. Hartmann 2007: 39.
270 Lindner 2011: 309; 320; Haney-López 1994: 136 on the US; cf. Blackbourn 1998: 434f.
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“whiteness” was (officially) constructed in the German colony comprised
the notion of a complete discrimination from “blacks” that included not
only the legal realm but also sexual relations. It goes without saying that
German men in the colonies may have heard this (official) discourse and
may have participated in it loudly, but acted (under the guise of employing
“washing maids”, for example) to the contrary – irrespective of their pos-
ition as high-ranking colonial officials.271 Even though GSWA’s “mixed”
population (Mischlingsbevölkerung) was constantly growing, German vis-
itors of Angola noted with disdain that the population consisted “almost
exclusively of negro bastards. Portuguese with negro hair and brown faces
are a matter of course [an der Tagesordnung].”272 In GSWA holding a
government position and being married to a woman of African descent
would have been unthinkable. The debates in court, within the colonial ad-
ministration, and the wider public about the legal status (“German nation-
al” or “native”) of the engineer Ludwig Baumann, a grandchild of the mis-
sionary Schmelen, who had one African great grand-mother, would have
been considered with ridicule in Angola. The German settler community
in GSWA “was determined to involve itself in constructing a localized
German identity” and racial difference was considered the “central
paradigm of the colonial order”.273 The distinction of colonizer and colo-
nized was supposed to be self-evident in the German colonies. It was con-
sidered a necessary element in the appropriation of the colony as Heimat.
Even though German officials never succeeded in legally defining “the na-
tive”, a bifurcated legal system was established in the colonies that sepa-
rated courts and legal provision applicable for “Africans” and “Euro-
peans”. Social, legal, and economic inequality was thereby legally deter-
mined.274
A man of African parentage taking “part in the city’s intense café cul-
ture” was a matter of course in Lourenço Marques around 1910,275 but
would have been inconceivable in Windhoek or Dar-es-Salaam. Mission-
ary attempts at religious conversion or schooling of African children did
not change the official German policy that Africans should not be “assimi-
271 Hartmann 2007a: 80 Vice-Governor Tecklenburg and one councilor had fathered children.
272 Reiner 1924: 334 ‘P. mit Negerlocken‘; cf. Lindner 2011: 327; Walgenbach 2005: 75; 183.
273 Hartmann 2007a: 81; Kundrus 2003: 273f.; Botha 2007: 11; cf. Güttel 2012: 140f.
274 Jaeger 2009: 488; Hartmann 2007a: 56-9; Bowden 2005: 17; Schaper 2012; Sippel 2001.
275 Penvenne 1996: 428 ref. to the journalist João dos Santos Albasini; cf. Conrad 2003: 188.
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lated” into the German populace and Kultur.276 Under German colonial
law there were no assimilados. In GSWA it was “generally accepted …
that purely economic arguments ought to be applied to the relationship be-
tween Europeans and Africans.” The “native treatment” was described by
Governor von Lindequist with the patriarchal formula streng aber gerecht
(firmly but fairly).277
German colonial officials carefully watched the race relations in neigh-
boring colonies and paid attention to ‘native legislation’ and the everyday-
treatment of Africans. A “too liberal” and “too lenient” “native policy”, as
allegedly practiced in the Cape Colony, was rejected as “dangerous” and
reflecting “a misguided ‘emotional’ humanitarianism”.278 Portuguese
“permissiveness” was equally rejected. German visitors to Angola were
disturbed when they had to share the First Class train coach “with mulat-
toes or Portuguese of doubtful origin.”279 Administrative and public dis-
courses about “miscegenation” in Germany and its colonies often evolved
around the alleged “decay” of the Latin colonies due to “the degradation
of the European race in the former Spanish [or Portuguese] colonies”. Pro-
cesses of “acculturation”, “creolization” (or how ever the “Africanization
of Europeans” – as exemplified in the Portuguese colonies – was later-on
called) were feared and rejected by German colonial officials.280
These differences in colonial histories help to explain why both parties
to the arbitration were unwilling to acknowledge the other’s point of view
with regard to who should be entitled to lay claims for damages.
Proof beyond texts. Maps, Photographs, and Witnesses, 1924–
1926
Afonso Costa, when detailing the Portuguese damages in 1920 to the
Supreme Council in Paris, stressed the objectivity of the numbers he pre-
3.3.10
276 Cf. Kundrus 2003: 201-210; Lindner 2011: 60; Walgenbach 2005: 205; Krause 2007.
277 Bley 1996: 226; 241; Stals 1979: 93;
278 Lindner 2011: 59; Dedering 2006: 286.
279 NAN A.529 n.1: 6, O.Busch: Studienreise von Südwest nach Angola [~12/14]. In Angola,
‘[c]ompared to neighbouring colonial dominations, day-to-day relations reflected both a mi-
nor social distance between blacks and whites and the aptitude, even if relative, of the
whites to adapt themselves to indigenous customs.’ Corrado 2008: 68 on loathing caffreali-
sation.
280 Güttel 2012: 142 quot. V.-Gov. Tecklenburg, 1905; Lindner 2011: 62; Hamilton 1975:12.
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sented by pointing out that they were “based on research” in government
files and commercial diaries, “visits” on the spot by technical experts,
“photographs, eyewitness accounts” and official statistics.281 When the
Luso-German arbitration began, also the parties attached maps and pho-
tographs to their memoranda to advance their arguments based on ‘objec-
tive facts’.
Even though it would be impossible to assess what role these means
played in the outcome of the arbitration, it is relevant to state that the par-
ties deemed it advantageous for their cause to seek proof for their argu-
ments “beyond texts”. Maps were used for more than purposes of geo-
graphically situating places like Naulila or Cuangar for the arbitrator in
Lausanne. The Portuguese drew maps that indicated by color the percent-
age of loss of lives in certain areas of southern Angola during the war.
Other maps explained the difficulties of establishing the “neutral zone”
between Angola and GSWA. Such maps linked with the Portuguese asser-
tion that prior to 1914 Germany had never accepted the border with Ango-
la and had constantly violated Portuguese sovereignty by sending military
personnel, traders, or recruiters across the border. As a result, Kwanyama
defying Portuguese pacification efforts were “inundated” with arms from
GSWA.282
Most important of all the arguments the Portuguese made regarding the
border and its geography was what they considered the “fact” that
Schultze-Jena did camp on Portuguese territory in October 1914. The Por-
tuguese replique thus advised that Schultze-Jena could have remained in
territory being less disputed and argued that already in 1909 the Germans
had faulty maps that indicated Portuguese territory as being German. The
German duplique responded that the most important “fact” along the bor-
der was that a precise fixation of the border had not yet taken place. Nev-
ertheless, the Germans stated that the camp was on the “German” side of
Erickson Drift (that is, still inside the neutral zone). They argued that also
the administrator Campos Palermo had reported that the Germans had not
yet passed the border of Angola. However, it appears that the Germans did
not put as much emphasis on that point as would have been possible, for
example by describing in more detail the complications due to the course
of the river: Erickson Drift was six miles upstream of the Kavale (or
281 BAB R 3301/2284: 3, Costa: Notes complémentaires, Paris, 29.6.20.
282 Cf. e.g. Casimiro 1922: 60.
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Cazembué) cataracts (the starting point for the northern [“German”] paral-
lel delimiting the neutral zone). Yet the Kunene River formed a north-
wards stream bend between Erickson Drift and the Kavale rapids. Accord-
ing to German maps, but also according to one Portuguese map attached to
the files of the arbitration, this northern parallel ‘re-touched’ the river at
Erickson Drift before it turned again northwards, thus leaving Erickson
Drift’s southern bank in the “neutral” (or German) zone and not on indis-
putably Portuguese territory.
Magalhães invested more energy in proving that Schultze-Jena’s camp
was on indisputably Angolan territory. Using to their advantage that the
Germans could no longer reach the scene of dispute in Africa, the Por-
tuguese summoned in August 1925 the witnesses Adelino Gonçalves and
Pieter J. van der Kellen, who in 1914 accompanied the administrator of
Humbe, Campos Palermo, to Erickson Drift, to identify the place of the
German camp. Surveyors erected a “pyramid” on the location, determined
its coordinates, took a photograph of it and sent it together with a map
(also showing the northwards stream bend of the Kunene River) and a re-
port to Lisbon to have them provided to the arbitrator.283
And not just (incriminating) locations were photographed by the Por-
tuguese. The administrator of Namakunde attached to his report two pho-
tographs of commander Franke and missionary Wulfhorst in Ovamboland
to underline their close cooperation. However, his claim that Franke had
made a reconnaissance tour to the Kunene with the support of the Rhenish
Mission before the battle of Naulila was rejected by the German coun-
cilors. They pointed to Franke’s explanation that before the battle he had
been the last time to Ovamboland in 1908 when also these pictures were
taken.
283 BAB R 1001/6636, Duplique 1923: 35; 84-7; R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 49f. Proces-ver-
bal de l’identification, 10.8.25; even a South African map of Ovamboland (1915) showed
that the Kunene River at Erickson Drift ‘re-touched’ the northern parallel, NAN A.450
Hahn Collection.
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From these disputes about very specific occurrences in the colonies the
relevance of (eye) witnesses can be discerned. The Portuguese memoran-
dum contained a list of seven “witnesses” and Portugal reserved its right
to forward additional documents and to name additional witnesses in the
course of the arbitration.284 The German memorandum named twelve wit-
nesses and reserved equal rights.
After the German duplique had been received in May 1923, de Meuron
considered it to be fruitless to continue with the exchange of memoranda.
He therefore ordered the parties to provide him with a definitive list of
witnesses until August 1, 1923.285 Magalhães presented a list of thirteen
witnesses, four of whom lived in Angola.286 Also the German Colonial
Department updated the list. The Germans first considered only Carl
Jensen to be a necessary witness for Germany from Africa. He had re-
turned to his farm near Outjo; but later, also German missionaries from
Ovamboland were nominated to give their testimony.287 All witnesses
were nationals of the party in whose favor they were expected to speak
(except the Dane Jensen). However, Germany’s financial chaos in 1922
caused the former soldier Georg Kimmel to seek his fortune by what some
might have called treason. He approached the Portuguese Legation in
Berlin and proposed to make “revelations” about the Naulila incident – if
“recompensated”. It is unknown whether Magalhães, who was then For-
eign Minister, accepted Kimmel’s offer (after all, he did not witness the
Naulila incident, but arrived one hour after the shooting; the Minister re-
284 PA R 52529, Mémoire justificatif, 12/1921: 106: 1. Norton de Matos, 2. Alves Roçadas,
3. Maia Magalhães, 4. Vasconcelos e Sá, 5. Mascarenhas, 6. Pinto Basto, 7. Augusto Mar-
ques. In March 1922, an additional claim of a Portuguese citizen, formerly living in Bel-
gium, was sent by the Portuguese government to de Meuron (PA R 52529, de Meuron to
DG Bern, 20.3.22).
285 BAB R 1001/6637, AA to RMW, 9.7.23, attached: Ordonance of de Meuron of 3.7.23.
286 BAB R 1001/6637, AA to RMW 17.8.23 attached: list of witnesses, 24.7.23: 1. Admiral
Alberto Ferreira Pinto Basto, 2. General José Mendes R. Norton de Matos, 3. General José
A. Alves Roçadas, 4. Dr. Alexandre José B. de Vasconcelos e Sá, 5. Colonel Brevete Ed-
uardo Marques, 6. Colonel Domingos Patacho, 7. Colonel Carlos Roma Machado de Faria
e Maia, 8. Lieutenant Colonel Brevete Manuel F.A. Maia Magalhães, 9. Lieutenant Colonel
Brevete José E. da Conceição Mascarenhas, 10. Capitane Roque d’Aguiar, 11. Lieutenant
Alberto Pereira, 12. Sous Lieutenant Julio Santos, 13. Sergeant Americo Inacio da Rocha.
287 BAB R 1001/6637, AA to RMW, 9.7.23; RMW to AA, 19.7.23 attached: German witness-
es of colonial damages: 1. Generalmajor a.D. Viktor Franke, 2. Gouverneur a.D. Dr.
Theodor Seitz, 3. Major a.D. Trainer, 4. Geh. Baurat Schubert, 5. Stabsarzt a.D. Weck, 6.
Gouverneur z.D. Dr. Heinrich Schnee, 7. Farmer Carl Jensen, 8. Max H. Baericke, 9. Georg
Kimmel, 10. Dr. Paul Vageler, 11. Ingenieur Eickhoff, 12. Oswald Ostermann.
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minded his Legate to avoid any correspondence with Kimmel). In 1925,
Kimmel gave his testimony in Berlin, speaking in favor of Germany about
the plundering of the bodies of Schultze-Jena and Lösch and providing the
arbiter with a sketch of Fort Naulila.288
The presentation of witnesses for one’s own case was not only an anal-
ogy to domestic court cases and national rules of procedure. The period
following World War I became an ‘era of hearings’ about past wrongdo-
ings. Witnesses all over the world were heard before courts or other public
bodies about alleged crimes of former enemies. In GSWA, British authori-
ties began already during the war to collect accounts of (African) eyewit-
nesses and others about the brutality of German colonial administrators.
The judge Bernhardo Botelho da Costa traveled to Mozambique and
Southern Rhodesia to hear witnesses about potential abuses and violence
in the Portuguese colony. Given his task, it was considered a matter of
course that he would also hear Africans. In his final report he laid out at
great length the challenges related to African witnesses given that their
“mentality [is] different from ours” and notions of truth and narration
would vary.289
During the Luso-German arbitration, none of the parties ventured the
idea of calling African witnesses to give their testimony, although the Ger-
man “police servants Andreas and August” were eyewitnesses of the
Naulila incident and had escaped Portuguese custody. August was, how-
ever, quoted in the German memorandum as having witnessed Portuguese
border infringement after the Naulila incident when a patrol allegedly en-
tered 15 km into German territory. August even claimed that Sereno per-
sonally shot jointly with his men when the Germans were about to leave
Fort Naulila, thus rejecting Portuguese accounts that Sereno was unarmed
during his dispute with Schultze-Jena.290 Also the Portuguese memoran-
dum mentioned African witnesses when discussing the damages in Ango-
la.291
The fact that, apart from these few hints, any African voices would be
made legally unreadable in the arbitration was not explicitly discussed.
288 AHD 3p ar.7 m 48, MNE to PLB, 25.7.22; BAB R 1001/6638: 122, questionaire Kimmel,
13.1.25.
289 Gewald/Silvester 2003; Hespanha 2010: 185.
290 BAB R 1001/6634: 148f., Vageler to RMW (10.11.21), Annex 10 to Memo Allemand,
23.5.22; p. 154, Vageler to KGW (~11/1914), Annex 11 to Memo Allemand, 23.5.22;
291 PA R 52529, Memo Portug., 12/1921: 45 FN 1, Chipuampanda, Chitabarera (dossier 5).
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There was apparently a consensus that Africans were unreliable and un-
trustworthy witnesses, not apposite to give testimony before a court or ar-
bitral body. This line of argument was used already by Germany during
the Anglo-German Walvisbay Border Arbitration (1909). The British had
argued that Africans (“Hottentotts”) were present during the ceremony of
annexation in 1878 and could give testimony as to the extension of the
British land claim. The Germans responded by attacking the credibility of
“the native” witnesses. They pointed to “the natives’ natural inclination”
to lie and reasoned that their “joy” during the annexation ceremony was
due to “Cape brandy”.292 Also judge da Costa’s doubts about alleged
African narration structures and notions of truth pointed to such reserva-
tions.
Arbitrator de Meuron had no objections to the lists of witnesses. He in-
vited the parties for a meeting in his office in Lausanne (September 17,
1923) on the planned testimonies.293 This technical consultation between
the arbitrator, Magalhães, B. Ferreira, Portugal’s Minister in Bern, and Dr.
Ruppel set the conditions for the testimonies. De Meuron expected both
governments to arrange for the institutional back-up of the testimonies
(rooms, interpreters, stenographers). He emphasized the necessity to de-
fine precisely the questions to be put to those witnesses he would not be
able to interrogate himself. Turning seventy soon, he had no intention to
visit Angola or Southwest Africa. Magalhães suggested that the witnesses
living in Angola should be interrogated by local courts. De Meuron de-
manded precise information about Angolan courts and all questionnaires
put to those witnesses. The Germans would be given a chance to comment
on the questions before they would be sent to Angola. Ruppel requested
the interrogation of the German witnesses to take place in Berlin, includ-
ing the “main witness” Carl Jensen, who lived in Southwest Africa. The
German government was willing to bear the costs for his journey to
Berlin. Ruppel emphasized the German desire to accelerate the arbitration
procedure, considering the general interest of the German government to
identify its foreign obligations; but, as he found, the Portuguese reacted
“with reserve”. He also pointed out to the Portuguese that they had nomi-
nated only high-ranking officials as witnesses who were not present dur-
ing the Naulila incident and invited them to present to the arbitrator the
292 Fisch 1984: 425; 427; cf. RIAA XI: 267-308.
293 BAB R 1001/6637, AA to RMW 17.8.23 (attached: Ordonance of de Meuron, 6.8.23).
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surviving Portuguese eyewitnesses of the incident. Also, de Meuron un-
derlined the importance of the clarification of what had happened in the
fort. Magalhães responded that there were two surviving Portuguese wit-
nesses; both lived in “Angola and it would be difficult” to bring them to
Europe.294 However, already in October, the Portuguese were able to
present to de Meuron, four new witnesses, two of whom were said to be
eye-witnesses of the Naulila incident and now lived in Portugal.295
The Germans were not so fortunate. It took the Colonial Department,
the Consulate-General in Cape Town, and most of all Germany’s repre-
sentative in Windhoek Dr. Franz (not to be mixed with Mr. Franz who
drafted the German memoranda in Berlin) five months to convince Jensen
to return to Europe. The frustrated and ruined farmer pressured the offi-
cials not only to reward him with an Eisernes Kreuz first class. He also
demanded “reparations” for his captivity and economic loss during the
war. He received altogether around 3,000 GM for his willingness to testify
before arbitrator de Meuron.296 Much to the chagrin of the Finance Min-
istry, the German Foreign Office and the Colonial Department were will-
ing to pay this staggering amount since they considered ex-Governor
Theodor Seitz and Carl Jensen the most important witnesses.297
In the meantime, de Meuron invited the parties to attend the first testi-
monies in Lisbon on June 2, 1924. Also Jensen was expected to make his
appearance in Portugal. De Meuron agreed to have the witnesses living in
Angola (High Commissioner Norton de Matos, Lieutenant Alberto
Pereira, Sub-Lieutenant Julio Santos and Sergeant Americo I. da Rocha)
interrogated by the President of the Court of Appeal in Luanda.298 After he
received Magalhães’ questionnaire, councilor Franz, the colonial ‘expert’
from GSWA, drafted the German counter-questions to be put to the Por-
tuguese witnesses in Lisbon and in Luanda. Franz tried to identify the wit-
nesses according to the Portuguese and German memoranda and was look-
294 BAB R 1001/6637, Ruppel: Aufzeichnung Termin vor dem Schiedsrichter, 22.9.23.
295 BAB R 1001/6637: 49, Ordonnance de Meuron, 26.2.24; cf. Hewitson 2010: 318f.
296 BAB R 1001/6637: 94, RMW to Dr, Ruppel, 12.4.24; p.111, Note on meeting, 6.5.24; p.
112, AA to C. Jensen; AA to DKG, 6.5.24; p. 120, Dr. Franz to RMW, 16.4.24; p.140,
DKG to AA, note Franz, 23.5.24; p.155f., calculation expenses19.6.24.
297 PA R 52531, remark Martius to Frohwein, 12.9.23.
298 BAB R 1001/6637: 49-51, Ordonnance de Meuron, 26.2.24.
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ing for inconsistencies in the reports made by these witnesses, as they
were annexed to the Portuguese memorandum of 1921.299
“Questionnaires have a long and complex history”, not only as juridical
tool, but also for ethnographic and even diplomatic purposes. Question-
naires seemed the perfect means to ensure objectivity and fact-based pro-
cedures. “No more narrative at all”.300 However, both parties framed their
questions in a way to provoke responses that favored their stance. To
counter these attempts, both representatives struggled to change the arbi-
trator’s perspective on the case by counter-questions. It was the task of the
representatives to assess the (probable) biases of the responses to ques-
tionnaires and the trustworthiness of each of the witnesses and their testi-
monies before his (there were only men) appearance before arbitrator de
Meuron.
It is also relevant to point out that statements by (eye) witnesses in
court (or before an arbitral body) are not identical with what historians to-
day call “oral history”. The setting differs profoundly between interview
and court hearing, and the same is true for the results of the words spoken
in court or during an oral history interview. On the other hand, both kinds
of evidence are formed in a similar process, first, by word of mouth and
then by transcription. Historians using oral evidence from court (or arbi-
tration) proceedings can refer to the insights gained by historians using
oral history evidence. This concerns most of all the limits of this source to
shed light on events in the past: “Historians using oral evidence now know
enough about memory to avoid the naïve assumption that it is a ‘verbal-
ized reflection of personal truth and social reality’.”301 Furthermore, it is
important to understand that “testimonies, as the first-hand experience of
informants, often draw on traditional historical perceptions”. The oral dis-
courses were formed and mediated not only by the memories and inten-
tions of the witnesses, but also by the questions raised and the process of
transcription and translation into French.302 In this form they found their
way first to the desks of the arbitrator and the party representatives and
then into the archives. In Lisbon, the Portuguese administration provided
299 BAB R 1001/6637: 108, AA to REA, 3.5.24; p.94, RMW to Dr. Ruppel, 12.4.24; p.131,
REA to AA, 19.5.24; p. 133-137, remarks Franz, 23.5.24
300 Vansina 1987: 435.
301 Hayes 1993: 106 ‘The dimensions of implicit world views in oral history are much larger
than the academic research agendas which tap their riches.’
302 Hamilton 1987: 68 in Hayes 1993: 108; cf. Koskenniemi 2014: 128 on ‘opaque’ intentions.
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stenographers for the statements of their witnesses and translated them
thereafter into French. Since the German councilor Ruppel assumed
Jensen’s Portuguese to be rather “limited”, a German-Portuguese transla-
tor was also necessary in Lisbon, as Jensen gave his testimony in Ger-
man.303
The first out of altogether seven hearings of witnesses over the next two
years took place from June 3 to June 11, 1924 in Lisbon’s Supreme Court
building. Professor Magalhães and his colonial councilor, Captain Manuel
da Costa Dias commenced interrogating their witnesses. Also the Por-
tuguese Minister in Bern, Dr. Bartolomeu Ferreira, was present. After the
statement of each witness, the German representatives (the new head of
the Foreign Office’s Colonial Department, Edmund Brückner, who depu-
tized for Ruppel being unable to leave his post in Paris,304 and councilor
Hugo Franz) were given the opportunity to ask their questions. In Lisbon
the arbitrator emphasized his neutrality by living “in a withdrawn way”.
He wanted to follow an invitation of the German Legation only in case
also the Portuguese representatives would attend the function. He finally
cancelled it due to his “overstrain“.305 Of the 14 witnesses invited, 13
were present. Even though the arbitration was not a court procedure in a
formal sense, the arbitrator functioned similar to a judge during the testi-
monies, authoritatively instructing the witnesses to restrict themselves to
courtroom protocol and only to answer the questions posed by him or the
party representatives.306
The arbitration became a stage for the expression of anger by the Por-
tuguese witnesses and their claim to justice for Portugal. The testimony of
General Alves Roçadas and several other high-ranking officials brought
little surprise for either side. They quoted German authors as proof of Ger-
many’s quest for world hegemony, confirmed that Germans had constant-
ly violated Angola’s southern border and had supported King Mandume
and others with guns and military instructions. Among the witnesses was
also Lt.-Colonel Manuel Maia Magalhães (1881–1932), the brother of
Portugal’s representative. He had not taken part in the battle of Naulila,307
303 BAB R 1001/6637: 94, RMW to Ruppel, 12.4.24; p.95f., Ruppel to Martius, 19.4.24; p.98,
de Meuron to Ruppel, 16.4.24; p.100, AA to ORR Franz, 28.4.24.
304 PA R 52531, Telgr. Ruppel to AA, 24.5.24; power of attorney Brückner, 25.5.24.
305 PA R 52531, remark Martius, 23.6.24.
306 BAB R 1001/6638: 143, Compte-rendu des séances de l’arbitrage, Lisbon 3.-7.; 9.6.24.
307 AHM/Div/2/2/21/16: 42, Pessoal que nelas tomaram parte [de Naulila].
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but was a member of the chief-of-staff of Roçadas and de Eça. After hav-
ing referred to Friedrich von Bernhardi’s Vom heutigen Kriege (1912), he
explained the German “conspiracy” in Angola by “agents” such as Eisen-
lohr, Schöß, Vageler’s study commission and missionaries. Maia Maga-
lhães then described the Naulila incident as if he had been an eye-witness;
justifying his good command of the particulars with the explanations
Sereno had given to him in 1914.308 Portugal’s witnesses firmly rejected
any wrongdoing on the Portuguese side like employment of irregular
troops during the battle of Naulila.
The two eye-witnesses of the Naulila incident were asked to relate their
accounts of what had happened ten years previously. Carl Jensen remem-
bered that when Schultze-Jena had learnt that Capitão mor Varão was not
in the fort, he wanted to leave. Sereno tried to convince him to stay but
Schultze-Jena rode his horse towards the gate. When he reached the build-
ings next to the gate he noted that soldiers were pointing their guns at him.
He attempted to take his own gun but was shot before he could do so.309
Sergeant Gentil, the commander of the fort, was not present at this very
moment, since Sereno had sent him to his office; but when Gentil heard
gun shots and ran towards the noise, he saw Schultze-Jena lying dead on
the ground. Gentil was told by his soldiers that the latter had shown a
threatening attitude and had therefore been shot. Gentil denied that Sereno
had ordered him to falsify a letter presumably from the Capitão mor.
When arbitrator de Meuron wanted to know whether Jensen, in Gentil’s
opinion, spoke Portuguese, Gentil responded that Jensen spoke very poor
Portuguese.310
After more than one week, the first hearing of witnesses was closed on
June 11, 1924. According to the German Minister Voretzsch, Brückner
and Franz were not contented with the hearing. They immediately request-
ed to hear in Berlin the former High Commissioner of Angola, General
Norton de Matos, who had just been appointed Ambassador to London
and could not come to Lisbon. And they reserved the right to request the
hearing of the missionaries Wulfhorst and Hochstrate in the former Ger-
man colony by a British court.311 Brückner’s and Franz’ impression was
that the Portuguese had prepared their witnesses very well for the hearing
308 BAB R 1001/6638: 143, extra-file: 197ff. testimony Magalhães, 7.6.24.
309 BAB R 1001/6638: 139, summary testimony Jensen, 7.6.24; cf. Santos 1978: 222-4.
310 BAB R 1001/6638: 143, extra-file: 297ff. testimony Gentil, 9.6.24.
311 BAB R 1001/6637: 171-190, Franz: report on hearing, 3-11.6.1924, 28.6.24.
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and may have “instructed exactly” each testimony, as their structure fol-
lowed the line of argument of Magalhães’ memoranda. The German repre-
sentatives, on the other hand, had agreed not to meet with Jensen after his
arrival in Hamburg on May 10, and not to instruct him about his testimo-
ny. The deputy-head of the Foreign Office’s legal department, Georg Mar-
tius, decided that Jensen should not be allowed to see the files with his
previous statements. Even though nothing in this regard had been dis-
cussed with the arbitrator, Martius – making an analogy to German rules
of procedure – was concerned that this could be interpreted “as influenc-
ing of witnesses”.312
Brückner and Franz identified two Portuguese main arguments: the al-
leged German intention to annex the Portuguese colonies and the German
instigations of “natives” against Portuguese rule.313 And indeed, the recur-
ring emphasis given by the witnesses to the anti-Portuguese propaganda of
Germans was striking; even a German “doctor Strauwald” (possibly the
farmer [S]Trauwald) treating Africans was claimed to have served Ger-
man interests.314 Upon their return to Berlin, Brückner and Franz con-
firmed their disappointment about the hearing. Brückner deemed it im-
probable that de Meuron would accept Franke’s expedition to qualify as
legitimate defense (berechtigte Abwehrmaßnahme). Based on the Por-
tuguese witnesses’ accounts it seemed possible that the transgression of
Angola’s border by Schultze-Jena’s expedition could be considered a fact
by de Meuron and, even worse, that it was executed with intent. However,
Brückner, who had been received in Lisbon by the Foreign Minister, nei-
ther deemed an offer for a diplomatic compromise to be more successful.
Voretzsch assumed that any German offer under 100 Million GM would
be futile.315
There would be no compromise also in the future. The arbitration con-
tinued unabated. Testimonies of further witnesses took place in Berlin
312 BAB R 1001/6637: 94, RMW to Dr. Ruppel, 12.4.24; p.111, Note on meeting, 6.5.24; p.
112, AA to C. Jensen; AA to DKG, 6.5.24; p. 120, Dr. Franz to RMW, 16.4.24; p.140.
313 BAB R 1001/6637: 191, Voretzsch to AA, 13.6.24.
314 BAB R 1001/6638: 140, summary testimony Marques, 7.6.24; no ‘doctor’ of such name is
known to the files. However, a bankrupt Farmer, Richard Strauwald, had left in late 1913
his Farm in order to go to Ovamboland; ‘he expressed his intention to go to Angola’; NAN
ZBU 1891 U V c 11 Farm Choantsas (R. Strauwald): 56, BA Grootfontein to KGW,
17.1.14; NAN ZBU 1010 J XIII b 4: 204f., Zawada to KGW, 2.12.09 mentions the
‘Tsumeb trader Strauwald’.
315 PA R 52531, remark Martius, 23.6.24.
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(January 1925), again in Lisbon (before a Portuguese judge on behalf of
de Meuron, April 1925), in Angola (before Portuguese judges on behalf of
de Meuron in Silva Porto [Bié] and Benguela, July 1925), in Frankfurt
(October 1925), in Southwest Africa (before South African magistrates on
behalf of de Meuron in Windhoek and Swakopmund, May 1926), and fi-
nally also Ambassador Norton de Matos gave his testimony in Paris (May
1926).
The German witnesses, most of all Governor Seitz and General Franke
spoke about the military necessity to attack Naulila, their conviction that
Germany was at war with Portugal, and the impossibility to receive infor-
mation from Germany. The Portuguese soldiers in Angola who had sur-
vived the attack on Fort Cuangar recounted German brutalities. Dr. Vagel-
er denied allegations that his study commission fulfilled military purposes
or was engaged in illegal activities. The German missionaries in SWA re-
jected claims that they had treated King Mandume “like a white
monarch”. And Norton de Matos responded eagerly to the questions of his
minister colleague of 1917 in the government of Afonso Costa, Maga-
lhães, about the German “infiltration of Angola”. The Ambassador was
well prepared and read a philippic with numerous facts to prove his
claims.316
In the end, arbitrator de Meuron and his secretary Guex had listened to
similar explanation of ‘facts’ time and again from the witnesses of one
party with minor variations. These ‘facts’ were then emphatically denied
and explained from a different perspective by witnesses from the other
party. The French transcriptions of the testimonies added up to several
hundred pages. Arbitrator de Meuron was left with the task to add them to
the four memoranda and form his opinion on matters of facts and of law.
Colonial Border Agreements, Pleadings, New Arbitrators, 1926
In 1926, it became evident to the German councilors that the case was not
going well for Berlin. Not only had the testimonies not brought forward
the intended predominance of facts in favor of Germany. Also on the colo-
nial ground, facts turned against German arguments and interests. In June
1926, shortly after the military coup of May 28 in Lisbon against “Euro-
3.4
316 BAB R 1001/6640: 111, extra-file: 3-37, testimony of General Norton de Matos, 5.5.26.
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pe’s most unruly parliamentary system” (45 governments in 16 years) and
the resulting end of the republic, agreements were signed between the Por-
tuguese Government and the Government of the Union of South Africa.
This rapprochement reduced years of mistrust between the parties and
Portuguese concerns about its sovereignty in southern Africa.317 Already
at Versailles, the Portuguese urged the British to finally regulate the
question of Angola’s southern border and thus the question became a mat-
ter of high politics.318 The Portuguese elite was still concerned about the
possibility of losing the colonies and “such fears reached a zenith during
the years 1922–28”.319 The Estado Novo, soon to be established by
António Salazar, was just as committed to the Empire as was the repub-
lic.320
The agreements concerned the delineation of the borderline between
Angola and the Mandated Territory of Southwest Africa (June 22, 1926)
and the use of the Kunene waters for the purpose of power generation and
irrigation (July 1, 1926). Both parties were not satisfied with the provi-
sional agreement of 1915 declaring the disputed area a “neutral zone”,
jointly administered by Portuguese and British commissioners. A Luso-
British commission met in July 1920 at the Ruacana Falls to initiate the
delimitation of the boundary. The Portuguese were headed by Colonel
Carlos R.M. de Faria e Maia, in 1914 member of the Luso-German “study
commission”. He took an extensive trip around southern Angola and docu-
mented in a photo album the commission’s work and the reestablished
Portuguese fortresses destroyed in 1914, among them Fort Naulila. The
head of the South African commission, Surveyor-General Francis E. Kan-
thack, considered as “fairly clear” the definition of the precise spot
through which the parallel of latitude from the Kunene to the Kavango
should be drawn according to the Luso-German Treaty of 1886. He called
317 Wheeler 1978: 3; cf. Roberts 1986: 497 ‘It was the principal achievement of the Estado No-
vo that, after 1926, … diplomatic support was obtained from both Britain and South Africa
… Both internally and externally, the Portuguese empire was more secure in the 1930s than
at any time in the previous hundred years.’; Ministério das Colonias 1929: 3.
318 TNA FO 608/217: 1, Hardinge;34, Crowe to Read, 6.5.;39, Curzon to Balfour, 17.5.19.
319 Wheeler 1978: 188.
320 On this continuity Arenas 2003: 6 referring to V. Alexandre.
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the German claim “ingenious” that the borderline must be drawn further
upstream at the “Small Cataract” instead of the Ruacana Falls.321
In the following years it seemed that the Portuguese administratively in-
corporated the “neutral zone” into Angola. Only in 1926 South Africa’s
new Afrikaaner nationalist government under Barry Hertzog (1866–1942)
was willing to accept Portuguese claims to the neutral zone. This was a
determined move away from the “imperialist aspirations” of Jan Smuts
(ousted in 1924). In turn Lisbon accepted Sout h African water rights and
ratified the first treaty that the Union negotiated and signed “in its own
right” without involvement of the British Foreign Office. “[P]rofoundly
important” for the National Party’s notion of South Africa’s indepen-
dence, the preamble asserted that the Union “possesses sovereignty over
the territory of South West Africa” to which the Portuguese agreed despite
the protestations of the League of Nations.322 Thus, “South Africa, gradu-
ally emerging from British suzerainty, took great pride in its new role as a
colonial power”323 Demarcation started in 1931.324
The connection of these agreements with the Luso-German arbitration
was palpable: The Portuguese delegation in Cape Town was headed by the
former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Augusto de Vasconcelos,
who had dealt with the border issues already before the war. He was ac-
companied by Colonel de Faria e Maia, who knew the disputed areas from
his tours in 1914 and 1920 and who had given his testimony on German
border infringements in Lisbon in 1924.325 The German Consul General
Alfred Haug reported that Prime Minister Hertzog had explained to him
that the Portuguese standpoint in the Angola boundary dispute was “well-
founded”. In 1927, Portugal concluded an equally successful treaty with
the Belgians on the border with the Congo.326 These successes of Por-
tuguese foreign policy stood in contrast to the domestic affairs of Portugal
321 Kanthack 1921: 321; 334; Faria e Maia 1941; PT/CPF/CAF/0012, Missão da Delimitação
da Fronteira Sul d’Angola, 58 photos [http://digitarq.cpf.dgarq.gov.pt/details?id=65446],
1920; cf. Akweenda 1997: 225; Pélissier 1977: 501; Dias 1991 on photography in Angola.
322 Cooper 1999:127 1928 Pretoria ceased flying the Union Jack in SWA; Vigne 1998: 300.
323 Botha 2007: 19; cf. Akweenda 1997: 228f.; Ndongo 1998: 291.
324 Art. 1; 2, BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 43-7, French transl. of Luso-South African Bor-
der Agreement, 22.6.26; on the delimitation (23.9.28) Brownlie/Burns 1979: 1033-36.
325 Cf. Kanthack 1921: 335; Faria e Maia 1941.
326 BAB R 1001/6640: 131, German CG Pretoria to AA, 12.7.26; cf. Vellut 1980: 103.
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where “public powers grind[ed] to a halt” and the political situation was
characterized by “relentless instability and overall uncertainty”.327
Considering that the facts turned against them, a more qualified legal
support to the German Foreign Office and its Colonial Department was
necessary than the former colonial official Hugo Franz could offer. During
the last hearing in Paris, arbitrator de Meuron had indicated that he intend-
ed to have the final oral pleadings in autumn 1926. Again, it became obvi-
ous that the lawyer wanted to follow similar rules of procedures as in a
domestic court cases.328 While it was considered a matter of fact that Pro-
fessor Magalhães would represent the case for Portugal, the Legal Depart-
ment of the German Foreign Office started in May 1926 to search for a
“personality” who could represent Germany in eloquent French.
The choice fell on the appellate court judge (Oberlandesgerichtsrat) Dr.
Robert Marx ( 1883–1955) from Düsseldorf. He knew the task of repre-
senting Germany in cases based on the Treaty of Versailles. Since 1921,
Marx was commissioned to the Franco-German MAT in Paris where he
worked and lived with his family.329 Fluent in French and English, Marx
accepted the nomination. He commenced to work on the four memoranda
during his summer holidays. Interestingly, the hundreds of pages of testi-
monies were considered of minor relevance for Marx’ preparations.330
Knowing billions at stake, Marx worked since August exclusively on this
arbitration in Berlin.331 Again, the Germans hoped the Portuguese would
accept a diplomatic settlement to avoid the formal arbitration.332 Already
in February 1926, the Portuguese and the German delegation to the Repa-
ration Commission in Paris agreed to limit the value of German deliveries
in kind to Portugal. Such sense of compromise could be upheld.333
Arbitrator de Meuron was not a disguised “state attorney”. He had to
weight the facts as presented to him by the parties. He was not entitled to
undertake his own inquiries. Thus, pleadings were his last chance to clari-
fy questions of fact or law. In July 1926, de Meuron sent a clarifying
327 Madureira 2010: 658; Madureira 2007: 82; cf. Meneses 2009: 32f.; 45.
328 PA Bern 1763, AA to DG Bern, 31.5.26; on this ‘analogy’ already Lauterpacht 1927.
329 LANRW Gerichte Rep. 244 Nr. 848: 196 Personalakte Robert Marx, MoJ to Marx,
19.9.1921; PA R 52531, Martius to Brückner, 14.5.26; remark Frohwein, 19.5.26.
330 BAB R 1001/6640: 121, Dr. Marx (Deutscher Staatsvertreter beim deutsch-französischen
Gemischten Schiedsgerichtshof) to Göppert, 17.6.26; p.138, remarks.
331 BAB R 1001/6641: 31, remark Frohwein to Martius, ~10.8.26.
332 PA R 52532, Martius to Göppert, Brückner, Franz, 4.9.26; Martius to Frohwein, 14.9.26.
333 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações, Proc.1, Port. Delegation to Reparation Com., 4.5.26.
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memorandum to both parties regarding the pleadings in Lausanne on
September 20, 1926. He considered the damages in the colonies the “most
important” part of the case, as compared to Portuguese damages in Bel-
gium and at sea. Before the indemnity for damages could be assessed, the
principles and the limits of Germany’s responsibility had to be deter-
mined: for that end, 1) the Naulila incident had to be further clarified; and
it needed to be decided 2) whether that incident was such as to justify the
measures subsequently taken by Germany; and 3) whether Germany as-
sumes responsibility for all of the harm ensuing from these measures, or if
its responsibility is diminished by the fact that concomitant causes inde-
pendent of its will might have contributed to augmenting such harm.334
The hearing in Lausanne took place in the auditorium of the University
(Palais du Rumine) and was headed by arbitrator de Meuron and the Pro-
fessor of law Dr. Guex, who had supported de Meuron already for years.
Despite the important political changes that took place in Portugal and the
intense struggles within the administration, Professor Magalhães and Ma-
jor Costa Dias were still Portugal’s representatives. Judge Marx and Coun-
cilor Franz represented Germany. Anyone was admitted to hear the repre-
sentatives in Lausanne; sessions lasted from 9-12 a.m. and from 3-5
p.m.335
Following a short introduction by de Meuron, Professor Magalhães was
the first speaker on Monday morning, September 20. As was to be expect-
ed, he commenced his pleading, which lasted for almost ten hours, with a
historical overview of the political situation at the eve of the war. He un-
derlined that German greed (convoitise) with regard to the Portuguese
colonies was no secret. Magalhães reiterated the Portuguese version of the
Naulila incident and put great emphasis on the “fact” that the Germans
had camped not in the contested “neutral zone” but on undisputable Por-
tuguese territory. He referred to the new border agreement with South
Africa of June 1926, recognizing the Portuguese definition of the border to
commence at the Ruacana-Falls. This agreement served him as prove that
Portugal has always been right when it claimed that Schultze-Jena had
camped in Angola.336 As to the German justification of the destruction of
forts, Magalhães reminded the audience that according to international law
measures of reprisals would have to be equitable. The destruction of the
334 BAB R 1001/6640: 130, de Meuron to DG Bern, 19.7.26; transl. Heinze/Fitzm.1998: 1267.
335 PA R 52532, Telgr. Bülow (Genf) to Martius, 18.9.26; remark Martius, 28.9.26.
336 BAB R 1001/6641: 12, extra-file: 15, statement Contre-Admiral Gago Coutinho, ~2/1926.
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forts along the Okavango River would have “sufficed”. When Governor
Seitz ordered the attack on Fort Naulila, he did not consider it a reprisal
but an act of war, which was contrary to international law. Finally, Maga-
lhães restated that the “native rebellion” was caused by German propagan-
da from German agents and missionaries, who had also delivered modern
guns to Africans. He concluded that Germany would be liable for all con-
sequences caused by the “native rebellion”.
Magalhães’ pleading was as ardent as Marx’ was sober – a legal duel
with uncertain outcome. Marx commenced with a statement from a purely
legal perspective. He reiterated that § 4 of the Annex to Article 298 TV
did not establish new obligations but regulated the usage of German prop-
erty in allied territory for damages committed by German authorities dur-
ing the neutrality of the respective allied power. Referring to a number of
precedents, he emphasized that under this clause the arbitrator would have
competence only to decide on the merits and the amount due, but that it is
not his task to decide on the mode of payment (the execution). In line with
public international law, only states would have a claim against another
state and not individual citizens.337 Only the next day, September 22,
1926, Marx included the factual situation on the colonial ground in his
pleading, which lasted for around three hours. He reasoned that the wit-
nesses had not clarified whether Schultze-Jena had camped on Portuguese,
German or neutral territory. German intention to procure foodstuff in An-
gola would have been perfectly in line with the rights and duties of neutral
states according to international law (Art. 7; 8, V. Hague Convention).
Marx spoke of an illegal order by the Capitão mor of Cuamato to arrest
and disarm the Germans, which was taken to the extreme by Lieutenant
Sereno who had tricked the Germans to get them into the fort. The author-
ities in GSWA, without information from Berlin and after several attempts
to contact the Angolan authorities via the wireless station, were entitled to
take “reprisal” measures against the Portuguese forts. The attack on Fort
Naulila was necessary considering that the first measures proved futile to
obtain the prisoners Jensen and Kimmel. The expedition of Commander
Franke was also justified by necessity to protect the border of GSWA
against Portuguese intrusions which seemed to be imminent. However,
even if certain reprisal measures would be qualified as “excessive”, such
excess were compensated by the grave errors committed by the Por-
337 Cf. on the contemporary legal discussion Petersson 2009: 97-107.
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tuguese. Marx concluded that German authorities had not “committed”
acts in the sense of § 4 and therefore no German responsibility could be
claimed. Furthermore, the “native revolt”, on which most of the Por-
tuguese claims for damages were based, could not be considered causally
related to German acts. The “troubles” with Africans were already ongo-
ing for years before 1915. Roçadas’ retreat up to Gambos after the battle
of Naulila was not caused or justified by any German military act. Finally,
the famine and the resulting damages were not only caused by the war but
also by the lack of rain. Marx agreed to the German payment of an indem-
nity for the incident in Mazuia, Mozambique, but asked de Meuron to re-
ject the claims for damages in Angola.338
On Wednesday afternoon, Magalhães was given time to prepare his
replique to the German statement. Apparently, he found Marx’s division
of the pleading in a legal and a factual part convincing. When Magalhães
commenced his replique the next day, he divided the subject in the same
manner. While he had barely touched on legal substance in the days be-
fore, Magalhães now changed his tactics visibly. He brought with him a
stack of international law treatises, which he put on his desk to read quota-
tions from them from time to time. Magalhães denied that Schultze-Jena
was a “peace envoy”, since there was no war. Germany would not have
been entitled to “reprisals” since treatises of international law stated that
according to the statutes of the League of Nations no such law of reprisal
exists any longer. Provided such law had existed in 1914, its exercise
would have been lawful only after a respite of several weeks after the orig-
inal incident. Governor Seitz had violated this rule, when he ordered the
attack on Fort Cuangar three days after the Naulila incident. Finally, Mag-
alhães resorted to factual issues and quoted extensively from the testi-
monies. His replique took almost seven hours. Marx reported later that
Magalhães prided himself with his ability as “politician, professor and
lawyer” to speak for hours without efforts. On September 23, de Meuron
invited all participants and their wives for a dinner party to his house.339
Dr. Marx, whose fluency in French impressed de Meuron, did not re-
quest a pause for his duplique to Magalhães, since the latter had not
brought up new arguments. Marx contented himself with less than three
hours on Friday afternoon. His duplique was driven by the political argu-
338 BAB R 1001/6641, Plaidoyer Marx, 20.9.; 12, file: 57f., conclusions Marx, 20.9.26.
339 BAB R 1001/6641: 4-11, report of H. Franz to AA, 18.10.26; cf. Santos 1978: 224-7.
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mentation brought forward by the Portuguese, claiming that in 1914 Por-
tugal had aimed at “no frictions with the Germans and strict neutrality”.
Marx however referred to the Portuguese Whitebook and wanted to prove
that Portugal had never been neutral. Regarding Schultze-Jena’s standing
as “peace envoy” or not, Marx considered this an issue of denomination
without legal substance; in any case he would have been entitled to enjoy
protection as envoy. The final pleading of Marx was full of quotations
from the testimonies. He preferred to quote Portuguese witnesses to under-
line his own standpoint. Marx reminded Magalhães that only the engineer
Schubert had been taken to court in Angola because of his alleged German
propaganda. However, the accused was acquitted for want of evidence.
Thus, he considered as pointless the Portuguese claim about the German
propaganda and its consequences. Under international law only direct
damages would create an obligation to pay damages. Emphasizing that the
Germans never pursued the Portuguese troops after their defeat in 1914,
Marx argued by quoting the witness Maia Magalhães that the battle of
Naulila was “simply a reprisal”, which did not cause Africans to rise.
Marx concluded by pointing to the “future” of Germany, loaded with the
obligations of the Treaty of Versailles, which should not be further aggra-
vated by the arbitration award.340
The pleadings anticipated most of the arguments which would finally
find their way into the award. De Meuron and Guex never made any com-
ments during the sessions and did not even ask a question after the oral
proceedings were over. De Meuron merely remarked that he would send
his decision to the envoys in Bern, but did not indicate when he would do
so. Marx lauded the handling of the hearing by the arbitrator as being fair
and neutral. Marx did not want to speculate on the outcome, but remarked
that he was “optimistic”, considering the “the manner in which de Meuron
and Guex listened to our arguments” and a comment by R. Guex after his
first “pleading, that he had rediscovered many lines of thinking in it that
corresponded to his [Guex’] ideas in studying the process”. 341
Over the following year, both parties speculated that the award would
be published soon. However, de Meuron struggled with the stenogram of
Marx’ pleadings that were wrongly recorded, so Marx had to revise the
120 pages.342 In October 1927, Marx met the secretary of the arbitration,
340 PA R 52532, Marx, Paris to AA, 3.3.28, Plaidoyer du Dr. Marx: 120.
341 PA Bern 1763, Dr. Marx to Göppert, 24.9.26.
342 PA Bern 1763, de Meuron to Dr. Marx, 26.9.27; Dr. Marx to AA, 6.10.27.
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Professor Guex (who was himself arbitrator in several MATs) in Paris. He
told Marx “in a very humorous manner about his persistent but heretofore
fruitless attempts to convince Mr. de Meuron to hand down the arbitration
award and [he] concluded with the observation, that in his opinion, a deci-
sion would be available until January 1, 1928”.343 In December 1927 de
Meuron’s request to meet the Portuguese and German ministers in Bern
led to rumors that the award would be imminent. However, de Meuron
suggested to nominate two additional arbitrators, thus deviating from § 4.
Considering the significance of the irrevocable definite decision, the enor-
mous amounts involved and the serious factual and legal problems of the
case de Meuron wished the arbitration award to be the result of a collec-
tive work. He referred to analogous considerations of the Greek-German
arbitration tribunal, which had also involved several arbitrators. De Meu-
ron suggested nominating a Swiss federal judge and Professor Guex who
had been involved in the case for years and knew all documents and pro-
ceedings.344
The Secretary of State of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry bluntly stated
that he had no intention to reject de Meuron’s suggestion, “whose reason
apparently is rooted in the concern of the arbitrator to bear all responsibili-
ty himself.”345 Guex was accepted unanimously. Due to his French native
language and his domicile in Lausanne, federal judge Robert Fazy (1872–
343 PA R 52532, Marx to Martius, 20.10.27.
J0?
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1956), the president of the German-Romanian arbitration tribunal, was the
favorite of de Meuron. Portugal’s minister in Bern pointed to Fazy’s
“Latin mentality” and saw his appointment as “favorable to Portugal”.
Even though the Germans would have preferred a Germanophone judge
(the President of the Federal Court Emil Kirchhofer (1871–1944),
Schaffhausen) they conceded to Fazy in February 1928.346
The Award of 1928 (Merits)
While the Portuguese administration, and most of all the Finance Ministry,
since April under the helm of Professor António Salazar, was hoping for
the immense amounts it had claimed, 347 its German counterpart was faced
in early 1928 with another pressing ‘colonial issue’: the reparation pay-
ments for the Germans expelled from the ex-colonies (and those expelled
from Russia and Eastern Europe). Altogether 10,4 billion marks in “for-
eign damages” (Auslandsschäden) due to the war had been claimed, but
the Ministry of Finance could allocate only 1,4 billion marks for payments
to claimants who were waiting now for almost ten years. Given that pres-
sure groups repeatedly linked the ongoing German reparation payments to
the Allies to the outstanding amounts for “expropriated Germans”, the is-
sue was highly politicized. When the final bill on war damages (Kriegss-
chädenschlussgesetz) was discussed, hundreds of claimants expressed
their anger in front of parliament. The Vice-President of the Reparations
Office (Reichsentschädigungsamt), faced with more than 350,000 claims,
was even attacked in his office by a farmer expelled from GEA.348
The obligation to pay additional billions could well have derailed the
German budget (even though § 4 made no allusions to the execution of an
award, as Marx had repeatedly stressed). Nervousness increased and Marx
had thus any reason to send encouraging letters from Paris to the Foreign
Office that – after having met Guex and Fazy during other arbitration tri-
bunals – he had won the impression from private conversations that the
4.
344 PA Bern 1763, pro-memoria de Meuron, 12.12.27; DG Bern to AA, 15.12.27.
345 PA R 52532, DGL to AA, 18.12.27.
346 PA Bern 1763, AA to DG Bern, 3.1.28; Portug. Minister Bern to Meuron, 12.1.28; AA to
DG Bern, 26.1.28; R 52532, Marx to AA, 21.1.28; Fazy to DG Bern, 28.4.28; Santos 1978:
228f.; Tscharner 1956.
347 Meneses 2009: 46; 59; Smith 1974: 662 on Salazar’s ‘passion for balanced budgets’.
348 Aas/Sippel 1997: 153-5, verdict Schöffengericht Berlin-Schönebg. vs. Langkopp, 9.4.1929.
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two agreed in essential parts with the German standpoint; especially with
regard to the claimed damages due to the “native rebellion”.349 In early Ju-
ly de Meuron asked the parties for a payment of 10,000 Swiss Francs
each,350 upon receipt of which he sent to the Portuguese and German Min-
isters in Bern on August 1, 1928 the award of the arbitration tribunal. Dat-
ing July 31, 1928, the 34 pages were immediately forwarded to Lisbon
and Berlin.
Disproportion évidente – Content of the Award
The question what makes jurists think what they think is always elusive –
an awareness of matters of fact and matters of law will not suffice to ex-
plain a specific decision by arbitrators. Most importantly for historians,
the arbitrators left no traceable sources about their reasoning other than the
text of the award itself. The criterion of falsifiability of the evidence pro-
vided was certainly applied by the three arbitrators. Their award was heav-
ily based on matters of fact while those claims that seemed implausible to
them were excluded. Verifiable ‘objectivity’ was the goal of the arbitrators
when analyzing the ‘facts’ in light of the law:
While Germany had argued that the attacks on the Portuguese fortresses
were lawful reprisals, Portugal contended that the reprisals were unjusti-
fied and that Germany was responsible for all damage caused by the inva-
sion. Portugal, in its memoranda and during the pleadings, had claimed
two categories of damage. One related to the direct consequences of the
German invasion of Portuguese colonial territory, like the killing or
wounding of soldiers or of civilian population, and the destruction of
property. The other related to the damage caused by the “African rebel-
lion” in the territory evacuated by Portuguese forces which became the
scene of pillage, and for the (re-)occupation of which it was necessary to
send a costly expedition.
The award focused exclusively on the colonial damages and began with
a discussion as to the law applicable. The arbitrators held that their award
must be governed by general rules of international law as distinguished
from any particular treaty provisions. The question was one of state re-
sponsibility, and as such must be determined by general international law.
4.1
349 PA R 52533, Marx, Paris to AA, 4.5.28; 25.5.28; 26.6.28; 26.7.28.
350 BAB R 1001/6641: 51, de Meuron to DG Bern, 7.7.28.
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The designation of a purely neutral tribunal and the use in § 4 of the term
“acts committed” – a term taken from the terminology of international law
– showed that there was no intention to substitute a special ius tractatus
for general international law. Pointing to two awards (Chatterton 1923;
Karmatzucas 1924), the arbitrators decided that the fact that the Treaty of
Versailles did not expressly lay down the rules of law to be applied by the
arbitrator could be interpreted only as meaning that the arbitrator should
apply international law. This being so, the law applicable by the arbitrators
was that laid down in the first four paragraphs of Article 38 of the Statute
of the Permanent Court of International Justice.351 In case where there was
no rule of international law applicable to the case the arbitrators filled the
gap by applying “principles of equity”. In doing so the arbitrators re-
mained, they argued by referring to Heinrich Lammasch, within the
“purview of international law applied by analogy, and taking its evolution
into account.”
De Meuron, Fazy, and Guex carefully reiterated the facts examined dur-
ing the arbitration. However, seeing that the witnesses disagreed “on sev-
eral points” they acknowledged that the “investigation did not yield a clear
reconstruction”. Therefore, “[i]n order to apportion responsibility, the ar-
bitrators, after having considered the testimony in accordance with the
customary rules governing allocation of the burden of proof, must then fill
any gaps by accepting the most plausible presumptions”.352 Among the
“facts” the arbitrators recognized as “established” was the Portuguese con-
tention that “Erickson Drift [south of which Schultze-Jena had his camp],
located to the north of the extreme limit of [the neutral] zone, was situated
on Portuguese territory.” (p. 1019f.) They found that the death of the three
Germans on October 19, 1914 was due to a déplorable misunderstanding
caused largely by the fact that the actors did not understand each other be-
351 Art. 38 StPCIJ: ‘1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general prin-
ciples of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59 ju-
dicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 2. This provision shall not
prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree
thereto.’ Cf. Kennedy 1997: 120f.
352 RIAA II: 1011-35 (page numbers hereinafter in the text); transl. in: Heinze/Fitzmaurice
1998: 1272f.; Fitzmaurice 1932: 156f.; cf. El Boudouhi 2013: 148.
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cause their interpreter was incapable353; and that the Portuguese officer
who gave the order to fire believed himself to be in danger (p. 1024f.).
They pointed out that in the following the colonial authorities did not
communicate with each other, but acknowledged that the Germans sent
uncoded radio-telegrams about the incident; a fact unknown to Angola’s
governor. Following this factual clarification the arbitrators defined the
term représailles:
“Reprisals are an act of self-redress (Selbsthilfehandlung) of the injured State,
an act done in reply – after giving notice and not receiving satisfaction – to an
act contrary to the law of nations by the offending State. Their effect is tem-
porarily to suspend, in the relations between the two States, the observance of
one or another rule of the law of nations. They are limited by humanitarian
experience and by the rules of good faith applicable in relations between
States. They would be unlawful if a prior act contrary to the law of nations
had not furnished the cause for them. They seek to impose on the offending
state reparation for the offence, the return to legality and the avoidance of
new offences.”354
Given this definition they found Germany responsible for the damage
caused by the invasion for the following reasons:
(a) A necessary condition for the legitimate exercise of the right of
reprisal is the prior violation of a rule of international law by the state
against which the reprisal is directed. However, there was no such viola-
tion in the present case, given that the death of the three German officers
was due to an accident caused by an unfortunate misunderstanding.355
Neither could the internment of the two surviving Germans be regarded as
an act contrary to international law. Portugal, as a neutral state, had the
right to disarm and intern armed belligerents who crossed its frontier (giv-
353 Brückner, Ruppel, or Seitz had attributed utmost importance to Jensen’s testimony (BAB R
1001/6634: 107, Seitz to Colonial Ministry, 21.10.19), but the arbitrators were not hesitant
to ‘express reservation, if not about the sincerity, than at least about the probative value of
testimony of the translator Jensen, regarding the meaning of certain conversations that had
taken place, or texts that had been written, in Portuguese. For it has been demonstrated by
the testimony of numerous witnesses – German as well as Portuguese – that Jensen, whilst
employed as a ‘translator’ for the German mission, knew little Portuguese and barely un-
derstood it.’ (p. 1020)
354 RIAA II: 1026, cit. in: 1998 ICJ: 432 (731) WL 1797317 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain vs.
Canada), 4.12.98 [transl. by the Registry]; cf. Séfériadès 1935: 139; Waldock 1952: 460.
355 Grewe 1988: 734 in his summary of Naulilaa errs when he states: ‘Repressalien der
deutschen Schutztruppe in [DSWA] aus Anlass der völkerrechtswidrigen Tötung einer
Gruppe deutscher Beamter und Militärpersonen auf portugiesischem Hoheitsgebiet in An-
gola.‘ [emphasis added].
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en that the arbitrators considered the German camp on Portuguese terri-
tory; the “fact that the [German] mission … was, at Erickson Drift, still on
German territory, has never been established”).
(b) Reprisals are illegal if they are not preceded by a request to remedy
the alleged wrong. There is no justification for using force except in case
of necessity. Germany did not deny this principle and pleaded that the
German governor informed all German posts by wireless of the death of
German officers, and this notice, which must have reached the Portuguese
authorities, should have been sufficient warning. Germany also pleaded
that Governor Seitz refrained from sending a party with a flag of truce be-
cause he feared that the members of the party might be put to death or im-
prisoned. However, the arbitrators did not regard these reasons as suffi-
cient.
(c) Reprisals which are altogether out of proportion with the act which
prompted them, are excessive and therefore illegal. This is so even if it is
not admitted that international law requires that reprisals should be ap-
proximately of the same degree as the offence. The arbitrators, knowing
that this argument was doctrinally the weakest, went into some detail in
their discussion of the legal literature:
“The most recent doctrine [of reprisals], notably the German doctrine … does
not require that the reprisal be proportioned [proportionée] to the offence. On
this point, authors, unanimous for some years, are now divided in opinion.
The majority considers a certain proportion between offence and reprisal a
necessary condition of the legitimacy of the latter. International law in pro-
cess of formation as a result of the experience of the last war tends certainly
to restrain the notion of legitimate reprisals and to prohibit their abuse
[l’excès].”356
Germany never denied the requirement of proportionality, but even men-
tioned it in the 1922-memorandum. The arbitrators concluded that there
was an obvious lack of proportionality (disproportion évidente) between
the incident in Naulila and the six acts of reprisals which followed the in-
cident.
All three requirements (prior illegality, prior demand, and proportional-
ity) were explicitly addressed in the German memoranda of 1922 and
1923, but the arbitrators interpreted the facts differently than the German
representatives. Also the other contentious claims (German camp on Por-
tuguese or German territory; Portugal’s siding with the Allies or neutrali-
356 RIAA II: 1026, transl. Gardam 2004: 47; cf. Séfériadès 1935: 141-7 ref. K. Strupp.
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ty) were decided against Germany: The first was apparently a question of
a few meters and the Portuguese had forwarded ample of evidence in their
favor; the second would have involved a balancing of political assess-
ments about Portugal’s “loyalty” to Britain that could have derailed the
entire arbitration under § 4 about “neutrality damages”. Evidently, the ar-
bitrators had not intention to do so and followed the formal argumentation
of Portugal. As a result, German reprisals in Angola were illegal and un-
justified in light of modern tendencies of international law.
After investigating the Portuguese contention that Germany was liable
in damages on the additional ground that the uprising of Africans was fo-
mented by German agents – a contention which the tribunal rejected as
unfounded – the arbitrators considered the question whether and how far
Germany was responsible for the indirect damages caused by the German
invasion. They referred to the fact that the decision in the Alabama arbitra-
tion (1872), denying compensation for other than direct damage, was sub-
jected to criticism, and that international tribunals frequently awarded
damages for indirect losses. “It would not be equitable to allow the victim
to suffer from losses which the author of the first illicit act foresaw and,
perhaps, willed, for the mere reason that there were intermediate links in
the chain connecting that act with the damage sustained.” On the other
hand, the arbitrators held that it was impossible to charge a state with the
responsibility for damage connected with the initial act by a chain of ex-
ceptional circumstances which could not be foreseen. They referred to the
decisions of the American-German Mixed Claims Commission (under the
Treaty of Berlin, 1921), which refused to award damages for losses which,
although causally connected with the initial event, were at the same time
due also to other causes.
The arbitrators held that Germany was responsible for such damage as
the German authorities as “author of the initial act … should have fore-
seen as a necessary consequence of its military operations.”357 For the ar-
bitrators it was “natural” that the German invasion should produce unrest
among the Africans and increase the opportunities for revolt, and Ger-
many was, in so far, responsible. It would not be just to limit German re-
sponsibility to damage caused directly by the German troops themselves.
But Germany was not responsible for the extension of the revolt, which
was due to specific circumstances connected inside Angola. It was not im-
357 Transl. in Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Comm., Decision No. 7, 27.7.07 (H. van Houtte).
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material that Roçadas who ordered the retreat evacuated a rich area, al-
though there was no pressure on the part of the German regiment, which
after the battle of Naulila retired to GSWA. The arbitrators concluded that
Germany could not be saddled with exclusive responsibility for the conse-
quences of the Portuguese officer’s decision.358
The award was decided only on the merits of the case; no amounts of
“Goldmark” were mentioned. Germany was obliged to compensate to Por-
tugal the direct damages caused to the forts, and to a limited extent Portu-
gal was also entitled to compensation of its indirect damages. The award
did not mention the Portuguese accusations about the alleged German in-
trigues before the war to annex Portuguese colonies and did not state that
Schultze-Jena’s expedition had an illicit purpose. In their “ordinance” to
the parties delivered together with the award, de Meuron, Guex, and Fazy
ordered Portugal to provide them within three month with a memorandum
listing detailed and complete amounts of direct damages caused by Ger-
man attacks on the Forts Mazuia, Cuangar, Bunja, Sambio, Dirico, Mucus-
so, and Naulila. For other claims for damages a limited supplementary and
equitable indemnity would be fixed, considering the preponderance of
causes beyond the responsibility of Germany. The Portuguese memoran-
dum would be forwarded to Germany for a response within three months.
Subsequently, a hearing on the amounts would be scheduled.359
As to the colonial setting of the case and the language used by the arbi-
trators with regard to the “rebellion” and King Mandume, who was de-
scribed as chef sanguinaire, it seems noteworthy that the subduing of the
“rebellion” was considered a necessity not to be questioned by the award.
The distinction between “civilized and uncivilized states” was one of the
“central features of positivism” in international law. The arbitrators expli-
cated the principle of the proportionality of reprisals, and it was out of
question that such limitation to the use of force would not apply because
the fighting took place in the colonies. International law, in this respect,
was truly universal – between Europeans. However, completely different
standards were, legitimately in contemporary discourse, applied to the cat-
egories of “civilized and uncivilized” people and all recourse to war
358 RIAA II: 1031f.; McNair/Lauterpacht 1931: 274, No. 179; 466, No. 317; 526f., No. 360.
359 PA R 52533, ordonnance de Meuron, Guex, Fazy, 1.8.28; DG Bern to AA, 2.8.28.
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against “natives” was considered by international lawyers a domestic af-
fair, since only European (colonial) power could exercise sovereignty.360
Responses to the Award. The Amount of Portugal’s Damages
In August 1928, both administrations began to assemble information on
the value of the destroyed forts and their equipment. Also the legal impli-
cations of the award were assessed. Evidently, Professor Magalhães was
not pleased with the finding that Portugal would be – more or less – only
entitled to direct damages from Germany. The award’s wording of a “limi-
ted equitable” indemnity did not leave room for much speculation that the
billions Portugal demanded since 1919 would be forthcoming soon. In
September, German representative Marx provided the Foreign Office’s le-
gal department with his estimation of the costs to be expected according to
the award. He assessed Germany’s “risk” to amount to around 18 Million
GM (9 Million direct damages and maximum 9 Million “supplementary
equitable indemnity” for indirect damages).361 However, while Portugal’s
administration was busy finding proof for the smallest piece of equipment
destroyed in 1914, the Germans began to contemplate about legal reasons
why no money should be paid at all.
German Hopes – A Possibility of Non-Payment?
Ruppel, the former head of the German team on the Portuguese claims
commented on the award: “I am not really delighted by the opinion the tri-
bunal has about the incidents in Naulila.” However, he assumed that the
“indemnity” would not be “too high”. Moreover, “we will not have to bear
it in addition to the Dawes annuities.”362 Judge Marx made a similar argu-
ment. In October 1928 he explained why diplomatic negotiations with the
Portuguese about an extra-judicial settlement (as recommended before)
4.2
4.2.1
360 Anghie 1999: 22; 7 ‘The violence of positivist language in relation to non-European peo-
ples is hard to overlook. Positivists developed an elaborate vocabulary for denigrating these
people’; cf. Koskenniemi 2001: 102f.; 128; Bowden 2005: 20; 23; Becker Lorca 2010: 487.
361 PA R 52533, Marx, Paris to AA, 12.9.28; AA to RFM, 27.9.28.
362 PA R 52533, Ruppel, Paris to Martius, 10.8.28. ‘Im übrigen werden wir diese ja nicht
gesondert neben den Dawes-Lasten zu tragen haben.‘; cf. Dawes 1926.
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would no longer be necessary. He based his change of mind on the latest
award by arbitrator Robert Fazy in the Romanian-German arbitration
David Goldenberg vs. German Empire (September 27, 1928) which did
not mention
“according to German request … the question of execution [Erfüllung]. Fur-
thermore, he indirectly supports the German thesis that neutrality claims [§ 4]
do not have a particular status vis-à-vis the reparation claims and do not form
a reason for payment obligations beyond the Dawes-annuities, by explicitly
stating that these are claims (Ansprüche) from state to state … there is no sen-
tencing [Verurteilung] to payments, but merely the amount of damages has
been determined.”363
The German Finance Ministry’s councilors, when provided with the award
and Marx’ estimate of 18 Million GM went even further and attacked the
basis of most of Portugal’s claims. They came back to basic considera-
tions of § 4, of which all participants to the dispute had apparently lost
sight: The award obliged Germany to pay damages for the destruction of
forts and military equipment – property belonging without any doubts to
the Portuguese state. However, referring to legal literature of standing
(Baruch 1920; Isay 1923; Fuchs 1927), the Finance Ministry argued that
§ 4 limited the competence of the arbiter to damages of nationals of neu-
tral states. It was thus considered a contradiction of the award that it
obliged Germany to pay damages to the Portuguese state for the destruc-
tion of military equipment, and at the same time it determined the arbitra-
tors’ proper jurisdiction for “taking cognisance of indemnification claims
brought by nationals of the allied powers against Germany” (p. 1016)
Considering the wording of § 4 there could not be any obligation to pay
damages to the Portuguese state. The councilors assumed that the larger
part of the risk of 18 Million GM assessed by Marx would fall under the
damages caused by Germany to Portuguese government property.364
However, the Foreign Office was – despite the Finance Ministry’s in-
sistence – hesitant to raise this objection to “state property” with the arbi-
trators. It did so for purely tactical reasons. Dr. Martius, deputy-head of
the legal department, conceded that the Finance Ministry’s understanding
of § 4 was not unfounded. But he reminded Judge Marx that it was “im-
possible” to use this argument officially at this point in time at the end of
363 PA R 52533, Marx, Paris to AA, 16.10.28 ‘keine Verurteilung zur Zahlung‘.
364 BAB R 1001/6641: 75, RFM to AA, 20.10.28; PA R 52534, RFM to AA, 21.2.29; Fuchs
1927: 259 Kaufmann 1923: 19.
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the arbitration procedure. Considering that the new Portuguese memoran-
dum, having reached the Germans in the meantime, did not always adhere
to the prescriptions of the award of 1928 when those were in favor of Ger-
many (only direct damages could be claimed), it was a German strategy to
emphasize the “the legal force of the interim award”. “[W]e would dam-
age ourselves if we contest the interim judgment in a substantial point.”
Furthermore, Martius argued, it was likely that the factual assessment of
Portugal’s claims would make evident that the damages to the Portuguese
state to be recognized by the arbitrators were minimal in comparison to
the original demands. He authorized Marx to use the argument of the Fi-
nance Ministry only during the oral proceedings and in case the Por-
tuguese representative would question the “legal force of the interim
award”; then Marx could respond that also Germany had not raised a sub-
stantial objection against the award.365
The Portuguese Memorandum, October 1928
Magalhães’ new memorandum on Portugal’s “direct damages caused by
German aggressions in Maziua, Cuangar, Sambio, Dirico, Mucusso and
Naulila” and a “detailed list of damages” (171 pages) reached Berlin in
November 1928.366 The Portuguese demanded 1) 275,000 GM for the
Maziua incident; 2) 4,025,000 GM for the destruction of Cuangar and the
other forts along the Kavango River and 3) 22,700,000 GM for the de-
struction of Naulila; in total more than 27,000,000 GM for the colonial
damages – thus three times higher than estimated by Marx. Magalhães
stipulated the damages in US dollars and summarized his calculations in
gold marks. The calculated damages were “extremely detailed” (listing
values as low as “23 dollar cents”). Included in the final amount were
interest rates of 5 per cent p.a., calculated from 1915 to 1921 and com-
pound interests to the amount of 30 percent on account of loss of profits.
Personal injuries (reine Personenschäden) in Maziua were assessed to
amount to 192,000 GM; in Cuangar 2,466,000 GM ($20,000 for the trader
Machado shot, $10,000 each for his wife and his son João [the German
councilors remarked that the two were “natives”], and $4,500 for other
African civilians killed in the raid); and in Naulila 7,706,000 GM
4.2.2
365 PA R 52534, AA to Marx, Paris, 5.3.29 ‘Rechtskraft des Zwischenurteils‘; Bruns 1929a: 7.
366 BAB R 1001/6641: 96, AA to Marx, Paris, 29.11.28.
PART TWO. The Arbitration Procedure and Awards
364
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
($40-45,000 for officers, among them Sereno [around 180,000 GM],
$20,000 for sergeants, $10,000 for European and African soldiers killed in
action).367 Additionally, indemnities were claimed for the maltreatment of
Portuguese prisoners of war in GSWA ($10,000 for lieutenants and $1,000
for rank-and-file). Around 100,000 GM were claimed for property of the
“natives” destroyed during the raid of Ostermann; around 8,000,000 GM
were demanded for claims of private individuals (also soldiers who lost
private property) or companies. The remainder of 8,000,000 GM consisted
of claims for damages to Portuguese government property (1,290,000 in
Cuangar etc.; 6,750,000 in Naulila).368
Despite de Meuron’s request to only list “direct damages”, Magalhães
maintained the claim of 2 billion GM for the infringement of Portuguese
sovereignty and international law by Germany. He in fact criticized the
distinction made in the award between direct and indirect damages. Irre-
spective of the arbitrators’ demand for a “precise list” of damages, the
Portuguese also forwarded a list of damages where the underlying docu-
mentation would not allow distinguishing between the German “aggres-
sion” and the “native rebellion” as immediate cause of the claimed dam-
ages. The Portuguese memorandum again demanded that Germany should
bear all costs arising out of the arbitration.
The German Counter-Memorandum, March 1929
Germany was given a deadline until February 10, 1929 to provide the arbi-
trators with a counter-memorandum, which was extended until March
15.369 Faced with the detailed Portuguese description of colonial damages,
Judge Marx and the councilors from the Foreign Office again referred to
‘colonial experts’, most of all (again) Hugo Franz, Major Trainer (com-
mander Franke’s deputy during the battle of Naulila), and Constable Os-
termann, who now worked as a tax administrator.370 They were tasked
with assessing the value of the property destroyed in southern Angola.371
4.2.3
367 BAB R 1001/6643: 16, Annexe, liste detaillée des domages, ~10/28.
368 PA R 52533, Meuron to DG Bern, 6.11.28; Limmer, 22.11.28; on POW Ziemann 2013: 38.
369 PA R 52533, de Meuron to DG Bern, 30.1.29.
370 PA R 52533, Marx on the meeting in Berlin, 15.12.28.
371 BAB R 1001/6641: 100, III K to Legationskasse, 9.2.29; p.104, Eltester to Trainer, 28.1.29.
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Trainer wrote a 40-page memorandum on the battle and why Germany
was not to be held responsible for Portuguese damages, most of which
were due to the disorderly retreat and the hatred of the Africans for Por-
tuguese troops based on a history of repression. He considered the figures
given in Magalhães’ memorandum about the costs of building the forts
and their equipment (including large numbers of cattle and horses) bloat-
ed.372
The counter-memorandum written by Marx included many of the argu-
ments Trainer made. Marx commenced by emphasizing that the Por-
tuguese did not adhere to the frame set by the award of 1928 when they
calculated their colonial damages. Only direct damages were of relevance
according to the award. But Marx claimed that the Portuguese memoran-
dum still included indirect damages, since the Portuguese commission es-
tablished to assess the damages had not made this distinction and its find-
ings were nevertheless included. Marx disputed any causality between
costs for military convoys, loss of oxen, or the deterioration of roads and
German actions against the six forts along the Kavango River. Marx also
disputed that Germany should bear the cost for damages caused by the
“Auanga gang”, since these Africans were not “German auxiliaries”, as
claimed by Magalhães. The Portuguese memorandum had again causally
connected to German actions the retreat of Roçadas’ troops from Naulila
to Humbe and the ensuing destruction and rebellion. However, the arbitra-
tion award had clearly stated that Roçadas did not act under military pres-
sure from the Germans. They had offered to fight the Africans in coopera-
tion with the Portuguese. Therefore Roçadas had to bear the responsibility
of leaving the area to “the natives”. The award did mention a supplemen-
tary “equitable indemnity” to a “very limited extent” for those damages
that followed from the “native rebellion” immediately after the battle of
Naulila. This however would exclude – according to Marx – those indirect
damages that resulted from the military expeditions by Roçadas and de
Eça against the rebelling Kwanyama, which were planned long before the
war and ordered in Lisbon in August 1914. Equally, the costs for trans-
ports, carriers and lost ox wagons of individual claimants would have to
be rejected, as they were related to these military expeditions.
Marx dealt with Portugal’s 2 billion GM claim for Germany’s infringe-
ment of international law in an extra-chapter. This claim was not specifi-
372 BAB R 1001/6641: 107-149, Major Trainer: Zur portugiesischen Denkschrift, 9.2.29.
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cally mentioned in the award of 1928, and Marx argued that for factual
and legal reasons it would be unjustified. He underlined that the claim was
not meant to be an indemnity but a punishment, nowhere mentioned in the
arbitration award. According to international law there was no such thing
as indemnité pour des dommages vindicatifs (exemplary, punitive dam-
ages). Marx quoted from the Mixed Claims Commission’s Lusitania case
(1923):
“The industry of counsel has failed to point us to any money award by an in-
ternational arbitral tribunal where exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages
have been assessed against one sovereign nation in favor of another present-
ing a claim in behalf of its nationals.”373
In the Lusitania case, umpire Edwin B. Parker (1868–1929) underlined
that the Treaty of Berlin between the United States and Germany, in its
meaning of “Peace Treaty”, would exclude the imposition of a penalty by
one state to another state. And Marx, while admitting that Part VII of the
Treaty of Versailles dealt with “penalties”, used this argument to underline
that also in the Luso-German arbitration in the context of a “Peace Treaty”
there should not be any mentioning of “penalties” between the parties.
Marx also rejected the inclusion of a “lost profit” category and criti-
cized the different classes of indemnities for military ranks mentioned by
Magalhães for the loss of lives. All prisoners of war were according to
Marx treated reasonably and according to the difficult circumstances in
GSWA in 1915. He refused the payment of an “equitable indemnity” for
them, but conceded that the arbitrators would have to decide on the issue.
The hanging of seven “native franctireurs” was justified as in line with the
laws of war. According to a calculation of Major Trainer, Marx also as-
sessed the Portuguese list of damages and the value of the forts destroyed
by German forces. The material loss in Fort Naulila (weapons, ammuni-
tion, animals – including two camels, 15 ox wagons, uniforms etc.) was
estimated by him to amount to only 255,625 GM. Marx deemed the
claimed damages for the destroyed military constructions “incomprehensi-
ble”, considering that even the value of Fort Naulila – one of the larger
forts – was estimated by (German) eyewitnesses to amount to only 8,000
373 Lusitania Case 1.11.1923, RIAA VII: 32-44 (40) Parker refered to Jackson Ralston: Inter-
national Arbitral Law, 1910, § 369: ‘While there is little doubt that in many cases the idea
of punishment has influenced the amount of the award, yet we are not prepared to state that
any commission has accepted the view that it possessed the power to grant anything save
compensation.’
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GM. Marx rejected reparations for losses in Fort Cuamato, Otoquero, and
eleven other forts mentioned in the Portuguese memorandum, since Ger-
man soldiers had never attacked them. All damages were due to the “re-
bellion”. Marx also mentioned “the drought” and “the epidemics” in
Southern Angola as causes for Portuguese loss unrelated to German ac-
tions. He thus asked the arbitrators to assess the “supplementary indemni-
ty” for indirect damages at a lower level then the 27 Million GM demand-
ed by Portugal for direct damages. To substitute the opinion on the limited
military value of the Portuguese forts and the minor costs borne by the
Portuguese state for their construction, the German memorandum had as
annexes three photographs of Cuangar and Naulila and seven of the Ger-
man police post Kuring Kuru.374
The Portuguese Replique and the German Duplique, April/June
1929
The 60-pages replique of Magalhães put great emphasis on the “native re-
volt” and insisted that the damages it caused were causally connected to
German actions and therefore qualified as “direct damages”. He stated that
also the award of 1928 had argued that way. Magalhães argued, the attack
on Fort Cuangar had determined the Portuguese authorities to send more
troops and equipment to prevent further probable aggressions. The attacks
on the forts were not necessarily executed by Germans but by their “allies,
the Auanga gang (Kanjime)”. The Portuguese retreat to Humbe was a mil-
itary necessity to avoid total destruction and therefore the damages in the
areas south of Humbe due to the “revolt” were an immediate consequence
of the German aggression against Naulila. Trainer’s offer to Roçadas to
jointly subdue the “rebelling natives” was considered by Magalhães as not
“sincere”. By invading Angola, the Germans had not shown any sign of
“solidarity” between Europeans in Africa. Instead, they had cooperated
with the “natives”. Magalhães conceded that the expenses of the military
expedition of de Eça could not, according to the provisions of the arbitra-
tion award, be considered an immediate damage. He, however, insisted
that the expedition of Roçadas of August 1914 had been made necessary
not only by the Kwanyama but mainly by the war and the “attitude” of
4.2.4
374 PA R 52534, AA to Marx, Paris, 1.3.29; Mémoire du Gouvernement Allemand, ~1.3.29.
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Germany against Portugal’s colonies. These troops had to suffer the Ger-
man aggression and the resulting damage was caused directly by Franke’s
troops.
The replique categorically denied any double-charging of claimed ex-
penses as assumed in the German memorandum for claims of transport
costs, loss of cattle and ox wagons. Magalhães explained that the Por-
tuguese state had indemnified some claimants already and claimed these
costs from Germany; whereas other private claimants had not yet received
an indemnity, therefore their losses would be directly claimed from Ger-
many.
The claim of 2 billion GM for the infringement of Portugal’s sovereign-
ty and international law was upheld. Magalhães rejected the German argu-
mentation that 1) this claim would be a “sanction”; 2) the American-Ger-
man Mixed Claims Commission had concluded that there is no German
obligation to pay indemnities to the U.S. for “vindictive damages”; 3) such
kind of indemnities would be unknown to international law; and 4) the
claim could not be maintained in the context of § 4. The first objection
was considered a mere technicality of denomination, since any reparation
could be called a “sanction”. The second objection was considered irrele-
vant since the American-German Mixed Claims Commission was based
on the Treaty of Berlin which did not incorporate Part VII of the Treaty of
Versailles on “penalties”. The German counter-memorandum’s argument
was thus not applicable to the Luso-German arbitration. The third objec-
tion was considered erroneous since international law would recognize
that reparations for damages must be complete. Finally, Magalhães main-
tained that § 4 did not exclude such claim but would admit it “in spirit and
letter”.
As to the calculation of the claimed indemnities for loss of lives, Maga-
lhães justified the establishment of three groups, officers, non-commis-
sioned officers and African and European rank-and-file as to be in line
with Portuguese and International Law. He considered it reasonable to put
European and African soldiers in one common group considering that the
latter “possessed a certain degree of civilization which distinguishes them
from uncultivated natives, and some of them were Christians”. Europeans
and Africans “cooperated in equal standing in the defense of the border.”
The “value attributed to each categories of killed military or civilians for
which Germany has to pay an indemnity” was, according to Magalhães,
rationally calculated in the annexed list. Also the indemnities claimed for
the Portuguese prisoners would have to take into consideration the distinc-
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tion between military grades, considering that the degree of humiliated
honor and “moral prejudice” differed between officers and recruits.
Similar to previous statements, the Portuguese disputed that irregular
African troops had been deployed or that a white flag had been hoisted.
Therefore, the hanging of seven alleged franctireurs for indiscriminate
shooting after the end of the fighting was considered contrary to the laws
of war. The Africans were regular infantry soldiers.
Referring to the classic Lapradelle and Politis, Magalhães rejected the
statement in the counter-memorandum that international arbitration would
exclude an indemnity for (indirect) lost profits. The method of calculating
the lost profit and the application of 5 percent interest was in line with in-
ternational law and the practices of the Mixed Claims Commission as well
as section 352 of the German Trade Code.375
Finally, Magalhães put in doubt the pictures annexed to the German
memorandum. He claimed that those on Cuangar would not give an “idea
of the importance of the fort and its buildings and annexes”; while the oth-
er of Naulila would show nothing of the fort. As was to be expected,
Marx, in his duplique of June 1929, insisted on all the points he had made
in March and rejected Magalhães criticism with previously used argu-
ments.376
The Pleadings and the Dispute about the Young-Plan, 1929/30
After the exchanges of memoranda, arbitrator de Meuron invited the rep-
resentatives for the oral proceedings on September 3, 1929 to a Hotel in
Crans Montana, Switzerland. He also ordered the parties to pay to him
10,000 Swiss Franc each (8,077 RM).377 To a large degree the pleadings
over five days in Crans Montana concerned the Portuguese claims regard-
ing damages in Belgium and on sea, which had not been dealt with in the
latest exchange of memoranda or in the previous oral proceeding. While
4.2.5
375 Lapradelle/Politis 1905 vol.1: 469, 472; 1923 vol.2: 284; 285: ‘L’arbitre doit donc tenir
compte du manque à gagner lorsqu’il ne constitue pas un dommage indirect’; 285-7; 70;
636; 675. § 352 I HGB (1900) ‘Die Höhe der gesetzlichen Zinsen, mit Einschluß der
Verzugszinsen, ist bei beiderseitigen Handelsgeschäften fünf vom Hundert für das Jahr.
Das Gleiche gilt, wenn für eine Schuld aus einem solchen Handelsgeschäfte Zinsen ohne
Bestimmung des Zinsfußes versprochen sind.‘
376 PA R 52534, Réplique du Gvt. portugais, ~15.4.29; Duplique du Gvt. allemand, 6/29.
377 PA Bern 1763, Ordonance de Meuron, 3.7.29.
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preparing themselves for the new and complex legal issues, all involved
personnel, including the arbitrators, had to refer to special law treatises.378
Again, representatives Magalhes and Marx, and Costa Dias and Franz
as “colonial experts”, ‘crossed swords’ over the question of assessing the
direct damages and the 2 billion GM indemnity for the violation of Portu-
gal’s sovereignty. The Portuguese representatives were of the opinion that
the assessment of the “equitable damages” to be paid by Germany should
commence from the claimed sanction of 2 billion GM. Franz won the im-
pression that the Portuguese therefore would expect to obtain “at least sev-
eral 100 Million [GM]”.379
Marx, who had previously complained about Magalhães’ undiplomatic
language and stylistic “faux pas” (Entgleisungen) in Lausanne and in
some parts of his memoranda, emphasized that his counterpart this time
was showing “restraint”. He was satisfied with the course of the pleadings.
Also arbitrator de Meuron, during a joint breakfast at the end of the plead-
ings, underlined the “pleasant atmosphere” during the sessions. Marx
again applauded de Meuron, Fazy, and Guex for their impartiality during
the hearing. De Meuron concluded the hearing with an appeal to the par-
ties to find a compromise until November 30 and offered his support. In
case, the parties would not conclude a settlement on the claims until that
date, they would render their arbitration award. However, the Portuguese
government did not come forward with an offer. And the Germans, who
were in principle in favor of such a solution, argued that they had request-
ed a settlement already once and were turned down by the Portuguese.
This time, it would be for Lisbon to commence settlement negotiations.380
Arbitrator Fazy conceded that the gap between the amounts the Por-
tuguese government demanded and those the Germans deemed justified
“is too big”.381 The time to find a compromise lapsed and the parties
found themselves soon bogged down in another disagreement that grew
out of the question of Germany’s payment obligations – even before any
final amount was indicated by the arbitrators.
378 PA Bern 1763, AA to DG Bern, 17.8.29; 30.8.29; R 52534, Marx, Paris to AA, 4.7.29; also
arbitrator Robert Guex counted on the library of the German Foreign Office. He requested
in 1929 Vol.2 of the awards of the Mixed Claims Commission and Verzijl Le droit de Pris-
es de la Grande Guerre and received them. He handed them back once the arbitration was
over. PA Bern 1763, AA to DG Bern, 26.10.29; R. Guex to A. Müller, 8.11.29.
379 PA R 52534, remark Limmer, 12.9.29.
380 PA R 52534, Marx, Crans to Göppert, 7.9.29; AA to RFM, 20.9.29; AA to DGL, 20.9.29.
381 PA R 52535, Marx, Paris to AA, 14.10.29.
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A few months before, on June 7, 1929, Germany and the Allied Powers
had finally agreed on a new payment schedule for German reparation an-
nuities. According to this Young Plan (replacing the Dawes Plan of 1924)
Germany agreed to payment obligations of 54 annuities beginning in 1929
and ending in 1988 (reaching from 1,7 to 2,4 billion GM p.a., thus consid-
erably less than the 2,5 billion p.a. according to the Dawes Plan). Further-
more, the payments could be partly postponed in times of economic turbu-
lences. From the German perspective, the advantages of the Young Plan
consisted in a “fix[ed] reparation total”, and it also “provided for a distinct
reduction in payments for the immediate future” (1929–32); third, “it pro-
posed to end all foreign financial controls of the Dawes regime, thus re-
establishing Germany’s ‘financial sovereignty’.”382 The newly established
Bank for International Settlement in Basle replaced the Dawes supervisory
structure “to receive and disburse reparation payments” and to coordinate
central bank policies.383
Most of all due to German and British opposition there was a “protract-
ed and acrimonious struggle over the ratification of the [Young] Plan at
the Hague Conferences of August 1929 and January 1930.”384 During
these two conferences, officially entitled “The Conference on the Final
Liquidation of the War”, the implementation of the Young Plan and the
end of the Rhineland occupation by Allied forces were negotiated not only
between the Great Powers and Germany, but also with the British Domin-
ions and six smaller European nations, including Portugal. While the
British and French were not in accord about the allocation of German an-
nuities, the French and the Germans argued hard about the Rhineland and
possible sanctions in case of German default. The Germans also insisted
that these negotiations about the “final liquidation of the war” should de-
termine that all other claims based on the Treaty of Versailles (including
382 Cohrs 2006: 537; cf. Lamont 1930: 350-63; Krüger 1985: 476-95; Ferguson 1998: 437-9.
383 Kraus 2013: 121; Marks 1978: 251; cf. Myers 1929; Draeger 1929; Lamont 1930: 354;
Lamont 1929: 366f. ‘The Bank will be the Trustee of the creditor countries in dealing with
annuities. … It will receive funds from Germany in foreign exchange and in reichsmark –
the latter in an amount sufficient to cover payments within Germany on account of deliver-
ies in kind. Out of the funds received in foreign exchange, it will make distributions to the
creditor countries by crediting the accounts which the several central banks maintain at the
Bank. … All political influences are excluded from the operations of the Bank, which will
be carried on according to business principles only.”
384 Kent 1991: 287; cf. Heyde 1998: 65-75; Gomes 2010: 166-83.
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the liquidation of German property) would be considered as replaced by
the payments according to the Young Plan.385
The Portuguese, however, were alarmed by the prospect of possibly not
being entitled to claim payments separately and in addition to their per-
centage (between 1,5 and 6,5 million RM p.a. until 1939) of the German
annuities. Legal difficulties would arise from a demand to execute German
payment obligations that should follow from the award of de Meuron,
Guex and Fazy. During the discussions on January 19 and 20, 1930, Por-
tugal (together with Romania and Czechoslovakia) raised its reservations
against Art. III of the Second Hague Agreement on the final acceptance of
the Young Plan.386 This reservation was based on Portugal’s intention not
to lose its rights under § 4 of the annex to Art. 298 of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, in particular due to the “neutrality damages” in Angola, the
amounts of which were still not decided by the arbitrators. Portugal’s rep-
resentative, the law professor and former director of the Banco de Portu-
gal Rui Ennes Ulrich (1883–1966), remarked on January 19, 1930:
“The Portuguese delegation unfortunately is not in a position to accept Article
3 of the Protocol as drafted now, as long as the German Government and the
Portuguese Government have not reached an Agreement … I have made all
efforts since the beginning of the Conference but, as I have not been able to
get the necessary reply [from Germany] I must make reservations on Article
3.”
Julius Curtius (1877–1948), Germany’s new Foreign Minister, who dis-
tanced himself from the fulfillment policy of Gustav Stresemann (1878–
1929), responded that his delegation was of the opinion that all additional
claims of Portugal against Germany had lapsed by the Young Plan. A per-
centage of the German annuities would be all Portugal was entitled to.
Still, Ulrich signed the Agreement on January 20. Portugal’s reservations
were found only in the minutes of the meeting, whereas Ulrich’s signature
385 Cf. Kraus 2013: 122; Marks 1978: 250; Krüger 1985: 495f.; Kent 1991: 313-9; Lamont
1930: 361; Pfleiderer 2002: 271f. on the course of the conference; cf. 244; 287.
386 Art. III B (b) Creditor Powers accept ‘the payment in full of the annuities fixed thereby as a
final discharge of all liabilities of Germany still remaining undischarged and waive every
claim additional to those annuities, either for a payment or for property, which had been
addressed or might be addressed to Germany for past transaction …’
Art III C (a) Creditor Powers undertake ‘as from the date of the acceptance of the Experts’
Report [Young Plan] of the 7th June, 1929, to make no further use of their right to seize,
retain and liquidate the propery, rights and interests of German nationals or companies con-
trolled by them, in so fas as not already liquid or liquidated or finally disposed of…’ cf.
Santos 1978: 234.
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under the text of the Agreement was not marked with a reservation (Vor-
behalt).387
Also among German politicians the Young Plan was highly disputed.
“Reparations dominated the political life of the Weimar Republic until its
breakup.” It was not accepted that obligations “dictated a decade ago”
would bind Germany “forever”.388 Adolf Hitler’s NSDAP and other right
wing parties initiated a plebiscite in December 1929 against its obliga-
tions. However, on March 12 1930, after Chancellor Hermann Müller’s
promises of budget consolidation and austerity measures, parliament rati-
fied the Young Plan and the payment details set-forth in the second Hague
Agreement. On June 30, 1930, the Rhineland was evacuated by foreign
troops.389
The Award of 1930 (Amounts)
Direct and Indirect Damages – Content of the Award
Robert Fazy uttered in January 1930 that due to his “overwork” the three
arbitrators could not yet meet to find a conclusion on the Luso-German
dispute about the amount of damages to be paid.390 Finally, in May 1930,
de Meuron announced the decision on the damages and ordered a last pay-
ment of 25,000 Swiss Francs (20,294 RM) from each party.391
After having concluded in 1928 that the German Empire violated inter-
national law when invading Angola, as a measure of alleged “reprisal”, the
5.
5.1.
387 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações: 58, Extrato da Acta da 3a Sessão, 19.1.30; PA R 52535,
objections Port., 11.2.30; Kraus 2013:134; Köppen 2014: 351; Mata/da Costa 2014: 907.
388 Felix 1971: 175; Schöttler 2012: 372f.; cf. Lorenz 2008: 133f.
389 Köppen 2014: 366; Kraus 2013: 126; Myerson 2004: 203; Krüger 1985: 505; Marks 1978:
252.
390 PA R 52535, Marx, Paris to AA, 20.1.30, ‘Arbeitsüberlastung‘.
391 PA Bern 1763, de Meuron to DG Bern, 21.5.30. The publication of the award was post-
poned until end of July since the Portuguese money transfer did not arrive in time in Lau-
sanne (R 52535, Marx to AA, 8.7.30; Telegr. DG Bern to AA, 28.7.30). Altogether, the
Portuguese and German Governments paid to de Meuron 130,000 Swiss Francs. Consider-
ing that during the first two payments of 20,000 Swiss Francs each (1921; 1924) de Meuron
was the sole arbitrator, and during the last three payment of 45,000 Swiss Francs each
(1928, 1929, 1930) he was supported by Guex and Fazy, de Meuron had earned 70,000
Swiss Francs and Fazy and Guex 30,000 Swiss Francs each. Contrary to the German Fi-
nance Ministry the Foreign Ministry regarded these amounts as ‘modest’ (PA R 52536,
Limmer to Martius, 15.12.30 ‘mäßig‘).
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award of June 30, 1930 dealt with questions of the amount of damages
claimed by Portugal. By far the largest part of the award concerned the
damages in Belgium due to German requisitions and the damages on the
high seas (parts A and B), which were not mentioned in the decision of
July 1928. These cases were decided on the merits as well as on the
amounts to be paid by Germany.392
As to the amounts due for the colonial damages (parts C and D), the ar-
bitrators based their decision on the provisions of the interim judgment of
1928. They upheld their distinction between direct and indirect damages in
the colonies that was criticized by the Portuguese in the memorandum and
during the oral proceedings. It was also repeated that the “native rebel-
lion” on which Portugal based most of its claims, had neither been insti-
gated nor encouraged by Germany (p. 1074). On the other hand, de Meu-
ron, Fazy, and Guex did not follow the German argumentation that – con-
trary to what was stated in the award of 1928 – only private damages
should be taken into consideration and damages to Portuguese state prop-
erty be excluded from the award (Marx made this argument to please his
Finance Ministry, he did not believe in it [p. 1071]). The distinction be-
tween “private” and “state” claims was less clear under public internation-
al law than the wording of § 4 might have suggested. In the wake of the
First World War also numerous “private” business claims pitted govern-
ments against each other.393
With regard to direct damages de Meuron, Fazy, and Guex held that
Germany was not only responsible for the losses caused in connection
with the destruction of Fort Naulila and others. Germany, they decided,
was also responsible for the losses suffered as the result of the retreat of
the Portuguese troops beyond the line of German attack. For the Por-
tuguese commander had no reason to assume that the German force would
regard its objective as achieved with the destruction of Fort Naulila and
would not “exploit the fruits of victory” by a further advance aiming at the
annihilation of Roçadas’ forces. The retreat was thus the “immediate, nor-
mal, and necessary consequence” (p. 1069f.) of the defeat. “Owing to the
haste” required after the first German attacks, the arbitrators included even
the additional costs for delivering Portuguese military goods to Fort
Naulila among the direct damages. Other items of direct damages includ-
392 RIAA II: 1035-77; cf. Lauterpacht 1935: 200-2 (Case No. 126); Parry/Grant 1986: 299.
393 Caron 1990: 151 ‘many…disputes were not truly between two states named as parties’.
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ed: (a) Damages for loss of life in respect of persons killed in the course of
the military operations. However, considering the claims put forward in
this matter by Portugal the arbitrators remarked that they were exaggerat-
ed inasmuch as they were higher than the claims put forward under this
head by the Allied Powers against Germany or than the sums awarded in
similar cases by arbitral tribunals; (b) damages for destroyed roads, cattle,
forts, farms, ammunition, and provisions; (c) 5 per cent interest on the sum
awarded (intérêts compensatoires). The arbitrators refused to award com-
pound interests to the amount of 30 per cent on account of loss of profits
as demanded by Portugal. They pointed out, in regard to some of the
claims, that the objects in question could have been replaced by the own-
ers who, by purchasing substitutes for them, would have been able to earn
the profits. “If they now receive their full value, plus normal interest as
from the date of the loss, they must be regarded as fully compensated.”
(p. 1074)
With regard to indirect damages the arbitrators awarded damages ex ae-
quo et bono on account of the losses suffered in consequence of the
“African rebellion” following upon the retreat of the Portuguese troops.
As stated in the previous award, the rising of Africans constituted an in-
jury which Major Franke “ought to have foreseen as a necessary conse-
quence of the military operations” (p. 1075). Also, the German attack re-
sulted in disorganization of the Portuguese forces which would otherwise
have been available for suppressing the “rebellion”. On the other hand, as
a mitigating circumstance, the arbitrators considered as relevant the con-
tinued inaction of the Portuguese troops subsequent to the German inva-
sion. This inaction was due to the mistaken belief of the Portuguese au-
thorities that Franke had the intention to continue and extend the German
invasion and to the resulting decision of the Portuguese authorities to
choose a rallying point at a considerable distance from the original opera-
tions and to delay unduly the resumption of the operations against the
Africans. Germany, they decided, could not be blamed for this “error of
judgment” (p. 1076).
Finally, the arbitrators dealt with the question of penal damages. They
were unable to accede to the Portuguese claim for penal damages of 2 bil-
lion GM as compensation for the “violation of Portuguese sovereignty and
offences against international law”, as such “sanction” lay beyond their
“sphere of competence”. De Meuron, Fazy, and Guex justified this by
pointing out that this claim was not in fact a claim for indemnity, but a
demand for retributory and deterrent punishment. However, Portugal and
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Germany in charging the arbitrator(s) with fixing the amount of damages
did not intend to endow them with the right to inflict punishment. The ar-
bitration procedure acted under a part of the Treaty of Versailles entitled
“Economic Clauses” (part X), whereas it was another part of this Treaty
(part VII) which bore the designation “Sanctions”. Moreover, Article 232
of the Treaty recognized that Germany was financially unable to bear fully
the burden of purely economic compensation.
With regard to questions of computation of damages the arbitrators,
contrary to the memoranda and contrary also to their assessment of dam-
ages in Belgium and on sea (parts A and B), did not go into factual details.
They concluded that
“Portuguese claims are admitted to the amounts which follow, in capital and
interest, to the date of the present award: Damages in Belgium: 653,861 GM;
Damages on sea: 572,607.30 GM; Direct damages in Africa: 22,000,000 GM
[5 Million below the Portuguese claims]; Indirect Damages in Africa:
25,000,000 GM [which included the expenses for the entire arbitration], total-
ing 48,226,468.30 GM. For these reasons the indemnity to be paid to Portugal
in terms of § 4 of the Annex to Articles 297-298 of the Treaty of Versailles, is
fixed at 48,226,468.30 GM” (p. 1077).
This sum was less than 1 per cent of what the Portuguese government had
hoped for since 1921; it was more than double of what Marx had estimat-
ed in 1928; but it was much lower than what the Germans had expected
when they had tried to make a settlement offer in the early 1920s.
The Negotiations over the Young-Plan
“The Young Plan proved non-viable in the grim economic conditions of
the late 1920s”, but its provisions had nevertheless profound legal conse-
quences. And the German officials were eager to use them to Germany’s
advantage.394 Immediately after the second award was published Judge
Marx pointed out with relief that the arbitrators did not mention the
question of the award’s enforceability (Erfüllung), as he had requested
during the pleading. The Portuguese could thus not find any indication in
the award for their intention – made visible through their reservation to the
second Hague Agreement on the Young Plan – to obtain direct payments
for their “neutrality claims” (Neutralitätsansprüche). Even though the
5.2
394 Gomes 2010: 182.
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awards final phrase spoke of an “indemnity to be paid to Portugal”, there
was no “sentence” (Verurteilung) of the German government to payments.
The award merely stipulated the amount of damages.395
Consequently, the Portuguese government was in an awkward position.
It planned to demand the execution of the award of June 1930, but it had
also signed in January 1930 the second Hague Agreement with the above-
mentioned reservations. However, in case of a ratification of the Young
Plan, the Portuguese entitlement for claims of damages deriving from the
time before the declaration of war in 1916 (neutrality damages, as award-
ed by the arbitrators in Lausanne) might be lost, since the annuities (and
Portugal’s percentage thereof) were Germany’s “final” payments accord-
ing to the Hague Agreement. During meetings in Lisbon, the German Mi-
nister Albert von Baligand (1881–1930) repeated what his Foreign Minis-
ter Curtius had uttered at the Hague Conference: Portugal would not re-
ceive additional payments for the neutrality damages, “because these
claim had also been made good through German reparation payments” and
would “be void due to the Young Plan.”
However, the Portuguese government, also with regard to public opin-
ion, believed that there needed to be some acknowledgement of the results
of the Lausanne arbitration and therefore insisted on separate German pay-
ments outside of the scope of the Young annuities. The Portuguese never
accepted the German understanding of § 4 that it would be a violation of
the Treaty of Versailles if the Allied state were to use the proceeds of the
liquidated German property, rights and interests for its own budget or to
cover its war expenses. After several rounds of negotiations in the first
half of 1930, the Portuguese and the Germans agreed that Lisbon would
ratify the Young Plan provided that 1) the question of payments to be stip-
ulated by the Lausanne award would be referred anew to an arbitration tri-
bunal; and 2) negotiations would continue over the Portuguese payments
of German pre-war loans (Staatsanleihe) and in case an agreement should
not be found on this issue, an arbitration procedure would be initiated too.
Only after the ratification of the Young Plan a new arbitration (Art. XV of
the Hague Agreement of January 20, 1930) would commence.396 The Por-
tuguese re-payment of private German pre-war loans to the Portuguese
government (in gold) was a question that complicated the negotiations.
395 BAB R 1001/6642: 55-9, Marx, Paris to AA, 1.8.30, ‘l’indemnité à payer par l’Allemagne’.
396 PA R 52536, AA, 26.9.30; Fuchs 1927:269 Liquidationserlös nicht für Haushalt verwerten.
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While the Portuguese aimed at compensating parts of their loan-repayment
with (future) German payments out of the Lausanne arbitration, the Ger-
mans tried (in vain) to separate both issues as far as possible.397
After the arbitrators in Lausanne had published their award in July
1930, the Portuguese government was not satisfied and changed its ap-
proach to the Young Plan. Not only were the 48,226,468.30 GM consid-
ered a completely insufficient indemnity, the ministers in Lisbon were also
concerned about possible effects the award of the Lausanne arbitration
could have on other disputes with Germany. On August 8, 1930, the Por-
tuguese Secretary of State told the German Minister the award had “creat-
ed a new situation”. An agreement between the governments with the aim
to refer disputes under the Young Plan to an arbitration tribunal would be
out of question now. New negotiations should start on the issue in Lisbon.
The German claim for payment in gold for the pre-war loans could be dis-
cussed in concert with other concerned countries. Irrespective of what had
been stated before, the Portuguese government would demand from Ger-
many the immediate execution of payment of the amounts awarded by the
Lausanne tribunal, since they needed to be paid separately and over all the
Young annuities. Only after Germany had paid its “Lausanne debts”, Por-
tugal would ratify the Young Plan.
Neither the Portuguese Secretary nor his German interlocutor had any
illusions: Germany would not pay the amounts stipulated by the Lausanne
tribunal, and Portugal would not initiate the repayment of the German pre-
war loan. However, without ratification of the Young Plan, Portugal could
not participate in the distribution of German annuities; money, Portugal’s
new strongmen, Finance Minister Salazar, needed “urgently“, since he
saw it as his “first task … to balance the budget, deemed to be an impossi-
ble feat”.398
The German government, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the
award of June 30, 1930 had changed nothing. Rather, it was claimed that
both, the German and the Portuguese government had agreed right from
the beginning that the Lausanne arbitration concerned Portugal’s claims
“only on the merits and on the amounts”. For the Germans there was thus
also an understanding that the execution of the award would be guided by
the legal principles currently in force between both governments. Irrespec-
397 PA R 52534, DGL to AA, 6.7.29; AA to DGL, 31.7.29.
398 PA R 52535, Telgr DGL to AA, 9.8.30; Meneses 2009: 46; 59; Kay 1970: 79.
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tive of an application of the provisions of the Dawes Plan or the Young
Plan, the German reparation payments, “in view of its all-encompassing
nature”, would cover also the obligations from the Lausanne award. From
the German point of view this resulted in particular from the provisions of
Art. II and III B b of the Hague Agreement of January 20, 1930. Again
and again German representatives in Lisbon stressed that “an immediate
payment of the amount stipulated by the arbitrators was out of
question“.399
Nevertheless, end of August 1930, Portugal’s Minister in Berlin,
António da Costa Cabral, met the new German Secretary of State Bern-
hard W. von Bülow to formally demand the execution of the award of de
Meuron, Fazy, and Guex. Cabral assumed that the German answer would
refer to the annuity payments of the Young Plan, as the German Minister
in Lisbon had done already, and warned: “that is a non-starter”. When
Cabral pointed to the possibility to refer the payment-dispute to the arbi-
tration tribunal set forth in the Hague Agreement, Bülow, “a decided op-
ponent of Stresemann’s ideas and the exponent of an outspoken nationalist
policy”, reminded him that this procedure could only be applied if Portu-
gal had ratified the Young Plan.400
The German Ministries of Finance and Economy wanted to prevent any
negotiations with Portugal on the payments before Lisbon had ratified the
Young Plan. However, since the negotiations in Lisbon had reached a
dead end, the Foreign Office wanted to continue the dialog with Cabral in
Berlin. It sent a councilor to him twice to discuss the possibility to agree
on a new arbitration before Portugal would ratify the Young Plan. The for-
mal German answer of September 6 to the Portuguese request stated mere-
ly, as Cabral had anticipated, “that the execution of the arbitration award
would be fulfilled according to the principles set forth in the New [Young]
Plan.” The wording avoided any justification that could create a prejudice
by which Germany were bound in a future arbitration. When Cabral had
received this statement he deemed an agreement on the arbitration (men-
tioned only verbally by the Germans) reasonable; however, he reminded
his German interlocutor that for their next step the Portuguese government
would also have to take into consideration “public opinion in Portugal.401
The same was true for the German side. The new foreign policy of the
399 PA R 52535, AA Note, 6.9.30 ‘im Hinblick auf ihre allumfassende Natur’.
400 Kolb 2007: 201; PA R 52535, remark Bülow; Cabral to Curtius, 30.8.30; Santos 1978: 237.
401 PA R 52535, Bülow to Cabral, 6.9.30; remark Busch, 8.9.30, remark on meeting, 2.9.30.
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presidential cabinets after the death of Stresemann focused on “bring[ing]
about a rapid and offensive solution to the reparation … questions”.402
Given the disappointment in Portugal that no payments followed the
Lausanne award, the government did not even introduce the Young Plan
for ratification. The German government in turn increased the pressure. In
September 1930, the German reparation commissioner in Paris was or-
dered to stop any delivery of reparations in kind to Portugal according to
the Young Plan. The Finance Ministry justified this act to the Bank for In-
ternational Settlements by arguing that it would be unjustified to concede
to the Portuguese government unilateral advantages based on the Young
Plan, while Portugal did not honor its obligations from the Young Plan.
The Ministry emphasized that prompt Portuguese ratification had been as-
sumed and therefore deliveries had taken place; but from now on, Ger-
many would refrain from doing so until Portugal’s ratification. The com-
missioner of the Portuguese government for deliveries in kind with the
reparation commission in Paris, Captain Tomás Wylie Fernandes (b.
1883), reminded his German colleague Litter that first of all the German
industry producing the goods would be hurt. He pointed to the possibility
to refer the matter to a new arbitration tribunal and underlined that it
should be clear that by ratifying the New Plan, Portugal would not lose its
entitlements to refer the matter of the Lausanne award to a new arbitra-
tor.403
End of September 1930, Portugal’s Foreign Minister met with his Ger-
man counterpart in Geneva during a session of the League of Nations and
spoke about the dispute regarding the payment out of the Lausanne award.
Both concluded to exchange notes detailing the number of open issues be-
tween the two countries and to formally agree to refer these disputes to ar-
bitration.404 In December, Germany protested against the payments to Por-
tugal by the Bank for International Settlements out of German Young an-
nuities. Again, the Germans argued that “a power which has not ratified
the [Young Plan] should not enjoy [its] advantages”. Concerned about see-
ing his bank dragged into a complicated legal dispute with Germany, the
bank’s director, Leon Fraser (1889–1945) wrote a personal letter to com-
missioner Fernandes in Paris. Frazer expressed his hope that Finance Mi-
nister Salazar would “abstain from drawing further funds from us until …
402 Kolb 2007: 202; cf. Cohrs 2006: 569; Köppen 2014: 357f.; Graml 2001.
403 PA R 52535, RFM to BIS, Basel 6.9.30; Telgr German Commissioner Paris to AA, 9.9.30.
404 PA R 52536, Telgr Curtius to AA, 24.9.30; Telgr DGL to AA, 30.10.30.
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ratification takes place”. The bank had sent a telegram to Salazar in this
respect. And Fernandes wrote another long letter to him personally, point-
ing to the public opinion of the world and asked him to abstain from draw-
ing German reparation funds. Salazar, who had “[f]rom his ivory tower [at
Coimbra] built up a mystique about his financial omniscience”, conceded.
He responded that negotiations with the Germans should be initiated soon
in order to permit ratification of the Young Plan.405
However, the suggested exchange of notes was not finalized until July
8, 1931.406 It stipulated the different opinions of the parties on the execu-
tion of the arbitration award of June 30, 1930 and confirmed that an arbi-
tral tribunal according to Article XV of the Hague Agreement of January
20, 1930 should decide on the matter. On July 11, 1931 Portugal ratified
the Hague Agreement on the final acceptance of the Young Plan.407 In the
meantime, the international discussion about the reparation payments con-
tinued unabated, conference followed after conference. While Portugal’s
public could not understand why no payments had come forward for the
colonial damages after ten years of legal reasoning, many in Germany
considered the Young Plan an affront, yet alone additional payments. The
president of the German Reserve Bank, Hjalmar Schacht (1877–1970), in
his critique of the reparation regime Das Ende der Reparationen (1931)
stressed that foreign governments “must refrain from any attempts to
squeeze (herauspressen) extra-payments beyond the Young Plan”.
Schacht, exonerating himself from any responsibility for the execution of
the Young Plan, demanded from his government “that it does not condone
additional outflows”.408 Since 1929 Germany lurched near bankruptcy, a
fact that weighed heavily on its political stability. Portugal did not profit
from its ratification of the Young Plan, for in 1931 the annuities could no
longer be paid. Given the “Great Depression” around the world, in Ger-
many the feeling prevailed that “we have paid enough”. The Young Plan
“had failed” and “reparations had been spirited off the international
stage.”409 In early 1932 it seemed clear – at least to Germans – that pay-
ments would not be resumed. The Lausanne Agreement of July 9, 1932,
405 Birmingham 2011: 162; cf. Wheeler 1978: 248f; AHD 3p ar 25 m 12-Reparações, BIS to
Salazar, 19.12.30; Fraser to Fernandes, 19.12.30; 21.12.30; Fernandes to Fraser, 21.12.30;
Fernandes to Salazar, 21.12.30; BIS to Salazar, 20.12.30; Salazar to Fernandes, 23.12.30.
406 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações: 58, Diário do Governo. Supplemento, 11.7.31
407 PA R 52536, Reichsanzeiger Nr. 159, 11.7.31.
408 Schacht 1931: 107; cf. Heyde 1998: 71; Cohrs 2006: 515.
409 Kent 1991: 321; Fischer 1932: 193; Grimm 1932: 64-6 ~67 billion GM in reparations.
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the 35th intergovernmental conference on reparations, sealed the end of
German reparations.410
In November 1931 a new Luso-German arbitration on Portugal’s de-
mand for the payment of the amount awarded by the Lausanne tribunal
was initiated. An exchange of memoranda and counter-memoranda fol-
lowed.411 The Portuguese, in their presentation of the facts and the law of
the Young Plan did not save theatric means. The 50-pages memorandum
was adorned with a strong quotation about the duties of those who execute
the Hague Agreements by Henri Jaspar (1870–1939), Prime Minister of
Belgium and President of the Hague Conference.412 The Portuguese
replique of 1932, emphasizing the legitimacy of the claims for payment,
concluded in demanding from the arbitrators: “JUSTICE!”413
Can the Germans Pay? The Award of 1933 (Execution)
“With his passion for balanced budgets”, Finance Minister António
Salazar had reason to look for reparation payments from Germany. His
ministry (he remained Minister of Finance also after becoming President
of the Council of Ministers in July 1932) became much more involved in
the arbitration than in previous years. As the “undisputed center of the po-
litical system”414 Salazar was always informed about new developments in
the arbitration and received the same correspondence as did the Foreign
Minister.415 His keenness for detail – which would characterize his han-
dling of government affairs for the next thirty-six years – was already ap-
parent at this point in his career. It was in this time leading up to the final
award that the decisive steps were taken in the ascent of Salazar and his
innermost circle which led to the creation of the New State (Estado Novo)
6.
410 Petersson 2009: 131; 114-133; Kraus 2013: 141-6; Kolb 2011: 100; Wehler 2003: 250.
411 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações: 58, Arbitration Tribunal to Fernandes, 5.9.31.
412 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações: 58, Case of the Portuguese Government, Lisbon 1931: 5:
The Hague Agreement ‘will only stand if those who execute it bring to the task the same
faith of those who were its first craftsmen. To carry it through, they must also remember a
past overburdened with murderous terrors, with countless sorrows, with perilous discus-
sions and deceptive revisions.’
413 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações: 58, Réplique du Gouvernement Portugais, Lisbon 1932:
24: the memoranda (and all three awards) are reprinted in Portugal 1936 (340 pages).
414 Smith 1974: 662; Roberts 1986: 499; Lewis 1978 629; cf. Meneses 2010: xxx.
415 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações: 58, Fernandes to Salazar and MNE, 31.1.33; 10.2.33.
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in 1933. However, the dictatorship was not yet consolidated as several
military and civil revolts from left and right against the new authoritarian
institutions attested.416
As head of government, Salazar “was finally free to recruit those who
identified most closely with his own position”.417 Feeling that the former
republican minister Magalhães who was Costa’s confidant would not be a
suitable representative of the new regime, Salazar appointed a new arbitra-
tion representative: José Lobo d’Avila Lima. Like his predecessor, he was
Professor of Law at Coimbra and in Lisbon. He acted as the legal counsel
to the Foreign Ministry. Together with Magalhães (who would, in the
1940s, join the opposition’s ranks of the Movimento de Unidade
Democrática [MUD]), d’Avila Lima had represented Portugal in numer-
ous League of Nations conferences on international law. During the new
arbitration on Portugal’s claim to the payment by Germany of the amount
fixed by the award of 1930, d’Avila Lima was supported by Tomas Fer-
nandes, the commissioner with the reparation commission in Paris. As we
have seen, the outspoken admirer of Salazar had dealt with the questions
previously.
The German government retained Judge Marx, who had received much
acclaim from the Foreign Ministry after the award in 1930. However, con-
sidering that the new arbitration was no longer about the war in southern
Angola, but most of all about the technicalities of the Young Plan and the
law and policies of reparation, Dr. Richard Fuchs (1986–1970), councilor
in the Finance Ministry and author of a treatise on the Sequestration, Liq-
uidation and Release of German Assets Abroad (1927) was considered the
main expert and thus drafted most of the German memoranda.418
Even though – given the state of Germany’s finances – there was some
doubt among specialists “that the legal position is to be decisive now”, the
new arbitration tribunal in Paris was set up with great care. It consisted of
five high-profile arbitrators: George W. Wickersham (U.S.) as president,
Marc Wallenberg (Sweden), Anton Kröller (Netherlands), Albrecht
Mendelsohn-Bartholdy (Germany), and José Caeiro da Matta (Portu-
gal).419
416 Baiȏa/Fernandes/Meneses 2004; cf. Livermore 1967: 331f.
417 Madureira 2007: 86.
418 Matta 1934: 9; PA R 52536, RFM to AA, 8.12.30; Minister to Marx, 18.12.30; 27.12.30.
419 Fischer 1932: 192; 194 ‘legal view is necessarily inadequate’; George W. Wickersham
(1858–1936), US Attorney General 1909–13; President of the Council on Foreign Relations
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After a week of deliberations these experts in law and business pro-
nounced on February 16, 1933 that Germany was “not obliged to make
payments to Portugal, separately and over and above all the other obliga-
tions accepted under the New [Young] Plan, of the amount [48,226,468.30
GM] awarded by the [Lausanne] tribunal” on June 30, 1930.420 The tri-
bunal found that this amount came under the general reparation payment
for war damages paid by Germany, limited to the annuities according to
the Young Plan. The Portuguese based their claim primarily on three argu-
ments: 1) Portugal was still neutral when it suffered the damages due to
German aggression; 2) the indemnity for damages was based on a valid
award rendered by an international arbitration tribunal before the Young
Plan came into force. Therefore, this award should be executed without
taking the Young Plan into consideration; 3) the Portuguese government
had its reservations to the execution of the Young Plan recorded during
the Hague conference (and before the Plan’s ratification). These reserva-
tions explicitly referred to the claims disputed between Germany and Por-
tugal.421 The arbitrators, however, were not convinced by these arguments,
but held that with the Luso-German agreements of 1931, “Portugal waived
any question of reservation to the agreement of January 20, 1930”. They
concluded “that the payment fixed by the [Lausanne] award cannot be
made separately and over and above all the other obligations accepted by
Germany in the [Young] Plan as a definite settlement of the financial
questions resulting from the war.” (p. 1385). This award was final and
binding. It created a precedent for other governments claiming due neu-
trality damages, since the Hague conference declared the arbitration
awards of the tribunal to be a binding interpretation of the content of the
conference.422
1933–36; Marc Wallenberg, banker and businessman; Anthony George Kröller (1862–
1941), banker and businessman; Albrecht Mendelsohn-Bartholdy (1874–1936), Professor
of International Law in Hamburg, 1919 German representative in Versailles and in arbitra-
tion procedures (Nicolaysen 2011: 217); José Caeiro da Matta (1877–1963), Rector of the
University of Lisbon (1929–46), Professor of Private International Law with a decidedly
‘anti-positivist’ stand (Hespanha 1981: 430), served as judge (juge suppleant) at the PCIJ
(1931–45). He, Barbosa de Magalhães and Lobo d’Avila Lima usually represented Portugal
during law conferences of the Leage of Nations.
420 RIAA II: 1371-1391; AJIL 27 (1933): 543-554 (543); Berliner Börsen-Zeitung No.66,
8.2.1933; cf. Santos 1978: 236f.
421 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações: 59, Fernandes: Observações, 18.12.31; Informação,
7.12.31.
422 BAB R 1001/6642: 64, Nachmittags-Ausgabe, 16.2.33, 84. Jg. Nr. 329.
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While the Germans were celebrating one of the first foreign policy suc-
cesses of the Third Reich, arbitrator Caeiro da Matta informed Salazar im-
mediately after the decision of the tribunal. The disappointing outcome of
the arbitration did not hinder Caeiro da Matta’s rise to an illustrious cursus
honorum in the Estado Novo. Less than two month after the award Salazar
made him his Foreign Minister (1933–35).423 Both parties continued their
negotiations about German property in Portugal (which had been ongoing
since the 1920s424) during and after the arbitration procedure – among
these properties were still parts of the load of the steamer Adelaide, which
in 1914 was seized in the harbor of Luanda by order of Norton de
Matos.425
German payments had come to an end. “Reparations were never for-
mally cancelled [the Lausanne Agreement of 1932 was never ratified by
either party], but fell into limbo as they became increasingly unrealistic.”
Although the Portuguese hoped that legal technicalities would allow them
to recover the money, this turned out not to be the case. However, recon-
struction and pensions still had to be paid for. “In the end, the victors paid
the bill.”426 Also the Angolan treasury never received any transfer money
from Germany. In the words of historian Filipe Meneses, the arbitration
procedures, so eagerly anticipated by those who had pushed Portugal into
the World War, “yielded even less [than German reparation payments];
they proved to be an elaborate and overly long waste of time and energy.”
With the award of 1933 “Portugal had been well and truly defeated.”427
423 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparaçoes, P 58, Caeiro da Mata to Salazar and MNE, 16.2.33; he be-
came Portugal’s representative in Vichy-France and returned to the Council of Ministers
(Education, 1944–50; Foreign Affairs, 1947–50).
424 AHD 3p ar 25 m 12-Reparações, DGL to MNE, 21.2.25 on German restitution claims. The
Portuguese government could liquidate the German property it had sequestrated during the
war and kept the proceeds. Information about these properties was not given by the Por-
tuguese government to German proprietors, as the German Legation responded to numer-
ous inquiries from Germany. Negotiations about clearance remained ‘unsuccessful’ (PA
Lissabon 176 (Vorkriegsforderungen), DGL to IHK Remscheid, 29.10.29).
425 AHD 3p ar 25 m 1-Reparações, P 59, Fernandes to MNE, 20.7.32; Fuchs to Fernandes,
18.1.33; 23.3.33;5.4.33; Fernandes: Mémoire au sujet de la réclamation de ‘Stahlwerksver-
band’, 11.4.33; minutes of meeting, Fuchs, Hechler, Fernandes, Paris, 13.2.33.
426 Marks 1978: 254; cf. Felix 1971: 176; Heyde 1998: 430-55; Gomes 2010: 203-12.
427 Meneses 2010: 162f.
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Legal and Historiographic Perspectives on the
World War in Angola, 1918–2014
Portuguese and German Reactions to the Awards
The first half of the twentieth century was not yet an “era in which trials
… ceased to be a matter of exclusive interest to jurists.”1 There were few
public reactions to the arbitration awards. During the ongoing procedures,
the press was rarely informed about latest developments. Afonso Costa
was at least once quoted in a Lisbon newspaper when he spoke (self-ap-
plaudingly) about the (future) arbitration according to § 4 and the forth-
coming reparations.2 In 1926, the German Foreign Office notified the
press about the oral proceedings in the Luso-German arbitration case.3
After the award of 1928 was received in Berlin, the Foreign Office was
not eager to see the result (German responsibility under international law
due to excessive use of violence by the Schutztruppe) widely published or
discussed. By the late 1920s, the “central importance of international law”
during the Great War had sunk into oblivion. In Europe and beyond, Ger-
man efforts to dismiss “[c]laims of systematic violations … as mere war
propaganda” won the day. The German Minister in Lisbon was notified:
“Press release is only intended in case the affair gets known to the press
by other means.“4 It did; Portuguese developments pressured the coun-
cilors to take a different stand. The Lisbon daily Diario de Notiçias used
the 13th anniversary of the battle of Mongua on August 17, 1928 not only
to inform its readers about the award and to stress the “most glorious ac-
tion” of Portugal’s colonial forces, but also pointed out that the Africans
were “instigated and financed [to revolt] by the Germans”. Germany’s Mi-
nister in Lisbon commented that this article was not a sign of triumph,
rather, as he remarked: “One cannot hold it against the Portuguese that
they put the best face possible to the public on the bitter results [of the ar-
PART THREE.
7.
1 Felman 2002: 2.
2 Quoted in: NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 175: 800, USML to SoS, 16.4.21.
3 PA R 52532, Martius to AA, Press Dpt, 17.9.26.
4 Hull 2014: 12; PA R 52533, AA to DGL, 3.8.28.
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bitration award]”.5 Still, he sent a letter of protest to Portugal’s Foreign
Minister, referring to the Lausanne award, which stated that there was no
proof for the alleged German instigations. The German Legation also pro-
vided Diario de Notiçias with an excerpt of the award and requested a rec-
tification. One day later Diario published a long article on the award and
explained that the arbitrators had concluded that there was “no proof” that
German agents had “provoked” the “rebellion”.6
Other journals in Portugal had published excerpts of the award without
comment, and it seemed only a matter of time until its content would be
published in the German press. The legal department therefore provided
the Foreign Office’s press department with some details on the award that
proved favorable to Germany: It was emphasized that the award did not
mention the Portuguese accusations about German intrigues before the
World War to annex Angola. The arbitrators described the Naulila inci-
dent as an unfortunate chain of events that were not due to illegitimate
purposes of Schultze-Jena’s expedition. Finally, the award declined the
Portuguese allegation that Germany had made propaganda among
Africans against Portuguese rule. Shortly thereafter, a statement in this re-
spect was given at the press conference of the Foreign Office7 The Frank-
furter Zeitung more or less copied the Foreign Office’s statement.8
While the award of 1928 was celebrated in Diário de Notiçias as a rea-
son for “great joy of all Portuguese”, the award of 1930 was more soberly
received in Portugal. The newspaper La Voz merely reported that the arbi-
trators had obliged Germany to pay 48 Million GM to Portugal.9 Judge
Marx was “more or less satisfied” with the award of 1930.10 In its assess-
ment of the award of 1933 the German Press office was clear: “Across the
board the decision came down in favor of Germany”. Arbitrator Caeiro da
Matta, now Foreign Minister, on the other hand was so disappointed that
he published his dissenting opinion (Le différent Luso-Allemand) in 1934.
He spoke of the “fidelity to the principles of law” as the “condition of the
prestige of [interstate arbitration]”, leaving thus little doubt that he saw
these principles violated by the award. However, the prestigious Boletim
5 PA R 52533, DGL to AA, 3.12.28.
6 PA R 52533, DGL to AA, 29.8.28, Diário de Notíçias 17.8. ‘Uma acção gloriosa’; 18.8.28.
7 PA R 52533, Martius to AA, Press Dpt, 15.8.28; remark AA, Press Dpt, 18.8.28.
8 PA R 52533, Frankfurter Zeitung, No. 619, 19.8.28.
9 Diário de Notíçias 17.8.28; PA R 52535, La Voz, 6.8.30 in: Telgr. DGL to AA, 6.8.30.
10 PA R 52536, Marx to Martius, 20.12.30; cf. Göppert 1931.
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da Faculdade de Direito of the University of Coimbra abstained from
publishing any article about the Luso-German arbitration. Rather, the edi-
tors, among them Prime Minister Salazar, decided to publish an amicable
article in French about the situation of international law in Germany that
emphasized the close relations between Portuguese and German legal re-
searchers.11
Also the political relations between Portugal and Germany were not ad-
versely affected by the ongoing arbitration. Several other disputed issues
were being negotiated at the same time, for example the German repara-
tion deliveries in kind, Portugal’s re-payment of German pre-war loans, or
the clearance of sequestrated German property in Portugal. Especially the
Legates in Berlin and Lisbon, Costa Cabral and Voretzsch, attempted to
‘normalize’ the relations of the former enemies. Finally, in 1936 the long-
standing question of the sequestrated German property was regulated by
the Luso-German accord on German properties, rights, and interests. Un-
der the title Portugal e Alemanha (1936) Salazar’s government published
a massive compilation of the documents relating to the arbitration. During
the Second World War the Estado Novo followed a policy of carefully
balanced neutrality – and upheld the Luso-British treaty of 1373.12
The afterlife of Naulilaa in International Law
Even though the arbitration procedure from 1920 to 1933 has been charac-
terized as an “overly long waste of time and energy”,13 this cannot be un-
derstood as a valid judgment of the effects the arbitration awards had on
international law. Most of all, the award of 1928 – known today as the
Naulilaa case – has not only “made legal history”; it is counted among the
“landmark cases in public international law.”14
Legal commentaries on the Lausanne award commenced immediately
after it was rendered. In September 1928 Judge Marx drafted an article
about it. Since he was Germany’s representative in the case, he requested
8.
11 BAB R 1001/6642: 64, Wolff’s Telegraphen Büro 16.2.33, Nr. 329; Matta 1934: 12; Jacob
1930; 1932/34.
12 NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753.62/1, note, 3.4.28; Cabral 1931: 340 hoping for closer ‘aca-
demic and economic cooperation’; Santos 1978: 242; Portugal 1936; Pereira 2012.
13 Meneses 2010: 162f.
14 Heinze/Fitzmaurice 1998; Sir R. Jenning in ibd.: vii.
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permission of the Foreign Office‘s legal department. He argued that his ar-
ticle would provoke a reaction to his questions about the reasoning of the
arbitrators in the coming award. In November, 1928 Marx’s short article,
more or less a summary of the 34-page award, was published in the
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung. He saw the three requirements for a lawful
reprisal, mentioned in the award, and most of all the “proportionality”
rule, as an argumentative device of the arbitrators to avoid any doubts
about Germany’s responsibility, since the factual findings of the award
(Schultze-Jena had camped on Portuguese territory, he had made an “un-
fortunate move” in Fort Naulila, Governor Seitz had insufficiently tried to
reach a compromise with the Portuguese before he ordered the attacks)
were “mainly based on the accounts of Portuguese witnesses.”15
At the same time, the award that immortalized the misspelling of Fort
Naulilaa in legal literature, received a more scathing critique from Ger-
man academics. It was included in a long article on § 4 by Karl Schmid
and Ernst Schmitz. They left no doubt that the arbitrators (similar to other
awards of MAT) had committed grave legal errors when they found Ger-
many liable for the destruction of the forts in Angola. The arbitrators, they
maintained, had (illegitimately) based their requirement of the “propor-
tionality” of reprisals on considerations of “equity”. To them it seemed
“clear that it cannot be determined according to what the arbitrator in 1928
considers to be principes d’équité, what formed a German act commis during
the first years of the war. It does not need any elucidation that when in 1914
rules of positive international law were inexistent in this respect, an acte com-
mis, a delinquency according to international law cannot be retroactively con-
structed by way of filling the gaps out of considerations of equity by devising
rules that have been violated.”16
A short while later, Viktor Bruns (1884–1943), professor at Berlin Univer-
sity and Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of International Law,
joined in this criticism with the question how international arbitration tri-
bunals establish the norms they apply in their awards? “Or are these norms
not part of positive international law?” – implying thus the same allega-
15 PA R 52533, Marx to AA, 18.9.28; 6.11.28; Deutsche Juristen-Ztg., 33.Jg/21, 1.11.28
16 Schmid/Schmitz 1928: 317. Sei doch ‘klar, daß nicht nach dem, was der Schiedsrichter 1928
für principes d’équité hält, sich bestimmen kann, was in den ersten Kriegsjahren einen acte
commis Deutschlands darstellte. Daß da, wo Regeln des positiven Völkerrechts 1914 fehlten,
nicht nachträglich aus Billigkeitserwägungen im Wege der Lückenfüllung ein acte commis,
ein völkerrechtliches Delikt konstruiert werden kann, indem Rechtsregeln, die verletzt wor-
den sind, fingiert werden, bedarf eigentlich keiner Erörterung.‘
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tions that (politically motivated) considerations of equity had found their
way into the award. In these comments, the skepticism of conservative
German legal scholars with regard to international law dominates. To
them, the international legal order created at Versailles and Geneva was
“mere cant, or a fig leaf for allied imperialism.” A few years latter Carl
Schmitt (1888–1985) would cement this world view in his International
Law Forms of Modern Imperialism (1932).17
Given that the legal dispute was not yet decided, the Foreign Office in
the Wilhelmstraße nearby the university tried to influence Bruns in writing
his comment. Marx had a conversation with him and also the Dirigent of
the legal department, Martius, discussed the matter with Bruns. Bruns
wanted to send a copy of his article to de Meuron. Marx and Martius, hav-
ing read a draft, had no objections, but Martius reminded Bruns: “until
now we were of the opinion that the award of July 31, 1928” had taken
into consideration the complicated facts “carefully and objectively” and
that the award, irrespective of doubts caused by the legal argumentation,
“was acceptable to us.” Marx and Martius aimed at influencing Bruns to
soften his tone towards the arbitrators. A few days later Martius wrote to
Marx that he met Bruns who told him that he “intends to commence his
article on the Luso-German arbitration with two acknowledging sentences.
He will also review his article and moderate possible incisiveness
(Schärfe). Our step (Aktion) was thus completely successful in this re-
spect”18
Nonetheless, the critique was indeed fundamental, not only in terms of
the understanding of the facts (according to Bruns, Sereno and Varão had
violated international law, when they arrested the Germans), but also of
the law. Like others before him, Bruns underlined that § 4 was not con-
cerned with damages to state property, but only with damages suffered by
Allied nationals prior to the declaration of war. Most importantly, how-
ever, while the arbitrators concluded in 1928 that the acts committed un-
der Franke’s command and ordered by Governor Seitz in 1914 violated in-
17 Bruns 1929: 1 ‘Die Urteile dieser Schiedsgerichte insbesondere stützen sich auf eine große
Zahl von Rechtsnormen, die weder zum [internationalen] Vertragsrecht, noch zu dem
gesicherten Bestand des Gewohnheitsrechts gehören. Eine sorgfältige Prüfung … ergibt
bereits einen Bestand von mehreren hundert solcher Regeln. Wie gewinnt d[er Haager]
Gerichtshof, wie gewinnen die anderen Schiedsgerichte diese Normen? Oder gehören gar
diese Normen nicht zum positiven Völkerrecht?‘; Hull 2014: 13; cf. Schmitt 2005; Verzijl
1973.
18 PA R 52534, Martius to Prof. Bruns, 1.6.; Marx to AA, 7.6.; Martius to Marx, 10.6.29.
8. The afterlife of Naulilaa in International Law
391
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ternational law, Schmid, Schmitz, and Bruns (even if he recognized the
“careful” analysis of the facts) criticized this reasoning. According to
Bruns, the arbitrators were “not entitled to base their award on principles
of equity”, since this was not previously agreed on by the parties. Bruns
based his argument on a consideration of “fairness” in international law:
an act in 1914 that was not illegal during the World War could not be
found wrongful in the 1920s. The legal proceedings against alleged ille-
galities (violation of the proportionality doctrine) contravenes the legal
principle that measures should not have retroactive effects (nulla poene
sine lege). The arbitrators were supposed to decide according to the “posi-
tive norms” in place in 1914.19
On the one hand, this critique of the application of the proportionality
doctrine to inter-state relations by a German law professor seems remark-
able because the “historical roots of proportionality as a public-law stan-
dard can be found in eighteenth-century German administrative law.”
Around 1900, the proportionality doctrine had developed into one of the
tenets of Prussian administrative (police) law and administrative judges
regularly applied the standard when inquiring about the possibility of a
less drastic measure of the administration/police in order to achieve a cer-
tain end. In 1928, Swiss law Professor Fritz Fleiner (1867–1937) “proper-
ly summarized the law of proportionality of the time, when he said: ‘You
should never use a cannon to kill a sparrow’.”20
On the other hand, the critique may have some substance to it since in
the realm of international law and more specific in the rules of ius ad bel-
lum there was, in academia and legal practice, a “lack of focus on propor-
tionality” at a time “when war was a sovereign right of States”. As stated
above, up to the First World War “the idea that the use of force must be
both necessary and proportionate was by no means … established in the
practice of States”. Infrequent references to the idea “that the use of force
should not be out of proportion to the situation that had provoked it” did
not suffice “it to acquire the status of customary international law.” There
19 Bruns 1929a: 81; Franck 1995; cf. Strupp 1923: 686 on ‘void decisions‘; Jacob 1930: 144.
20 Barak 2012: 177 ref. to C.G. Svarez (1746-98); 179, Fleiner, Verwaltungsrecht; cf. Arnauld
2000; Vranes 2009: 11; Somek 2014: 110: ‘Proportionality is about assessing the reasonable-
ness of interferences with liberty … it is particularly apt to constrain where there is no posi-
tive rule setting limits to power. The limits can then only be determined from within the per-
spective of reasonable action.’
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was, furthermore, a noted “absence of clear positive or customary rules
governing reprisals”.21
However, Aloïs de Meuron and his co-arbitrators did refer to certain
changes in the notion of what constitutes legitimate use of force (in this
case reprisal) when they wrote about “[i]nternational law in process of for-
mation as a result of the experience of the last war” (p. 1026). This “for-
mation” included the Covenant of the League of Nation of 1919 restrain-
ing the liberty of states to resort to war; also, the “proportionality equation
… was articulated by several commentators during the period of the
League. The focus tended to be on the gravity of the attack”. Such tenden-
cies found their political climax in the General Treaty for the Renunciation
of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact) concluded in August 1928.22
Post-war tendencies, however, did not obviate the criticism of retroac-
tive application of ‘new’ rules to past acts; for the extent to which the re-
quirement of ‘necessity’ for legitimate reprisals was reflected in state
practice (especially prior to 1918) “is not clear”. And – given the “permis-
siveness of international law towards the use of force” – the same seems
true for the requirement of “proportionality”. While authors referred to it
when discussing forcible reprisals, there are precedents of state practice
“where proportionality was clearly not a restraining factor.” Legal scholar
Judith Gardam refers to the forceful occupation by the United States of the
Mexican port Vera Cruz in 1914 in response to the (unlawful) arrest by the
Mexican authorities of three US seamen. In 1923 Italian forces bombarded
and occupied the Greek island of Corfu in response to an alleged wrong
committed by Greece. After a lengthy discussion, the League of Nations
did not condemn this use of force. Evelyn Colbert therefore concluded the
proportionality requirement of the Naulilaa award “has little or no support
21 Gardam 2004: 42-4; Darcy 2015: 884; cf. Huber 1910: 88 on ‘Selbsthilfe‘; Kelly 2003: 10f.;
Corten 2012: 261 ‘At that time [nineteenth century], States were able to use force if they
could invoke `legitimate grounds´ largely defined: self-preservation, autoprotection, redress
of torts or outrages, and so forth. … legal limitations were still so broad that it would clearly
be excessive to contend that these were equivalent to precise rules. These limitations – like
`self-preservation´ – must rather be characterized as broad standards [and] … these standards
can be characterized as a sort of blend between legal and moral/political considerations. No
`sharp distinction´ between law and moral thus prevailed.‘
22 Gardam 2004: 45; cf. Poincaré 1929: 520 acknowledged ‘such evident progress’; Séfériadès
1935: 146; Roscher 2004.
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in the practice of states.” In this respect, she agreed with Bruns’ critique
from twenty years earlier.23
However, this critique overlooks that even prior to 1914 neither “posi-
tive international law” nor state practice were the only way to assess the
conformity of a certain act with international law. Irrespective of the fact
that during the Hague Peace Conferences no convention was concluded
about (forceful) reprisals, in the theory of just war – discussed since the
Middle Ages – “proportionality” was next to “necessity” and “immediacy”
one of the possible limitations to a (defensive) act of war. There was “also
a long history of restraints” in state reprisals.24 “Proportionality” was thus
not only a key term in domestic, administrative law, but also known to the
doctrines of public international law. While “in the 1920s … well-known
writers had argued that proportionality was not a legal requirement but
merely a moral obligation [,c]ontemporary doctrine … was decidedly in
favor of such a requirement”.25 The arbitrators of 1928 could base their ar-
gumentation on this contradictory history. They openly admitted that the
“most recent doctrine [of reprisals], notably the German doctrine … does
not require that the reprisal be proportioned to the offence. On this point,
authors, unanimous for some years, are now divided in opinion.” The arbi-
trators then did not balance arguments in favor or against the proportional-
ity of reprisals, but went with the “majority [that] considers a certain pro-
portion between offence and reprisal a necessary condition of the legitima-
cy of the latter.” International law “certainly tends to restrict the notion of
legitimate reprisal and prohibits excess”. (p. 1026).
The arbitrators also avoided the criticism that they had not adhered to
the fundamental positivist position that states are bound only by that to
which they have consented (the accusation implicit in Schmid, Schmitz
and Bruns’ critique was that Governor Seitz and Franke could not know in
1914 about the [evolved] doctrine of proportionality in 1928). Rather, they
emphasized (p. 1028 FN 1) that the Germans had first mentioned the argu-
ment of proportionality in their memorandum of 1922. This hint sufficed
to show that German officials were well aware of considerations of pro-
portionality for (military) reprisals. Any critique about an allegedly
retroactive application of a “newly” evolved doctrine on proportionality as
23 Gardam 2004: 47f; Darcy 2015: 885; Colbert 1948: 76; cf. Kelly 2003: 11; Séfériadès 1935:
140.
24 Reichberg 2007: 8; Hull 2014: 92; cf. 59;278 ref. Carl Lueder (1889); Mitchell 2001: 161.
25 ILC, 2238th meeting (Arangio-Ruiz), 10.7.1991, in: UNYB ILC 1991: 207.
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an important limit to the right of self-defense could be contradicted by the
award’s longest footnote listing legal literature (p. 1026). It has been re-
marked recently that “none of these requirements for reprisals were estab-
lished or altered by the Naulilaa case; rather, they confirmed rules of
reprisals established by earlier writers”.26 And indeed, “proportionality” as
a limit to the right of self-defense can latest be found in attempts to define
reprisals since the nineteenth century.27
Since the arbitrators could rightly have the impression that their under-
standing of a lawful reprisal was not altogether “new”, “proportionality”
as the measure for lawful reprisals was not emphasized in the award of
1928. It merely confirmed that forceful reprisals could be appropriate if
they responded, in a proportional way, to an illegal act. The balancing of
interests (abuse of rights or not) or the relation between the original illegal
act, appropriate counter-measures, and effective success of the reprisal
was not discussed – even though only this relation could determine the
“proportionality” required. The arbitrators limited themselves to describe
the facts and concluded that “there was an obvious disproportion between
the incident at Naulilaa and the six acts of reprisal that followed.”
(p. 1028)28
In the realm of international law, the question of what this law includes
and how to balance (contradictory) sources of law (state practice, case
law/precedents, academic writing, etc.), never produced one straightfor-
ward answer. In the 1920s, the sources of international law had been ana-
lyzed by a host of legal scholars, but the critique of the Naulilaa award
shows that they never agreed on a single concept. What Schmid, Schmitz,
and Bruns strongly contested can be described (in modern terms) as the
“rules of change” in international law: Given the absence of a centralized
(world) legislator or sovereign, who has, and who is conferred by whom,
the authority to change the interpretation of old rules? In subsequent
decades, legal scholars elaborated on these questions in detail and showed
26 Sverrisson 2008: 88f.; but cf. Bruns 1929a: 86; Malanczuk 1985; 1983: 724: ‘In classical in-
ternational law the right to reprisal as an instrument of self-help in response to an interna-
tional offence was frequently invoked with little attention paid to proportionality of the
wrong suffered and the wrong inflicted upon the delinquent state.’; cf. Kennedy 1997: 113.
27 Pokŝtefl 1975: 637 on Lieber Codex (24.4.1863) and Brussels Conference (27.8.1874), draft
of the Russian delegation: ‘Des représailles démesurément sévères sont contraires aux règles
du droit de gens.’; cf. Hull 2014: 64; Neff 2010: 64; Gaurier 2014: 700; Kalshoven 2005:
45-51; 67; Watts 2009: 365f.; Röben 2003; Bleckmann 1981: 193 on literature.
28 Transl. Nolte 2010: 249; cf. Cannizzaro 2001: 892; Franck 2008: 716; Vranes 2009: 17f.
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that the development of (international) law had to accommodate two con-
flicting demands: on the one hand, law must be consistent over time to be
predictable for all parties; on the other hand, law must be responsive to
changing or new circumstances to retain its legitimacy. The legal philoso-
pher H.L.A. Hart (1907–1992) took on these questions on the “rules about
rules” by articulating the concept of “secondary rules” and he explained
changes in these rules about rules by revolutions and wars.29 As the word-
ing of the Naulilaa award indicates (“international law in process of for-
mation as a result of the experience of the last war”), contemporary arbi-
trators cherished a notion of legal innovation (as opposed to a static char-
acter of rules) in international law. The “freedom of judicial law creation”
(Freiheit richterlicher Rechtsfindung) proved to be one basis of interna-
tional law by assessing and applying existing principles of international or
municipal law in light of (new) questions put before the arbitral body that
could not be solved by treaty law or ius cogens.30 Other arbitration awards
in the context of the Treaty of Versailles were criticized for not being ac-
tive enough in “further developing” the rules of international law.31
However, de Meuron, Fazy, and Guex were not merely (un)consciously
attempting to introduce new concepts into international law. Rather, they
were referring to precedents and legal literature, where – as we have seen
previously – the idea of a necessary and proportionate use of force as a
justification for self-help or -defense had been developed at some length.
The award of 1928 was thus based on the conviction that the use of vio-
lence was to be avoided (call for negotiation prior to resort to forceful
reprisal), or at least to be limited (proportionality of reprisal). This convic-
tion was in line with contemporary tendencies in international law, as can
be seen from the “Convention respecting the Limitation of the Employ-
ment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts” of October 18, 1907.32 In-
ternational law expert Georg Nolte (b. 1959) has thus recently pointed out
that the “tribunal, in its legal language, more or less said:
We all come from our national legal systems with their more or less refined
sense of and intuition about what is proportionate. While this informs our un-
29 Fuller 1963; Hart 1961: 117f.; cf. on evolution Foster 1909; Lauterpacht 1934.
30 Bothe 1976: 291. The arbitrators (or international judges) had to solve two ‘fundamental
problems’: ‘the choice of the legal orders to be considered and the comparability or transfer-
ability of the results found in a municipal legal order.’ 299; cf. Hull 2014: 88-92
31 Isay 1923: 427 concluded the Franco-German MAT had ‘failed’ in this respect.
32 Huber 1910: 94 ‘Schaffung von Anstalten zur friedl. Erledigung‘; cf. Carnahan 1998: 213.
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derstanding of what ‘proportionality’ should ‘normally’ provide, we recog-
nize that in international law we cannot assume that our specific sense or intu-
ition of proportionality is shared by others in certain situations. But we can
assume that we all have enough of a common background understanding to
identify and apply a minimum of common substance. International law only
identifies certain factors as being relevant for proportionality analysis, fewer
factors that one would ‘normally’ take into account. Such factors are those
which have a higher degree of visibility or which are manifest.”33
Arbitration awards thus reflected the current legal standards of their time
and they contributed to a further development of international law. Al-
ready contemporaries lauded the Lausanne-awards as “particularly rich in
the enunciation of general principles of international law, which are stated
with great clarity and precision.” Today, the Naulilaa case (1928) is cited
as “represent[ing] the only noteworthy judicial application of the concept
of armed reprisal”. Furthermore, this early example for the definition of
the law of reprisals and the law of neutrality by tribunals is counted among
“the most important arbitral decisions of the inter-war period”.34 Others go
beyond the historical context and count it among the “landmark cases in
public international law. For the subject ‘use of force in international
law’” the award of 1928 has been described as “representative”, just as the
Caroline case of 1842.35 It is considered “authorative” and “a major step
towards the modern system of international law aimed at limiting the use
of force as much as possible.”36
When assessing the (judicial) afterlife of the Naulila case it is important
to bear in mind that judicial bodies such as the three arbitrators “are not
primarily concerned with the elaboration of the general rules … but with
the relative superiority of the evidence produced by one of the parties.”37
The award’s neat listing of the three requirements for a lawful reprisal,
however, almost ‘invited’ the readers to “regard the Naulilaa Arbitration
as authoritatively establishing the conditions for legitimate reprisals.”38
Whereas prior to 1945 the “actual influence of ideas of proportionality in
limiting the use of force … must not be over-emphasized”,39 today the le-
33 Nolte 2010: 250; cf. Dietz 2014: 681 on ‘zeitlos überpositive Maßstäbe‘; Somek 2014: 111f.
34 Fitzmaurice 1932: 156; Darcy 2015: 884; Pierling 2005: 44; Boczek 2005: 354.
35 Heinze/Fitzmaurice 1998; Sir R. Jenning in ibd.: vii.
36 Kalshoven 2005: 8 FN 19; Pfeil 2007 Rn 18; cf. Partsch 1997.
37 Schwarzenberger 1957: 309.
38 Gardam 2004 referring to Waldock 1952; 460.
39 Gardam 2004: 10; cf. La Brière 1933.
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gal requirement of “proportionality” of reprisals is “almost universally af-
firmed in international practice and literature“, and for this the Naulilaa
case is still the most often quoted case.40 Numerous are the authors who
consider that the “best account of the customary law of reprisals is to be
found in the Naulilaa case”.41 However, even though “proportionality is
the quintessential factor in appraising the legitimacy of the counter-mea-
sures“, Yoram Dinstein (b. 1936) pleads for a sense of pragmatism. With a
view to the requirements for “defensive armed reprisal” he assumes it to
be
“unrealistic to expect defensive armed reprisal to conform strictly and literally
to the tenet of ‘an eye for an eye’. A precise equation of casualties and dam-
age, caused by both sides (in the course of the armed attack and the defensive
armed reprisals), is neither a necessary nor a possible condition. All the more
so, since in every military entanglement there is an element of chance, and
defensive armed reprisals can unpredictably give rise to more casualties and
damage than anticipated.“42
With the advent of the United Nations system forceful reprisals as acts of
legitimate self-help or -defense came increasingly under scrutiny. In 1965,
during the Vietnam War (after incidents in Chinese air space), U.S. Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk (1909–1994) while detailing the Guidelines of
U.S. Foreign Policy, made clear: “Nothing in international law or morality
confers on an aggressor immunity against reprisal. There can be no privi-
leged sanctuary if we are to organize a decent world order.”43 Referring to
an “aggressor”, he ‘embedded’ the US reprisal measures legally within the
limits of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” ac-
cording to Article 51 UN Charter. In 1970, in light of Article 2 (4) UN
Charter (prohibition of the use of force in international relations), the Gen-
eral Assembly stated in consensus that “states have the duty to refrain
from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.” As a result, the three
“Naulilaa principles are still applicable in today’s international law, [but]
subject to their interpretation in the light of the ban on the use of force in
40 Cannizzaro 2001: 889; cf. Nolte: 2010: 245-8.
41 Waldock 1952: 460; Carter/Trimble/Bradley 2003: 971, referring to the three requirements
for lawful reprisals in international law set forth in the 1928-award, it is noted that the award
‘is generally accepted as giving a correct interpretation of the customary law of reprisals.’
42 Dinstein 2001: 197f. ‘A calculus of force, introducing some symmetry … between the di-
mensions of the lawful counter-force and the original (unlawful) use of force, is imperative.’
43 Quoted in Poulantzas 2002: 334; cf. Mitchell 2001: 160f.; Tomuschat 1973.
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international relations.”44 Therefore, the majority of experts are currently
of the opinion that the UN Charter’s (Art. 2 [4]) comprehensive prohibi-
tion of the threat or use of force “also applies to reprisals employing
force.” As Julia Pfeil points out, however, “States have not completely ad-
hered to this principle and have carried out actions which they character-
ized as acts of self-defense permitted under the UN Charter, but which
should, in fact, be characterized as reprisals” (she gives the example of the
1986 bombing of Libya by the United States). Others “have characterized
the attacks on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan following the terrorist at-
tacks of September 11, 2001 as reprisals.” However, Pfeil cautions that
reprisals “should not be used as an excuse to circumvent the strict precon-
ditions of the UN Charter which must be fulfilled before States may legal-
ly resort to force.”45
Yet, even if the original question on the legitimacy of forceful reprisals
is today differently answered than in 1928 (they were, but are no longer
legitimate), the Naulilaa case remains relevant, most of all due to its refer-
ence to the principle of proportionality. Not any reprisal (or counter-mea-
sure, as it is called nowadays) is legitimate as long as it does not resort to
physical force, but it still needs to remain within the limits of proportional-
ity. The Naulilaa award did not provide lawyers with a “proportionality
test”, but seemed to assume that proportionality is self-explanatory. Others
have since attempted to lay out the questions more comprehensively:
What was supposed to be the aim of the legitimate reprisal? “[I]f retribu-
tion were the aim, the gravity of the offence could be a relevant factor in
the assessment of proportionality. If what was sought was reparations,
then the damage … suffered would be a primary factor to take into ac-
count in the assessment of what was a proportionate response.”46 “The
challenges of proportional calculation explode … as soon as one puts the
least thought to the question. What counts as costs and benefits in
wartime? Only elements we can quantify, like casualties? But usually we
also want to appeal to qualitative elements, like the value of sovereignty.
Is there a distinction between explicit and implicit costs? Short term and
long-term benefits?”47
44 Boczek 2005: 112; cf. Darcy 2015: 888; Kalshoven 2005: xvii; Kelly 2003: 12; Stein/
Marauhn 2000: 27.
45 Pfeil 2007 Rn 20-22; cf. Kelly 2003: 31 on ‘resurrection of anticipatory self-defense’.
46 Gardam 2004: 48; cf. Vranes 2009: 21f.
47 Orend 2000: 537 ref. to Walzer 1991: xv-xxi; a most encompassing account is Barak 2012.
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While some authors have questioned whether the principle of propor-
tionality can be legitimately applied at all in public international law, oth-
ers consider the Naulilaa award in its application of this principle “quite
strict”. They are of the opinion that this strictness has to be considered in
light of the fact that the arbitrators were dealing with a forceful reprisal
that was – in principle – legitimate.48 In 1978, the question was further de-
veloped in the U.S.-French Air Services case from which a “less strict con-
cept emerged” as the award referred to “some degree of equivalence” and
to the fact that judging the proportionality of countermeasures could at
best “be accomplished by approximation”. Recently, Erich Vranes con-
cluded that the “overall function of the test of proportionality [require-
ments of suitability, necessity, and proportionality in the narrow sense]
can be seen in structuring, and increasing the rationality of, complex deci-
sions.”49
Also another aspect of “strictness” in the 1928-award has been criti-
cized. The requirement of a prior demand (sommation) for reparation of
the alleged damage, as stipulated by the arbitrators, is not supported by
references to precedents or literature. The only footnote in this paragraph
refers to the rule that the “use of force is justified only in case of necessi-
ty” and therefore the preceding notice must have “yielded no satisfactory
response” (p. 1027). Indeed, international law “classic” Emer de Vattel
(1714–67) underlined in 1758 that “Nature gives us the right to have re-
course to force only when gentle and pacific methods have proved ineffec-
tual.”50
The requirement of prior demand, however, is not uniformly supported
by state practice or writers and may not be appropriate or possible in some
circumstances. For critics of the Naulilaa award, it seems “exaggerated”
to uphold this requirement of an attempt to seek contact and demand repa-
rations if circumstances do not allow for this.51 The arbitrators wrote of
“messages transmitted from Windhoek to German stations”, which they
did not accept as “inter-State notice”. However, the measure of the arbitra-
tors seems unclear given the expressed intention of Governor Seitz in
48 Stein/Marauhn 2000: 27 ob es ‘so strikt zu handhaben ist, wie [im] im Naulilaa-
Schiedsspruch wird heute bezweifelt, denn der Schiedsspruch betraf die damals
grundsätzlich zulässige gewaltsame Repressalie‘; cf. Vranes 2009: 6; 21f.; Krugmann 2004;
Gazzini 2005: 164.
49 ILC, 2238th meeting (Arangio-Ruiz), 10.7.1991, in: UNYB ILC 1991: 207; Vranes 2009: 35.
50 Vattel 1916 [1758] § 330: 225; cf. Bleckmann 1981: 194f.
51 Malanczuk 1983: 726; cf. Klein 1998: 39f.; Nickles 2003 on diplomacy and the telegraph.
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Windhoek to contact his counterpart in Luanda by radio-telegrams, for
which “he took the initiative” as the German memorandum of 1922 under-
lined. The award assumed not only that these messages were destined (on-
ly?) to “German stations”, but also accepted that these messages had “not
come to the attention [avoir été ignorés] of the Portuguese authorities”.
Given that wireless apparatuses were available in Luanda this appears
doubtful – if such messages had been sent by Seitz. Considering the
archival documents of 1914, Seitz, on the insistence of commander Hey-
debreck, ordered not to send the radio-telegrams he had drafted only hours
before; this, however, would put in doubt the testimonies of the governor
and his technician Eickhoff during the arbitration. The statement of ex-
Governor Norton de Matos in 1926 – on the other hand –, responding to
the question whether he found it necessary to contact his German counter-
part after he learnt about the Naulila-incident (Oct. 21): “I could not and
must not have done it”, seems in itself an indicator that he refused to com-
municate with Seitz.52 But even if they had reached Luanda, the arbitrators
stated apodictically, “these messages would not have amounted to notice”
(p. 1028). The arbitrators would have liked to see Seitz send a messenger.
However, given the war in the south of GSWA and the concern of a Por-
tuguese invasion from the north, the alternative described in the award to
send a negotiator with a letter to Fort Cuangar and demand reparations
seems out of touch with everyday life. From the perspective of Seitz the
treatment of Brauer in Moçâmedes and the fate of Schultze-Jena in Naulila
left little doubt how the Portuguese would deal with yet another negotiator
or commission. Given the state of war in GSWA, it seems barely adequate
to require Seitz to send to the Governor General in Luanda (however this
could have been accomplished) a warning of an imminent forceful
reprisal, since this would have negated the “protection function” of the
reprisal. Karl Doehring therefore concludes: “The notice can only be de-
manded, if it does not render ineffective the protection” the reprisal ef-
forts.53
52 BAB R 1001/6635: 64f.; 71, Memo Allm, 7/22; R 1001/6640: 111 (34) testimony of Norton
de Matos, 5.5.26.
53 Bowett 1972: 3; Doehring 1987: 51; cf. Yearbook ILC 1992, Vol. II/1 (Documents of the
44th Session), New York 1995: 10. (State responsibility): ‘While rejecting the charge that it
had not met that requirement [of a preceding sommation that has proved fruitless], the ac-
cused State [Germany] did not contest the rule [of prior demand]’; cf. Darcy 2015: 892f.
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A “landmark case” such as Naulilaa has been much-analyzed, and not
only by academics in treatises or by the UN’s International Law Commis-
sion.54 International courts or commissions have also referenced Naulilaa
in their decisions, thereby elevating it into the highest ranks of authorita-
tive texts in international law. Here, mentioning only a few examples from
the judiciary over the last decades shall suffice: The International Court of
Justice (ICJ) in giving its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons (July 8, 1996) cited the Naulilaa-case in con-
nection with considerations of “humanity” in warfare, observing that “the
right of reprisals ‘is limited by the experiences of mankind’”.55 The same
phrase was included in the dissenting opinion by Judge Torres Bernárdes
in the ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain vs. Canada) (December 4,
1998) when underlining the “unanimity about the definition of reprisals”
according to the Naulila award, which the Judge quoted at length.56 The
Naulilaa award is not exclusively an important reference for questions of
reprisals or proportionality. A decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission (2007) referred, among others, to the 1928 award when dis-
cussing the “connection between delict and compensable damage”, asking,
as de Meuron did, “whether the damage was foreseeable … to the perpe-
trator.”57
Finally, the arbitration award of 1928 can also be read as a “monument”
to King Mandume’s effort to halt the onslaught of colonialism. Certainly
not versed in a neutral tone (the King is described as a bloodthirsty tyrant),
arbitrator de Meuron did not lose sight of the fact that the war was not
over in southern Angola after the German withdrawal from Fort Naulila.
While research on colonial scandals has shown that forms of African resis-
tance that may have become apparent through such scandals were hidden,
silenced, or “lost in transfer”, in this particular case the possibility of
54 ILC, Hague Conference 2010: 306 FN58 on the ‘foreseeability’ of the harm suffered due to
the violation of international law; Sverrisson: 2008: 171. ‘In the commentary to Article 50 of
the 2001 Draft Articles, the ILC explained somewhat the meaning of fundamental human
rights in paragraph 1 (b). The commission cited the tribunal in the Naulilaa Case and a reso-
lution of the ILC, which stated that states taking countermeasures had to respect the law of
humanity.’
55 1996 ICJ: 226 (408) Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 8.7.96 (Dissenting Opinion Judge M. Shahabuddeen); cf. Lovric-Pernak 2013.
56 1998 ICJ: 432 (731) WL 1797317 Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Spain vs. Canada), 4.12.98.
(Dissenting Opinion Judge Bernárdes) Reprisals ‘are limited by humanitarian experience and
by the rules of good faith applicable in relations between States’ [transl. by the Registry].
57 Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Com., 27.7.07 (Guidance ius ad bellum liability, H. v. Houtte): 3.
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African “agency” had to be acknowledged58 during the arbitration. After
all, the Portuguese claimants demanded reparations for the damages
caused during the campaign of General de Eça against King Mandume.
Naulila and King Mandume in the Memorial Cultures of Portugal,
Germany, Angola and Namibia
“[D]espite all warnings that historians should not press their noses too flat
against the windowpane”59 this chapter attempts to follow ideas and
events that connect, in one way or another, the Naulila-affair to the
present. This chapter will thus engage not only with ‘events’ in ‘history’,
but also with historians or others engaged in ‘history-making’ by turning
positivist ‘knowledge’ about historical occurrences into commemorative
content. Four modern nations, Portugal, Germany, Angola and Namibia
are involved. And although all four are treated separately in subchapters in
order to highlight particularities, comparative allusions are made in order
to illustrate the ways the four countries are entangled with each other in
their modes of remembering the legacies of the Angolan battles of 1914–
15 and their colonial heritage in general.
While it has been assumed that “today the German punishment expedi-
tions [against Angola] have more or less sunk into oblivion” (at last, the
“German victory at Naulila … achieved nothing in the long run”),60 it
seems evident that the destruction of Fort Naulila have had two results that
still hold relevance for today: The afterlife of the Naulilaa award in public
international law has been recapitulated in the previous chapter. The
memorial cultures that developed not only around the German “punish-
ment expedition” in itself, but also around the military campaign of and
against King Mandume as a result, is to be analyzed in the following. The
sociologist Reinhard Kössler pointed out that historical processes are
“transformed into memory” in the form of “fixed states or events. In a
strict sense … public memory operates on myths, where myth denotes the
transfer of contents to contexts that differ from their contexts of origin.”
9.
58 Habermas 2014: 78f on the Atakpame colonial scandal, 1902-07.
59 Birmingham 2011: 7; cf. Hilton /Mitter 2013; Drayton 2011: 671.
60 Cann 2001: 163; Morlang 1998: 48 ‘Strafexpedit. weitgehend in Vergessenheit geraten‘.
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Evidently such “myth-making” integrates some interests while it excludes
others.61
The “consequences of colonialism … remain omnipresent.”62 It seems
received post-colonial wisdom that the former colonizer and the formerly
colonized have profoundly influenced each other’s sense of self. What has
been remarked about the relation between Brazil and Portugal is true also
for other constellations: “The (post)colonial link will always inform the
cultural memories of both countries to one degree or another, yet, such
memories will be differently lived by [the colonizer or the colonized na-
tion].”63 Indeed, the continued presence of Angola and Portugal and
Namibia and Germany in each other’s national life is manifold and in-
cludes features of memorial cultures. The debate about how to appropri-
ately commemorate colonial history is ongoing in the former colonies and
the former metropolises. The “impossibility of uncritically commemorat-
ing historical events marked by colonialism (and its corollary slavery)”
has thereby often been restated.64 Given the multifaceted nature of the
memorial cultures in question and the relatively recent political interven-
tions, the following discussion is a rather skeletal statement of develop-
ments.
Writing about “Heroes”: Portugal
The Portuguese government organized days of remembrance early on for
those fallen in Angola and elsewhere during the World War. The Con-
sagração dos Mortos da Infantaria Portuguesa was celebrated in June
1920, with Portugal’s president attending.65 In April 1921, homage was
paid to two unknown soldiers killed in Africa and Flanders who were
buried in the Monastery of Batalha. This “high point of the commemora-
tion of Portugal’s participation in the war” was also destined to be a sym-
bol of national reconciliation. The ceremony, attended by the head of
state, dignitaries, and soldiers of all Allied nations, among them Marshal
9.1
61 Kössler 2007: 364 referring to Roland Barthes; cf. du Pisani 2007: 99.
62 Osterhammel 2003: 124 ‘die Folgen des Kolonialismus, … [bleiben] doch allgegenwärtig‘.
63 Arenas 2003: xxviii; cf. Hobuß/Lölke 2006; Jansen/Osterhammel 2013: 122-6.
64 The wording is borrowed from Arenas 2003: xix on ‘Luso-Brasilian complicities’; xvii.
65 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 172: 845.5, MNE-USML, 8.6.20; Meneses 2006; on WWI memo-
rials Janz 2013: 353-8; Hettling/Echternkamp 2013.
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Joseph Joffre of France (1852–1931), was the first since the founding of
the republic in 1910 where not only church leaders were present, but rep-
resentatives of the toppled monarchy, as well. Furthermore, ex-Prime
Minster Afonso Costa had returned from Paris and – despite being consid-
ered the “arch-enemy of the clergy” – attended the ceremony including the
mass. The American Minister quoted an observer saying “that it would
have been impossible for such a gathering to have taken place three years
ago”. In the following years, “physical evidence of Portugal’s war efforts”
were inaugurated “in numerous town squares from Cascais to Lisbon” and
throughout the Empire.66 Streets in Porto and Lisbon were named Rua de
Naulila or Herois de Naulila.
In addition to the erecting of monuments, literature on the war in Africa
played an important role in the “politics” of memory and memory con-
struction. In 1919 the former Minister of War, General Morais Sarmento
published a book on the German Expansion as the “determining reason of
the war 1914–19”. As we have seen, the book – detailing pan-German de-
votion to violence and “universal hegemony” and recognizing a “specific
German character” built around the “cult of war” – seemed to have been
the inspiration for many paragraphs of the first Portuguese memorandum
of 1921. In fact, Magalhães quoted extensively from the “most persuasive
and celebrated of war books”. Quotations from the Generals Meisendorf,
von der Golz, and Bernhardi, as well as from the philosophers Arndt,
Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Wagner provide the reader with an unmistak-
able sense of German expansionism. “Sarmento’s work was popular in
Portuguese military circles and was translated into French…. It is signifi-
cant, too, that his work concentrated on Portuguese Africa”.67 Exculpating
himself, immediately after the war in 1919 also Alves Roçadas published
his account of the events leading to the disaster of Naulila. A few years
later, one of Portugal’s more important novelists at the time, the civil ser-
vant Augusto Casimiro (1889–1967), who repeatedly wrote novels on the
colonies, authored a 200-page account of Naulila (1922), while he accom-
panied Norton de Matos on his second term as High Commissioner in An-
gola. He had access to original documents from 1914, but was no eyewit-
ness of the events. Glorifying the Portuguese attempts to withstand the
66 NARA RG 84, Lisbon, v. 175: 800, USML to SoS, 16.4.21; Meneses 2010: 141; 2006: 109
reconciliation between republicans and monarchists was facilitated by a political amnesty,
political prisoners were freed; Wheeler 1978: 133; cf. Mosse 1999; Aldrich 2005 on France.
67 Sarmento 1919: 24-36; Wheeler 1978: 177; cf.; Arruela 1940; Faria e Maia 1941.
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German onslaught, Casimiro, who participated in the Portuguese Expedi-
tionary Corps in Flanders, left no doubt that Franke won the day only by
treacherously enlisting Africans. But he did not hide his criticism of Lis-
bon’s politicians and officers whom he considered disinterest in colonial
affairs. As a result they abandoned the army in times of need. A convinced
colonialist, Casimiro believed, just as his former superior, in altruistic civil
servants paternalistically guiding Africans towards a brighter future under
Portugal’s flag.68
In its article on Angola, the semi-official Grande Enciclopédia Por-
tuguesa e Brasileira (1936) not only pointed out that the Germans “invad-
ed” southern Angola in 1914 prior to the declaration of war. It also
claimed that the battle of Naulila was an “undecided military action, but it
forced the Germans to hastily retreat south of the Kunene [River]. Mean-
while, all the peoples of the South, manipulated by agents provocateurs of
the European invaders rose up against us; the events of the Dutch invasion
[1641] are repeating themselves.” Years later, the publishers of the GEPB
decided to grant the keyword “Naulila” its own article at a stunning ten (!)
pages in length. The article detailed the “incident” and the “battle” care-
fully but did not mention at all the arbitration and the futility of Portugal’s
legal battle for reparations.69
Given that the battle of Naulila was depicted as “a draw”, Roçadas’ rise
to the rank of General was less surprising. First of all, he remained the
“hero of 1907” who avenged the disgrace of 1904 and occupied Cuamato.
He is among the “heroes” of Portugal’s military history whose picture
(laid with azulejos, tiles) still adorns the court of the Army General-Staff
building in Lisbon. General de Eça, on the other hand, is missing in this
frieze of honor. The battle of Mongua, despite being Portugal’s only de-
cisive victory in Africa during World War I and despite being one of the
largest battles ever fought in colonial Africa, did not find its way into the
Portuguese national consciousness. Even historians barely touched upon
it. It has been assumed that one of the likely reasons for this was the ab-
sence of any capable Portuguese “propaganda in 1915”. “In Mongua there
68 Cf. Hamilton 1975: 33; Camacho 1934; Norton de Matos 1926; 1934.
69 GEPB 1936, vol. 2, Art. ‘Angola’: 663; 1948, vol. 13, Art. ‘Naulila’: 466-475. The rumor
that Germans had attempted to incite a ‘native rising’ against Portugal after the battle of
Naulila remains stubbornly quoted by Portuguese historians as fact, just as the Naulila inci-
dent of October 1914 is described as a ‘German attack’. Cf. Teixeira 2003: 25; Fraga 2010:
133; Oliveira Marques 1995: 557, in 1915 ‘tornou-se novamente necessário pacificar algu-
mas tribos angolanas, incitadas pela Alemanha a revoltar-se contra Portugal.’
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was no equivalent to Winston Churchill covering the campaign of Kitch-
ener in Sudan in 1898.” Only in 1921 was de Eça’s official report, a cum-
bersome volume of 600 pages of dry language, published posthumously.
The difficulties of his campaign and the occupation can barely be found
between the lines. Later on, some articles and books were published about
the campaign in 1915 by ex-combatants like Coronel Pires Monteiro, but
the output was small in comparison to the “Boer War” or the Herero
War.70 Cabo Adelino, whom the Germans believed to be the “murderer”
of Schultze-Jena, wrote an autobiographical novel O convite (The Invita-
tion), where he explains how Germans misled Roçadas before the battle of
Naulila.71 The majority of these authors had in mind a patriotic purpose: to
pay tribute to the fallen “heroes”. Courageous Portuguese troopers were
depicted in their fight against brutal Germans and barbaric “savages” led
by soba Mandume and his German financiers.72
Norton de Matos also used his memoires to repeat in unmistakable
terms his anti-German sentiments when he related the Naulila affair that
so rudely interrupted his career. To a certain extend the pages of these four
volumes (1944–46) dealing with the ‘German threat’ are mere repetition
of all he had to say during the Naulila-arbitration on German expansion-
ism; he spares no detail of espionage, infiltration, and incitement of “na-
tives” like Mandume or “Ananga” (Kandjimi), their training by German
military instructors and an extended German trade in weapons with “na-
tives”. In his view, the German incursion and Portugal’s defeat at Naulila
were the culmination of a long history of a well-planned annexation
scheme whose execution was prevented by Germany’s defeat in the war.73
Forty years after the debacle at Naulila, Angola’s former Chief-of-Staff,
General Ernesto Machado, in 1914 a lieutenant in Roçadas’ general-staff
who had partaken in the battle and the chaotic retreat, began to collect data
in the military archives and in the memorial literature about the causes of
the defeat. Written from a Portuguese perspective (he spoke about “us”
and rarely drew on German sources), the resulting 450-page volume (No
Sul de Angola), published by the Overseas Ministry in 1956, remains up to
the present the most comprehensive treatise on all military aspects of the
70 Pélissier 2004: 270; cf. Eça 1915; 1922; Teixeira 1935a,b,c; Soares 1934; 1937; Vieira da
Rocha 1936; Monteiro 1947; 1952; Santos 1957; Pimenta 1941.
71 Baericke 1981: 93.
72 Sousa [n.d.~1935]: 3; cf. Diário de Notíçias 17.8.28 ‘Uma acção gloriosa’; Varão 1934.
73 Norton de Matos 1944-6; cf. Silva 2008: 364f.; Baericke 1981: 9f.; 21 written in 1953.
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Naulila incident and the battle. The book is to a large extent a self-justifi-
cation and furthermore has a ‘pedagogical’ purpose in its explanations for
future officers about ‘dos and dont’s’ in African ‘bush’ warfare. In his
“general critique” of Roçadas’ army, Machado assessed the expeditionary
forces’ preparations as having been “defective” and wondered about
Roçadas’ “inaction” upon Franke’s arrival at the Kunene River. Another
work on the subject, the long article of Eduardo dos Santos on Naulila
(1978) focuses mostly on the events leading to the Naulila incident. Like
later authors working on the World War in Angola, he relies overwhelm-
ingly on the published accounts of contemporaries, but avoids the nation-
alistic overtones of his predecessors and includes, albeit briefly, the arbi-
tration procedure. Recent overviews on Portugal and the Great War barely
mention the Angolan theater of war. A source based monograph on the is-
sue that is considering also the preparations, logistics, and experiences of
the rank and file, or the details of the occupation regime with its raids and
court martials is still lacking.74
The long-time dominance of overtly nationalist narratives about the war
in Africa that put “us”, the Portuguese, against treacherous Germans,
should be seen in the context of Salazar’s New State. Salazar put an “em-
phasis on national pride [that] was also effective on broadening the basis
of consent for the dictatorship.” “[H]eavy architectural projects”, includ-
ing historical monuments, resulted from this policy. And it was not only
the Marquis de Pombal (1699–1782) or Henry the Navigator (1394–1460)
who were honored,75 but also the soldiers of the war in Africa. Some went
so far to argue that “the national reason for being was transformed into a
‘longing’ (saudade) for what Portugal used to be.”76 While foreign visitors
to Lisbon in the 1950s and 60s may have frowned upon “the primitives of
Western Europe’s Albania”, Salazar attempted to endow his compatriots
with the self-confidence to identify themselves with the sentence “we are
all the children of Dom Henrique [the Navigator].”77 For many in Portu-
gal, their national history “demonstrated that there was a uniqueness in the
Portuguese soul, which … would enable this tiny country to recreate the
74 Cf. Matos Gomes/Afonso 2010.
75 Birmingham 2011: 170; cf. Salazar 1963 – a speech for a foreign audience.
76 Arenas 2003: 12 referring to Eduardo Lourenço: O labirinto da saudade, 1978.
77 Pélissier 1979: 15 mocking French officials; Birmingham 2002: 227; cf. Silva 2008: 355.
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triumphs of the past.”78 Emotional attachment to the colonial cause could
be backed up by these kinds of mystic accounts that were ‘rationalized’ as
Portugal’s “humanitarian and noble task – to educate and civilize back-
ward peoples.”79 The history of Portugal’s presence in Africa was related
as the history of a “civilizing mission”. This old “ideological assumption
of the Portuguese imperial vocation” was strengthened under the Estado
Novo. “Historical lessons” were understood to be “moral lessons” for the
nation, putting historiography at the service of the state. For Marcello Cae-
tano, law professor, minister and Salazar’s successor, history was sup-
posed to be “an instrument of national recovery”.80 The claim of Portu-
gal’s “special genius for Christianizing and assimilating indigenous popu-
lations into a nonracial people” developed into “what many considered an
absurd nationalistic mythology”; but it became instrumental to defend the
colonies until the downfall of o Império in 1975.81
Already before the days of sociologist Gilberto Freyre (1900–1987),
(semi-) official debates on the “‘qualities’ of Portuguese colonialism were
permeated by characterizations such as ‘benign’, ‘unique’ and ‘distinct’
(read ‘better’) in relationship to other colonialisms.” Especially the
“Freyrean Lusotropicalist nexus has proven to be quite resilient as it has
migrated from the intellectual field to the realm of politics and that of
mentalities with lasting effects until today”.82 During the quincentennial
celebrations in 2000 marking the “discovery” or “founding” of Brazil,
Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio (b. 1939) continued the tradition of
his predecessors by seeking to “emphasize past Portuguese glories”. Com-
mentators noted “the euphoria expressed in official discourses” on this oc-
casion. Contrary to the demands of some protesters, he offered “no apolo-
gies for the misdeeds of colonial-era Portuguese.”83
Also after decolonization, the legacy of Portugal’s “ties to the sea and
of empire still plays a large role in the national collective imaginary”. The
Portuguese still call themselves heróis do mar (heroes of the sea) whenev-
er they sing their national anthem. The social scientist Fernando Arenas
speaks of “the symbiotic relationship between nation and empire in the
78 Smith 1991: 597; cf. Hamilton 1975: 3 on the ‘unique role as revealers of Africa to Europe’;
Birmingham 2002: 227f. on the theme of Portugal’s ‘uniqueness’ and the search for identity.
79 Ferreira Mendes 1940: 225; cf. Caetano 1970; Corrado 2008: 23; Errante 2003: 16.
80 Roque 2003: 112; Hespanha 1981: 441; cf. Minist. Colónias, Decreto No. 16.473, 6.2.1929.
81 Cooper 2002b: 139; Hamilton 1975: VIII.
82 Arenas 2003: 7 ref. to Cláudia Castelo; Arenas 2011: 11; 15; Madureira 1994.
83 Arenas 2003: xvii; 9; cf. Almeida 2004 on identity discourses.
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Portuguese collective unconscious” that remained unchanged for the
greater part of the twentieth century.84 While some observers of modern
Portuguese historiography or the society in general have marked the ab-
sence of “a coming to terms with” the colonial past, others have written
about “Portugal’s significantly more mature relationship to its colonial
past”. They speak of “significant shifts in Portuguese national identity that
have occurred in the past twenty-five years.”85 Asked whether “the Por-
tuguese are defensive about their [colonial] past”, António M. Hespanha,
the legal historian often quoted in this book and head of the National
Commission for the Commemoration of the Portuguese Discoveries
(1995–1998) responded:
“The Portuguese are not free from nationalistic biases. But the new generation
of Portuguese historians and scholars have basically the same intellectual atti-
tude of their colleagues all over Europe. … Old, apologetic historiography …
is not any more in fashion.” He added: “Believe me, the Portuguese are not
obsessed by the past.”86
Writing about “Heroes”: Germany
“The historiography of the First World War had already begun during the
war.” Throughout Europe, the “great public interest in treatises on the war
produced countless ‘illustrated histories’ and other nationalistic publica-
tions.”87 The battle of Naulila was probably first described to a German
audience in an article by the Kölnische Zeitung (Feb. 24, 1915) that was
translated from the newspaper O Mundo (Feb. 9). The details of this arti-
cle about the panic among Portuguese soldiers during the retreat and the
destruction of Fort Roçadas were quoted with evident pleasure in a pam-
phlet issued by the Colonial Office and in several publications over the
following years. The story of the three Germans in Naulila, who were first
9.2
84 Arenas 2003: 6; 9; cf. Ramos 2007: 429f. on decolonization; Larsen 2006.
85 Lourenço/Keese 2011: 243 ‘Aufarbeitung‘; Arenas 2003: 10; 21.
86 Hespanha 1997; cf. Arenas 2003: 20. ‘Portuguese national metanarrative linked to the sea
and its imperial past, though weakened, has not altogether disappeared. … Portuguese na-
tional identity has been, and will continue to be, linked to the memory and the symbolic
space of empire.’
87 Krumeich/Hirschfeld 2012: 241f.; better refer to the German version 2003: 304.
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invited to breakfast and then shot dead, was also recounted a great number
of times.88
Despite the one triumph at Naulila, Governor Seitz was concerned
about future political and historiographic assessments of his performance.
As early as June 1915, with the loss of Windhoek and the continuous re-
treat of the German troops, he already knew: “It would be sad if we sur-
render the entire country without fighting; later on, people will make accu-
sations against us!!”89 After the war such accusations were indeed voiced,
as one Schutztruppen officer lamented. The constant comparison with the
“heroes” under Lettow-Vorbeck in GEA especially offended their com-
rades from GSWA.90 The Schutztruppe‘s operation in GSWA and that of
commander Franke were scathingly criticized after the surrender at
Khorab in July 1915. Franke, whose alcoholism and morphine addiction
was an open secret among German officers, was seen by many as unfit for
his position as commander. The victory at Naulila was explained by a
younger officer – full of contempt for his superior for the surrender – as
owing to Franke’s “well-known luck in war” (Kriegsglück) and the fact
that the larger Portuguese forces did not immediately attack the exhausted
Germans upon their arrival near Erickson Drift. Also Franke’s conduct
during the battle was depicted as “very careless, so that defeat” could have
easily followed.91
This criticism continued well into the Nazi period. A draft of the mono-
graph by the historical department of the army (Kriegsgeschichtliche
Forschungsanstalt des Heeres) on the “Campaign in GSWA 1914/15”
(April 1943) described the colonial army as “well organized, disciplined
and equipped”, but emphasized that it seemed “improbable” that the
Schutztruppe would be employed against “foreign enemies.” The battle of
Naulila was described over three pages, which mentioned heavy losses
“also on the German side”. The historians of the Wehrmacht, however,
could not understand why the commander decided to attack Angola in-
stead of South Africa and why Franke personally led this operation, thus
leaving the more important theater of war for an extended period of time.
88 RKA 1915: 87 (6.3.1915); Wirtschaftsdienst, Hamburg, No. 12, 9.9.1916: 145-7; Weck 1919:
139 FN 14; Suchier 1918: 57-62; a corrupted version in Historicus 2012: 155-7.
89 NAN A.560 Diary V. Franke, v. 15: 986, 25.6.15, ‘man wird uns Vorwürfe machen‘.
90 Hennig 1925: 9 summarizing the accusations as ‘You have not done your duty!’
91 NAN A.566 v. 2: 20; 70, Schmitt to his parents, 12.9.; 15.9.15; Schmitt,Bemerkungen zum
Feldzug in DSWA, 24.2.16.
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To them, the necessity of sending a strong force northwards seemed
doubtful, against so irrelevant an enemy that it would have been “unable
to instigate a general revolt in the north”. The army-historians probably
did not know about the arbitration award of 1928, but they too argued that
“it was not out of the question that a resolution [after the Naulila incident]
and sufficient atonement could have been obtained via diplomatic chan-
nels.”92
Nevertheless, Franke was promoted to the rank of general after the war,
but he had few friends left. In 1930, he emigrated to Brazil. His loneliness
was already evident at the first anniversary of the battle of Naulila in De-
cember 1915. Only Franke, Trainer, and another officer celebrated seclud-
ed in Karibib and Okawayo, Franke’s Farm, where he lived on parole. Ex-
cept for the “great amount of alcohol” and the drunkenness of Trainer,
“nothing special” happened. Among German troopers Naulila was soon
“called… ‘Blaulila’ or Blue Lilac, partly from the peculiar coloration of
the faces of their drinking officers, partly because the fight at one time
looked almost like lost.”93
Although it is claimed that after the Naulila-incident “the bodies of the
slain were returned to the Germans with apologies”,94 the documents do
not provide evidence of such return. As none of those shot in the fort re-
ceived an identifiable grave, it was left for the Germans to erect some
form of monument in their memory. In the municipal cemetery in Jena,
the family of Hans Schultze-Jena (his father, a Professor of medicine, was
an honorary citizen of Jena), marked a part of the family grave with the
name of their son Hans. This was a private undertaking, without official
endorsement.95 The gravestone made neither allusions to GSWA nor An-
gola, but merely stated that Hans was “killed in action at Naulia in
Africa”. Germany, whether Imperial or republican, refrained from “recog-
nizing colonial engagements.” There were no state funerals for “colonial
pioneers“. Also among the public the death of a “colonial hero” was met
with little resonance. It was rare to see one of them honored with a monu-
ment before 1914. As historian Winfried Speitkamp pointed out: “Also
92 NAN A.566, v. 1: 13; 44f; 146 ‘Der Feldzug in DSWA 1914/15 (Draft)‘, April 1943.
93 NAN A.560 Diary Franke, v. 16: 1040, 18.12.15; TNA FO 371/2231, Smuts to Buxton,
15.10.15.
94 Cann 2001: 150 gives no reference for his claim, but relies mostly on Casimiro 1922.
95 Nordfriedhof Jena, Gräberfeld E 9. I gratefully acknowledge the research of Constanze
Mann, Head of Stadtarchiv Jena, to ascertain the private character of the symbolic burial.
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during memorial functions the colonial community kept to itself”. “The
‘colonial community’ retreated more and more to the margins” “Evident-
ly, the popularity of the colonial idea remained limited.”96
The loss of colonies in 1919 had repercussions in Germany not only in
the political and administrative sphere (reintegration of the colonial offi-
cials into other branches), but also in cultural terms. Literature was written
that “provide[d] an opulence of strange images, bizarre fantasies, and
spectral cultural symbols that fit together to reveal the contours not of an
‘imperialist imagination’, but of a postcolonial one.”97 In particular the
German “fear of reverse colonization” produced such strange images. This
fear was manifested in the hysteria and the campaigns against French
colonial troops deployed during the Rhineland occupation in 1921. It
“might seem counterintuitive to think of the Weimar Republic as a post-
colonial state” And indeed, the loss “provoked an explosion of colonialist
discourse.” Schoolbooks were understood to be a formidable means to en-
sure that Germans would always remember their (former) colonial “glo-
ries”. Interestingly, “colonial literature” had its heyday (measured by the
number of publications) in the postcolonial phase – in 1938/9.98
However, these political efforts to use education and culture as a tool of
colonial revisionism were also a sign that – considering the far more pres-
suring domestic political issues – Germany’s former colonies were in-
creasingly forgotten by the mid-1920s. Despite a host of organizations
such as the German Colonial Society (DKG), or pressure groups founded
by re-migrees from Africa to keep alive colonial memories, the ranks of
German colonial enthusiasts dwindled after the loss of the colonies. The
DKG had a mere 25,000 members, many of them former colonial officials
or settlers. They all joined the chorus of denunciation of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles and demanded the return of their lost African “homeland”. But they
gained only marginal influence on politics and society, irrespective of a
“burgeoning colonial nostalgia industry” that campaigned against the
96 Speitkamp 2005: 145-7 ‘Die Popularität des kolonialen Gedankens war offenkundig begren-
zt‘; cf. 2009; 2000; Janz 2013: 358; Hirschf./Kr. 2013: 301 kein ‘gemeinsamer Totenkult für
die Gefallenen‘; on ‘postcolonial Germany‘ cf. now the excellent study of Schilling 2014.
97 Poley 2005: 13: ‘As the images, hypotheses, criticisms, words, and worries of theses people
crept up on one another, strange inversions resulted: the African imperialist, the African
slavedriver, the whipped German, a German-Jewish voodoo queen, …, whites who become
black, men who became women, colonizers who were themselves colonized.’
98 Klotz 2005: 135; 142 ‘it brought to life a ghost that had long haunted the practitioners of em-
pire: Africa colonizing Europe’; Poley 2005: 11f.; cf. Bley 2003: 56f.
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colonial Schuldlüge and continued to report about the former colonies.
The “lost colonies” were not a cause for mass mobilization in the Weimar
Republic. Parties paid lip-service to colonial revisionism, but true colonial
enthusiasm was rare among politicians.99 “[R]ecolonization of the lost
colonies was never a stated goal of the Weimar Republic [governments]”.
Foreign Minister Stresemann, arguing that Germany deserved of “equal
treatment”, demanded during his negotiations with the Allies that Ger-
many should participate in the mandate system of the League of Nation.
But this implicit acceptance of the mandate system brought him in conflict
with colonial pressure groups. The most important German success in the
field of colonial policy was the lifting of most bans on German immigra-
tion and trade in the mandated territories and other colonies in the late
1920s.100
A number of memorials for the “lost colonies” and those fallen in
Africa during the war were erected in the 1920s – in private initiative. The
support of the German government was limited. Parliamentarians and
councilors repeatedly referred to the difficult financial situation of the Re-
ich. They openly stated that the financial support of the expelled Kolo-
nialdeutschen would be more important than new monuments. Statues of
“colonial heroes” like Peters, Wissmann or Dominik which had been
erected in the colonies before the war and which had been removed by the
victors during the war, were returned to Germany and re-erected.101
Although the Luso-German arbitration had barely started, in Portugal,
but also in Germany, novelists, amateur historians, retired soldiers and
colonial officials had already begun to write about the events in Naulila,
leaving no doubt about the true culprits: it was always the other party.
More often than not, their arguments mirrored those uttered during the ar-
bitration. In 1918, Walther Suchier, one of the medical doctors during the
battle of Naulila, published one of the first German accounts of the World
War in GSWA. He called the Naulila incident a “wretched assassination”.
Richard Hennig called the German attack on Cuangar a “coup de main”
(Husarenstückchen). He mentioned that when it became known in GSWA
that Portugal was actually neutral when Fort Naulila was sacked voices
were raised “which were critical of the government’s measures instead of
99 Ciarlo 2012: 320; Dannert 1926: 186; cf. Schnee 1926; Patin 2010: 70f.; Conrad 2012:
117f. ‘Kolonialrevisionsimus [blieb] … ein Randphänomen‘.
100 Gründer 2004: 219-24; cf. van Laak 2003: 71f.; Wright 2002: 81; 436f.; Krüger 1985: 480.
101 BAB R 1001/6614: 28, AA to F. Behn, 13.2.25; 80, Exc. SBRT, 14.3.22; cf. Zeller 2000.
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being thankful for the forceful defense in the face of serious danger.”
Much to Hennig’s chagrin, these critical voices in GSWA somehow found
their way into the South African and British press, which happily reported
about the “Hun’s” violation of Portugal’s “neutrality”. Hennig used more
than three pages of his GSWA during the World War to justify the attack
on Naulila and to prove that Portugal was in fact never neutral.102 Gover-
nor Seitz in his exculpatory South Africa during the World War (1920),
when describing the fight against the Portuguese, called the “murder of
Naulila” “one of the greatest acts of villainy in this history of the world”.
In his massive memoirs (3 vols., 1927–29), he kept the same tone when
speaking about “the Portuguese” and Naulila. In 1923, Major Oelhafen
published the semi-official history of the GSWA campaign with the ex-
plicit aim of countering the accusation “that the [Schutztruppe] did not at-
tack with the necessary tenacity.” He knew of voices that – comparing
GEA and GSWA – called the campaign in GSWA a “short fiasco”. Oel-
hafen tried to show that the men in GSWA had fought to the “bitter end”.
He dedicated an entire chapter to the Naulila-affair. Wilhelm Mattenklodt,
a NCO of the “regiment Naulila” who had furnished information about the
“reprisal” during the arbitration, did the same in his highly readable mem-
oirs about the war in GSWA and Angola. Constable Joseph Schaaps, who
in October 1914 had been waiting in vain for the return of Schultze-Jena
to Erickson-Drift, wrote in the Festschrift for the German colonial police
forces about “the murder of Dr. Schultze-Jena”. He deemed that “for the
Portuguese Army and its officer corps, this act represents a badge of
shame for all time.“103
During the Nazi period, general publications on the former German
colonies mostly included sections on “Germany’s entitlement to the return
of its colonies” (Deutschlands Recht auf Rückgabe) and historicized “Ger-
many’s struggle for the lost colonies”. Quotations from Adolf Hitler such
as “we need colonies just as any other power”, were frequent. Narrations
about the Portuguese in Naulila became markedly racist. Adolf Fischer in
his Südwester Offiziere (1935) painted a rosy picture of young German
colonial officers who heroically fulfilled their dreams of a “German mis-
sion” with honor and a strong sense of liberty and duty. His pathetic lan-
guage and rampant stereotyping not only of “the natives” but also of “the
102 Strümpell in: Kolonialkriegerbund 1924: 83; Suchier 1918: 28; Hennig 1920: 118f.
103 Seitz 1920: 33; 1929: 95; Oelhafen 1923: I; Mattenklodt 1936: 35-46; Schaaps 1930: 384.
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German colonial officer” and his “enemies” becomes most glaring in his
description of “the murder of Naulila”. Everything “Portuguese” was de-
picted as corrupt and “racially degraded”. Thus, the “punishment of Portu-
gal in Angola remained within the limits of German campaigns against na-
tives; shameful to admit it.” Even children’s and youth’s books were pub-
lished about the “Murder in Naulila”; several others about “German
Africa” mentioned the Portuguese “misdeeds”.104
The Kolonialpost, magazine of the League of German Colonial Sol-
diers, headed by Franz Ritter von Epp (1868–1947, a veteran of the
Herero War of 1904), used the publication of Investidas alemãs a o Sul de
Angola (1934) by António Varão (the former head of Fort Cuamato and
the superior of Lieutenant Sereno) to remind its readers of Portuguese
“treachery” and German “bravery” in Naulila. The German Foreign Office
assisted with a translation of the relevant pages of Varão’s book.105 When,
however, the former soldier Max Baericke presented a manuscript on
“Naulila” and hoped to have it published in 1936, one of the new men in
charge of colonial affairs in the Foreign Office, Dr. Seger, having in mind
the improved relations between Portugal and Germany, questioned
whether it would be wise to publish the book. Seger recommended con-
tacting the Dienststelle v. Ribbentropp and the Prüfungsstelle für national-
sozialistisches Schrifttum. However, Baericke was fairly critical of the
Naulila affair. For him the attack on Fort Cuangar was “no honorable
page” in the history of GSWA. The affair should have been solved “diplo-
matically”, and if this were not possible, war should have been declared.
For Baericke, Franke’s victory at Naulila “was pure luck”. He did not get
104 v.Rudolf 1938: 197; Fischer 1935: 109; Pietzner-Clausen 1943: 236; Vageler 1941: 61;
Tanz 1938; Lehr 1941.
105 BAB R 1001/6642: 67, Dt Kolonialkrieger Bund, v.Boemcken to Dr. Lotz, 26.11.35; p.68,
AA, Dr. Seger to v.Boemcken, 7.5.36. The taking over of power by Hitler in January 1933
had no immediate repercussions for the personnel of the Foreign Office; only the Ambas-
sador in Washington D.C. Friedrich von Prittwitz (1884–1955) resigned from his post. The
attitude of the Foreign Office’s high ranking officials has been characterized as ‘policy of
wait and see’ (Politik des Abwartens). Many hoped for the new government’s ‘energetic
measures’ against unemployment and were eager to support it in its ‘combat against Ver-
sailles’. In early 1933, around ten senior officials (höhere Beamte) were members of the
NSDAP, in late 1933, fifty more. In the course of this year, a number of diplomats were
relieved of their positions because of their Jewish origin or an affiliation with Social
Democrats. Döscher 1987: 67;73; Graml 2012; Kröger 2014; on colonial literature Schnei-
der 2011.
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his Naulila-book published.106 The writer Julius Steinhardt (1880–1955),
was more successful with his colonial books for young people. The retired
lieutenant and ex-farmer had lived in GSWA for ten years, where he was
constantly in dispute with the administration due to his insistence to hunt
and trade in the Okavango region. Following in the footsteps of ex-farmer
Karl Angebauer’s (1882–1952) Mandumes Jagdzug (1926), Steinhardt’s
Sultan Mandumes Tod (1942) is a lively written piece of racist fantasy.
At this point in time, the man who had, more than any one else, averted
the possibility that Germany would have to pay damages for the Naulila-
campaign, was already out of office: In 1935, Judge Marx, who was once
hailed by Minister Curtius, Brückner, and his colleagues in the case for his
service to the Foreign Office, lost his position as German representative at
the MAT in Paris. At the same time, he was discharged by the Appellate
Court (Oberlandesgericht) in Düsseldorf and forced into retirement due to
his Jewish descent (though he was actually a Lutheran). He did not return
to Germany but remained in Paris, where he tried to establish himself as
legal consultant on questions of international law.107 In 1941, the retired
judge was denaturalized. He was by now addressed in public correspon-
dence with the Jewish-identified middle name “Israel” assigned according
to the “Law on Alteration of Family and Personal Names” (1938). His re-
maining funds were confiscated by the Gestapo and he had to flee Paris.
He survived the Nazi period, probably in Monaco. In 1949, left without
any regular income and for reasons of health no longer able to work as le-
gal consultant, he approached his former employer, the OLG Düsseldorf,
to rectify the situation of his pension. For the previous ten years, since the
beginning of the Second World War, he had not received any of the pay-
ments that were his by right from the German government.108 However, it
would take at least another year until the court and the North Rhine-West-
phalian state Ministry of Justice had assembled sufficient legal expertise
to legitimize the transfer of pension payments to a “foreigner” (Marx was
no longer a German citizen) living abroad (in Paris). He was then retroac-
106 BAB R 1001/6642: 97, Baericke to AA, 9.11.36; p.75, AA to Baericke, 17.11.36; cf. BAB
R 1001/2193: 176 BA Grootfontein to KGW, 23.10.12 re Steinhardt; cf. Tabel 2007.
107 LANRW Gerichte Rep. 244 Nr. 848: 258 Personalakte Robert Marx, MoJ to Marx,
18.12.35; Marx to MoJ, 7.1.36.
108 LANRW Gerichte Rep. 244 Nr. 848: 280 Personalakte Robert Marx, Marx to OLG Düssel-
dorf, 5.2.49; 285 Copy: Deutsche Bank to Robert Israel Marx and Gertrud Sara Marx,
13.6.41.
9. Naulila and King Mandume in the Memorial Cultures
417
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
tively (starting in 1936) promoted to the rank of Senatspräsident and hon-
ored in 1952 with the Federal Cross of Merit.109
Marx’ colleague in the ‘third’ Naulila arbitration procedure (1930–
1933), Richard Fuchs, the Reich’s leading expert on the law of repara-
tions, had lost his position as Ministerialrat in the Ministry of Finance al-
ready in 1933. He then worked as a consultant for the Zentralausschuss
and the Reich Representation of German Jews (Reichsvertretung der Ju-
den) under Rabbi Leo Baeck (1873–1956). In 1939 Fuchs emigrated to
Great Britain and returned, in 1945, to Germany as legal consultant of the
British Control Commission for Germany.110
The community of former colonial soldiers still alive in the 1960s (no
one questioned their entitlement to pension payments) continued the
apologetic tradition of the 1920s and 30s of emphasizing the “moral justi-
fication” of the German reprisals in their publications.111 From a Marxist
perspective, East-German historian Helmut Stoecker explained how the
expansionistic imperialists of the Kaiserreich planned to orchestrate bor-
der incidents with neutral Portugal in Africa in order to have a “pretext”
for an attack on the colonies they wanted to annex.112 It took more years
until Thomas Morlang published his article – the first based on archival
files – on the German campaign against “neutral Portuguese-Angola”.
Neither concerned with the “moral” justifiability nor with a preconceived
image of German expansionism, he did not shy away from quoting the or-
der of police commander Bethe to attack Fort Cuangar and “give no quar-
ter”. He also reiterates the Portuguese claims that Germans had supported
the “rebellion” in southern Angola.113
Morlang’s work fits in the picture of “a growing interest in the history
of Africa” in German speaking countries. While the critique of Eurocen-
trism and Eurocentric research profiles is still high on the agenda of histo-
rians of Africa, some have observed, however, also attempts at revision-
109 LANRW Gerichte Rep. 244 Nr. 848: 304 Personalakte Robert Marx, OLG Düsseldorf to
MoJ NRW, 24.2.50; LANRW NW 110 Nr. 1182, Innenministerium: Wiedergutmachung,
Einzelfälle, vol. 2, 1946–1965; Schätzel 1955: 386.
110 Walk 1988: 108; Röder/Strauss 1980: 207; it needs to be added that in 1933 also the Ger-
man arbitrator in the ‘third’ arbitration (1933), Albrecht Mendelsohn-Bartholdy, was forced
into retirement. In 1934, he emigrated to Great Britain where he died two years later.
111 Dammann 1968: 2f.; Speitkamp 2005: 175f. on the German colonial army Kameradschaft.
112 Stoecker 1986: 284f.; 1991: 251 quot. Jagow to Zimmermann, 21.1.14.
113 Morlang 1998: 45 ‘Keine Schonung‘; 47 ‘dt. Regierg. unterstützte die Aufständischen‘.
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ism and colonial apologetics in the writing about African history.114 A cer-
tain strand of German memorial practices (including German-speakers in
Namibia) with reference to the former colonial empire has been criticized
for its strategy to “relativize, belittle or embellish” the colonial past and its
inherent brutality.115 While the interest in Germany in the history of the
First World War has grown over the last years (bestselling authors such as
Christopher Clark and Herfried Münkler attest to this), in German “collec-
tive memory” the “colonial past barely plays a role.” In this context, histo-
rians of colonial and global history have coined the term “colonial amne-
sia”. Reinhard Kössler deplores that “everything that relates to German
colonialism… has for long remained thoroughly expunged from national
memory.”116 The short period of the formal colonial empire might be one
reason for this. Also colonial repercussions have, at first sight, barely im-
pacted German society. Historians of (German) colonialism, however,
tirelessly underline the “continuing relevance” of the “colonial legacy in
German history”. The “colonial turn” in German historiography continues
unabated.117
History as a Source of (National) Pride: Angola
The at times passionate debates about appropriate forms of memorial cul-
tures in post-colonial Africa have been extensively researched. While the
“official approaches in projecting images of the past differ widely”,118 the
necessity to officially institutionalize certain forms of memory, most of all
the deeds of a number of men during the “liberation struggle”, is hardly
questioned. Monuments, national shrines or other forms of commemora-
tive complexes in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, or Namibia attest to
the dominance of glorifying narratives of “great heroes” who fought (and
sacrificed themselves) for “the nation”.119 The intention is to make history
a source of (national) pride that can translate into national unity. On the
9.3
114 Sonderegger/Grau/Eckert 2009: 9f. ‘ein wachsendes Interesse‘; 17; cf. Eckert 2013a: 140f.
115 Kössler 2007: 378 (transl. B. Schmidt-Lauber 1998); 2008: 317; 2009; cf. Jansen/Oster-
hammel 2013: 125.
116 Conrad 2003: 195; Kössler 2007: 365; cf. Krüger 2003: 120; Pawliczek 2014; Münkler
2014: 9; Clark 2013; on Clark’s ‘revisionism’ and success in Germany Winkler 2014: 14.
117 Conrad 2003: 204; 2012: 121; Bruns 2009; cf. Lindner 2008; Speitkamp 2005: 184f.
118 Kössler 2007: 361.
119 Fassin 2008; Werbner 1998; Kössler 2010; Shiweda 2005.
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other hand, a critical analysis of contemporary African cultural produc-
tions like film or literature has brought to light strategies “to problematize
the experience of independence as historical telos”. Speaking about Ango-
la, Fernando Arenas notes an “exhaustion of the utopian fervor associated
with the struggles for independence”. The end of the Cold War, the
demise of Marxist-Leninist ideology and its vision of a new, egalitarian
society, to which both leading nationalist movements, MPLA (Angola)
and SWAPO (Namibia), once adhered to, have contributed to this socio-
cultural change. Considering the transformation of the post-Marxist politi-
cal elite “into an oligarchic state largely divorced from the needs and aspi-
rations of the poor majority”, this disillusionment can be understood as
part of the realization (not only by academics, but also by ordinary women
and men) of the “internal dynamics of formerly colonized nation-states
whereby the post independence elites have replicated such [colonial] pow-
er structures.”120 Historian David Birmingham has summarized the moral-
ly bankrupt situation devastatingly: “the colonial class of three hundred
thousand privileged and semi-privileged expatriates had been replaced by
a similar number of black Portuguese-speaking Angolans who retained
many of the old colonial attitudes of moral and social superiority”.121
The ways in which politicians officially commemorate “heroes of anti-
colonial resistance” in modern day Angola also follows a colonial tradi-
tion of celebrating “a national pantheon peopled by immaculate and
monodimensional heroic discoverers, restorers, soldiers, and explorers”.122
In 1937 a “colossal” and “elaborate” monument to “Our Honored Dead in
the Great War” was inaugurated in Luanda’s borough of Quinaxixe.123
With a fine sense of historical irony, it was “incorrectly known [to Luan-
dans] as Maria da Fonte” after the instigator of a popular uprising in Por-
tugal in 1846. The reason “the statute has taken on this name”, the novelist
José E. Agualusa (b.1960) recalls, “relates to the main figure, an athletic-
120 Arenas 2011: xvi; xxi; xxvii; 172 on ‘pernicious forms of coloniality of power’ in Angola.
121 Birmingham 2006: 157: 198; in Pepetela’s novel O Desejo de Kianda, 2002 [1995]: 53, a
husband reflects on his wife’s ‘little quirk’ to call all her maids ‘Joana’: ‘It was the colonial
madams who changed the names of their domestics to Maria or Joana – there is evidence of
this in literature. His wife [a member of Angola’s communist party elite] had taken her
lessons from those colonial madams and, even after Independence, she continued to play by
the same rules. When he pointed this out to her they had a tough argument’. cf. Clarence-
Smith 1980: 109f.
122 Corrado 2008: 20.
123 Pélissier 1969: 100; Wells 1940: 566.
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looking and determined woman, who holds up a sword. Maria da Fonte
was destroyed immediately after independence [in 1975], and replaced by
a military tank.”124 Also ex-Governor General Norton de Matos, who in
1949 had dared to challenge Salazar’s regime in the presidential elections
(a move in which he was supported by his former ministerial colleague
Magalhães), was honored with a huge monument in Nova Lisboa (Huam-
bo), the town he ‘founded’. In 1975 it was “defaced by the slogans and
colors of the new power in the land [“UNITA”, “MPLA”, and “Holden
Roberto”]. All of these statues were later destroyed.”125 However, small
memorials deep in the countryside more or less survived. In Cuangar a
monument (an obelisk) was erected in May 1950 to commemorate the
Portuguese killed during the German raid in October 1914.126 After 1915,
Fort Naulila was re-erected and maintained until 1975. The border inci-
dents involving the fort were now more mundane (mostly trespassing cat-
tle) and less politically charged than in the (pre-) World War I era; even
though after 1920, the Luso-South African rivalry was unmistakable. It
was felt in the region since officials from SWA encouraged the local pop-
ulation’s “flight movements” to the south of the border in order to increase
the labor force.127 In Naulila and Mongua small monuments were also
erected next to the war cemeteries, whose inscriptions are, after years of
neglect, barely visible. In 1936, it was claimed that in Angola “December
18 is still a day of mourning.“128
The indisputable bravery of Mandume’s men during the battle of
Mongua made a lasting impression on Portuguese officers. As mentioned,
following the defeat of King Mandume, within fifty years the “Ovambo
warriors” became the most trusted and “best soldiers” of the Portuguese
colonial army against nationalist insurgents (1961–75). The reasons under-
lying this might be an interesting research topic alone. Here, it suffices to
124 Agualusa 2007: 298 FN 2; cf. Bettencourt 2011: 22 ‘A sua simbologia ficou reduzida a pó’.
125 Steenkamp 1989: 45 photo of defaced memorial; Salvador [n.d.]: 153; Norton 2001: 193.
126 Cf. Dammann 1968: 2 quotes the inscription: ‘Aqui repousam os restos mortais das vitimas
do massacre ocorido neste local, na madrigada do XXXI de Outobre de MCMXIV;
28.5.1950.’
127 NAN NAO 59 6/17, Native Commissioner Ondangua to Chief Native Commissioner,
6.12.51; Keese 2015: 237; cf. Bollig 1998: 515; Nathanael 2002: 52.
128 AHM/Div/2/2/60/6, Monument in Mongua, 1923; Eckenbrecher 1940: 181 ‘ein Trauertag‘;
on the last hoisting of the Portuguese flag in Naulila in 1975 cf. http://www.momentosde-
historia.com/001-grande_guerra/001-03-republica-e-guerra/001-03-04-culto_mortos/
001-03-04-01-monumentos/001-03-04-01-03-angola.html [3 Feb. 2015]
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say that they were stationed throughout southern Angola and beyond.129
Other memories of the World War also left their traces in the colonial psy-
che. Rumors about German intentions to annex Angola remained acute in
Angola. It was “important…that a number of Portuguese leaders believed
that the German menace was a real one.” In 1924 rumors still abounded in
Angola that “natives, under the guidance of German [immigrants], are go-
ing to revolt against the Portuguese rule”. A similar story as in 1914 was
repeated about a “hidden large stock of guns and ammunition in the interi-
or”.130 The Portuguese press continued to point to the threat of “denation-
alization of our colonies”.131 In 1926, even Mussolini’s Italy seemed a
menace to Angola.132
Looking back at Portugal’s history in Angola, publications from the late
colonial era lauded the Portuguese “for their lack of racial pride – a lack
that not too many years ago was despised by those white people who, to-
129 Pélissier 1979: 198; 195.
War memorial in NaulilaIll. 39
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day, pretend to be defenders of the black race”.133 The “ideology of misce-
genation and its Luso-tropicalist deflections” which was given literary
form by Gilberto Freyre “proved to be particularly successful not only in
Brazil, but also in Portugal and in its former African colonies, where it
still arouses interest, nostalgia, or resentment.” In fact, the Luso-tropicalist
ideology of the Estado Novo “proved to be a tenacious obstacle to the lib-
eration cause”.134
However, even during colonial times, it became evident that King Man-
dume’s candor and military wit has earned him a “place in the pantheon of
early Angolan protest and dissent”.135 While official colonial memorial
policies were still focused on the King’s enemies (N’giva, his former capi-
tal, was renamed Vila Pereira de Eça and in 1927 was made seat of the
Baixo Cunene district), a counter-discourse to official rhetoric emerged
and signs of public (as opposed to official) memory about Mandume be-
came evident to Europeans. Following his death, the King had become the
subject of poems. In his magisterial three volume work Etnografia do su-
doeste de Angola (1958, English 1976), the missionary Carlos Estermann
(1896–1976), who spent most of his life among the peoples of southern
Angola, “transcribe[d] and interpret[ed] an encomiastic poem composed in
memory of Mandume”. Estermann was not a friend of the late King,
whom he called a “tyrant”.136 However, the perception of King Mandume
as a man of exemplary courage and inspirational heroism seems to have
continued unabated among the African population throughout the colonial
period. During the war against the Portuguese and the civil war after 1975,
commanders (re-)namend themselves “Mandume”, others were given the
name by their parents. This shows: “The past was very much present in
the organization of violence, even during … the self-consciously mod-
130 Wheeler 1978: 129; NARA RG 59, MF 705, roll 28, 853m00/8; USC Luanda to SoS,
20.8.24.
131 NARA RG 84, Lisbon v. 168: 800, USML to SoS, 11.8.19 on Diário de Notíçias, 7.7.19.
132 NARA RG 59, box 6811; 753.65/2, USML to SoS, 1.11.26; cf. Alype 1926; Jessen 1936.
133 Almeida Santos 1964, transl. in Corrado 2008: 69; cf. Abshire/Samuels (eds) 1969.
134 Corrado 2008: 52; Arenas 2011: 162; cf. Lourenço/Keese 2011: 224; Andrade 1969.
135 Wheeler 1968: 56.
136 Hamilton 1975: 72; cf. Estermann 1976: 174. He argues that the ‘poem was undoubtedly
composed to please the relatives … of the deceased chief [Mandume]. It does not express
the general opinion, for the chief’s subjects were content with that death; through it they
were freed from a tyrant’. Cf. the hommage to Estermann by Pélissier 1979: 201 ‘Cet
homme a fait pour l’Afrique plus que tout le Corps consulaire luandais en soixante ans.’ Cf.
Estermann 1963.
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ernist struggles of the mid-twentieth century. States and societies sought
historical precedents and heroic forebears, for both inspiration and so-
lace”.137
After Angola’s independence, the perception of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ were
reversed; the villain became the hero and the hero became the villain of
the war in 1914–15. Just as Portuguese-Angola was “in desperate need of
heroes”138, so was the independent state. Or, as the protagonist in José E.
Agualusa’s novel O vendedor de passados explains to one of his clients,
who is purchasing a new past: The authorities changed the name of his
former school from Salvador Correia to Mutu Ya Kevela “because they
wanted an Angolan hero – in those days [after 1975] we needed our own
heroes like we needed bread to feed us.” Again, the “material of the past is
adapted to the needs of the present.”139 However, there was an older tradi-
tion of celebrating “heroes of anti-colonial resistance”. During Angola’s
“’Free-Press’ Period” (1866–1896) newspapers not only published articles
that criticized Portuguese administrators as “crocodiles” or “rats” and
mentioned that “in the interior of the country the colonial troops hunt peo-
ple as if they were game”, but they also dared to “cheer as heroes those
who still resisted Portuguese penetration.”140
Decades ago, historian Henri Brunschwig (1904–1989.) assumed that
(early) leaders of African resistance to colonial rule (and there cultures)
have been forgotten.141 However, it has been recently shown that – con-
trary to pessimistic assumptions about a “crisis of memory” in Africa –
there is an “incessant labor on memories ongoing in present African soci-
eties”. The manner in which “memory” of a personality in history is con-
structed and transmitted differs between those who attempt to construct
and transmit and their goals. Politicians use the past in different ways than
civil society organizations or academics. The past, as ethnologist Arjun
Appadurai’s (b. 1949) famous dictum says, is not “a limitless and plastic
symbolic resource”, but “a scarce resource”. And the “discourse concern-
ing the past between social groups is an aspect of politics, involving com-
petition, opposition and debate.” The “hero of the past is a ‘scarce re-
137 Reid 2012: 10; cf. Shiweda 2005: 1.
138 Corrado 2008: 43; cf, Chabal et al. 2002; Keese 2005.
139 Agualusa 2004: 110; Kössler 2007: 364.
140 O Arauto Africano, 20.1.1890, transl. Wheeler 1969a: 16; 10; Corrado 2008: 174; 177.
141 Brunschwig 1974: 55 ‘Ces combattants, admirables, sont morts deux fois, physiquement
d’abord, puis moralement, quand disparut la culture qu’ils incarnaient.’
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source’”, too, whose usage as symbolic capital is determined by political
power games.142 And “[h]istory is thus, above and beyond official narra-
tives, a haunting claim the dead have on the living, whose responsibility it
is not only to remember but to protect the dead from being misappropriat-
ed.”143
It is not the task of this work to decide whether the Kwanyama culture
of Mandume’s time has disappeared (almost) one hundred years after his
death, but it can be ascertained that in modern Angola and Namibia the
King has become “an unblemished hero of anti-colonial resistance.” While
“academics in the [global] north sing the praise of hybridity and multiple
identities…, many Africans [not all, as we will see], especially the urban
elites, call for a history that acts as a moral institution and forges identi-
ties.” Indeed, Mandume’s official iconography hinders the presentation of
a multifaceted personality; the somewhat ambiguous and less edifying
episodes of his life are concealed.144 Mandume is not a “father of the na-
tion” – this title is reserved for others in Angola and Namibia. After all, he
lost the war in 1915 and was shot in 1917. The question remains, however,
how modern politicians attempt to include his legacy of anti-colonial re-
sistance into a national narrative of “struggle”, independence, self-deter-
mination, and nation-building. Did he develop into a (popular) hero? Such
an attribute is mostly determined by the charisma that stems from his
deeds (often war activities). These deeds may, later-on, have been the
cause for official veneration not to speak of a ‘cult’.145
This is not the place to analyze the attempts of the MPLA government
to rewrite Angola’s history according to Marxist-Leninist doctrines.146
During the 1980s, the government in Luanda even rejected the description
of Angola as “Lusophone”, even though Portuguese remained the admin-
istrative language. At the same time, the new masters found it disturbing
to hear from historians that instead of “500 years of uninterrupted Por-
tuguese colonial rule”, Portugal was in fact the last power to implant itself
in the African hinterland around 1920. If this was the case, how could they
speak of “500 hundred years of oppression”, the “alpha and omega of the
142 Appadurai 1981: 201f.; Charton/Fouéré. 2013: 5; cf. Jewsiewicki/Mudimbe 1993;
Speitkamp 2007: 394f.
143 Felman 2002: 15 qut. W.Benjamin ‘the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins’.
144 Hayes 1993: 91; Wirz/Deutsch 1997: 12;
145 Cf. Charton/Fouéré 2013: 3f.; Centlivres/Favre/Zonabend 1999.
146 MPLA 1975: 179 ‘Enfim, a História de Angola...é uma História da luta de classes’; Heintze
2008: 182 on attempts at reform and the hope to have more research by Angolans.
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new regime in Luanda”? Therefore, and given that he was hesitant to
speak of Angolan nationalism before 1940, the works of historian René
Pélissier on the colonial conquests were received very differently in Lis-
bon and Luanda.147
While many memorials were blown to pieces, others had to be erected,
thereby inviting a reevaluation of the Portuguese conquest and the resis-
tance to colonial domination. Government-sponsored publications since
1975 have narrated de Eça’s war in 1915 as a “treacherous attack” on the
Ovambo: The latter fiercely fought under their “courageous chief, Man-
dume”, who began to “reunite all the Ovambo tribes” and was able to beat
the Portuguese several times. However, – “using treason more than once”
– they brought in reinforcements and overpowered Mandume (who is put
in a long line of resisters since Queen Njinga [c.1583–1663]) in the battle
of Mongua. Even the King’s “suicide” in 1917 is explained by “treachery”
of some of his followers. “Still today this hero of Angolan resistance to
colonial occupation is loved and venerated all over in Ovamboland.”148
While in colonial accounts of “Naulila” the campaign against Mandume
was mentioned only in passing, in post-colonial narratives the King’s
fighting and stamina in facing colonial occupation take center stage. Not
Naulila but Mongua and most of all Oihole seem destined to become An-
golan lieux de mémoire, relating events of colonial oppression, war, and
glory. In 1994, Mongua and Vau do Pembe [Mupa], the site of the colo-
nial defeat in 1904, were declared “historic sites”.149
147 Dianoux 1989: 9; 13; 25 ‘reactions contrastées’; cf. Schubert 2015: 5f.
148 MPLA 1975: 148, Mandume ‘ainda hoje é querido e venerado em todo o Ambó.’
149 Heintze 2008: 185 on Francisco Xavier Yambo, Director do Instituto Nacional do
Património Cultural, speaking in Luanda about ‘pertinência e prioridades no estudo dos lo-
cais de memória’; I am grateful to Beatrix Heintze for pointing to me the publications of
AngolaPress: ‘Lista de património mundial deve conter Monumentos e Sítios angolanos’,
AngolaPress 11.9.2006; ‘Governo deve criar política dos bens culturais’, AngolaPress
11.9.2006; ‘Huambo: província dispõe de 82 monumentos por classificar’, AngolaPress
17.4.2008; ‘Moxico: Estudantes defendem conservação de monumentos e sítios’, Angola-
Press 17.4.2008; ‘Huambo: Huíla: Académicos defendem classificação dos monumentos
históricos’, AngolaPress 18.4.2008; Cunene: Cultura pretende catalogar monumentos e
sítios da província’, Angola Press 18.4.2008; ‘Cabinda: Província conta com 76 monumen-
tose sítios’, AngolaPress 18.4.2008; ‘Benguela: Sociedade garante conservação dos monu-
mentos e sítios’, AngolaPress 18.4.2008; ‘Bié: Província diespõe de duzentos e cinquenta
monumentos e sítios’, AngolaPress 24.4.2008; www.hpip.org/default/en/contents/naviga-
tion/geographicToponymicNavigation/Place?a=264.
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The practice of naming boys after Mandume lives on in modern An-
golan literature. In his novel My Father’s Wives José E. Agualusa nick-
names one of the protagonists “Mandume” (whose brothers are called Mu-
tu [ya Kevela] and Mandela, African freedom fighters in their own right).
Ironically, while aware that he was named after the “Cuanhama tribal
chief who killed himself during a battle, in the south of Angola, against
German [!] troops”, young Mandume “isn’t very interested in finding out
about the historical figure” or Africa in general. Having grown up in Por-
tugal, he is teased by others (in Angola) as “Mandume, the whitest black
man in Portugal.” In 2005/6, his journey – reluctantly accompanying his
girlfriend – across Angola to Namibia, South Africa, and Mozambique
brought them close to the venues of Mandume’s war in 1915. However,
they only found the time to recall places of fighting during the South
African invasion of 1975.150
The widespread indifference among the younger generation to the
“heroes” of the past and their “glorious deeds” is a subject that has been
explored also by other Angolan authors. Manuel Rui’s (b. 1941, a former
MPLA minister and author of Angola’s national anthem) novella Um anel
na areia (A ring in the sand) describes “the loss of faith in grand…belief
systems such as Marxism, Catholicism, animism, capitalism, and even…
independence”. Even “attraction and repulsion surrounding the taboo ob-
ject of colonialism”, in particular the older generation’s nostalgia for colo-
nial times is touched upon. Such affection, however, is met with bitter sar-
casm by one of the protagonists. He wonders why those who fought for
independence say “that the old times were the best”: “If life was so great
back then how is it that they gave birth to this shit hole that we’re in.” Ex-
pressions of sympathy such as nostalgia for colonial times can be read, as
suggested by Fernando Arenas, as “emotional strategies to cope with the
recent civil war trauma, complicating the hegemonic colonial/anticolonial
binary that operated during the liberation wars.”151
150 Shiweda 2005: 94; Agualusa 2007: 13; on Agualusa cf. Arenas 2011: 30.
151 Transl. in: Arenas 2011: 175f ‘como é que eles pariram esta merda que estamos com ela’;
189f ‘[S]een through the prism of trauma [of war]... it is easier to understand the perception
that life was relatively better for many during colonial times, in spite of the inequalities and
injustices’. In Pepetela’s novel O Desejo de de Kianda, 2002 [1995]: 23, a Luandan couple,
belonging to the nouveaux riches, reflects on the appropriateness of the term “overseas”,
given its colonial origins: ‘What we’re seeing now is a reappropriation of the colonial her-
itage. There are plenty of people around who miss the old days; they say people were better
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The regions that were the theater of war in 1914/5 remained war torn
for years after Angola’s independence. The South African photographer
John Liebenberg (b. 1958) described one of his pictures of a landscape
near Ruacana (1987), when the war between Angolan, Cuban, SWAPO,
UNITA and South African troops was in full swing, as “the valley of
death” and pointed to the southern Angolan “towns of Ngiva [Pereira de
Eça], Xangongo [Fort Roçadas], Cahama – land of war, and more valleys
of death.”152
Considering the widespread disaffection with the “Angolan Revolu-
tion” after forty years of war and the alienation of the majority population
from the ruling MPLA oligarchy in far-away Luanda (the “African
Dubai”), the fact that a “hero of anti-colonial resistance” like Mandume
would become a prime object of government-sponsored memorial
practices should be understood in this context of the “relativization of the
independence metanarrative”. There are political reasons for putting em-
phasis on Mandume over the last decade. They are connected to the civil
war that ended in 2002 and “the climate of fear and repression [most of all
the purges following the failed ‘coup’ in May 1977] under the regime led
by Agostinho Neto [1922–1979]”153 and his successor José Eduardo dos
Santos (b. 1942). Given that the Kwanyama area and southern Angola in
general was considered a stronghold of the UNITA-rebels against the
MPLA government, this government (still in power) found it necessary to
include a popular hero from the south into the national narrative of the
struggle for Angola’s independence, thus “blending communal with na-
tional historical accounts”. Aiming to reduce centrifugal tendencies and
hoping that this honoring of a southern “hero” on a national scale could
prompt reconciliation and better integrate the Ovambo of Angola with the
far-away center, the MPLA government in Luanda launched an explicit
memorial campaign that allowed Ovambo to claim “a rightful place for the
community within national history.”154 In the context of nation building
and the debate about the “coloniality of power” in post-independence
Africa, it may be too far-fetched to speak of a (post-)colonial occupation
of public memory by naming schools, streets and squares in the south of
off before Independence. That’s why to call a company “Overseas”’; cf. Diawara 1997: 21;
Eckert 2013 responding to such ‘allzu rosige Sicht auf das koloniale Projekt’.
152 Liebenberg/Hayes 2010: 252 photo 81.
153 Arenas 2011: 190; 170 on Boaventura Cardoso; cf. Pawson 2014; Schubert 2015: 7
154 Kössler 2007: 375 on the Namibian case; an African overview in Speitkamp 2007: 390-408.
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Angola after King Mandume. If the naming of universities is understood
as expressing a hierarchy of (historical) “relevance” (as decided by those
in power), Mandume seems well positioned: Luanda’s state university is
named after Augustinho Neto (the founding president), Huambo’s (the
country’s second city) after José Eduardo dos Santos (President since
1979), and Lubango’s university, which has been in charge of academic
education in the southern provinces since 2009, is named after Mandume
ya Ndemufayo.155 Nearby the university, a street is named “rua Mongua”.
Also in Lubango, the Diogo Cão High School was renamed after 1975 in
Mandume High School. Angola’s postal office issued a stamp with Man-
dume’s counterfeit.
In 2002, the MPLA government inaugurated the national Mandume
memorial at the King’s grave in Oihole. This was a move, whose (posi-
tive) economic impact on the war-torn area should not be forgotten and
which fits well into the governmental development rhetoric of sidelining
the UNITA opposition. At Oihole, the place in the formerly “neutral zone”
where the King was shot by South Africans, there was already “some sort
of commemoration at Mandume’s grave” taking place in colonial times
every February 6th, the day he died. “Even the Portuguese used to attend
this commemoration by joining the festivities as people slaughtered cattle
and prepared drinks.”156 A government publication quotes longtime Presi-
dent dos Santos saying during a visit to Oihole in 1997 “We are the decen-
dants of Mandume” and posing the (rhetorical) question “why not a statue
of Mandume?” The Oihole Shrine inaugurated five years later does not in-
clude a statue and its design is far less militarized than Namibia’s “Heroes
Acre” (cf. 9.4). The “traditional grave” has been transformed into a mas-
sive concrete structure resembling three Omufati leaves that are connected
atop with a golden ring “which allegedly symbolizes the union and
strength of the Kwanyama people in both Angola and Namibia.” The
leaves are adorned with a photograph of the King and two quotations that
emphasize his virility and courage. Again, the complexities and “ambigui-
ties” of Mandume’s personality and politics are flattened out by this
memorial culture focusing exclusively “on his bravery in fighting colonial
occupation.”157 In Kwanyama tradition Omufati leaves are related to “the
155 https://umn.ed.ao/umn/index.php/umn/tradicao-historica; cf. Schubert 2015: 13f.
156 Shiweda 2005: 95 quot. Godfrey Nangonya, 10.1.2005; cf. Oliveira 2010: 1066f.
157 Shiweda 2005: 23 quotes from the monument: ‘My heart tells me that I have done nothing
wrong’; ‘I am a man, not a woman…and I will fight until my last bullet is expended.’
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grave of an important person. The practice of laying Omufati leaves on
Mandume’s grave existed long before the present commemoration at the
site” and continues. Visitors are invited to take some leaves in their hand
and to present other offerings to the King’s grave. The memorial services
on February 6th each year are currently attended by high-ranking state rep-
resentatives (Angola’s and Namibia’s Presidents in 2002). Namibian offi-
cials and representatives of the Kwanyama authorities are invited, thereby
ensuring massive media coverage. Historian Napandulwe Shiweda, when
commenting on the current Mandume memorial practices in Angola, right-
ly pointed to the massive presence of persons in official attire (women
wearing the party colors), “suggesting the degree to which this is an
MPLA project.” Indeed, the legitimizing aspect is evident in this post-
colonial memorial culture, allowing the ruling elite with only meager
democratic credentials to present themselves during such “events” as the
conscious heirs and proud trustees of honorable and courageous heroes of
the past.158
History as a Source of (National) Pride: Namibia
Compared to other African states, Angola became independent relatively
late (1975); Namibia was even later (1990). Today, the Portuguese legacy
in Angola is probably more marked in Angola than the German legacy in
Namibia. This is first and foremost evidenced by the prominence of Por-
tuguese as Angola’s official language, but also by around 100,000 Por-
tuguese migrants. Having lost administrative power in 1915 to the South
Africans, the German population, however, upheld a remarkable degree of
economic and cultural influence upon Namibia. Africa’s only German dai-
ly is published in Windhoek for around 15,000 Namibiadeutsche who
maintain their schools and a radio station.159
Memorial practices during the South African rule over SWA/Namibia
(1915 to 1990) were very much divided between the rulers and those
9.4
158 Shiweda 2005: 96-101; ix, explaining the pictures she has taken in Oihole (6.2.2005); mon-
uments were also erected for other ‘historical figures’: ‘Malanje; Ministro da Cultura anun-
cia construção de monumentos de figuras históricas’, AngolaPress 14.4.2004; ‘Ministro
testemunha lançamento da pedra de construção do Monumento do Rei Ekuiki II’, Angola
Press 27.8.2008; cf. the recent excellent analysis of MPLA policies by Schubert 2015: 10f.
159 Chabal 2007: 4f; cf. Schmidt-Lauber 1997; Keegan 1999: 228 ‘Windhoek remains today
the only distinctively German city in the southern hemisphere.‘
PART THREE. Legal and Historiographic Perspectives on the World War in Angola
430
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845271606, am 02.01.2020, 11:37:41
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ruled, as the example of Windhoek’s “Mandume Column” indicates. In
1919, the South African administration inaugurated the “Ovambo Cam-
paign Memorial” in a small park at the center of Windhoek opposite the
railway station. Consisting of an obelisk with six sides (in reference to the
battle of Oihole on February 6, 1917) and surrounded by nine palm trees
(in reference to the nine South Africans killed in combat), the monument
soon became the object of competing interpretations of the past. “Virtually
no whites knew of the Kwanyama belief that [Mandume’s] head had been
cut off [after his suicide during the battle of Oihole in 1917] and buried
under” the Ovambo Campaign Memorial in Windhoek. The bodies of the
nine soldiers it was meant to commemorate were disinterred in 1928 from
the former neutral zone after Portugal and South Africa agreed to make
the southern line of the neutral zone their common border. The South
Africans, when reburying their soldiers in Odibe, the Anglican mission
station south of the border, “overlooked the important fact that Man-
dume’s body now lay buried in Angola.” “The literal and symbolic bisec-
tion” of the Kwanyama-kingdom and the King’s body, the border line
“cutting Mandume’s head from his body anew, was referred to by the
Kwanyama as onhaululi – separation.”
The rededication of the Ovambo Campaign Memorial as the (partial)
grave of Mandume and thus the “reappropriation” of space in Windhoek’s
city center has been explained most of all with reference to its vicinity
near the railway station “through which many contract workers passed en
route to their southern labor centers and a place familiar to many urban-
ized Ovambo.”160 As Windhoek became increasingly a site “of (re-)con-
struction of African identities and hierarchies” Ovambo groups did not shy
away from proposing their own version of history, which collided with
colonial history, and “claimed a [public] space [of their own] within the
capital city (a white controlled area) when they claimed the monu-
ment.”161 By projecting alternative contents of memory onto the “col-
umn”, “urbanized Ovambo were drawing on ‘tradition’ to mobilize some
form of self-constituting unity, which they could present” to others. Much
to the surprise of the colonial administration, a “Mandume Memorial
Committee” consisting of Christianized Ovambo emerged and in 1937 it
“obtained permission to lay a wreath at the memorial” to honor King Man-
160 Silvester/Wallace/Hayes 1998: 10.
161 Shiweda 2005: 37 quoting Wallace 2002: 24; cf. Timm 2001: 147.
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dume, whose head they believed to be buried there. However, when they
reapplied in January 1938 their request was refused by the South African
administration as inappropriate because the monument “stands as remem-
brance of the British troops who fell in the war with Mandume”. The
memorial was meant to remain a decidedly ‘colonial space’ that left no
room for different – joint or competing – forms of commemoration. The
Memorial Committee “seems to have disappeared”.162 However, with a
sense of irony, those working in the colonial economy found ways to ac-
tively remember Mandume’s name and his fate in very different ways and
literally beyond the control of the colonial state. In his memoirs, Andimba
Toivo yaToivo (b. 1924), one of Namibia’s “legendary revolutionaries”
against South African rule recalls the practice of “okulila ohamba, mourn-
ing the King. When the Namibian workers pinched from their workplace,
they used to say they were mourning King Mandume, who was killed by
the Whites and not given an honorable funeral; therefore whoever stole
from a white man said he was mourning the King.”163
Evidently, Mandume’s “resistance to both Portuguese and South
African colonialism won him legendary status in both African and colo-
nial eyes.”164 The belief in Mandume’s head being buried under the
memorial, whether a “reaction to trauma” or not, persists up to the present
time, and many Namibians are “just now … finding out that the monu-
ment was actually honoring other people, not Mandume.”165 Whereas
South Africa’s administrators considered the Ovambo belief as “irra-
tional”, the remaining German community in Windhoek also adopted the
notion of a monument (re-)dedicated to King Mandume. They called it
Mandumesäule (Mandume Column) in memory of the “faithful Man-
dume”; thereby underlining their supposed good relationships with
Africans and their rulers and countering the claims of the Bluebook about
German colonial ‘incapacity’.166
A further example of the divided memorial practices in SWA is the
erecting of the “Naulila Memorial” in Outjo. The German Committee
162 Silvester/Wallace/Hayes 1998: 10f. quot. Location Superintendent O. Bowker, 2.2.38.
163 yaToivo, Memoirs (Manuscript). I am thankful to W. Hillebrecht for providing this excerpt.
164 Hayes 1993: 91.
165 Shiweda 2005: 42f.; 48 quoting Godfrey Nangonya, Windhoek, 10.1.2005; 51; 54.
166 Shiweda 2005: 13; Eckenbrecher 1940: 182 ‘…ein schlichter Obelisk, die Mandumesäule.
Er trägt die Namen aller Angehörigen der Unionstruppen, die beim Niederwerfen des Man-
dumestammes fielen. So bleibt der Name des treuen Mandume lebendig unter unseren
Nachfahren.‘
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(Deutscher Verein) Outjo, in a private capacity, asked in the early 1930s
one C. Wille to erect a small monument in honor of the 31 German sol-
diers killed during the battle of Naulila. This monument, listing all names
of those who died as “heroes”, was inaugurated on June 12, 1933 in the
church yard in Outjo. During the ceremony, Major Erich Weiss, who had
fought with Franke in Naulila, reminded his audience also of the initial in-
cident at Fort Naulila that had caused the death of Schultze-Jena, Lösch,
and Roeder. Only in June 4, 1971, after the town council had agreed to
maintain it, was it proclaimed a “National Monument”. The monument
still exists.167
At least two accounts of the events in Naulila were published during the
South African era. In comparison to his German contemporaries, Namib-
ian historian Ernest Stals, based on German sources, was in a position to
provide a more nuanced, less “moralistic” analysis. He interpreted the
German victory as an indicator of the “indisputable assertiveness which
the Schutztruppe had”. In 1981, Baericke’s account, written in the 1930s
and declaring Franke’s victory a “piece of luck”, which did not find a pub-
lisher in Nazi-Germany, was (expanded to include a chapter on the Ger-
manophobe Memorias of Norton de Matos) posthumously published in
Swakopmund.168
Shortly after Namibia’s independence, the change of historiographic
perspectives towards African “agency” in the history of Namibia, which
had been under way at least since the work of Brigitte Lau (1955–1996),
manifested itself in a study on King Mandume by Jeremy Silvester. He
could rightfully state: “The name of Mandume is familiar to most Namib-
ians. He is often mentioned in speeches as a fallen hero of the struggle of
Africans against colonialism.” Patricia Hayes’ work on Mandume, com-
bining archival research with oral history interviews in Ovamboland, con-
tains the most comprehensive analysis to date. In all the interviews she un-
dertook in 1989 with contemporaries of Mandume, the centrality of the
battle of Mongua emerges for subsequent events during his reign. Hayes
speaks of an “enduring magnetism Mandume holds for researchers”. How-
ever, given the wealth of materials available, it is remarkable that no bio-
167 NAN RNG 36, 1/s/O-t/1 Naulila Monument, 1.7.85; Decl. 917, 4.6.71; Vogt 2006: 111.
168 Stals 1968: 191 ‘die onbetwisbare deursettingsvermoe wat die Schutztruppe vir 26 jaar
lank‘ had; Baericke 1981: 61, 75. In 1953, he revised his memoirs; he then lived in Calulo,
Angola. In 1981, the last member of ‘Regiment Naulila’, Hugo Pleitz, lived in Swakop-
mund and was asked about details of the battle when the memoirs were edited.
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graphical monograph about him has been published to date. Considering
works such as the one by Napandulwe Shiweda or Natanael Shinana, this
seems to be only a matter of time, given that the expansion of the educa-
tional system has increased the number of potential authors (and readers);
even though for the time being “the cost of books remains prohibitive for
most of the population [in Angola and Namibia].”169
As Silvester’s remark about “speeches” that mention Mandume sug-
gests, in Namibia the memory of the King is also considered of extraordi-
nary political relevance. “Indeed, history frequently appears in [Namib-
ia’s] public domain”. The consensus among many Ovambo that Man-
dume’s head was cut off and buried in Windhoek is “[s]o important …
that a question was raised in the first National Assembly in 1990 as to
whether his head could be located, for the purpose of erecting a national
monument.” While South Africa’s Ovambo Campaign Memorial was the
“first monument that people came to identify…with King Mandume” it
was not to remain the last.170 One of the major thoroughfares in modern-
day Windhoek, commencing at the “Mandume Column” and leading to
the University, was re-named Mandume Ndemufayo Avenue. In 1998,
Kwanyama Kingship was reestablished. When Namibia’s multi-million
dollar national monument, “Heroes Acre”, was inaugurated near Wind-
hoek in August 2002, King Mandume was among the nine initially identi-
fied “national heroes and heroines” who received a symbolic grave out of
the 174 graves that are foreseen for future burials. Here, Mandume’s
(symbolic) grave in Windhoek is finally made “tangible” with his name
and picture on marble. Similar to its Zimbabwean ‘role model’ near
Harare, questions of selecting the “heroes” and a possible broad ethnic
range of these heroes in order to avoid marginalization and to foster na-
tional reconciliation, remain unresolved. Even though “[i]n Namibia, ex-
plicit controversy [over history] is rather limited”,171 the opposition in par-
liament headed by Ben Ulenga (b. 1952) spoke of “unaffordable megalo-
mania” and accused “living politicians” of budgeting for a “burial site for
themselves”.172 As “Heroes Acre was Sam Nujoma’s [b. 1929] project”,
169 Silvester 1992: 1; Hayes 1992 v. 2: 12; 1993: 91; Arenas 2011: 164; cf. Saunders 2008;
Raphael 2003: 53f. Shinana 2002; Speitkamp 2007: 438-42; Lourenço/Keese 2011: 243.
170 Wallace 2012: 6; 315; Hayes 1993: 108, FN 127 refers to Brigitte Lau; Shiweda 2005: 46.
171 Düsing 2002: 129; Kössler 2007: 362; cf. Speitkamp 2005: 180; Kössler/Pisani/L. 2010.
172 Shiweda 2005: 81 on the SWAPO vs. COD [Ben Ulenga] debate; cf. Becker 2011: 520.
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the countries first President (1990–2005), it comes as no surprise that
those recently buried were “SWAPO [the ruling party] associates only”.173
In independent Namibia, public memory and debates about the colonial
past are dominated by the “struggle” against South Africa (1966–89) and,
albeit to a lesser extent, by the German war against Herero and Nama
(1904–08).174 A public debate about the nine “heroes of early anti-colonial
resistance” symbolically honored in 2002 seems not to have taken place.
When asked about the selection criteria, the curator of Heroes Acre spoke
of a “national consensus that Mandume is a hero, Jacob Marengo is a hero
… I don’t think it would have been debatable to say Mandume is a hero or
not.”175 From those (symbolically) buried so far, it becomes evident that
official commemoration in Namibia is focused on (male) elites and espe-
cially military commanders. This memorial policy of Namibia’s ruling
party is mirrored by the architectural layout of Heroes Acre. Constructed
by North Korean contractor Mansudae Overseas Projects who flew in its
own construction workers, this massive complex (286m x 134m) with a
seating capacity of over 5,000 people overlooking the capital is designed
to impress its visitors and to inscribe a post-colonial order into the land-
scape. An eternal flame and the enormous statute of the Unknown Soldier
(stunningly similar to Sam Nujama) holding an AK-47 and throwing a
hand grenade in the direction of the city give the site a distinctly militaris-
tic ambiance, reflecting the official historical narrative of warfare leading
to liberation.176
Given that Angola has dedicated a monument specifically to King Man-
dume, Namibia is eager to follow in Angola’s footsteps: Namibia’s Min-
istry of Veterans’ Affairs announced in February 2013 “the erection of
monuments of important historical figures” among them King Man-
dume.177 Four weeks later, Namibia’s President Hifikepunye Pohamba (b.
1935), during a remembrance ceremony of King Mandume’s death,
echoed the debate of 1990: “The British should inform us where Man-
173 Shiweda 2005: 58 FN 177; 60; cf. Kössler 2007: 369; Speitkamp 2007: 394.
174 For an overview cf. Förster 2010: 349-59; Kössler 2008: 314f.; Speitkamp 2005: 176-80.
175 Shiweda 2005: 72 quot. Iipinge Pombili, Windhoek, 24.2.2005. The director of the Namib-
ian Monument Council, when asked [in 2005] about the criteria to be used to determine
who should be buried at Heroes Acre, replied: ‘I don’t think I am presently in the position
to talk about these things. The issues you mentioned…are all politically sensitive and…I
am not the person to express myself on such issues.’ ibd.: 72; cf. Conrad 2012: 122.
176 Kössler 2007: 370; 361; 2008: 327; on memory in Namibian literature Arich-Gerz 2008.
177 New Era (Windhoek) 7.2.2013 ‘Anti-Colonial Resistance Fighters to Be Honoured’.
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dume’s head is and it is a demand, not a request, that they return his
skull.” Comparing Mandume to “African leaders such as Patrick Lumum-
ba”, the President saluted “his spirit of resistance. The bravery of leaders
such as Ohamba [King/chief] Mandume yaNdemufayo inspires us to al-
ways face challenges head on”. It was announced that in the future, on
February 6, the date of his death, an annual remembrance ceremony for
the King would be held. After all, also founding President Nujoma, in his
autobiography Where Others Wavered (2001), credited King Mandume
with being inspirational to him in his early years.178 Windhoek’s Indepen-
dence Memorial Museum, inaugurated in March 2014 and – in one way or
another – a museologist version of Where Others Wavered, unquestioning-
ly tries to put on display “an inexorable march towards freedom”. The
book – just as the museum – is, as Namibia’s leading public intellectual,
political scientist André du Pisani (b. 1949) put it, “rarely gendered. By
and large, it is preeminently about the heroism of one man and a few other
men.” Pictures of Mandume are also prominently exhibited in the muse-
um, including his alleged decapitation. In modern Namibia, “[t]races of
Mandume’s memory are present in many things such as songs, folklore,
poems”, or even tourist articles.179
The question of competing memorial practices between Angola and
Namibia seems undeniably of relevance as the King’s name is used by po-
liticians to foster post-colonial national unity in two countries. Nujoma
has been quoted as stating about King Mandume: He “was and continues
to be a common hero of our people on either side of our common border.”
Even though Nujoma added that “[o]ur people are bound together by un-
breakable bonds of blood, kinship, and a common culture”, this is true for
only (a small) part of the respective Angolan and (a larger part of the)
Namibian population – the Kwanyama (or other Ovambo, who make up
around fifty percent of Namibians). The celebration of Mandume’s deeds
during the First World War and his legacy, however, is meant not to nur-
ture any forms of “tribalism” in Angola and Namibia, but to assist two
178 The Namibian (Windhoek), 5.3.13 ‘Pohamba demands return of yaNdemufayo’s skull’; cf.
Nujoma 2001: 29; Nathanael 2002: 35 on references to Mandume in the 1970s.
179 du Pisani 2007: 100; 104; Shiweda 2005: 1; cf. Margo 2001: 145f.; Nghifikua 2001 consist-
ing mainly of poetry in English and of the prophecies of the Kwanyama prophets Shishaa-
ma shaNdunge, Nakulenga, Mutweutwima waKaluwa kaMushimba and ‘last remarks and
war-songs of the late King Mandume’; Andy Botelle: The Power Stone. A History of the
Kwanyama Kingdom, Windhoek, Mamokobo Video&Research [53 min.], 1999; on du
Pisani’s analysis of SWAPOs ‘anti-colonial nationalism’ Botha 2013: 21f.
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governments in nation-building within the frame of the post-colonial state.
Therefore, the “frontline” of the competition about Mandume’s memory
seems not to lie between Angola and Namibia. Rather the competition lies
between those who want to promote the post-colonial unity of two modern
African states on the one hand, and those, on the other, who aim to replace
the colonial border in order to enable people to regain their pre-colonial
unity. As elsewhere, “it is not only governments that determine the content
and emphases of public memory.”180
Irrespective of the different experiences that Kwanyama have had since
1915 under two different colonial rulers, there have been attempts (mostly
from Namibian nationals) to raise the issue of a possible border shift. In
2001 the Mandume Traditional Community Discussion Committee was
quoted in Namibia’s leading daily as aiming “to have the border shifted 60
kilometers up to Ondjiva in Angola so that Oshikwanyama speakers in
Angola and Namibia could be reunited.” As elsewhere, suggestions of
“drawing a better line” have re-emerged since the 1990s with regard to the
“taboo” of the integrity of colonial boundaries in Africa and redrawing
them. Schemes have been devised to “abandon the principle of uti pos-
sidetis” and to “disassemble African states and reconfigure them.” In
2014, following Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, it was even asked: “Is
the Crimea referendum a good model for Africa?”181
In Namibia, such differing ‘calls for unity’ from a civil society group
that makes “claims for identity and redress based on one or another kind
of historical argument”182 needs to be read in conjunction with the reestab-
lishment of the Kwanyama kingship in Namibia (1998). There was also a
profound disillusionment among many Kwanyama with Namibia’s politi-
cal and economic situation at the time, which influenced such alternative
historical discourses. The Traditional Authorities Act granted jurisdiction
to the kingship only up to Namibia’s border and it thus did not comprise
all areas once under Mandume’s rule. The larger part of the Kwanyama
population lives in Angola. However, such groups, which do not enjoy
180 Shiweda 2005: 106; ix, Fig. 16; 107; Kössler 2007: 366; cf. Diawara 1997: 26.
181 Mazrui 1993: 32; Mutua 1995: 1114; 1175; 1118; Ratner 1996: 595; Dowden 2014; cf.
Bley 2005; Nugent/Asiwaju 1996; Griffith 1986: 212; the Constitution of Angola (2010),
Article V 5 declares: ‘O território angolano é indivisível ... e inalienável’. According to Ar-
ticle 30 of Namibia’s Constitution (1990), the President of the Republic merely takes an
oath to protect the ‘territorial integrity’ of the Republic.
182 Kössler 2007: 362; cf. Friedman 2005.
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government support, have barely any access to the media or any re-
sources.183
Finally, the official memorials honoring King Mandume serve political-
ly to prevent these traditionalist opposition circles from claiming Man-
dume as their spiritus rector, a personality that could stand in the way of
constructing two distinct national identities. Thus, government attempts to
“build a myth around the memory of the last independent King” are part
and parcel of a policy that intends to entangle Mandume into a national,
Namibian ‘history’ and emphasize the ‘memory’ of a man who fought
colonial oppression. They are also to be seen in connection with a “nation-
building rhetoric [after 1990] that calls for the preservation of Namibia’s
‘national heritage’”. According to social scientists, the main addressees –
the postcolonial (“born free”) generation – seem to creatively deal with
these political demands upon their identity. Their sense of pride in their
“warrior-forefathers”, as presented to them by official historiography, still
remains to be assessed. Seeking to avoid “becoming constructed as an ex-
otic object”, their re-interpretation of “a heritage as an essential compo-
nent of modernity” enables them to “claim a distinctive Owambo/Namib-
ian subjectivity.” Irrespective of a separatist movement in the far-off
Caprivi-Strip, which was bloodily repressed in 1999, historian Marion
Wallace recognizes “a strong discourse of ‘Namibianness’ since 1990
[that has] a restraining effect on ethnic divisiveness”. Thus, given the
growing concern about “tribalism”184 and the need to further foster nation-
al unity in Namibia, the creation of (new) lieux de mémoire out of the
memory of the First World War in Ovamboland is to be expected in the
future.185
183 Namibian 14.3.01 ‘Kwanyama group wants northern border shifted’, Shiweda 2005: 111.
184 Pélissier 2004: 280; Fairweather 2006: 731; Wallace 2012: 314; The Namibian 1.8.14
‘PM’; New Era 6.8.14 ‘Prime Minister Hage Geingob…on…the rise of tribalism’.
185 The Namibian 5.3.2013 ‘Mandume-Museum’; New Era 7.2.2013 ‘Fighters to be honoured’.
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Conclusion
Can African history, European legal history, and the history of memory
speak to each other, enrich each other? The history of an African region
laid out in the previous chapters points to this possibility. The region’s
fate was dominated by a contested borderline that bore witness to political
machinations between colonial powers, to a border war, and to the “rebel-
lion” of African peoples. These events gave rise to seemingly unending le-
gal disputes. Also, the divided and shared memories of the First World
War in the region of southern Angola and northern Namibia and its impact
on the peoples living there can be analyzed from several perspectives; four
national contexts have been chosen here, whose entanglement is just as
evident as are the differences. Portuguese and German narrations about the
war and its pre-history were informed by a colonial zeitgeist that assessed
and justified events from a moral standpoint putting the rights of ‘the na-
tion’ in Africa at the forefront. With the change of the zeitgeist towards
the consent of the unjustifiability of colonialism, these justifications are no
longer upheld. The focus of memorial practices in independent Angola
and Namibia has shifted to questions of national unity.
The long pedigree of the Luso-German dispute about the regions of
southwestern Africa, commencing with Bismarck’s announcement that
Germany would not recognize Portuguese “pretentions” on the Congo re-
gion (1884), played an important role in the ensuing arguments that finally
led to the assumption of a German invasion in 1914. The weakness of
colonial presence in the areas that had become since 1886 a Luso-German
“border” region invited not only for transgressions by private individuals
such as trafficking in alcohol, guns, slaves, or ivory. It also accommodated
and accelerated the development and spread of rumors, false information,
and insinuations about alleged plans and intentions of the colonial com-
petitor. The decision of the Portuguese government to step up the occupa-
tion of southern Angola after 1900 increased the colonial presence north
of the borderline and led to German concerns about alleged Portuguese
border violations. But it only went so far to alleviate Portuguese anxieties
about German pretensions on southern Angola that grew steadily since
Germany had pressed for the borderline along the Kunene River. These
anxieties were not necessarily based on facts on the colonial ground – be-
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fore 1914, growing German (economic) presence was felt in many places
around the globe and was not limited to Portuguese possessions. Also, the
Germans did not respond in kind to the Portuguese expansion of their mil-
itary network near the border. Only one, somewhat symbolic police station
manned with three Germans was erected at Kuring-Kuru, Kavango. How-
ever, the impression the Anglo-German negotiations of 1898 and 1913
created among Portuguese politicians and the public at large was unmis-
takable: The Germans would do their utmost to rob Portugal of its colonial
sovereignty. This impression was further confirmed due to numerous Ger-
man voices that were not shy in their denouncement of Portugal’s colonial
rule as ‘archaic’ and ‘incapable’. In retrospect, the presence of the rather
Germanophobe governor-general Norton de Matos since 1912, who took
German expansionism for granted, aggravated the situation when in 1914
he allowed the German invasion of Angola to become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The occurrences at Fort Naulila in October 1914 remain diffi-
cult to establish. All witnesses were representing one party or the other
and did not even claim to be impartial. The arbitrators of 1928 attempted
to be salomonic when they found that the death of the three Germans was
entirely due to a misunderstanding; it seemed bad luck in a moral sense.
Given these conflicting accounts it is comprehensible when historians of
international law have warned that history “is not unequivocal in produc-
ing answers.”1
Considering this background, the German war efforts in late 1914
against Angola did not come as a surprise to the Portuguese. Given
Roçadas’ expeditionary corps, they were exceedingly well prepared to re-
pel any intruder. While the Germans under Franke had a clearly offensive
task, the Portuguese were bound by their defensive orders from Lisbon. It
remains one of the conundrums of this case, why the Angolan administra-
tion did not undertake to clarify Portugal’s neutrality when it became evi-
dent that Franke was marching against them. Was it the aversion of Nor-
ton de Matos to start any negotiations with the Germans? He later stated
that he would not have been competent to deal with foreign administra-
tions. Was it the confidence of Roçadas that he would defeat Franke’s
small regiment in case he dared to attack? Was it the intention to demon-
strate to the British allies that Portugal, too, was a victim of German ex-
pansionism and that Portuguese colonial troops could overcome an adver-
1 Grewe 1999: 90.
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sary as reputable as Franke’s Schutztruppe? It ended differently. Given the
number of soldiers available to both military leaders, the Portuguese de-
feat came as a surprise. Baericke’s assessment of a German “piece of
luck” is convincing. The catastrophic retreat of the Portuguese troops,
however, was unrelated to any German action; it was the result of years of
rumors, poor intelligence and sheer panic.
King Mandume, who had since 1911 repeatedly expressed his desire to
expel the Portuguese once and for all from the territories east of the
Kunene River, used this opportunity in late 1914 to exert his dominance in
the region. The 100 guns possibly delivered by Franke to Mandume were
less decisive for this undertaking than the thousands of guns that had been
bartered with Portuguese (and to a lesser extent German) traders over the
previous decades. Mandume’s defeat at Mongua after one of the longest
and largest battles of colonial Africa was possible for two reasons: 1) the
Portuguese under General Pereira de Eça were equipped for a different ad-
versary, the Germans; 2) the drought and famine had weakened the capac-
ities of Ovambo to resist. In the end, de Eça had achieved what the Ger-
mans had never dared to do: direct occupation of Ovamboland.
Given the costs of the “expeditions” in Africa, the humiliations at the
hands of the Germans (and to a lesser extent by several African adver-
saries), and the general discourses in Allied Europe about Germany’s obli-
gation to repair the damage she had caused from 1914 to 1918, the inten-
tion of the Portuguese government to recoup the losses, if not by direct
reparations then by claiming damages in legal proceedings, seems intelli-
gible. During the arbitration, Portugal proved wrong all those who had
solely observed the republic’s “administrative chaos”. Thousands of docu-
ments were compiled and a massive case was prepared against Germany.
The argumentation used during the procedure, as has been shown in the
previous chapters, was deeply rooted in historical claims and factual oc-
currences. Legal arguments were less central for the government represen-
tatives. Despite the professional preparation of the case, the outcome for
the Portuguese party was disappointing, firstly, considering the division
between direct and indirect damages (1928), secondly, considering the
“minuscule” amount conceded (1930), and finally considering the non-ex-
ecution of the award (1933).
The German party, on the other hand – seeing the arbitration as part of
the puzzle posed by the foremost goal of German (foreign) policy, namely
the revision of the Treaty of Versailles – was not satisfied with the 1928-
award’s legal interpretation of the facts (an illegitimate excess of the
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1914-military reprisal). While the German government lawyers remained
attached to the point of view of their predessessors since the Brussels Con-
ference (1874) who “had developed military necessity into a more princi-
pled … and explicit legal cover for [Germany’s] stance on the laws of
war”, the world had changed. “Public opinion and most jurists had been
moving towards limiting the writ of military necessity.” Nevertheless, the
end result proved to be a German victory. While successive Portuguese
governments had, since 1920, hoped that they could obtain by legal means
the redress Portugal had neither won militarily in Africa, nor diplomatical-
ly in Versailles, the outcome of the arbitration proved wrong the assump-
tion that international law would reverse diplomatic setbacks. This conclu-
sion, however, was very much in the eye of the beholder. For the German
lawyers, some of whom had personally witnessed the ‘humiliation’ at Ver-
sailles, international law proved to be Germany’s most vital tool to
counter the Allied claims for reparations they so despised. For them, the
outcome after thirteen years of legal reasoning was indeed a victory for
‘right over might’.2
The constellation of the end of this arbitration was just as linked to con-
temporary history as was the background of the dispute in 1914. The Lu-
so-German arbitration was decided based on political considerations that
had little to do with the problems and questions at the origins of the case.
The government in Lisbon had pushed for the arbitration expecting that,
based on the Treaty of Versailles, the violation of Portuguese sovereignty
could be punished and hoping that damages could be claimed by the state
and its nationals for “acts committed by the German Government … since
July 31, 1914, and before [Portugal] entered into the war [in March
1916].” The award of 1933, however, referred to the agreement made in
the Young Plan that Germany was not obliged to make payments to Portu-
gal separate from all the other obligations accepted under the Young Plan.
The amount mentioned in the award of 1930 thus came under the general
reparation payment for war damages, limited to the annuities of 2.05 bil-
lion Reichsmark according to the Young Plan. While the Allied experts
had in view the capacity of the German budget that was not to be thrown
out of its “equilibrium” by additional, separate payments outside of the na-
tional budget (award 1933, p. 1379), the Germans considered the Young
2 Hull 2014: 67; cf. Isay 1923: preface to the third edition. ‘Das Vertrauen auf Deutschlands
staatliches Fortbestehen und die Zuversicht auf seinen Wiederaufstieg können heute lediglich
auf dem Vertrauen in die Macht des Völkerrechts beruhen‘.
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Plan a “success” since it “reconstituted [German] sovereignty in the eco-
nomic realm” and led to the evacuation of the Rhineland by Allied
troops.3 The financial interests of smaller nations such as Portugal that
aimed at enlarging their minuscule percentage of the general reparation
payments, on the other hand, were cast aside. The arbitration tribunal set
up according to the Young Plan proved to be a protection tool against par-
ticular interests. For the arbitrators of 1933, the original case of ‘Naulila’
and the campaign against King Mandume did not play any significant role.
While the handling of the Luso-German arbitration underlined the sub-
stantial and procedural judicialization of international tribunals, the award
of 1928 acquired relevance later on for the development of the doctrine of
public international law. With regard to the legitimacy of (forceful)
reprisals, the Lausanne award articulated a set of principles that continue
to be formative for present-day international legal order: Reprisals are on-
ly legal (1) if there is a previous act by the original wrongdoer in violation
of international law; (2) if the reprisal taker pursues, prior to any reprisal,
non-violent means to demand satisfaction; (3) if there is proportionality
between the original offence and the reprisal. Even though the requirement
of proportionality of the use of force has developed over the years into the
most famous principle of the Naulilaa award, also other stipulations of the
award, like the question of direct and indirect damages under international
law, or the requirements of causality, remain central to public international
law. As to the requirement of proportionality, it needs to be emphasized
once more that – beyond the comparison between three men shot and six
forts destroyed – the award of 1928 did not stipulate any proportionality-
test, thus indirectly acknowledging the complexity of the term ‘propor-
tionality. While the German memorandum, when discussing the alleged
proportionality of the German reprisal against Angola, more or less argued
that neither the decision to resort to reprisals nor the extent of its execution
could be determined by law, the Portuguese countered in a more substan-
tial way.4 They used the term ‘proportionality’ to correct the asymmetrical
power relationship with Germany. Portugal, as the weaker party was eager
to claim disproportionality as a shield from the stronger party.
3 Winkler 2000: 478, YP stellte die ‘Souveränität auf wirtschaftspolitischem Gebiet wieder her‘.
4 This argument made reprisals a question of pure politique. They are thus tools used most of all
by great powers against smaller nations that must not be concerned about possible riposte of
those against reprisals were executed. Gaurier 2014: 700.
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When, with the centenary of World War I, scholars are currently recon-
sidering the impact of this war on the modern world, the award of 1928 is
a case at point. It is an expression of the “concerted efforts to regulate the
resort of States to force” in the aftermath the World War. Thereby,
Naulilaa and its interpretation by generations of international legal
scholars became part of the enduring arguments that “revolve around de-
termining what is a just cause for resorting to armed force”.5 Due to the
disproportion of the German action in 1914 and the ‘didactic’ enumeration
of the conditions required for a legitimate reprisal the award of 1928 was
destined to become a “landmark case in public international law.”
One further aspect of the arbitration should be considered: Even though
two European armies fought against each other, Naulilaa was also a “colo-
nial case”. On the one hand, Naulilaa thus seems to be another example
that, from a doctrinal standpoint, colonialism has “yielded a generous by-
product in international law”, as was evident already for contemporaries:
“Protectorates, spheres of influence, hinterlands, the position of savage
and semi-civilized tribes, nominal and effective possession, territorial
lease” – all these terms and the attempts to define them grew out of the
discussions that commenced at the latest with the Berlin Congo Confer-
ence in 1884/5. In fact, “much of the international law of the nineteenth
century was preoccupied with colonial problems”.6 However, the Luso-
German arbitration procedure also underlined discursive ruptures that are
too easily concealed by sweeping statements about international law’s
“complete complicity with the colonial project.” Such criticism launched
by researchers affiliated with the intellectual school of Third World Ap-
proaches to International Law (TWAIL), who call the “regime of interna-
tional law…illegitimate”7, tends to obscure that – from a historical per-
spective – international lawyers never “developed a fully homogeneous
colonial discourse.”8 Differing interpretations of pre-1914 colonial rule,
especially notions of ‘race’ or the (legitimate) involvement of Africans in
combat between Europeans, played an important part in the Luso-German
arbitration.
On the other hand, and although the award of 1928 lengthily set out the
conditions in Angola in 1914, the arbitrators abstained from any notion of
5 Gardam 2004: 57; Kelly 2003: 8; Orend 2000: 546.
6 Reeves 1909: 99; Anghie 1999: 5; cf. Koskenniemi 2004: 65; 2011; Galindo 2012: 86.
7 Anghie 1999: 74; Mutua 2000: 31 IL ‘is a predatory system that legitimizes…subordination.’
8 Koskenniemi 2001: 105; 2014: 122; cf. Fassbender/Peters 2012: 4; Pauka 2013.
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the colonies as a lawless space or a “laboratory” that would have exotiz-
ingly justified the use of relentless violence (against Europeans). The
award thus underlined that the norms of international law were “universal”
and consequently binding for governments ‘even’ in the colonies. The fact
that the case arose out of a “colonial dispute” was not only no hindrance
for it to develop into a “landmark case”. For the legal interpretation of the
facts by the arbitrators it was most of all of no relevance that the dispute
had taken place between GSWA and Angola – and not between Germany
and Belgium. The question, whether European (and international) legal
systems “have also been the product of colonial experiences”9 has been
rightly posed. For the reasons stated above, however, Naulilaa should not
be considered an example for the effects colonial rule had on international
law.
The sketched juxtaposition of the memorial cultures in the four in-
volved countries raises the “question of which side’s interpretation … will
be forgotten and which will have a historical impact. This is clearly an im-
portant question for historians, since scholarly historical analysis ought to
analyze and not duplicate the processes of forgetting and the emergence of
the historically significant.”10 As we have seen, Naulilaa is certainly “sig-
nificant” in international law; the history of the Luso-German border war
and the defeat of Mandume, however, have barely marked any entries in
the latest overviews of World War I for readers in the Northern Hemi-
sphere – not to speak of any interpretation of these mostly forgotten facts.
In the historiography and also in politics of Angola and Namibia, on the
other hand, the subsequent war between the Portuguese, the Kwanyama,
and the South Africans has made a significant “historical impact”. The
reinterpretation of King Mandume, his “shift from tyrant to hero might be
more gratifying and more historically accurate”, but it is still a distortion
as other social strata are excluded from the accounts, “a characteristic
common to all so-called Great-Man views of history.” Similar to colonial
times, an adversarial interpretation of history still dominates. It remains to
be seen how future politicians and historians will consider the challenge of
constructing a more encompassing interpretation of the history of “anti-
colonial struggle.”11
9 Becker Lorca 2010: 477; Conrad 2003: 188; 199 on ‘laboratories’.
10 Habermas 2014: 80.
11 Isaacman/Isaacman 1977: 39f.; cf. Heintze 2008: 185.
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